Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Burlington Ditch, Reservoir & Land Company (Burlington) and Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company (FRICO) filed applications to change its 1885, 1908 and 1909 water rights. The changes to Burlington and FRICO's rights were precipitated by a new water supply project by the United Water & Sanitation District (United) and East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District (ECCV). Approximately fifty parties argued for their particular interests in relation to Burlington and FRICO's applications. The water court imposed conditions on Burlington and FRICO's historic water rights to prevent injury to all other interested parties' rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Burlington, FRICO, United and ECCV challenged the water court's order regarding its determination of the historical consumptive use of the water rights. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's decision.

In 1956, Appellants Harold and Ellen Cowan were deeded half of a tract of land that contained a "perpetual right of way running with the land" over a thirty-foot strip along its southeastern side. Between 1960 and 1973, Appellee Sharon Yeisley was deeded the other half that ran adjacent to the Cowan's land. The Yeisley deed made no mention of the right-of-way. Ms. Yeisley applied to subdivide her tract in 1980. The plat was approved and recorded. The new plat showed the right of way. In 2006, the Cowans filed suit against the Borough of Ketchikan, Sharon Yeisley and other parties seeking to quiet the title to the right of way. The Cowans argued that their 1956 deed conveyed it, or in the alternative, they acquired the strip by adverse possession. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the 1956 deed did not convey the strip to the Cowans and that they had not adversely possessed it. The court applied the then-current adverse possession statute instead of the statute in effect when the Yeisley land was subdivided. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cowans argued that the superior court erred in using the 2003 adverse possession statute. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court should not have used the 2003 statute. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Twin Lakes Canal Company (Twin Lakes) owned a reservoir. Respondents Warren and Sessilee Choules own property subject to a "prescriptive overflow" easement by Twin Lakes. In 2008, Twin Lakes filed suit against the Choules, alleging that the Choules moved earth, rocks, concrete and other debris from elsewhere on their property into areas below the height of the reservoir, which reduced the reservoir's storage space and damaged a lining designed to prevent leaks. The district court determined that state law allows the Choules as owners of the servient property, to use their property in any way they see fit, despite the common law rule that generally prohibits them from using their property in a way that interferes with the "dominant estate." The district court dismissed Twin Lakes' complaint. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Twin Lakes argued that the district court misinterpreted state law in its ruling in favor of the Choules. Upon careful consideration of the plain meaning of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.

Appellants David and Kathy Caldwell appealed the district court's refusal to allow the removal of trees within and adjacent to an access road easement that ran over property belonging to their neighbors, Respondents Thomas and Lori Cometto. Until 1997, an access road ran in a straight line directly through the Comettos' property and was subject to a deeded easement that benefited the Caldwells. The Comettos rerouted the road so that it avoided buildings on their property. The new road had four new sharp turns, and was narrower than the previous road. The Caldwells filed suit against the Comettos alleging that the new road injured their rights in the easement. To settle that litigation, the parties signed an agreement that granted Appellants an easement over the newly constructed road. The Caldwells then filed suit in 2007 to quiet title to the new easement, and sought a declaration that the Comettos must upgrade the road to the same standards as the previous road. Furthermore, the Caldwells sought to enjoin the Comettos from placing obstacles in the right-of-way. The trial court quieted title to the easement, and specifically held that the Comettos were to keep the easement free of debris. The Comettos were precluded from removing nineteen mature trees from the easement. Neither side was awarded attorney's fees, because as the court concluded, there was no prevailing party. The Caldwells appealed the denial of attorney's fees and the order regarding the trees. They argued that there was no substantial evidence to support the court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the lower court's record sufficient to support its decision. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision on the trees and the denial of attorney fees.

Coeur d'Alene Paving, Inc. (CDA Paving) leased several parcels of real property in Kootenai County from Beacon West, LLC. Approximately thirty acres of this leased property was zoned for mining activity. CDA had an interest in two undeveloped parcels that were initially zoned for agricultural use. The two agricultural parcels bordered the mining-parcel, but were not adjacent to it. In January 2008, CDA Paving submitted an application to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department to have its two agricultural lots rezoned for mining. The Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) held public hearings on the application, and eventually approved the application. Several property owners located in the vicinity of the zone changes, including Appellant Linda Ciszek, petitioned the district court for a declaratory judgment, alleging the zone change was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CDA Paving, holding that the BOCC had the authority to amend its zoning map. Appellants raised multiple issues with the district court's decision. Principal among their arguments to the Supreme Court was that the BOCC lacked statutory authority to approve a zoning application as it had for CDA Paving. The Supreme Court found all of Appellants' arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision.

The Idaho Department of Water Resources (Department) appealed an order of the district court that required it to strike a term from a hydropower water right license issued to the Idaho Power Company. In 1984, an agreement was entered into between Idaho Power, the State, the governor, and the attorney general, in an effort to resolve a controversy associated with the company's water rights at the Swan Falls Dam. As part of the Swan Falls agreement, the parties agreed to support legislation for the commencement of an adjudication of water rights in the Snake River Basin. One key piece of the legislation that was passed pursuant to the Swan Falls Agreement gave the Department specific authority to subordinate hydropower rights in a permit or license to the rights of subsequent upstream depletionary users. The Department was also authorized to limit a permit or license involving hydropower to a term of years. The Department issued a final order that articulated the legal basis for including the "term of years" condition in the license to Idaho Power. The Company sought judicial review of the Department's final order, arguing that the Department did not have statutory authority to include a term condition in its license. The court indeed concluded that the Department did not have the authority to limit the license. The Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Department had the statutory authority to include a term condition in Idaho Power's license. The Court reversed the district court's decision.

Appellants Samuel Jr. and Laurie Schneider appealed the district court's decree quieting title to real property in favor of Respondents Vernon and Dorothy Kennedy as adverse possessors. In 1924, Mr. Kennedy's great-uncle purchased the property that would eventually be passed to the Kennedys. When the Kennedys decided to place their property up for sale, they became aware that three parcels of the property that they believed had been owned by their family for generations were the subject of deeds in favor of other parties. In 2007, the Kennedys initiated a quiet title action to assert ownership over the three parcels as adverse possessors under a written claim of title. A default judgment in favor of the Kennedys was entered against the titleholders of record for two of the three parcels. The Schneiders answered and defended the Kennedys' claim to the third parcel. The district court issued a memorandum finding that the Kennedys had proved the elements of their claim of adverse possession by clear and satisfactory evidence. The court then entered a decree quieting title to the third parcel. The Schneiders appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was not substantial, competent evidence to support the district court's findings. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decree and its judgment awarding attorney fees. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Knipe Land Company (KLC) and John Knipe appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendants Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. KLC is a real estate broker that specializes in agricultural and commercial real property. In 2005, the Robertsons signed an employment contract with KLC, where KLC was granted an exclusive listing to sell 1400 acres they owned. KLC would earn a percentage commission of the sales price or nonrefundable portions of any earnest money paid. In 2005, Robert and Sheila Harmon signed a purchase contract to buy the Robertsons' 1400 acres. The Harmons paid $50,000 as earnest money. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, $35,000 of the earnest amount would be non-refundable. The Harmons did not purchase the property, and the nonrefundable portion of the earnest money was transferred from the Harmons' real estate broker to KLC, which in turn distributed it to the Robertsons. In 2007, Robertson Kennels signed an employment contract with KLC to sell 1887 acres of land it owned. MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Company, LLC entered into a purchase agreement to purchase all of the Robertsons' property. The company paid $450,000 as nonrefundable earnest money. MidAmerican did not purchase the Robertsons' property. After the Harmon and MidAmerican purchase contracts ended, KLC demanded the Robertsons' pay its commission from the two cancelled purchase agreements. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Robertsons "clearly breached the unambiguous employment contracts and there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict." The Court vacated the damages and attorney fees that were awarded to the Robertsons at trial, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Appellants appealed the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate of their father, the decedent. At issue was whether the district court erred when it assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate when the decedent was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation at the time of his death. The court overruled State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of the decedent's estate and assumption of subject matter jurisdiction by the district court was impermissible because Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe had not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.