Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who signed documents presented by her husband without reading them, sought damages and to rescind two mortgages ostensibly encumbering titles to her residence in Massachusetts and a retreat in Maine. Her husband allegedly misrepresented the nature of the documents, which were powers of attorney. She claims she did not receive documents required by the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635 and the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D 10.1. The trial court dismissed, reasoning that notices to the husband were sufficient under the powers of attorney. The First Circuit vacated. The district court improperly made findings of fact on a motion to dismiss, in concluding that the powers of attorney suffered from identical scriveners' errors and should be read as if their expiration dates were May 31, 2009 (not 2008).

Appellants F. Jeffrey Miller and Hallie Irvin were charged in an eleven-count indictment with a variety of crimes stemming from an alleged conspiracy to defraud mortgage lenders in connection with the subprime housing market. After a month-long jury trial, Miller and Irvin were each convicted on several of the charges and sentenced. They appealed their convictions, citing numerous evidentiary and legal errors. Miller also challenged his sentence. Miller was a builder and developer involved in residential construction in Kansas, Missouri, and other states. With many competing developers marketing their homes to well-qualified buyers, Miller chose to focus his business on buyers with low income and poor credit. The marketing of Millerâs homes was handled by Stephen Vanatta, who would refer potential buyers to a mortgage broker named James Sparks for financing. Because a prior felony conviction for passing a bad check prohibited Vanatta from maintaining a checking account, his portion of commissions were paid by checks issued to his wife, appellant Irvin. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred on three of the eleven charges against Defendant Miller, but affirmed the district court in all other aspects. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the conversion of a railroad line on plaintiffs' property to a public trail, pursuant to the National Trail System Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. 1241 et seq. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, brought suit against defendant, alleging claims of inverse condemnation and trespass under Missouri law. After defendant removed the case to federal district court, that court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable statutes of limitations had expired on both of plaintiffs' claims. The court held that because plaintiffs did not file their suit until December 23, 2002, both claims were time-barred, absent a tolling a provision or some exception to the statute of limitations. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to allege a continuous trespass and their trespass claim was barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations.

After Homeowners' house burned down, Homeowners' insurer denied coverage, stating that payment was not timely delivered, the money order was not signed, and the damaged house was the secondary house and Insurer's underwriting policies required insurance on the primary house also to be purchased through Insurer in order to have coverage in place for the secondary residence. Homeowners filed suit, asserting that no reasonable basis in fact or law existed for denial of the claim and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the loss was covered. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to their declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Insurer as genuine issues of material fact remained, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment.

Appellees Dana Headapohl and Lawrence Martin placed two buildings in the floodplain without a permit and installed an un-permitted incinerating toilet. The health department issued a notice of violation (NOV) to Appellees, informing them that the two structures constituted "increased use" of the septic system in violation of the health code and requiring Appellees to remove the buildings and incinerating toilet. The health board affirmed the Department's NOV following a hearing. The district court concluded that Appellees had not violated the health code by adding the two buildings, that the contested provisions of the health code suffered unconstitutional vagueness as applied to Appellees, and that the incinerating toilet did not qualify as a wastewater treatment and disposal system under the health code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court relied on an incomplete interpretation of "increased use" to determine whether the addition of the two buildings constituted increased use of the septic system that violated the health code, and (2) Appellees' incinerating toilet required a permit under the health code as a wastewater treatment and disposal system. Remanded to determine whether Appellees' changes of use could result in increased effluent flow to the septic system.

Laclede Gas Company maintained gas lines along Pitman Hill Road in St. Charles County. Pitman Hill Road and the gas lines were located within areas established as public roads on five recorded subdivision plats. Each of the subdivision plats first established public roads and then designated the roads as utility easements. The plats specifically stated that one of the purposes of the utility easements was for the installation and maintenance of gas lines. The County planned to widen Pitman Hill Road, which required Laclede to relocate its gas lines. Laclede declined to pay for the relocation, after which the County filed a declaratory judgment action to require Laclede to bear the cost of relocation. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was required to reimburse Laclede for displacing the gas lines from Laclede's utility easement because the easements were constitutionally cognizable property interests and, therefore, requiring Laclede to relocate its gas lines without compensation would amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property.

The Tenth Circuit considered whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) properly exercised its discretion to reject a gift of property by a member of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to the tribe. The Court noted that this appeal also raised a novel jurisdictional question regarding its review of administrative decisions following a remand from district court. James Smith wanted to transfer to the tribe a portion of his property interest in the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35 (southwest of Kansas City) where the tribe had plans to develop gaming facilities. Federal law and restrictions on Smithâs fee interest required the BIA to approve any transfer. Citing concerns regarding fractional land interests in the Reserve as well as the long-range best interests of Reserve landowners, the BIA denied Smithâs application to transfer the land. The Tribe challenged that decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held the BIA properly exercised its discretion in denying the application. With regard to the jurisdictional question raised, the Court concluded that the government has not abandoned its right to challenge the district courtâs remand order, even though the government substantially prevailed in the district courtâs final judgment. The Court found the district court erred in its remand order reversing the BIAâs denial of Smithâs application. Therefore the Court vacated the district courtâs final judgment and its order reversing the BIA, and remanded the case for further consideration of Smithâs application consistent with this opinion.

This matter came before the court on a Petition for Partition of a five acre parcel of land. The property had been sold by a Trustee, the Trustee's Return had been accepted, and the proceeds of the sale had been placed in escrow. The property was owned in common by petitioner and her five co-tenants. Petitioner had filed a claim against the proceeds of the sale for her attorney's fees and to reimburse her for the cost of an appraisal of the property she ordered in connection with her partition request. The court held that there was no common benefit that had been accomplished for the co-tenants and therefore, the application of the "common benefit" exception to the American Rule was not warranted and each party must bear his own attorneys' fees. The court also held that the appraisal was obtained at the request of and for the benefit of petitioner, who wished to sell her interest. Therefore, the cost must be borne by petitioner.

The owners of Landmark Towers appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree), permitting Green Tree to vacate office space it subleased from the owners' tenant (DBSI). The lease agreements at issue in this case arose from a complex real estate transaction that DBSI and its affiliates commonly structured in order to generate revenue. DBSI, a tenant in common syndicator, or an affiliate - here DBSI Landmark, LLC - acquired commercial property and leased it to another affiliate - here DBSI Leaseco. The court found that, irrespective of 11 U.S.C. 365(h), principles of contract law dictated that DBSI Leaseco and Green Tree were no longer required to perform their obligations to each under the sublease. The court also found that the sublease contained promises between the tenants in common (TIC) and Green Tree via the attornment provision and therefore, the parties were in privity of contract regardless of their status as master landlord and sublessee. The court further found that the only surviving contractual interest in the sublease was the TIC's right to attornment, which was triggered only when the TIC succeeded to the interest of DBSI Leaseco. Therefore, the sublease did not require Green Tree to attorn to the TIC here.

In 2004, Sherry Ray formed CFRE, a single-member limited liability company with herself as the sole member. CFRE conducts no business and was formed solely for estate planning and asset protection purposes. To that end, Ray declined to have CFRE taxed as a corporation and, in 2006, deeded the title in her home to it. Because there was a conveyance by deed of the property, the Greenville County Assessor automatically commenced a reassessment of the property for the 2007 tax year. Accordingly, the property was subjected to the default property tax ratio of six percent until CFRE could prove entitlement to the lower ratio under section 12-43-220. When CFRE sought the four percent ratio, the Assessor denied it eligibility. CFRE, LLC appealed the decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that held that real estate owned by the company was not entitled to the residential tax ratio. Furthermore, CFRE argued the ALC erred in not sanctioning the Assessor for failing to respond to discovery requests from CFRE. While the Supreme Court held the ALC did not abuse its discretion in not sanctioning the Assessor, the Court reversed the ALC's conclusion regarding CFRE's entitlement to the legal residence tax ratio and remanded the case for further proceedings.