Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a non-profit, member-owned, water company serving rural areas of Ross County, Ohio. To finance its system, plaintiff borrowed nearly $10.6 million from the USDA. The disputed area of the county includes properties served by the city and properties served by plaintiff. Each has objected to the other's extension of new lines to the area. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the company is protected under the Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b)(2), based on its obligations under the USDA contract, had a legal right to serve the area under a contract with the county, and did not have unclean hands. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Appellant Anthony Hayes appealed a superior court order that denied his petition to enjoin a sheriff's sale and found a prejudgment attachment by Appellee Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC or Hospital) valid and executable. In 2006, Appellant's wife Karen was admitted to the SNMHC for medical treatment stemming from alcoholism. SNHMC filed suit in superior court against Appellant for his wife's unpaid medical bills. At the same time, the hospital petitioned to attach a portion of the couple's real estate owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. During the pendancy of the attachment proceedings, the Hayses divorced. Under the terms of their separation agreement, each was responsible for their own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the real estate. Shortly thereafter, she died. SNHMC obtained a limited probate administration in order to proceed with the sheriff's sale of the properties. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayes' interests in the subject properties remained valid and that SNHMC was entitled to execute its judgment against them. On appeal, Appellant contended that, because Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that her death terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded during Mrs. Hayes' lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her husband. As such the hospital's judgment remained valid. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the hospital.

Petitioner Town of Newington appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the State through the the Pease Development Authority (PDA) and the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES). Before land from the former Pease Air Force Base was deeded to the PDA, the United States Air Force engaged in a series of environmental impact analyses required by federal law. Following several iterations of environmental documents and deed restrictions, PDA accepted title to the Pease AFB land in three title transfers between 1999 and 2005. Shortly thereafter, the Town began the process of designating prime wetlands within its borders pursuant to state law. Six wetlands were located within the former Pease base. DES initially "approved" the Town's request, but later clarified that it "did not purport to 'approve' the legality of the Town's designation of prime wetlands located within PDA boundaries, nor would the agency have statutory authority to do so." Several months later, as part of a proposed construction project on PDA land to expand an existing office building, an alteration of terrain permit application was filed with DES. The Town rejected, asserting that it involved fill within 100 feet of wetlands that the Town had designated as "prime" and, therefore, required a wetlands permit. DES disagreed. After the Wetlands Council dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Town filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in superior court. The trial court concluded that PDA was not required to comply with the Town’s prime wetlands designations and, therefore, granted PDA and DES’s motion for summary judgment. Upon careful consideration of the superior court records and the deeds of the wetlands in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the DES' reservation when first 'approving' the six wetlands within the PDA did not confer the Town with standing to challenge any subsequent development. As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment.

The issue on appeal in this case stemmed from a 2005 real estate purchase and sales agreement (PSA) entered into between Pines Grazing Association as the seller, and J.C. Investments (owner of Flying Joseph Ranch) as the buyer of the Pines Ranch. Prior to closing, the parties learned that approximately 80 acres of what Pines had previously believed to be a portion of Pines Ranch was omitted from the ranch's legal description. Pines retained attorney Fred Snook to assist with the acquisition of the 80 acres. Mr. Snook determined that the 80 acres had been deeded to Lemhi County and that the County still owned the land. In light of this, the parties entered an addendum to the PSA whereby they would proceed with the original closing on the ranch while giving Pines time to try to acquire the 80 acres from Lemhi County in order to sell the 80 acres to Flying Joseph Ranch. The sale closed before the parties learned that Lemhi County could not sell the 80 acres privately; the land had to be sold at public auction. Pines sent Mr. Snook to the auction to bid on the 80 acres. The parties' agents cut a side deal whereby Pines would be paid not to bid on the 80 acres. Flying Joseph ultimately won the land at auction. Flying Joseph's agent faxed Pines' agent an agreement and release of all claims for the 80 acres. Pines refused to sign, believing that the agreement was not part of the oral agreement not to bid at the auction. Pines subsequently filed suit to enforce the terms of the oral contract. Among the issues brought before the Supreme Court were whether the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for JNOV on the grounds that the $20,000.00 offered to refrain from bidding constituted an unauthorized brokerage commission. Upon review, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the oral agreement not to bid at the auction because it was an illegal contract in violation of the Sherman Act. "As such, the parties are left as they are with respect to the oral agreement not to bid, and neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal or in the district court with respect to all issues related to the oral agreement not to bid." The Court upheld the jury's finding that Pines did not breach the grazing lease.

Mortgage deeds executed by the debtors three years earlier were still pending recordation when they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtors sought to avoid the mortgages and to prevent any post-petition actions that would perfect them 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(5), 544(a), 547(b). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the lender. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. Debtors failed to establish the necessary elements of a preferential transfer.

The Slacks sued the County for damages due to the County's alleged failure to comply with its statutory obligation to notify the Slacks that the home they purchased was once the site of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. After a trial, the jury found the County was negligent and awarded the Slacks $563,592 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues, holding (1) the County waived all the issues it raised on appeal; and (2) the district court properly denied the Slacks' motion for attorneys' fees because simply including attorneys' fees in a bill of costs does not entitle a party to recover attorneys' fees, and the County's defense was not frivolous or pursued in bad faith.

Hannaford Brothers applied for a site plan review permit to construct a grocery store and drive-through pharmacy. The town's Planning Board voted to grant the permit. The Biziers and other concerned citizens directly appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board. The Biziers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record amply supported the Board's findings that the project was harmonious and in good scale with the natural terrain and surrounding development of the area in accordance with the town's zoning ordinance; and (2) the Board did not err in failing to conclude that Hannaford's plan to modify the dimensions of a landowner's property would create an illegal back lot, and the dimensions of the landowner's resulting lot did not bar the issuance of the site plan review permit to Hannaford.

Defendants Robin Colburn and Ronald and Richard Tennant appealed a superior court order that denied their motion to dismiss this action by Plaintiffs Richard and Cheryl Fellows and Benjamin Bellerose. Plaintiffs were successors-in-interest to property once owned by Defendants' parents. The property was subject to a 1996 lead paint abatement order. Defendants' parents sold the property to Jesus and Eileen Guzman who were not aware of the abatement order when they sold the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought suit upon discovery of the abatement order. Defendants argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over them because despite being administrators of their parents' estate, none of the Defendants actually lived in New Hampshire. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suffiient to justify the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Defendants as either successor trustees or beneficiaries. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient for the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment.

Appellants Wsbaldo Valdez and Linda Vargas owned property in joint tenancy and neglected to pay the 2005 property taxes. In 2006, Appellee Mae Ouellette purchased the property at a tax sale and later applied for a tax deed. She served notice on Vargas but not on Valdez. In 2008, Ouellette received a tax deed. Valdez and Vargas filed a petition to quiet title, for ejectment, and damages. They then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the tax deed was void for failure to serve Valdez, and Valdez could redeem the entire property. In Ouellette's counter-motion for summary judgment and response to Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, her two main assertions were: (1) Valdez and Vargas were either an unincorporated association or a partnership and service on Vargas was good service on Valdez; and (2) the service on Vargas was at least valid and the tax deed was effective as to her interest, thereby severing the joint tenancy. Ouellette argued she and Valdez were tenants in common. The trial court held that service on Valdez was ineffective but agreed with Ouellette that Valdez could not redeem the entire property, and Valdez and Ouellette were tenants in common. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that service of a notice for application of tax deed is mandatory and must be made on all parties according to the applicable statute. Failure to make such service will render any issued tax deed void in its entirety. Accordingly, Valdez had the right to redeem the entire property. The Court reversed the trial court's decision.

After the district court reduced Defendant Lindsey Springer's tax assessment to judgment and ordered foreclosure on certain real property, persons who held a mortgage on the property and who had participated in the litigation moved for an award of attorney's fees and expenses against Mr. Springer. The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion in part and awarding to the Cross-Claimants $10,576.56 of the $35,416 requested in fees and expenses. Defendant objected but the district court affirmed. The Tenth Circuit declined to address three of the five issues Defendant raised on appeal as they were precluded by res judicata. However, the Court found one remaining issue persuasive: Defendant contended that the Cross-Claimants waited too long under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to seek their fee award. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Cross-Claimants indeed filed their request too late, and the district court abused its discretion in granting even a partial fee award. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and the case was remanded for the district court to deny Cross-Claimants' award for attorney's fees and costs.