Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the doctrine of "contra non valentem" applied to suspend a ten year liberative prescriptive period applicable to an action by a mineral interest owner against the operator of a unit well who failed to pay the owner share of the proceeds for mineral production. Plaintiff James Wells filed suit after being contacted by a landman concerning leasing of his mineral interest in lands inherited from his parents. In the 1950s, Plaintiff's parents sold the land but reserved the mineral interests. Plaintiff's mother executed a mineral lease which was released a few years later because the well drilled resulted in a dry hole. However, the landowners executed their own mineral lease, which achieved production in 1965, and continued producing until 2007. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Donald Zadeck and Zadeck Energy Group and several other companies who were allegedly conducting oil and gas exploration and production activities from his unleased unitized acreage without tendering to him (or his parents) their rightful share of proceeds from the production. In response, Zadeck filed a Peremptory Exception of Prescription, urging that Plaintiff's claim to recover payments was a quasi contract that prescribed ten years from Zadeck's successor's cessation of involvement with the "dry hole." Plaintiff argued that the doctrine of "contra non valentem" applied to suspend the running of prescription since he had no knowledge of the existence of the mineral interests or production until December 2008. Plaintiff contended that his ignorance was not attributable to any fault of his own, and he clearly exercised due diligence in discovering the relevant facts once he learned from the landman that he owned the mineral interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the doctrine of contra non valentem applied to suspend the running of prescription because the mineral interest owners did not know nor reasonably should they have known of the mineral production until December 2008.

Trustee sought an order allowing him to remove the life tenant (Defendant) from property owned by the trust. The probate court issued an order in conformity with Trustee's petition after Defendant was defaulted for failing to appear. Defendant filed a complaint in superior court purportedly appealing from the decision of the probate court. The trial justice concluded that Defendant had failed to comply with the requirements for filing a claim of appeal from the probate court and granted Trustee's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's appeal for failure to comply with every relevant provision of the statute governing appeals from the probate court, and therefore, the superior court did not err in its judgment.

J. Russell Tarason sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment declaring that he held an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property. The superior court concluded that Tarason did not hold an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property because the 1925 deed that created the easement conveyed only a life estate in a right-of-way that terminated upon the death of the original grantee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the superior court erred in concluding that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act did not apply to this case, the court properly concluded that the language of the 1925 deed demonstrated a clear intention to create an easement in gross that terminated upon the death of the original grantee rather than to create an appurtenant easement.

Robert Stanton filed a complaint against Michael Strong alleging nuisance and trespass and requesting injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages. Stanton requested that the superior court permanently enjoin Strong from engaging in any act that obstructed Stanton's access to his property from any point along an easement over property owned by Strong. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment finding for Stanton on his trespass claim and granting Stanton's request for a permanent injunction. Strong appealed the portion of the judgment granting the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts as found by the trial court supported the permanent injunction, and the court did not abuse its discretion in making its determination.

In this property dispute, Robert Spickler (Robert) filed claims for declaratory judgment and to quiet title, and Adah Ginn (Adah) filed a claim for adverse possession. After a jury made findings of fact, the superior court entered judgment awarding ownership of the property to Robert. The court declared that, between Adah's and Robert's competing deeds to the same property, Robert was the rightful owner of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming and applying Hill v. McNichol, a case issued more than a century ago, to the instant case, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that Robert was the owner of the disputed property as against Adah.

In the early 1990s Appellant Kenneth Middleton was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life in prison. In 1992, a default judgment was entered against Appellant in a wrongful death action brought by Appellees, Appellant's wife's siblings. In 1999, a chancery court entered a decree finding that a conveyance Appellant had made to Appellant Lynn Middleton after the 1992 judgment was fraudulent. In 2009, Appellees filed a petition for writ of scire facias to revive the 1999 decree. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the 1999 decree be revived for another ten-year period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1999 decree, which was entered in the chancery court prior to the adoption of an amendment merging law and equity, was entitled to "the same footing" as a judgment, and the circuit court did not err in concluding it could be revived by a writ of scire facias; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree.

Verizon attached a box to a building that plaintiffs owned and used the box to transmit telephone communications to and from Verizon's customers in other buildings. Plaintiffs claimed that Verizon took their property without paying them just compensation and deceived them into believing that no compensation was owed. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a valid "inverse condemnation" claim for just compensation, and that the claim was not time-barred. However, their claim for an alleged violation of General Business Law 349 was barred by the statute of limitations, and their unjust enrichment claim was legally insufficient. The court also held that the courts below properly denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Morrow Global (Morrow) filed suit against a Uinta County school district (District) and Windjammer Communications (Windjammer) that (1) sought a declaration that Morrow was a co-owner with the District of a conduit located under an interstate; (2) sought an order permanently enjoining the District from interfering with Morrow's use of the conduit; and (3) asserted that Windjammer had been unjustly enriched by using the conduit without paying for it. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Windjammer (Defendants) after treating Defendants' motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, concluding that Morrow had failed to present any facts showing that it was an owner of the conduit and entitled to the relief sought. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the district court improperly granted summary judgment when the parties had no opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue of Morrow's ownership.

The Rochester International Joint Zoning Board enacted a zoning ordinance that increased the size of a runway safety zone and changed the restrictions within the safety zone to allow fewer types of uses of land within the zone. The safety zone extended over property owned by Leon and Judith DeCook. The DeCooks brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging that the Board's decision constituted a taking for which the DeCooks were entitled to compensation. The district court first concluded there was no taking, and upon remand, again concluded that the Board's actions did not constitute a taking. The DeCooks appealed another time, and the Supreme Court ultimately held the ordinance constituted a taking of the DeCooks' property. The DeCooks subsequently moved for an award of attorney fees incurred during the appeals. The Supreme Court granted the motion, as the Cooks prevailed and were entitled under Minn. Stat. 117.045 to an award of reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred on appeal.

Rex and Vickie Lewis and Brad and Brenda Carnahan owned property in a subdivision. The Lewises filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Carnahans did not have authority to block their use of a public easement to access their property and an injunction requiring the Carnahans to remove a fence they erected across the easement. The Carnahans responded by seeking to have title to the easement quieted in them. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lewises, holding (1) neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the Lewises' declaratory judgment action; and (2) the easement remained dedicated to public use, meaning the Lewises had the right to use the easement and the Carnahans did not have the right to obstruct their use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Lewises had standing to bring their claim for declaratory relief; (2) the Lewises' claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of Laches; and (3) an affidavit recorded in 1994 was not effective to vacate the public easement.