Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff's bank, Firstar, erroneously dishonored her check for her April 2002 monthly mortgage payment to Aames. Firstar issued an "official check" to Aames on April 8, 2002 but also failed to honor that check. Aames notified plaintiff of default on April 20 and assessed a late fee. Firstar ultimately honored her personal check as well as one of two official checks, resulting in two mortgage payments received for the month of April. Plaintiff did not submit a payment for May. Aames sent notice that it had assigned the mortgage to Ocwen, which began dunning plaintiff and her husband, who is not a co-borrower, for the May payment, despite proof of the double payment. No assignment was recorded. Ocwen made endless collection calls, despite cease and desist requests and registry on the federal “Do Not Call” directory; threatened foreclosure; assessed late fees; and reported derogatory information to the credit reporting agencies. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court dismissed, concluding that neither defendant was covered under the Act as neither was a debt collector. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that defendants cannot "have it both ways."

In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted an urban renewal plan (Plan) to renew a portion of Baltimore City. A five-block area located in the renewal area was the subject of protracted litigation between 120 West Fayette, LLLP and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The current iteration of the litigation focused on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the City and the Maryland Historical Trust relating to the treatment of historic properties in connection with the Plan. The MOA required the City to submit redevelopment plans to the Trust for approval. After the Trust's director provided conditional approval of a fifth set of plans 120 West Fayette (Appellant) filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights interpreting the terms of the MOA. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was neither a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the MOA, and therefore, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant, at best an incidental beneficiary to the MOA, could not file a suit requesting declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces an agreement to which it had no part.

James Woods appealed the district court's dismissal of his appeal of the appraisers' award in an eminent domain action initiated by the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas. The district court found that Woods' notice of appeal, filed forty-eight days after the filing of the appraisers' report, was untimely. Woods contended that Unified Government failed to comply with the notice requirements applicable to eminent domain proceedings and, therefore, the district court should have extended the thirty-day statutory deadline for appealing the appraisers' award. The Supreme Court dismissed Woods' appeal, holding that the district court did not have the authority to extend or modify the jurisdictional requirement that a party's notice of appeal of an appraisers' award must be filed within thirty days of the filing of the appraisers' report.

Landowners brought this lawsuit against their neighbor, seeking compensation for property damage caused by the neighbor, and seeking a determination of access and water rights. The application before the Supreme Court, however, raised questions concerning procedural aspects of the hearings before the trial court and of the appeal to the intermediate court of appeals (ICA). The first question concerned pleading standards of appellate briefs, and the remaining questions addressed the trial court's determination of which parties must participate in a lawsuit, and the procedure an appellate court should follow when reviewing that determination. The Court reversed the decision of the ICA and reinstated the trial court's order, holding (1) the ICA did not err in reviewing the defendants' points of error on appeal; but (2) the ICA erred in vacating the trial court's final judgment.

Petitioner Sherman "Red" Smith built and operated a sawmill on 14 acres of land under a special-use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. He alleged that Alaska acquired title to the land and conveyed it to a third party without acknowledging his claim or compensating him for his improvements. The last disputed conveyance of the land took place in 1983. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's claim, finding it to be time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations. The superior court also ruled in favor of the State on two alternative grounds: first, concluding that sovereign immunity bars fraud actions against the State and second, determining that res judicata bars the relitigation of a claim the superior court previously dismissed in 2007. Petitioner appealed, arguing that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims brought for the vindication of constitutional rights. Because statutes of limitations do apply to constitutional claims, and because Petitioner did not allege harm amounting to a continuing violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's claim as time-barred. The Court also affirmed the superior court's alternative finding that the 2007 dismissal of Petitioner's previous claim bars his current action.

In 2008, Pioneer Irrigation District filed suit against the City of Caldwell seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the removal of urban stormwater discharge conduits constructed by the City without Pioneer's authorization. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer. The court held that Pioneer held exclusive interests in its irrigation easements and rights-of-way such that Pioneer could maintain trespass claims against the City. The court also held that I.C. 42-1209 granted Pioneer the power to remove encroachments constructed without its permission that it deemed to unreasonably or materially interfere with its easements and rights-of-way. The district court held that review of certain decisions by the irrigation district would be limited to whether they were arbitrary and capricious or reached in an unreasonable manner. The City moved for permissive appeal, which motion the district court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, except for its holding that irrigation easements and rights-of-way were exclusive interests.

The Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. and Charles Browdy, a resident of the unincorporated Fort Morgan area of Baldwin County and a member of the Association (collectively "the FMCA"), sued the City of Gulf Shores and its mayor and city council seeking a court order declaring the City's annexation of a 19.3-mile segment of the land on which Fort Morgan Road is located and the adjacent land to be invalid.1 Following a nonjury trial, the trial court held that the FMCA had failed to establish that the Fort Morgan annexation was invalid; it accordingly entered a judgment in favor of the City. The FMCA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "because the FMCA submitted evidence at that trial indicating that two parcels of property included in the Fort Morgan annexation were owned by private individuals and because the City failed to submit any evidence indicating that those same parcels were owned by the State, the trial court exceeded its discretion in upholding the annexation."

This case involved the property rights to coal bed methane gas (CBM) produced from certain lands located in Sebastian County, Arkansas. The original holder of fee simple absolute title to the lands (Grantor) conveyed surface and coal rights in 1965 via an instrument the parties referred to as the Garland Deed. Coal Owner acquired those rights effective April 30, 2010. However, three years before the grant of the coal rights, in 1962, Grantor had conveyed an undivided one-half interest in all oil, gas, and other mineral rights except coal via an instrument known as the Wheeler Deed. In 1976, Grantor conveyed its second undivided one-half interest via an instrument known as the Texas & Pacific Deed. Gas Owners were the successors-in-interest to the rights Grantor conveyed in the Wheeler and Texas & Pacific Deeds. EnerVest entered into various oil and gas leases and contracts with Coal Owner and Gas Owners to produce CBM from the lands and initiated this interpleader action seeking a ruling as to whether Coal Owner or Gas Owners were entitled to the CBM royalties. The parties moved for summary judgment on a stipulated record that included the Wheeler, Garland, and Texas & Pacific Deeds. The court affirmed the district court's holding that Gas Owners were entitled to the CBM royalties where the plain language of the deeds broadly conveyed to Gas Owners all rights to oil, gas, and other mineral resources.

Heidi Schumacher signed a renewed lease with Meadowland Apartments. Meadowland later filed an eviction action against Schumacher, alleging that she was in material non-compliance with the lease because Schumacher kept a disruptive dog in her apartment. The magistrate court found that Schumacher's conduct constituted sufficient grounds for termination of the lease. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the magistrate court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Schumacher's motion for a continuance, as Schumacher was given a reasonable opportunity to secure evidence on her behalf; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering evidence of incidents that occurred prior to the term of Schumacher's most recent lease with Meadowland; and (3) did not err in finding that Meadowland provided reasonable accommodations for Schumacher's disability as required under the Fair Housing Amendments Act.

Appellants Michael and Analisa Jones purchased a home with a loan from a mortgage company, which assigned the note and deed of trust to SunTrust Mortgage. After the Joneses defaulted on their mortgage, the Joneses elected to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. SunTrust and the Joneses resolved the pending foreclosure by agreeing to a short sale of the Joneses' home. The Joneses, however, never returned the short-sale documents and instead filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, requesting that the court impose sanctions against SunTrust because SunTrust violated section 107.086 and foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) by failing to provide required documents and mediating in bad faith. The district court (1) denied the petition, finding that the Joneses entered into an enforceable short-sale agreement and therefore waived any claims under section 107.086 and the FMRs; and (2) allowed SunTrust to seek a certificate from the FMP to proceed with the foreclosure based on the terms of the short-sale agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the short-sale agreement was an enforceable settlement agreement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose sanctions against SunTrust.