Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Theodore Wolk filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the trustee sought an order from the bankruptcy court authorizing the sale of the home Wolk owned as a tenant in common with his wife, Kathryn Tennyson. After several proceedings the bankruptcy court denied the motion to sell the home, concluding that the detriment of such a sale to Tennyson outweighed the benefit to the bankruptcy estate. Wolk appealed, and the bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. The trustee appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court had not abused its discretion in denying the trustee's motion to sell the home, as (1) the court's findings with respect to the benefit to the estate and the detriment to Tennyson were not clearly erroneous, and (2) the court carefully balanced the equities in its judgment. View "Lovald v. Tennyson" on Justia Law

Fernandes injured his back when he stepped into a hole in the floor of a tire "shed," an old shipping container, which was on property leased by AGAR to Fernandes's employer, Penske Truck Leasing. He sued AGAR on the theory that it owed him a duty of care to maintain and repair the tire shed under the lease. The district court granted summary judgment to AGAR under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that, under the lease, Agar had no duty to repair or maintain the shed. View "Fernandes v. Agar Supply Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs leased state trust land and owned all structures and improvements on the land. Under the terms of the lease, the improvements that existed on the land would become the state's property upon lease termination. After the leases were entered into, the legislature created a property tax classification ("Class Nine") in which property was taxed at a lower rate than that applicable to commercial property. For certain years, Maricopa County classified the improvements under the classification applicable to general commercial property and taxed Plaintiffs accordingly. The State Board of Equalization denied Plaintiffs' request for Class Nine classification. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action in the tax court. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County based on Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-12009(A)(1)(a), which provides that improvements on land leased from the state qualify for a reduced ad valorem tax rate if they become the property of the state on termination of the leasehold interest in the property. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that section 42-12009(A)(1)(a) applies when, at the time of taxation, improvements exist on the land that, under the terms of the lease, would become the state's property upon lease termination. View "CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved two properties purchased by John Hogan. Each parcel became subject to a deed of trust when Hogan took out loans from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Hogan was delinquent on both loans, which triggered foreclosure proceedings. A notice of trustee's sale recorded for the first parcel identified Washington Mutual Bank as the beneficiary and Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary for the second parcel. Hogan filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin the trustees' sales unless the beneficiaries proved they were entitled to collect on the respective notes. The superior court dismissed the cases. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statute (Statute) does not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders dismissing Hogan's complaints and vacated the court of appeals, holding that the Statute does not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or show the note before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure. View "Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a house from Defendant, who built the house. Plaintiffs later discovered mold in some of the windows and walls and sued Defendant. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their negligence claim but found in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim. The jury also found that Plaintiffs failed to perform all, or substantially all, of the things the contract required them to do and therefore the jury did not reach the question of whether Defendant breached the contract. The Supreme Court held (1) the economic loss rule prevented recovery of economic damages within the scope of the parties' contract but allowed for recovery of damages to other property or for bodily injury; (2) the trial court did not err when it permitted Dr. Eugene Cole to testify as an expert witness; (3) because Defendant prevailed in his claims under the contract, which provided the only basis for awarding attorney fees, he was entitled to recover attorney fees for the breach of contract suit; and (4) the trial court did not err when it denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Remanded. View "Reighard v. Yates" on Justia Law

Offshore Systems – Kenai (Offshore) operates a commercial dock facility on Cook Inlet in the Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough). Nikishka Beach Road traverses Offshore's property. The public has used this road to access the beach since the 1950s. In 2007 Offshore installed a gate blocking the road. The State and the Borough sought an injunction against Offshore, alleging a public right-of-way or prescriptive easement exists over Nikishka Beach Road. Offshore counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment quieting title to its property. The parties disputed the length and history of Nikishka Beach Road. The superior court concluded that Nikishka Beach Road provided public access to the beach on several alternative grounds. Offshore appealed the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a 1980 patent reserved a valid easement for public access to the shoreline of Cook Inlet. The Court held that the superior court had the authority to locate an easement over Nikishka Beach Road. The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees to the Borough. View "Offshore Systems - Kenai v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Blonde appealed denial of his motion to stay pending appeal after a probate judge appointed a special master for the purpose of selling the parties' former marital home. The property has since been sold. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Blonde had the opportunity to appeal to a panel of the appeals court. He also could have requested that the appeals court expedite such an appeal. An exercise of the court's “extraordinary power” is not necessary because he did not attempt to pursue ordinary appellate remedies. A stay pending appeal was not required and the request for a stay of that aspect of the judgment has become moot.View "Blonde. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

This appeal was a consolidation of two actions relating to residential leases on State endowment lands. In one action, the Attorney General sought a declaratory ruling that I.C. 58-310A, which exempts so-called "cottage site" leases from conflict auctions, was unconstitutional in light of Article IX, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court determined that I.C. 58-310A was constitutional, and thus, dismissed the Attorney General's complaint. The Attorney General appealed that decision. In the other action, Gladys Babcock and several others who lease cottage sites on Payette Lake filed an action against the State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands Director. The Payette Lake Lessees alleged that the Board breached their lease agreements when it declined to renew the expiring leases for an additional ten years. The district court granted summary judgment to the Board, finding the Payette Lake Lessees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Payette Lake Lessees filed a cross-appeal challenging that decision. Upon review of the cases, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling on the Attorney General's claim because I.C. 58-310A was unconstitutional. The Court vacated the district court's holding with respect to the Payette Lake Lessees' claim and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Wasden v. Board of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a dispute over whether Capstar Radio Operating Company held an easement over the property of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence. Capstar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging in the alternative, that an easement existed based on the theory of either an easement by implication, an easement by necessity, or a prescriptive easement. The district court filed its Order granting summary judgment, finding that Capstar holds an easement implied by prior use, an easement by prescription, and an easement by necessity. The Lawrences appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed. The Lawrences also argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself for alleged bias, and that the lower court erred in determining that the Lawrences' defenses of laches and statute of limitations were meritless. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on the (1) easement implied by prior use, (2) easement by necessity, and (3) prescriptive easement theories. The Court affirmed the district court's decision denying the Motion for Disqualification for Cause and affirms the court's ruling that the Lawrences' defenses of laches and statute of limitations were without merit. Nevertheless, the Court ordered that a new judge be assigned to preside over all further proceedings in this case. View "Capstar Radio v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Jerry and Terry Machado (the Machados) and Richard Clifton appealed a district court's decision finding that their properties were burdened by an express easement and an implied easement by necessity in favor of Charles and Carol Ryan and Kristopher Jones. Ryan and Jones cross-appealed the district court's failure to rule on their claims of implied easement by prior use and easement by prescription. In 1970, Promised Land & Cattle Company conveyed a parcel of land to Timberland Resources, Inc., which included an easement to a then-existing logging road. Later that year, Timberland sold the land to Clifton with the deed containing the easement. The Ryans purchased an adjacent parcel to the Clifton property, conveyed with "all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging." The Ryans built a home on the property, accessing their parcel by a private road, access to which was via the former logging road. From 1993 until this suit was filed, the Ryans maintained the private road. Timberland conveyed another portion of its parcel to Jones, with the deed containing reference to the private road. When Clifton purchased his lot from Timberland, there was no public road providing access to what later became the Jones property, and the only access to the Jones property was the private road. Machado filed a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory relief in 2007 with regard to the easement across his property from the private road. Ryan answered and counter-claimed, asking the district court to find an easement of Machado's property by express, implied by necessity, implied by prior use and prescription. Jones was permitted to intervene. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found that the deed from Timberland to Clifton was unambiguous and did not create an express easement. The Court concluded that there existed an implied easement by necessity as to the Jones property, but to as to the Ryan property. With regard to the Ryans, the Court concluded that the Ryans could not "create" an implied easement because they sited their home in the lease accessible quadrant of their property. The Court reversed the district court with regard to finding an express easement over the Machado property and for finding an easement implied by necessity over the Machado and Clifton properties for the benefit of the Ryans. However, the Court affirmed the district court finding an easement implied by necessity for the benefit of the Jones property. The case was remanded for further proceedings on issues that were not addressed due to the court's findings on the other easement issues. View "Machado v. Ryan" on Justia Law