Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This litigation arose from the construction of a 143-unit condominium complex. Plaintiff Long Trail House Condominium Association appealed a trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant general contractor Engelberth Construction, Inc. on its complaint. The Association argued that the court erred in: (1) applying the economic loss rule to bar its negligence claim; and (2) dismissing its breach of implied warranty claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's decision. View "Long Trail House Condominium Assoc. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Two mining companies entered a ten-year mining lease. The lessee was responsible for mining and prospecting claims owned by the lessor and its president. The companies entered a holdover tenancy after the expiration of the lease. During this time, an officer of the lessee company staked mining claims that overlapped with the claims his company had mined under the ten-year lease. In his own name, that officer filed location notices for the newly staked claims with the State Department of Natural Resources. The parties disagreed about who rightfully owned the claims staked during the holdover tenancy and broke off their lease agreement in October 2003. In 2007, the former lessor filed suit against the former lessee and its two officer-shareholders, seeking to quiet title to the disputed mining claims, to eject the former lessee and its officers from the claims, and to secure damages under several tort and contract causes of action. The former lessee denied various allegations, raised 13 affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed for the value of labor performed on the claims. Following a three-week trial, the superior court resolved the dispute in favor of the former lessor. The former lessee filed two appeals of post-trial orders, which we have consolidated for decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court on all but one issue: because specific findings were needed to pierce the corporate veil, the Court reversed the entry of judgment and the award attorney's fees against the wife of the officer of the lessee company and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gold Dust Mines, Inc. v. Little Squaw Gold Mining Company" on Justia Law

Under section 6(6) of Ballot Measure 49 (2007), certain "owners" of property may file a claim to establish up to three home-site approvals, notwithstanding existing land use restrictions that would otherwise preclude such development. At issue in this case was the meaning of the term "owner" as it is used in that section. Specifically, the issue was whether the term includes a seller of property under a land sale contract who retains legal title to the property. The Court of Appeals concluded that, as the term is used in Ballot Measure 49, the term "owner" means only the purchaser of property under a land sale contract and does not include the seller of the property who retains title. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: "In short, there is no persuasive evidence that the voters intended the three categories of owners under ORS 195.300(18) to be mutually exclusive. To the contrary, the phrasing of that definition, along with other definitions in the same section, and other related provisions of the law make clear that those definitional components were intended to be inclusive." View "Burke v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Respondent issued an eminent domain action against Appellants. The district court awarded Respondent possession of the property, and the jury found Respondent owned Appellants $4.4 million in just compensation. Appellants appealed and Respondent cross-appealed. While the appeals were pending, Respondent filed a notice of its intent to abandon the condemnation proceedings and a motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the judgment while an appeal was pending but certified its inclination to grant the motion to vacate based on its conclusion that Respondent was entitled to abandon the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action after it has paid just compensation and the district court has entered a final order of condemnation, but before the resolution of issues pending on appeal; (2) the district court retains jurisdiction to address a notice of abandonment and motion to dismiss, even while an appeal of the matter is pending in the Supreme Court; and (3) thus, the motion to remand was denied as moot because a remand was unnecessary for the district court to decide the motion to dismiss. View "Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal, which arose out of Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP), the Supreme Court examined the note-holder and beneficial-interest status of a party seeking to foreclose. The Court concluded (1) to participate in the FMP and ultimately obtain an FMP certificate to proceed with the nonjudicial foreclosure of an owner-occupied residence, the party seeking to foreclose must demonstrate that it is both the beneficiary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory note; (2) when the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS) is the named beneficiary of the deed of trust and a different entity holds the promissory note, the note and deed of trust are split, making nonjudicial foreclosure by either improper, but any split is cured when the promissory note and deed of trust are reunified; and (3) because the foreclosing bank in this case became both the holder of the promissory note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, it had standing to proceed through the FMP. View "Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Cleveland sued financial institutions, alleging that by securitizing subprime mortgages and foreclosing on houses, defendants allegedly contributed to declines in property values, shrinking tax base, and increased criminal activity, causing a public nuisance. The district court dismissed, finding preemption by state law and failure to demonstrate that defendants unreasonably interfered with a public right or were the proximate cause of alleged harm. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cleveland filed another suit in state court against non-diverse institutions, alleging public-nuisance, violation of the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, (RICO analogue), by inaccurately claiming title to mortgages and notes in foreclosures in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.32. Cleveland also sought to recover (Ohio Revised Code 715.261) costs incurred maintaining or demolishing foreclosed houses. While the case was pending, banks sought a declaratory judgment that Cleveland’s public-nuisance claim was preempted by the National Bank Act and an injunction against the suits. The district court suggested that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed. Subsequently, the state court dismissed Cleveland’s public-nuisance and OCAA claims; appeal is pending. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the first case, so that declaratory relief is now moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the second suit; the district court had jurisdiction.View "Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the partition by sale of property owned by her deceased father and distribution of the proceeds to the three cotenants, herself, her sister Claudia, and her brother Benjamin. Claudia filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against Plaintiff, Benjamin, Benjamin's wife, Homeowners Loan Corporation (HLC), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) for, among other things, a declaratory judgment that she had a life estate in the property. The Court of Chancery found in favor of Plaintiff and her request for a partition of the property. Claudia was then evicted from the property by a trustee appointed by the court to oversee the sale of the property. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought reimbursement for several expenses. HLC and MERS sought attorneys' fees and rent payments. The Court of Chancery awarded a total of $12,098 to Plaintiff for attorneys' fees, rent payments, funeral expenses, and trustee's fees. The Court also awarded $2,166 in rent payments to HLC and MERS and requested an itemized list of fees incurred as a result of Claudia's behavior that was found to be vexatious or in bad faith. View "Brown v. Wiltbank" on Justia Law

James Turner and Julie Viers opened a line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank and granted Wells Fargo a deed of trust on property they owned as security for the line of credit. Later, John Turner, Christina Turner, and Sandy Couch (the John Turners) purchased the property. Julie and James paid off the entire outstanding balance under the credit line agreement using the proceeds from the sale of the property to the John Turners, but Julie subsequently borrowed $169,090 under the credit line agreement secured by the property. Thereafter, Wells Fargo refused to release the deed of trust. The John Turners then filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the John Turners could not enforce the terms of the credit line agreement because they were not intended beneficiaries of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the John Turners were not entitled to judgment requiring Wells Fargo to release the deed of trust the bank held on the property; and (2) the John Turners failed to establish prima facie claims of promissory or equitable estoppel. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This was an action for partition of the real property in the estate of Ronald McKillip. At the time of his death, McKillip owned four tracts of land. McKillip's will left the property to his three daughters, "share and share alike." The probate court confirmed ownership of the real estate to the daughters in equal shares. One daughter brought an action to partition the real estate. A referee appointed by the county court determined that a partition in kind of the real estate was not possible and recommended a public sale. The court approved the report and concluded that the real estate could not be partitioned in kind "without great prejudice to the owners." The court ordered the referee to sell the real estate, and the personal representative appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the real estate should be partitioned in kind. Remanded with directions. View "In re Estate of McKillip" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted further review of this dissolution-of-marriage case to consider the proper distribution of a retired spouse's monthly pension benefits. The district court awarded the entirety of those benefits to the retired spouse. The court of appeals reversed and divided the benefits between the spouses to the extent they were accrued during the marriage. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision in part and affirmed the district court's judgment as modified, holding that the court of appeals did not err in ruling that the benefits should have been divided but erred in dividing the benefits without taking into account the remaining allocation of property between the parties. Remanded. View "In re Marriage of O'Brien" on Justia Law