Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the good faith requirement of 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 extended to third parties and requires that the third party be notified of a debtor's financial condition. The trial court found the interest of Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of Beaver City (Bank) in the livestock of cattle operation and debtor Lucky Moon Land and Livestock, Inc. (Lucky Moon) to be superior to that of another creditor of Lucky Moon, Defendant-Appellant Barretts' Livestock, Inc. (Barretts). The Bank alleged that in 2004 it perfected a security interest in all of Lucky Moon's livestock, including all after-acquired livestock, giving it a superior claim to cattle purchased by Lucky Moon from Barretts to satisfy the debt owed by Lucky Moon to the Bank. Barretts asserted that the Bank did not have priority over it because the Bank was not a good faith secured creditor. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, finding that the Bank's perfected security interest had preference over Barretts' unperfected security interest. Barretts appealed, contending that Bank did not have a superior security interest because: 1) the Bank's security interest never attached; and 2) the Bank had not acted in good faith. The Court of Civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Bank sought certiorari, contending that: 1) the case presents an issue of first impression as to when good faith under 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 should be determined; 2) Bank's security interest never attached; and 3) the Court of Civil Appeals' decision was inconsistent with a different decision of the Court of Civil Appeals on which the court relied. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 did not extend to third parties nor require that the third party be notified of a debtor's financial condition. View "Bank of Beaver City v. Barretts' Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on interest earned on block grants made to Indian tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. Specifically, Appellant Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Division of Housing challenged both a regulation placing a two-year limit on the investment of grant funds and two notices issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development stating that any interest accrued after the expiration of this two-year period must be returned to the Department. The Nation sought declaratory relief invalidating the regulation and notices as well as an injunction to prevent HUD from recouping interest earned on grant funds. The Nation also sought recoupment of the approximately $1.3 million of earned interest it wired to HUD after HUD sent a letter threatening an enforcement action based on the Nation’s investment of grant funds for longer than two years. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that HUD’s sovereign immunity was not waived by the Administrative Procedures Act and, in the alternative, that the Nation had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because HUD’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that HUD was authorized to promulgate a regulation limiting the period for investments, and required to demand remittance of interest earned in violation of the regulation. The Nation was therefore not entitled to recouping the interest it paid to HUD pursuant to HUD's enforcement of its rules. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. HUD, et al" on Justia Law

A school district (District) obtained an in rem delinquent property tax judgment against an oil and gas lease that Respondent owned and operated. Respondent did not appeal, and the District foreclosed its judgment lien on the leasehold, taking ownership. The Railroad Commission ordered Respondent to plug a well on the lease. Respondent did not comply, and the Commission plugged the well and brought an enforcement action in court to recover the costs of the operation and the penalty. Respondent and the Commission settled. Respondent then sued the District, alleging in part that the District's actions had resulted in a taking of his property requiring compensation. The trial court dismissed Respondent's action for want of jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded with respect to the takings claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Respondent's case, as Respondent did not assert on appeal that the District took his property without compensation. View "W. Hardin County Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Poole" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice Community Justice Assistance Division (TDCJ) brought this interlocutory appeal from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction as to claims for damages related to actions of two county substance abuse treatment facility officers. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against TDCJ for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the claims against TDCJ based on the use of tangible property involved intent to accomplish intentional torts, and its plea to the jurisdiction as to those claims should have been granted; and (2) TDCJ's plea as to the remaining claims also should have been granted because there was no allegation that those claims resulted from the use of tangible property. View "Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Campos" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a non-hurricane windstorm case could be joined as a tag-along to a previously created pre-trial Hurricane Ike multidistrict litigation (MDL) court. A single pretrial judge remanded this case because it did not arise from a hurricane. The Supreme Court granted the motion for rehearing and vacated the single pretrial judge's order of remand, holding (1) the case was related to the MDL litigation because the issue of whether State Farm covered shingle damage arising from wind events during the period between 2008 and 2010 was common to all cases; and (2) transfer would promote efficiency and serve the convenience of parties and witnesses. View "In re State Farm Lloyds Hurricane Litig." on Justia Law

In 2004, Allen Ehlers signed a contract to sell certain property to Keith Sharp, the owner of Upper West Side, LLC. Allen had acquired the property in question pursuant to a 1995 deed of assent that identified the land as “Parcel Two,” and described the property as a strip of land 25 feet wide and 200 feet long. Although the deed of assent described the land as a 25' x 200' strip, Upper West Side believed that it would be purchasing the entire eight acre tract of land at the time that it entered the February 2004 contract with Allen. Eventually, in 2008, Allen deeded the property in the deed of assent to Upper West Side, and Upper West Side filed an action in the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to reform the deed of assent and asking the court to declare that, as reformed, the deed conveyed the entire eight acre tract of Parcel Two, and not just the 25' x 200' strip described in the deed. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Upper West Side, and issued a certificate of immediate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that Upper West Side’s action to reform the deed of assent was not barred by the seven-year statute of limitations applicable to reformation actions. View "Ehlers v. Upper West Side, LLC" on Justia Law

Neighbors of a proposed affordable housing development appealed an Environmental Division decision affirming a decision of the Town of Woodstock Development Review Board (DRB) granting appellee-applicants Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont (WCT) a zoning permit and a decision of the District 3 Environmental Commission, granting an Act 250 Land Use Permit. The Environmental Division had reversed an earlier decision of the DRB granting a permit, but upon WCT’s reapplication, and another favorable decision from the DRB, the Environmental Division affirmed, finding that the deficiencies of the first application had been corrected. Following the second DRB decision, WCT went to the Environmental Commission and obtained an Act 250 permit; the Environmental Division also affirmed the grant of this permit. Neighbors argued that: (1) the successive-application doctrine should have barred the submission of the second zoning permit application; (2) the second application failed to correct the problems of the first application; (3) certain of the Environmental Division’s findings with respect to the Act 250 permit were clearly erroneous; (4) the court erred by denying a motion to stay this proceeding; and (5) the Environmental Division erred by conditioning approval on a water easement’s location being drawn on the plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "It is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Environmental Division to impose conditions on permits. . . .the Environmental Division was sensitive to the concurrent litigation when it imposed the condition, requiring that the pending litigation be noted on the plan. The condition was based on the requirements of the Woodstock zoning ordinance, and it was within the court’s jurisdiction and discretion to require it." View "In re Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont PRD" on Justia Law

This appeal, filed by brothers Gary and Dennis Baasch (Appellants), concerned disputed land located in Howard County. After a bench trial, the district court for Howard County denied Gary Baasch's counterclaim for quiet title. The court found that husband and wife Paul and Betty Lou Obermiller (Appellees) owned all the land they claimed to own, that the fence constructed by Appellants was on Appellees' land, and that Gary Baasch did not own any of the disputed land. The court also found that Appellants had trespassed, ordered them to remove the fence, and enjoined them from blocking access to the land owned by Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) Appellees were the rightful owners of the disputed land; (2) because Appellees owned the land, Appellants' intentional installation of a fence on the land constituted a continuous trespass; and (3) Appellees were entitled to an injunction. View "Obermiller v. Baasch" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit in superior court claiming that she and her son entered into an oral that granted her a life estate in certain property. Petitioner sought to enforce the oral agreement or, in the alternative, recover of a theory of quantum meruit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The appeals court remanded for proceedings as to whether Petitioner should recover under a theory of quantum meruit. While the case was pending on remand, Petitioner filed a petition in the county court against the judge assigned to the matter, in both his individual and official capacities, and against the Commonwealth. Petitioner raised a number of claims concerning the judge's rulings and conduct, including an assertion that he had acted in an unlawful and biased manner. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claims of judicial bias and declaratory judgment claims should have been addressed through the ordinary trial and appellate process; (2) the judge was absolutely immune from Petitioner's request for monetary damages; and (3) Petitioner's allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to overcome the judge's absolute immunity. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal was whether an uncontroverted affidavit attesting to the statutory form "Affidavit of Sale under Power of Sale in Mortgage" was sufficient to show compliance with the power of sale for the purpose of establishing the right of possession by motion for summary judgment in a summary process action. A judge in the housing court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, and the defendant, Oliver Hendricks, appealed. Hendricks asserted error in the grant of summary judgment to Fannie Mae, where the statutory form failed to set forth "fully and particularly" the acts taken to exercise the power of sale in Hendricks's mortgage, as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 15. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the statutory form that Fannie Mae offered in support of its motion for summary judgment was sufficient within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, 8, it made out a prima facie case of compliance with chapter 244, 14; and (2) because there was no genuine issue of material fact to be decided, Fannie Mae was entitled to summary judgment. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Hendricks" on Justia Law