Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Bethel brought this action asserting that the County's zoning regulations, which prevented Bethel from constructing a church, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., the United States Constitution, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all claims. The court concluded that the County had presented no evidence that its interest in preserving the integrity of the rural density transfer zone could not be served by less restrictive means, like a minimum lot-size requirement or an individualized review process. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Bethel's substantial burden claim. The court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council" on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on his property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent's excavation was exempt from the permitting requirements, the Town's zoning ordinance required the variance before respondent began excavating, and that state law did not preempt the local zoning ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction, but remanded the case with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

In 1982, two elderly widows (the Millers) sold land to one party. Four years later, the Millers purported to sell the same land to Petitioner (the Partnership). The Partnership engaged two title companies (the Title Companies) to complete the title work, and the Title Companies failed to locate and report the Millers' first land sale. Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title) underwrote the insurance policies on the land. These transactions led to numerous lawsuits. At issue in this appeal was (1) whether a title company owes a duty of care when conducting a title search; and (2) whether a title insurance company may be held vicariously liable as a result of the title company's negligent title search. The Court of Appeals held (1) the Title Companies owed a duty of care to the Partnership in conducting the title search and issuing the title commitment; and (2) under the circumstances, Chicago Title may not be held vicariously liable for the Title Companies' negligence. View "100 Investment Ltd. P'ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title" on Justia Law

The zoning board of appeals of the town of Madison (board) approved a variance to replace Plaintiffs' house on the footprint of the prior structure. After Plaintiffs built a new house on the property, Plaintiffs submitted an application for a certificate of zoning compliance seeking approval to convert their present balcony into a large, uncovered deck. The proposed deck would fully comply with the zoning regulations but arguably would not comply with the previously approved variance. The zoning officer denied the application, and the board upheld the decision. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the board could not deny Plaintiffs' application because the footprint limitation was not expressly described in the certificate of variance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) conditions attached to the granting of a variance are not to be construed solely on the basis of the language in the certificate of variance; and (2) the board properly denied Plaintiffs' application for a certificate of zoning compliance. Remanded. View "Anatra v. Town of Madison Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

A builder sued a homebuyer in a Utah state district court for failing to pay some charges for his home's construction; the homebuyer counterclaimed, alleging that the construction was defective. Shortly before the Utah state court rendered a judgment, the homebuyer sued the builder in an Idaho state district court, seeking to void the builder's allegedly fraudulent transfer of a ranch and appurtenant water shares in Franklin County, Idaho. The homebuyer also filed and recorded the Utah judgment in Franklin County, creating a lien on all of the builder's currently owned and after-acquired real property located there. The builder reversed the transfer, and therefore the ranch became subject to the lien. However, the homebuyer continued to prosecute the fraudulent-transfer action, and did not request a writ of execution. A few months later, the builder declared bankruptcy. In a settlement agreement, the bankruptcy trustee agreed to lift the automatic stay on the homebuyer's fraudulent-transfer action, and also abandoned the ranch from the bankruptcy estate. The homebuyer's judgment lien was not discharged in the builder's bankruptcy, but apparently all in personam causes of action were discharged. The fraudulent-transfer action was repeatedly delayed, and after five years from the entry of the Utah judgment, the homebuyer's lien expired. The homeowner had never attempted to renew the judgment, and had never requested a writ of execution from the Idaho district court. The builder then moved for summary judgment; the homebuyer filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to a writ of execution. The Idaho district court granted the builder's motion for summary judgment, denied the homebuyer's motion for summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the builder because no relief could be granted based on the expired lien, and because there was no timely request of a writ of execution for the Utah judgment. View "Grazer v. Jones" on Justia Law

Colleen Weflen, Marleen Weflen, Sharon Kruse, Catherine Harris, Norris Weflen, Windsor Bakken, LLC, Gulfport Energy Corp. and EOG Resources, Inc., appealed a district court judgment vacating a previous order granting Weflens' motion for summary judgment, granting Patricia Capps' motion for summary judgment and finding that the Weflens had no claim to a one-half mineral interest reserved by Ruth Nelson in 1975. Nelson conveyed real property in Mountrail County, to Olav and Rose Weflen, reserving to herself one-half of the minerals in the property. In 1979, Nelson executed a mineral deed conveying her mineral interest to Patricia Capps and Terrel Anderson. Nelson's deed was not recorded until 2009. Colleen Weflen, Marleen Weflen, Sharon Kruse, Catherine Harris and Norris Weflen were the current surface owners of the real property. In December 2005 and January 2006, the Weflens published a Notice of Lapse of Mineral Interest in the Mountrail County Promoter for three consecutive weeks. The notice of lapse was subsequently mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery to the two last known addresses of Nelson. The addresses were obtained from the 1975 warranty deed from Nelson to Olav and Rose Weflen and from an oil and gas lease dated 1973. The two notices sent by mail were returned undelivered. Nelson died in 1983. No Statement of Claim of Mineral Interest was filed by or on behalf of Nelson within sixty days after the first publication of the notice of lapse. Capps filed a statement of claim in2008. Capps brought suit to quiet title in the mineral interest in 2009. The district court granted Weflens' motion for summary judgment, quieting title of the disputed minerals in the Weflens. Subsequently, Gerald Wools, Penny Brink, Michael Lee, Melissa Kellor and Gwen Hassan ("Hassans") were joined as plaintiffs and then designated as defendants. Hassans claimed an interest to the minerals as heirs of Nelson. Weflens moved for summary judgment against Hassans. Capps requested the district court deny the motion and reconsider its prior order quieting title in Weflens. Upon reconsideration, the district court vacated its prior order granting Weflens' motion for summary judgment, granted Capps' motion for reconsideration and found as a matter of law Weflens had no claim to the one-half mineral interest. The district court entered a final judgment adjudicating fewer than all of the claims of the parties pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b), concluding, "Because the ancillary claims in this case depend[ed] upon final resolution of the dormant minerals dispute, the Court agrees there is no just reason to delay entry of judgment on the main claim." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court inappropriately certified the summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b), and the court abused its discretion in directing entry of a final judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Capps v. Weflen" on Justia Law

Mariner's Cove Townhomes Association appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings for the United States. The district court held that the Association was not entitled to just compensation for the diminution of its assessment base resulting from the government's condemnation of fourteen properties in the Mariner's Cove Development. The court found that the Association's right to collect assessments was a property interest, but the loss of the Association's assessment base was incidental to the condemnation and was barred by the consequential loss rule. Accordingly, the court held that the loss of the Association's right to collect assessments on those properties was not compensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Land" on Justia Law

Mortgagors appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims against the FHLMC and other financial institutions, a law firm, and others. Mortgagors asserted twenty-one claims under Minnesota law related to defendants' rights to the mortgages on the mortgagors' homes. The court rejected the mortgagors' argument that the district court improperly dismissed their claims against the law firm and their contention that their complaint made out a Minnesota slander-of-title action. The court also concluded that the mortgagors did not make out a quiet title claim and the district court properly dismissed their claims against the financial institutions. View "Peterson, et al v. CitiMortgage, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Mortgagors filed suit in Minnesota state court against defendants, alleging numerous deficiencies in the assignment of their mortgages and in their foreclosures. In this appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred in denying their motion to remand when it concluded that they failed to make out claims for slander of title, declaratory judgment, and quiet title, and in mistakenly relying on Jackson v. Mortgage Registration Sys. Because the court recently concluded that nearly identical claims against a resident law firm had no reasonable basis in law and fact under Minnesota law and constituted fraudulent joinder, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred by dismissing the claims against the law firm and denying remand; the court disposed of the slander-of-title claim because the court recently upheld the dismissal of a virtually identical claim in Butler v. Bank of America; the court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment to determine whether defendants had "any true interest in or right to foreclose on their properties" and whether the notes were properly accelerated by the correct party; and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the quiet title action. View "Karnatcheva, et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose from a land development project dispute where the Retreat took out a short-term purchase loan from a Georgia bank to finance the acquisition of the land. At issue was the district court's interpretation of an exclusion in a title insurance policy issued by First American to the bank and the district court's decision that First American was entitled to summary judgment based on that exclusion. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted the terms of the title insurance contract; the district court's conclusion that the affidavit at issue would be admissible at trial was not an abuse of discretion; and the evidence demonstrated that the bank was fully aware of the Retreat property's lack of dedicated access when it extended the purchase loan and took out the insurance policy from First American. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and because First American was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment was appropriate. View "Cynergy, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law