Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in February, 2013
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Debtor appealed from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee on his objection to debtor's claimed homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that debtor had abandoned the property at issue as his homestead by removing himself from the property with no fixed or actual intent to return, and was not, therefore, permitted to claim a homestead exemption. View "Paul, Jr. v. Allred" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an administrative law court's (ALC) decision authorizing Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam's Spit (the Spit) on Kiawah Island. In 1999, the Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) established a baseline and building set back line twenty feet landward based on information that the Spit had accreted, and had not been subject to any significant, measurable erosion between 1959 and 1999. The movement of the baseline prompted Respondent to consider development of the Spit. On February 29, 2008, Respondent submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a combination bulkhead and revetment in the area. On December 18, 2008, DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 feet. DHEC refused the permit request for a remaining 2,513 feet based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers. DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP). Respondent requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board, but the Board declined to hold a review conference. Respondent then requested a contested case hearing before the ALC, and challenged the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 feet. The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) opposed the construction of any bulkhead or revetment on the Spit, and also requested a contested case hearing challenging the decision to authorize the 270 foot structure, but supporting denial of the remainder. The cases were consolidated. The ALC granted Respondent's permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment, subject to certain conditions reducing and altering its size. DHEC and CCL (collectively, Appellants) appealed the ALC's order. The Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in a decision published in late 2011. The Court subsequently granted Respondent's petition for rehearing, and accepted an amicus brief from the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the SRMC). The Court then withdrew its initial opinion, and issue this opinion, affirmed the decision of the ALC. "The essence of Appellants' argument is rooted in dissatisfaction with the verbiage and structure of the ALC's order, and not in actual errors of law or the absence of substantial evidence. The ALC acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit to include a structure no larger than that requested by Respondent or initially reviewed by DHEC. On appeal of a contested case, we must affirm the ALC if the findings are supported by substantial evidence." View "Kiawah Development v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

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Defendants owned three lots in the Eagle Crest subdivision adjacent to the Eagle Ridge Estates (Eagle Ridge) subdivision. Defendants' predecessor in title obtained a private access easement from the prior owners of Eagle Ridge, which allowed Defendants to access their property in Eagle Crest by way of roads running through Eagle Ridge. In exchange, the grantee of the easement agreed to pay an annual general road assessment for each lot. The Eagle Ridge Homeowners Association (Association) brought suit against Defendants for their failure to pay general assessments for three assessment years. Defendants argued that the Association only had authority to assess general road assessments against them and not general assessments. Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of the Association and awarded attorney fees, finding that the expenditures made by the Association were associated with roads. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues with the exception of the Association's request for certain attorney fees because of contradictory findings and conclusions by the trial court. Remanded. View "Eagle Ridge Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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In 1994, Plaintiff granted a drainage easement to Pennington County on land he owned. In 1996, silt began to accumulate near the bottom of the canyon on part of Plaintiff's land due to the County's repair of a section of road abutting Plaintiff's land. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against the County for nuisance, constructive taking, trespass, and unlawful taking. The trial court granted summary judgment for the County, determining that there was no continuing tort and that the statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the County, as the County's actions did not constitute a continuing tort, and thus, Plaintiff's action was untimely filed. View "Brandt v. County of Pennington" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs were a group of landowners who owned properties abutting South Avenue in the City of Missoula. This lawsuit arose out of dispute between Plaintiffs and the City concerning the width of a public right-of-way constituting South Avenue. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the right-of-way was sixty feet wide. Because the City's recent improvements to South Avenue extended beyond this sixty-foot parameter, the district court concluded that the City had effected a taking of property and awarded Plaintiffs compensation for the taking as well as their requested costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all but two issues, holding that the district court (1) applied an incorrect measure of compensation; and (2) erroneously barred Plaintiffs' counsel from passing on to his clients the costs and fees incurred in proving underlying litigation expenses other than attorney's fees. Remanded. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

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Appellant owned 5,400 contiguous acres of mostly undeveloped farmland in Chouteu County. Appellant filed a claim seeking declaratory relief regarding whether the entire length of a road that ran through Appellant's property, Lippard Road, constituted a public roadway. The district court determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constituted a public roadway. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly viewed the record as a whole, pursuant to the principles of Reid v. Park, to determine whether the County had established a public road; and (2) the district court properly determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constitutes a public roadway. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents, bought a three-dwelling in Massachusetts, financing the entire purchase price with two mortgage loans from Plaza Home Mortgage (Plaza). After the collapse of the housing market, Plaintiffs sued Plaza, alleging state common law and statutory violations in making the loans. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim based on Plaza's alleged violation of the Massachusetts covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs' claim based on a violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection was correctly dismissed as time-barred. View "Latson v. Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

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While a lawsuit by Appellees David and Elizabeth Speaks was pending against Rosemary and Byron Baker for damages related to poor construction workmanship, the Bakers transferred two parcels of real property to their son, Nathan Baker. The case resulted in a judgment against Byron but a dismissal of the claims against Rosemary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Five days later, Nathan transferred the properties to a limited liability company (LLC) he and his family controlled. Appellees subsequently filed this case under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. While the case was pending, the LLC transferred the two pieces of property to trusts controlled by Rosemary Baker. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees permitting execution on the properties, finding that all of the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly found the conveyances to be fraudulent; but (2) Appellees failed to make the required prima facie showing that the properties were subject to execution on a judgment against Byron Baker alone. View "Baker v. Speaks" on Justia Law

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In 2001, Taxpayers bought two parcels located within a residential subdivision that was zoned residential. In 2009, the county assessor reclassified the property from residential to agricultural. The assessor assumed a commercial use on the property and thus valued it as commercial. The county board of equalization affirmed the assessor's determinations. Taxpayers appealed to the State Tax Commission (STC). A hearing officer found the appropriate classification for the property was commercial and that it should be assessed at the commercial rate as opposed to the agricultural rate. The STC affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The circuit court affirmed the STC's decision as being supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the STC's application of the factors set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 137.016.5 to Taxpayers' property was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. View "Bateman v. Rinehart" on Justia Law

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Decedent executed a will in which all of his possessions to his wife. Decedent and his wife (Ex-Wife) divorced a few months later. One year later, Decedent died. Ex-Wife later sold the real property devised to her in Decedent's will to Petitioners. Thereafter, Decedent's mother (Respondent) filed an objection to final settlement, contending that Decedent's divorce from Ex-Wife after the execution of his will and prior to his death automatically revoked any disposition to Ex-Wife. The county commission ordered that Decedent's estate should pass to his heirs at law as if he had no will and found that Respondent was the sole heir to Decedent's estate. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition to quiet title to real estate and claim for unjust enrichment against Decedent's estate. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that Ex-Wife did not possess title to convey to Petitioners and that title to the subject real property should be quieted in Respondent's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Respondent was not time-barred from claiming title to the subject property; and (2) the circuit court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent. View "Johnson v. Kirby" on Justia Law