Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in August, 2013
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The Board of Equalization and Adjustment of Shelby County appealed a consent judgment reflecting an agreement between the Board and Shelby 39, LLC. The Board argued the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over certain matters decided by the consent judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Board of Equalization and Adjustment of Shelby County v. Shelby 39, LLC " on Justia Law

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Nancy Finkle appealed an order and judgment quieting title to 1/2 of the mineral interests in certain real property in Mountrail County in Leslie D. Johnson, Carol Johnson, Merlyn H. Johnson, Thea Donna D. Johnson, Delores Albertson and their children. Finkle claimed she owned 1/4 of the mineral interests. The district court held Finkle did not have an interest in the minerals. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Finkle" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, Cynthia and Alan Roers, filed suit against Countrywide and others after Countrywide initiated foreclosure proceedings on the ranch property they owned. The court concluded that fact questions existed as to whether the parties were operating under a mutual mistake as to a basic assumption on which the mortgage agreements were made; whether the ranch's acreage and corresponding value were material to the finance agreements for Cynthia's separate properties; and whether plaintiffs have been adversely affected and were, therefore, eligible to seek rescission of the mortgage agreements. The court concluded, however, that the district court did not err in granting Countrywide's motion for summary judgment on Alan's claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs have waived their remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Appellants, several individuals, contended that a Robertson County passway was a private drive, and Appellees, Robertson County, the County Fiscal Court, and an individual (collectively, Fiscal Court), argued that the passway was a part of the formal county road system of the County. Appellant asked the Fiscal Court to acknowledge there had never been a formal adoption of the passway into the official county road system, but the Fiscal Court declined. Appellants subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the passway was not a lawfully adopted county road. The trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment. The Fiscal Court appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by treating the case as an original action pursuant to the declaratory judgment statute instead of an appeal from an action of the County Fiscal Court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellants' action could be brought in the circuit court only as an appeal from the decision of the County Fiscal Court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because no appealable event occurred under the facts of this case, Appellants properly invoked the declaratory judgment process to challenge the legal status of the passway. View "Whitley v. Robertson County" on Justia Law

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Brian and Lori Peay purchased a home manufactured by Energy Homes, Division of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (SEHI). At closing, SEHI offered the Peays certain warranties on the home in exchange for the Peays' agreement that any disputes over the home would be submitted to binding arbitration. Brian Peay accepted the warranties and signed the arbitration agreement. After discovering flaws in the home, the Peays filed suit against SEHI, among other defendants. SEHI moved to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, (1) the arbitration agreement was not prohibited by the merger and integration clause of the purchase contract; (2) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable; and (3) Lori Peay was bound to the arbitration agreement even though she did not sign the agreement. Remanded. View "Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay" on Justia Law

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Mark Hilde hired Big Lake Lumber (Big Lake), Wruck Excavating (Wruck), and J. DesMarais Construction (DesMarais) to help him build a "spec home." 21st Century Bank (Bank) recorded a mortgage against the property to finance the purchase of the property and the home construction. After the Bank foreclosed on its mortgage, Big Lake commenced this mechanic's lien foreclosure action. The district court found that the mechanic's liens of Big Lake and DesMarais related back to the date Wruck commenced work on the improvement project, and thus, the mechanic's liens of Big Lake and DesMarais had priority over the mortgage of the Bank. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by adopting and then applying a new "integrated analysis" to find the Bank's mortgage superior to the liens; and (2) the district court did not clearly err when it found that Wruck, Big Lake, and DesMarais contributed to the same project of improvement, and accordingly, under the relation-back doctrine, the mechanic's liens of Big Lake and DesMarais had priority over the Bank's mortgage. View "Big Lake Lumber, Inc. v. Sec. Prop. Invs., Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case, Thomas and Mary Ulrich sought to quiet title to an easement over the "Peacock Parcel," which is adjacent to land that they own. The Peacock Parcel is owned by four parties. The Ulrichs brought suit against “all parties claiming to hold title” to the Peacock Parcel, but served only one of the owners, John Bach. The district court quieted title to the easement in the Ulrichs, declared the Ulrichs’ easement to be superior to any right claimed by Bach, and enjoined Bach from interfering with their use of the easement. Bach appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court affirmed that portion of the district court’s judgment granting an injunction against Bach, but vacated the portion of the judgment quieting title to the property. View "Ulrich v. Bach" on Justia Law

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Wilson Lucom was an American expatriate who wished to bequeath assets worth more than $200 million to a foundation established for impoverished children in Panama. Plaintiff, Lucom's attorney, filed suit against the Arias Group/Arias Family, Lucom's wife and step-children, under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, alleging that the Arias Group participated in a criminal conspiracy to thwart plaintiff through acts of intimidation, extortion, corruption, theft, money laundering, and bribery of foreign officials, so that the Arias Group could steal the Estate assets for themselves. At issue on appeal was RICO's four-year statute of limitations on civil actions and the "separate accrual" rule. Under the rule, the commission of a separable, new predicate act within a 4-year limitations period permitted a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused by that act. The court concluded that none of the injuries in plaintiff's complaint were new and independent because all of his alleged injuries were continuations of injuries that have been accumulating since before September 2007. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had done little more than repackage his 2007 abuse of process complaint. Therefore, plaintiff's civil RICO complaint was untimely, and the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Arias Group. View "Lehman, et al. v. Lucom, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendant executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage deed. Plaintiff subsequently sought to foreclose on the mortgage, claiming it was the holder of the note and mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. Defendant filed an objection to the foreclosure, alleging that because he was no longer in default, Plaintiff did not have standing to foreclose the mortgage. Defendant also requested that the court direct Plaintiff to produce the original note to prove Plaintiff had standing to institute the foreclosure action. The court determined Plaintiff had standing and rendered judgment of strict foreclosure. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Plaintiff had standing to bring this action after Defendant challenged Plaintiff's standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, Defendant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of Plaintiff's standing where the trial court's determination that Plaintiff had standing to commence this action was not in error. Remanded. View "Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers" on Justia Law