Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the servicer of his loan (Bank) in a putative class action, asserting that the Bank's requirement that he maintain flood insurance coverage in an amount sufficient to cover the replacement value of his home breached the terms of his mortgage contract. The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Specifically, Defendant contended that the Bank, under a covenant of the mortgage contract, could not require more than the federally mandated minimum flood insurance. The covenant was a standard uniform covenant prescribed by the FHA pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed by an equally divided en banc First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract, as (1) the Bank's reading of the contract was correct and Plaintiff's was incorrect; (2) Plaintiff could not avoid dismissal on the grounds that his specific understanding or the actions of the parties created an ambiguity; and (3) the United States' position articulated in its amicus brief, which stated that Plaintiff's interpretation of the contract was incorrect, reinforced the Court's conclusion. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ind. Code 6-1.1-24-3(b), which provides that a mortgagee annually request by certified mail a copy of notice that a parcel of real property is eligible for sale under the tax sale statutes. Here a bank, which held a mortgage on certain property, failed to submit a form affirmatively requesting from the county auditor to mail notice of a pending sale of the real property. Therefore, the bank was not notified that its mortgaged property was tax delinquent until after the property had been sold and the buyer requested a tax deed. The buyer filed a petition to direct the county auditor to issue a tax deed for the property, and the bank filed a response challenging the tax sale notice statutes as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court issued an order holding that the statute was unconstitutional and denying the buyer's petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 6-1.1-24-3(b) was constitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remanded. View "M & M Inv. Group, LLC v. Ahlemeyer Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

The federal government holds, in trust for three Indian communities, certain Minnesota land acquired in the late 1800s, with federal funds appropriated for a statutorily identified group of Indians. That beneficiary group and the three present-day communities that grew on the land overlapped but diverged. Many beneficiaries were part of the communities, but many were not; the communities included many outside the beneficiary group. In 1980 Congress addressed resulting land use problems by putting the land into trust for the three communities that had long occupied them. Since then, proceeds earned from the land, including profits from gaming, have gone to the three communities. Descendants of the Indians designated in the original appropriations acts allege that they, rather than the communities, are entitled to benefits. In earlier litigation the Federal Circuit rejected a claim that the appropriations acts created a trust for the benefit of statutorily designated Indians and their descendants. On remand, the Court of Federal Claims rejected several new claims, but found the government liable on a claim for pre-1980 revenues from the lands acquired under the 1888-1890 Acts. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, finding that the descendants had no valid claim. View "Wolfchild v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a quiet title action for mineral interests. Defendants-Appellants (Lyngstads) appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in the Plaintiffs-Appellees (Hallins) to a 2/3 interest of an undivided 3/4 interest in minerals in land in Mountrail County. After careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the legal effect of a 1960 warranty deed's plain language, excepting and expressly reserving "unto the Grantors [Lyngstads]" an "undivided 3/4 interest" in the minerals, did not alter their proportion of ownership existing before execution of the 1960 deed. View "Hallin v. Lyngstad" on Justia Law

Stake Center petitioned for a writ of mandamus reversing the district court's denial of its motion for forfeiture under The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Stake Center moved the district court to compel the government to institute criminal forfeiture proceedings against Stake Center's former employee, who was charged with crimes stemming from her embezzlement of funds from Stake Center and others, and to obtain property traceable to the employee's crimes. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error in denying Stake Center's motion for forfeiture where the CVRA and Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), gave victims a right to restitution, not a right to criminal forfeiture. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in declining to order the U.S. Attorneys' Office to commence criminal forfeiture proceedings against the IRS and other non-parties alleged to possess assets implicated in the employee's criminal activities. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "In re: Stake Center Locating, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against North American after the moving company severely damaged or loss some of plaintiff's items. Because plaintiff's claims arose out of the interstate shipment of her possessions, the Carmack Amendment, 29 U.S.C. 14706 et seq., provided the sole and exclusive remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for North America, determining that her claim for damages did not satisfy regulatory requirements. The court concluded that plaintiff's demand letter unequivocally requested that North American remit payment totaling $182,750.00 and constituted a written communication containing facts sufficient to identify the shipment, asserting liability, and making claims for the payment of a specified amount under 49 C.F.R. 1005.2(b). The plain language of the regulation's minimum filing requirements required nothing more. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for North America and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. N. Amer. Van Lines of Texas, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant was a real estate firm that owned a vacant four-story building (the property) and sought to develop it into an office building. Before the Minneapolis City Council approved Appellant's site plan application, the Minneapolis Heritage Preservation Commission (Commission) nominated the property for designation as a local historic landmark. Appellant subsequently submitted an application for a certificate of appropriateness to the Commission. The City Council denied the application and subsequently designated the property as a local historic landmark. Plaintiff commenced this action against the City, alleging that the City violated Minn. Stat. 15.99(2)(a) by failing to approve or deny the application for a certificate of appropriateness within sixty days. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that section 15.99(2)(a) did not apply to an application for a certificate of appropriateness. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an application for a certificate of appropriateness is a "written request relating to zoning" under section 15.99(2)(a), and because the City failed to approve or deny Appellant's application within sixty days, summary judgment for the City was not proper. Remanded. View "500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Appellee Pamela Vukman appealed a superior court order that affirmed the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. That order granted appellees motion to set aside judgment and sheriff's sale, and dismissed appellant Beneficial Consumer Discount Company's praecipe without prejudice. Beneficial moved to foreclose appellee for being in default of her mortgage. The parties agreed to a settlement whereby Beneficial received judgment for the accelerated amount due on the mortgage as long as appellee made regular payments. Appellee eventually defaulted according to the terms of the settlement; Beneficial filed for a writ of execution. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale, and Beneficial was the successful bidder. Appellee then moved to set aside the sale, arguing Beneficial failed to comply with the requirements under the Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Act. The court concluded that Beneficial did not follow the Act's requirements, and as a result, it id not have jurisdiction. Therefore the court set aside the sale and dismissed Beneficial's original complaint. Beneficial appealed; the superior court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act's notice requirement did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Beneficial Consumer Discount Company v. Vukman" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Although several claims of error asserted by claimant were without merit, the court acted nostra sponte in holding that the district court's application of legal standards antedating adoption of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. 983, constituted plain error and affected claimant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Pellegrino" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a; Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.; and Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201-02, seeking to quiet fee-simple title to the Oro Grande mining claim and its improvements. The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6); with regard to plaintiff's first QTA claim, the court concluded that the Solicitor's Opinion was entitled to at least Skidmore deference, and, thus, plaintiff did not have a "valid existing right" to a fee-simple patent on its Oro Grande mining claim; with regard to plaintiff's second QTA claim, plaintiff did not plead with particularity the circumstances under which its title to the structures was acquired; and since the QTA was the exclusive means for challenging the United States' title to real property, the court concluded that the district court also properly dismissed plaintiff's APA and DJA claims. View "McMaster v. United States" on Justia Law