Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the doctrine of adverse possession and whether the presumption that a private drive across another's property was a permissive use and did not give rise to an easement. The presumption does not apply where a drive was not originally established by the other's property owner for his or her own use. Appellee Edward Shaw owned two lots of land; Appellants James Dault and Shala Dobson owned a non-adjacent parcel in the same subdivision. Shaw used a trail as access to his parcel. The trial crossed several parcels, including that owned by Dault and Dobson. Dault built a shed on his property where the trail had been. Shaw's house was not then occupied. When Shaw’s brother, Michael, discovered that a driveway was being constructed, he asked Dault about the project. Dault assured Michael that the new driveway would provide safer access to Shaw's property, but Michael expressed concern over the lack of a Borough permit. During a subsequent conversation, Dault said that he did not believe that he needed a Borough permit. Michael had by then discovered the grantor easements on some of the lots, including his brother's, and based on them, told Dault to remove the obstruction from the trail. After consideration of the parties various land interests and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the presumption of a private drive as permissive use and did not give rise to an easement applied in this case because the drive at issue was constructed by the original subdivision developers for their own use. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding that Shaw had a prescriptive easement to use the portion of the trial crossing Dault's lot. View "Dault v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Through the exercise of its eminent-domain power, the County of Dakota acquired a commercial property owned by Appellant. Following an administrative hearing, three condemnation commissioners awarded Appellant $655,000 in damages. Appellant appealed, arguing that under Minnesota's minimum-compensation statute, he was entitled to an award of damages that would allow him "to purchase a comparable property in the community." The trial court concluded Appellant was entitled to $997,056 in damages after finding that certain property, which was located within the same city as the condemned property, qualified as a comparable property in the community under the statute. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was what qualified as a "comparable property" located in the same "community" as the condemned property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "comparable property" in the minimum-compensation statute refers to an existing property that has enough like characteristics or qualities to another property that the value of one can be used to determine the value of the other; and (2) the district court did not err when it determined that the disputed property qualified as a "comparable property in the community" of the condemned property. View "County of Dakota v. Cameron " on Justia Law

A title services company may not pay a real estate agent a fee in exchange for a referral, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2607(a), with an exemption for “affiliated business arrangements.” The defendants are related title and real estate agency companies and met three prerequisites for the exemption. Home buyers claimed that the defendants fell outside the safe harbor’s coverage because they failed to satisfy a fourth condition announced in a Department of Housing and Urban Development policy statement. The district court held that the policy statement is not binding on the Department, is not otherwise entitled to deference, and does not supplement the Act’s existing safe-harbor conditions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants qualify under the exemption for affiliated businesses. View "Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

A stone wall demarcated the boundary between Plaintiff's and Defendant's property. After Plaintiff discovered that a large portion of the stone wall had been destroyed and a significant number of trees on his property were missing, Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Defendant for the unauthorized removal of his trees and the theft of portions of the stone wall. After a jury trial, the trial court granted judgments as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial justice abused her discretion in precluding expert testimony on the subject of historic stone walls, and the exclusion constituted reversible error; and (2) the trial justice committed prejudicial error in granting a judgment as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. View "Morabit v. Hoag" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Norman and Robin Riley appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Spiral Butte Development, LLC and Jim Horkley. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract against Spiral Butte and sought specific performance of the parties' Lease Option Agreement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Riley v. Spiral Butte Development, LLC" on Justia Law

Several neighbors all owning lakefront property objected when others planned on building a dock on the lake and using a portion of what was believed to be a designated common area. Plaintiffs appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their claims that they had the right to use parcels of property designated as common areas in a plat that was void because the persons who recorded the plat did not own all of the real property included in the plat and that awarded the plaintiffs an easement across a parcel of land owned by the cross-appellants. Upon review of the records, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment except as to the width of the easement. View "Siegwarth v. Opportunity Management Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Black Rock Development, Inc. developed a planned unit development consisting of residential homes and a golf course on the shore of Lake Coeur d'Alene. Black Rock Development recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R's) applicable to the development. The CC&R's created the position of "Declarant," named Black Rock Development as the Declarant, stated the rights of the Declarant, defined the time period that the Declarant would be entitled to exercise those rights, and specified the qualifications for a "Successor Declarant." The golf course in the development was developed and owned by The Club at Black Rock, LLC. The Club conveyed its real property to the Washington Trust Bank in lieu of foreclosure. Black Rock Development also assigned to the Bank all of its rights and interests as the Declarant under the CC&R's. The Bank then assigned the real property and the Declarant rights to West Sprague Avenue Holdings, LLC. West Sprague deeded the real property and assigned the Declarant rights to an entity named The Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, which was a different entity than The Club. Black Rock Development assigned to The Golf Club any Declarant rights that Black Rock Development may still have retained due to any procedural or substantive defect in the prior assignments. Plaintiffs, who are the owners of at least one lot in Black Rock and are members of the Black Rock Homeowner's Association, Inc., filed this action against The Golf Club seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not qualified to be a Successor Declarant and therefore could not exercise Declarant rights. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether The Golf Club satisfied the requirements of being a Successor Declarant under the CC&R's. The district court held that it did. It therefore dismissed the complaint and awarded court costs, including attorney fees, against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded The Golf Club did not qualify as a Successor Declarant; it did not take title to Property for the purpose of sale and development. Because The Golf Club did not qualify as a Successor Declarant, it could not exercise the rights or powers of a Declarant. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment, including its award of costs and attorney fees to The Golf Club. View "Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. The Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC" on Justia Law

Utah resident Elham Neilsen wanted to purchase a residence close to the city of Tyler in Smith County, Texas. He contacted Plaintiff-Appellant Holli Telford because he had heard that she knew how to acquire properties through tax or other distress sales and had contacts for obtaining financing for prospective buyers. Mr. Neilsen entered into an agreement with Plaintiff that she would bid on the property and sell it to him after she had obtained the warranty deed. Plaintiff submitted a bid, but did not obtain title to the property because, according to her, it was wrongfully redeemed by the prior owners after she had spent money improving it. She sought specific performance of the alleged contract with Smith County, Texas, or damages for breach of the alleged contract. Defendants moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice as to them and without prejudice as to the other defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but vacated the dismissal with prejudice and remanded the for entry of a judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice. View "Telford v. Smith County" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff financed a purchase of residential property. Residential Finance was the lender; Chase serviced the loan. In 2011 Plaintiff sent Chase a “Qualified Written Request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e), requesting information about the amount owed on the loan, the identity of the “current holder,” the date Chase began servicing the loan, and a breakdown of accrued charges. Plaintiff disputed late fees and other charges and stated that Chase had refused a loan modification for which she qualified and had failed to provide a copy of the Note as requested. Chase sent some material, but stated that any requested information not included was either unavailable or considered proprietary; the letter did not provide the identity of the loan’s owner or information on the correctness of Plaintiff’s account, and did not provide contact information for obtaining assistance. Plaintiff sued, alleging that she made excess payments that Chase failed to credit, violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1641(f)(2), RESPA, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and conversion. Chase finally identified the owner of the loan: Fannie Mae. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to TILA, but reversed dismissal of the RESPA claim, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged causation of damages. View "Marais v. Chase Home Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Borrowers obtained a home loan from Mann Mortgage and executed of deed of trust (DOT) naming the lender. Borrowers also signed a promissory note, which was endorsed to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) was identified in the DOT as the beneficiary of the note. Borrowers later defaulted on the note. MERS then assigned its interest in the DOT to Greenpoint, and Greenpoint assigned the servicing rights to Countrywide Home Loans. Following a series of cancelled foreclosure sales, Borrowers filed a complaint against MERS, Greenpoint, and Countrywide (collectively, Lenders), alleging that they lacked the authority to foreclose. The district court granted summary judgment for Lenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lenders because (1) MERS did not qualify as a beneficiary of the DOT under Montana's Small Tract Financing Act; and (2) MERS' agency relationship with the lender was not sufficiently established to warrant summary judgment. View "Pilgeram v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc." on Justia Law