Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Amzak appealed the district court's summary judgment on its loan loss claims against its title insurance policy provider and related entities. The court concluded that Amzak failed to show that it suffered actual loss because of a failure of title and STL could not be held responsible for any harm suffered by Amzak. The court formalized the holding in First State Bank v. American Title and likewise rejected the guarantee rationale of Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., and agreed with the district court's rejection of Amzak's argument that STL breached the title policy at the time of the loan because its mortgage was voidable at that time. The court also disposed of Amzak's negligence claim where STL's delay in making a complete filing of Amzak's mortgage was not a legal cause of Amzak's loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amzak Capital Mgmt. v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law

Jay and Judith Turim were trustees of a family trust that owned property in a subdivision. Barbara Beach, the owner of a neighboring property in the subdivision, erected a wall at one end of the Turims’ purported private walk easement and had concrete poured over the steps located within the easement that provided usable access to the Turims’ lot. The Turims filed an amended complaint alleging a private nuisance against Beach and asking the trial court to issue an injunction requiring Beach to remove the wall and restore the steps. The circuit court held that an express easement had been created in favor of the Turims over Beach’s property and granted an injunction requiring Beach to remove the wall and to restore the steps within the easement to their former condition. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and vacated the injunction, holding that the Turims were the beneficiaries of an express easement over the private walk, as the subdivision deed did not create an express easement in favor of the Turims. View "Beach v. Turim" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Chapter 286 of the 2007 Session Laws of Maryland. The legislation revised existing law by replacing ejectment with a lien-and-foreclosure process for defaulting lessees of ground leases when more than six months of rent is overdue. Plaintiffs, a group of lessors holding ground leases, brought an action against the State challenging Chapter 286 on constitutional grounds, claiming that the Legislature impermissibly abrogated their vested rights. The State counted that the legislation simply substituted one remedy for another remedy that achieves the same purposes. The circuit court held that the General Assembly exceeded its power and that Chapter 286 operated as an unconstitutional taking of the ground lease holder’s property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the foreclosure-and-lien remedy of Chapter 286 does not provide the same safeguards for leaseholders as the prior ejectment remedy did; (2) accordingly, the foreclosure-and-lien remedy cannot effectively replace the ejectment remedy, which is essential for the right of re-entry in Maryland ground rents; and (3) thus, Chapter 286 cannot survive constitutional scrutiny because the right of re-entry is vested in ground rents entered prior to its enactment. View "State v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

In 2005, Winyah Bay Holdings, LLC held an event aimed at selling marsh-front lots located in South Island Plantation, an affluent, unbuilt housing development. Winyah conducted the sale by lottery, and geared the event toward on-the-spot sales. Winyah had Wachovia Bank and two unrelated realty and marketing companies (the Realtors) set up booths to promote financing the lot sales. Respondents alleged that Winyah, the Realtors, and Wachovia further enticed potential buyers by promising that "day docks, roads, infrastructure, pool [sic], marsh walks, and other amenities would be in place within 18 months of the lottery." Respondents William and Judith Blackburn claimed these promises got them to participate in the lottery. Over six months later, Respondent William Blackburn delivered a promissory note to Wachovia in the amount of $463,967 to finance the purchase of one of the lots. The note was secured by a mortgage and unconditional personal guaranties executed by Tammy Winner, Watson Felder, and Respondents. Sometime in 2008, Respondents failed to make payments on the note. Wachovia then filed a foreclosure action. Respondents answered, asserting counterclaims against Wachovia, cross-claims against the South Island Plantation Association, Incorporated (the HOA), and a third-party complaint against the Seller and the Realtors. At issue here were the counterclaims against Wachovia, which included claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract/breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud/fraud in the inducement, breach of contract/negligence, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, illegality of contract, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA). Wachovia appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the circuit court's determination that Respondents' counterclaims were within the scope of a jury trial waiver in the property sales documents. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the appellate courts' judgment finding that the waivers were executed knowingly and voluntarily; however, the Court reversed the portion finding that the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception to arbitration applies in the jury trial waiver context, and found instead that Respondents waived their right to a jury trial on all of their counterclaims. View "Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

In a quiet title action, the parties disputed claims of ownership to the gas rights underlying a plot of land known as Blackshere. On appeal, EPC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record and found no jurisdictional defect with respect to Republic Partners; the court dismissed REV from the suit where, having reviewed the parties' arguments and the record, the court was satisfied that there was no reason to believe that any party would be harmed by REV's absence, or that plaintiffs received an improper tactical advantage by including REV as a party; the court affirmed the district court's decision that the Memorandum unambiguously conveyed to Cobham the gas rights in the Blackshere Lease; the court rejected EPC's argument that because plaintiffs failed to offer the 2004 Confirmatory Assignment into the record the district court lacked a factual basis on which to find that Prima ever received title to the Blackshere Lease; the court affirmed the district court's decision that Prima was a bona fide purchaser for value in 2004 and therefore held superior title to the Blackshere Lease by virtue of its unbroken, recorded chain of title; and the court rejected EPC's challenges to the district court's procedural rulings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Trans Energy, Inc. v. EQT Production Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the mortgage trust that claimed to hold his mortgage was not validly assigned the mortgage, and therefore, his mortgage could not be foreclosed by the trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee, Wells Fargo. The court affirmed, concluding that the assignment to the mortgage trust was valid. Given the record, including the custodian's initial certification failing to list the promissory note as missing - which provided a strong inference that the note was not missing - and given the lack of any other reason to believe the note was or is missing, the court agreed with the district court that no reasonable jury could find that the original promissory note was not in the Trust's possession on the startup date of the Trust. View "Johnson, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The parties in this suit had interests in a parcel of land as tenants in common. The trial court ordered the equitable partition by sale of the parcel. Appellee Sidney C. Mahan, Jr. sought the equitable partition and sale of the property. Appellant Brittany Pack urged that statutory partition was an adequate remedy and that the property should be divided by metes and bounds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the property could not be fairly divided by metes and bounds, and it granted the petition for an equitable division by sale. Pack appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with Pack's argument that the trial court's order was made in error, insofar as statutory partition was an adequate remedy in this case and no peculiar circumstances required an equitable partition. "But even in a statutory partition, a court may order the sale of property that cannot be fairly divided by metes and bounds, and we see no error in the finding that the property here cannot be fairly divided." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision that the property be sold, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it purported to order the sale as an equitable (rather than a statutory) partition. View "Pack v. Mahan" on Justia Law

Appellants owned residential real estate in West Des Moines. In 2011, the Dallas County Board of Review established an assessment value of Appellants’ property for tax purposes. In 2012, the Board established a new, greater value for the property. Appellants filed a petition with the Board protesting the assessment. The petition stated that the protest was lodged against the 2011 property valuation. At a hearing before the Board, Appellants stated that they wished to protest the valuations for both 2011 and 2012. The Board denied Appellants’ protest, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 2011 protest was untimely. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellants’ petition was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board and bring Appellants’ protest within the Board’s authority to review; and (2) the Board had the authority to entertain a request for amendment of Appellants’ petition and relate it back to the original filing. Remanded. View "Allen v. Dallas County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Appellee taxpayer Trevor Jenkins owned and lived on property in the Town of Milton. He failed to pay property taxes for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 tax years. The Town mailed him three delinquent tax notices, in June 2008, June 2009, and January 2010, respectively, advising him to take additional steps to avoid a tax sale. The notices were sent to taxpayer by first-class mail. He denied receiving them, and the notices were not returned to the Town. In 2010, a notice of tax sale was sent via registered mail, return receipt requested. Nearly two weeks before the tax sale, the notice sent to taxpayer by registered mail was returned to the Town’s attorney unclaimed after two attempts at delivery. The Town proceeded with the sale and Loren and Kathryn Hogaboom purchased taxpayer’s property at auction. On the day following the tax sale, the Town’s attorney sent a letter by first-class mail informing taxpayer that his property had been sold in a tax sale, he had one year from the date of sale to redeem the property, and interest would accrue on the purchase amount. This letter was not returned to the Town’s attorney. Taxpayer did not redeem the property during the one-year period, and the Town issued a deed to the purchasers. Purchasers filed a complaint for ejectment in 2011, seeking a writ of possession for the property. Taxpayer admitted his failure to pay taxes but denied ever having received notice of the tax sale. He filed a counterclaim against purchasers and a third-party complaint against the Town, seeking a declaratory judgment setting aside the tax sale as void. Purchasers and the Town both filed motions for summary judgment, contending that notice to taxpayer satisfied the requirements of due process. The Superior Court concluded taxpayer's due process rights were violated because of the undelivered notices. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hogaboom v. Jenkins v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Monica Clark, as the personal representative of the estate of Lester Jasmanka, appealed a district court order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in Jack and Eugene Peterson. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding: (1) the 1990 judgment was not void and therefore could not be vacated; and (2) the motion to vacate the judgment for fraud and misrepresentation was untimely. View "Peterson v. Jasmanka" on Justia Law