Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Bank commenced this adversary proceeding in Restivo's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, seeking a judgment declaring that the security interest it acquired on January 4, 2005, had priority over the IRS's tax lien filed on January 10, 2005, regardless of the fact that it did not record its security interest until after the IRS had filed notice of its tax lien. The district court granted the Bank priority. The court rejected the district court's holding that Md. Code. Ann., Real Prop. 3-201 gives the Bank retroactive priority over the IRS, concluding that 26 U.S.C. 6323(h)(1)(A)'s use of the present perfect tense precludes giving effect to the Maryland statute's relation-back provision. However, the court affirmed the judgment based on the ground that under Maryland common law, the Bank acquired an equitable security interest in the two parcels of real property on January 4, regardless of recordation, because its interest became protected against a subsequent lien arising out of an unsecured obligation on that date and that therefore its security interest had priority over the IRS's tax lien under sections 6323(a) and 6323(h)(1).View "Susquehanna Bank v. United States/Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Anthony Aulisio, Jr., appealed a jury verdict that found defendants, consisting of his homeowner association's management company (Optimum Professional Property Management and Debra Kovach), the patrol service it employed (BLB Enterprises, Inc., dba Patrol One, and Bill Bancroft), and a towing company (PD Transport, dba Southside Towing, and John Vach), did not wrongfully tow and convert his Jeep vehicle, nor convert the personal property it contained. CAAJ Leasing Trust (CAAJ), which Aulisio created as sole grantor, trustee, and trust beneficiary, owned legal title to the Jeep and also appeals. CAAJ appeals the trial court's ruling at the outset of trial that CAAJ "can't participate in the proceedings" with Aulisio appearing in propria persona as the trust's sole trustee and sole beneficiary. The trial court relied on precedent that an executor or personal representative may not appear in propria persona in court proceedings outside the probate context on behalf of a decedent's estate because representing another person or entity's interest in a lawsuit constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. But if a sole trustee is also the trust's sole settlor and beneficiary, the rationale of these cases ceases to apply: no interests are at stake except those of one person. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that a sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. The judgment as to CAAJ was reversed, and the case remanded so Aulisio may appear in propria persona to assert his interest as the sole beneficial owner of the Jeep as a trust asset. The Court affirmed the judgment against Aulisio in his individual capacity concerning his personal property in the Jeep.View "Aulisio v. Bancroft" on Justia Law

In August 2007, Winnie Lyons signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering her real property in Burien. The property served as Lyons' primary residence and was also where she operated an adult family home (AFH). Wells Fargo Bank NA was the lender and beneficiary; Northwest Trustee Services LLC (NWTS) was the trustee. In October 2009, an employee of Wells Fargo executed a beneficiary declaration identifying Wells Fargo as trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006. In June 2010, another beneficiary declaration was executed by an employee of Wells Fargo naming Wells Fargo Bank as the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation evidencing the above-referenced loan "or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said obligation." In 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo. While Lyons was waiting for a response regarding her application for a modification, she received a notice of trustee's sale from NWTS informing her that her property was scheduled to be sold. Wells Fargo told Lyons' attorney that the modification had been approved, the terms of which were that Lyons had to pay $10,000 by a set deadline. Wells Fargo informed Lyons they would discontinue the sale upon receipt of this payment. Lyons made the payment as requested, however, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons' loan to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3 with Carrington Mortgage Services LLC as the new servicer of the loan (to be effective May 1, 2012). NWTS received notice of the sale and service release; Lyons received notice of this sale. Lyons' attorney was informed that Wells Fargo no longer had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, Lyons had received a loan modification, so she was no longer in default. Lyons' attorney again called NWTS to inform them of the loan modification and the sale of the loan. A NWTS employee informed her that Carrington had directed NWTS to continue with the foreclosure sale as scheduled. Lyons' attorney called Carrington and an employee indicated that Carrington did not show the property in foreclosure status. Another employee further indicated that Carrington had not told NWTS to go forward with the sale. Lyons' attorney then sent a cease and desist letter to NWTS and Carrington. Lyons' attorney followed up with NWTS; NWTS acknowledged receipt and informed her the sale was still on but that the matter had been referred to an attorney. Lyons' attorney again spoke with NWTS' attorney, who refused to discontinue the sale. Lyons' attorney filed the complaint. NWTS then executed and recorded a notice of discontinuance of the trustee's sale. Lyons alleged that this situation the foreclosure sale created had serious emotional and economic impacts on her. In addition to the sense of humiliation Lyons felt, Lyons alleged she lost business as a result of the foreclosure process. Lyons asserted that she experienced constant nausea from the stress and continuously worried about losing her business and the subsequent homelessness of herself, her son, and the elderly clients she cared for. NWTS moved for summary judgment. After argument, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to all claims against NWTS. Subsequently, Lyons and the remaining defendants (Stanwich, Carrington, and Wells Fargo) entered a stipulated order of dismissal. Lyons' motion for reconsideration of the order of summary judgment was denied. We granted Lyons' petition for direct review. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the alleged violations of the deed of trust act (DTA) and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but the Court reversed and remanded as to Lyons' Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim.View "Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Appellant Merle Temple and Appellee Bradley Gartner owned 3,375 acres of land as tenants in common. After relations between Temple and Gartner deteriorated, Gartner brought an action for partition. After appointing three referees and adopting the referees’ report, the circuit court ordered a partition in kind and ordered Gartner to make a compensatory payment to Temple. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a partition in kind, as Temple did not show that partition in kind would cause great prejudice to the owners; (2) the circuit court did not err in adopting the referees’ report; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to reduce the compensatory payment in favor of allocating additional land to Temple.View "Gartner v. Temple" on Justia Law

Eastern Farmers Cooperative (EFC) applied for and was granted a conditional use permit to build and operate an agronomy facility on sixty acres of land near Colton, South Dakota. Appellants’ residence was directly across a county road from the proposed facility. Appellants appealed. The Minnehaha County Commission upheld the decision to grant the conditional use permit to EFC, as did the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County Commission’s decision to uphold the approval of the permit was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of Appellants’ due process rights; and (2) any alleged due process concerns arising out of a certain commissioner’s participation in the County Commission’s action were remedied by invalidating that commissioner’s vote.View "Hanson v. Minnehaha County Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the viability of the historic police power of the state in validating and regulating riparian rights and remedies where it was alleged that a downstream landowner subject to federal rail-safety regulations obstructed a natural watercourse causing upstream flooding and significant damage as a result. Hotel owner David Miller and his hotel (appellants) sought to hold the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") liable for water damage allegedly resulting from the negligent construction and/or maintenance of a nearby SEPTA-owned railroad bridge. Appellants purchased hotel property in 1996, and they claimed that the bridge thereafter obstructed the flow of a creek which ran under the bridge, causing the creek to flood appellants' upstream hotel on three separate occasions of extreme weather conditions. On each occasion, appellants experienced flooding that filled the hotel basement and first floor. In 2001, the hotel closed and appellants declared bankruptcy. "As this is an area of law that has been regulated by the Commonwealth for centuries," the Pennsylvania Court concluded that there was no clear and manifest federal congressional intention to preempt Pennsylvania law central issue of this case. The Court declined to "invalidate the rights and remedies afforded to appellants under the laws of this Commonwealth." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded this case for further proceedings.View "Miller v. SEPTA" on Justia Law

In 2004, the plaintiffs’ Rockvale, Tennessee home burned down. They replaced it with a 2180-square-foot, “triple-wide” manufactured home purchased from the defendant for $160,230. Defendant was responsible for “normal delivery and installation” on the plaintiffs’ land and warranted that, “[f]or new homes, installation at the initial homesite will be completed in accordance with applicable governmental requirements.” Defendant delivered and installed the home in March 2005, but only one member of the installation crew was identified. He was not licensed to install manufactured homes as required by T.C. 68-126-404(a). Plaintiffs immediately began noticing defects that suggested the home was not level when installed and notified the defendant before they closed the purchase. Defendant assured plaintiffs that it would repair and level the home. After several years of inspections and repair efforts, defendant never levelled or repaired the home to the plaintiffs’ satisfaction. Plaintiffs sued, claiming breach of contract and federal breach of warranty under15 U.S.C.A. 2304, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, “and/or other applicable law.” The district court held that an arbitration clause was invalid and awarded $39,238.29. The Sixth Circuit remanded, concluding that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the home is not a “consumer product” under the Magnuson-Moss Act.View "Bennett v. CMH Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Margaret Butcher and her former husband purchased property in 2005 with a loan secured by the property from Home Federal Bank. Butcher received the property in their divorce in 2009, and she subsequently defaulted on the loan. Wells Fargo Bank, the indorsee of the loan, foreclosed on the property. At the foreclosure sale, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) purchased the property with a credit bid. FHLMC then filed a post-foreclosure eviction complaint for ejectment and restitution of the property. The magistrate court granted FHLMC's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment in favor of FHLMC. Butcher appealed. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision. Butcher appealed again, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too.View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher" on Justia Law

In 2005, Herbert and Julie Thomas opened a $2,000,000.00 home equity line of credit (the HELOC) with U.S. Bank. To secure the obligation, the Thomases executed a deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank to their property in Sun Valley. A few months later, the Thomases approached Citimortgage, Inc. seeking refinancing. Blaine County Title Associates (BCT) issued a Commitment for Title Insurance under which Stewart Title Guarantee Company agreed to issue a policy to CitiMortgage so long as all prior deeds of trust, including the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust, were released so that CitiMortgage would be in first lien position with regard to the Thomas Property. To that end, BCT contacted the local branch of U.S. Bank in Ketchum to determine the HELOC payoff amount. In response, U.S. Bank faxed BCT a screen shot of an account inquiry reflecting the balance owed on the HELOC. The Thomases closed with Citimortgage a few weeks later, and the Citimortgage loan was secured by a deed of trust on their property. The Citimortgage deed of trust was recorded days later. This appeal arose from a lien priority dispute between U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage. The district court concluded that U.S. Bank lost its first priority position on the Thomas property after finding that CitiMortgage delivered a demand for reconveyance and U.S. Bank failed to release its deed of trust as required by Idaho Code section 45-1514. U.S. Bank appealed, contending that the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that testimony offered by CitiMortgage was inadmissible, and that CitiMortgage failed to prove delivery of the demand for reconveyance. CitiMortgage cross-appealed the district court's decision that CitiMortgage was not entitled to attorney fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that the district court did not err in admitting Citimortgage's proffered testimony, and that it could not determine whether the district court's findings of fact were supported by substantial and competent evidence because the court failed to evaluate certain evidence. As such, the Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "U.S. Bank National Association N.D. v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, LLC appealed a judgment entered in favor of Franklin County dismissing Spirit Ridge's complaint which had requested abatement of a private nuisance and for an injunction against a gun range operated by Franklin County adjacent to its property. In a bench trial, the district court ruled that Spirit Ridge had failed to demonstrate that there was an ongoing and continuing nuisance at the time of the trial. Spirit Ridge appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: the district court record reflected a lack evidence to show that a nuisance existed after 2008.View "Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs v. Franklin County" on Justia Law