Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Major forest fires swept through areas south of Fairbanks in the summer of 2009 and approached properties owned by appellants (the landowners). Firefighters working under the direction of the State Department of Forestry intentionally set fire to the landowners’ vegetation. The burnouts deprived the advancing wildfires of fuel and saved the structures. But the landowners sued the State, bringing a takings claim under the eminent domain provision of the Alaska Constitution, article I, section 18, and tort claims for negligence and intentional misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the tort claims because of governmental immunity; it reversed its dismissal of the constitutional claim, remanding it to the superior court for further consideration of whether the specific exercise of the State’s police powers at issue here was justified by the doctrine of necessity.View "Brewer v. Alaska" on Justia Law

AIDG Properties, LLC, a real-estate holding company managed by Anjan Dutta-Gupta, purchased property. AIDG obtained loans from BankNewport (Defendant) to finance the purchase and to perform improvements. Dutta-Gupta personally guaranteed the loans. Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. and Tecta America New England, LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) served as subcontractors on the project. Plaintiffs substantially completed the renovations, and BankNewport deposited the loan proceeds into AIDG’s account. After Dutta-Gupta was arrested, Defendant declared Dutta-Gupta to be in default and accelerated the loans. Defendant then set off the deposit it made previously by reversing it. As a result, AIDG was unable to pay Plaintiffs for the work they had performed. Defendant, who was granted possession of the property, later foreclosed. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to recover compensation for their work under the theory of unjust enrichment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due to the absence of a relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant and the lack of any allegation that Defendant engaged in any type of misconduct or fraud, Defendant’s retention of the property, including the improvements, was not inequitable under the Court’s jurisprudence on unjust enrichment.View "Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. BankNewport" on Justia Law

Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. ("TCVH"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of First Tuskegee Bank on breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims stemming from a construction loan TCVH received from First Tuskegee in September 2004. The gravamen of those claims was that TCVH was injured by First Tuskegee's alleged insistence that TCVH use PJ Construction as the general contractor on the project although PJ Construction was not licensed as a general contractor in Alabama, that PJ Construction's work product was below what one would expect from a properly licensed general contractor, and that using PJ Construction resulted in delays, cost overruns, and, TCVH argued, the ultimate failure of its business. However, because TCVH's claims accrued in approximately July 2005 and TCVH did not formally assert them until after it initiated this action in April 2009, those claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that governed them. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of First Tuskegee was affirmed.View "Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. First Tuskegee Bank " on Justia Law

In 2004, Paint Rock Turn, LLC purchased a sod farm and related farm equipment. To partially finance the purchase, Paint Rock borrowed $1,706,250 from First Jackson Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the sod farm and a security interest in the equipment used on the farm. By February 2009, reflecting in part a drop in demand for sod caused by the collapsing market for new homes, Paint Rock had defaulted on the loan. In early 2009, Paint Rock filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The filing of the petition operated as an automatic stay and precluded First Jackson from foreclosing on the sod farm or retaking the equipment. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed later that year, and a few months later, First Jackson moved forward with its intent to foreclose by publishing the first of three notices of a foreclosure sale on the Paint Rock property. On the morning of the scheduled sale, Paint Rock filed a second bankruptcy petition, which stayed the sale. This second petition was dismissed a month later for failure to file the proper schedules and statements. First Jackson published another notice that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled for December 30, 2009. December 26, Paint Rock filed a third bankruptcy petition. Four days later, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, expressly finding that Paint Rock misused the bankruptcy process to "hinder and delay First Jackson's efforts to foreclose its mortgage and security agreement." First Jackson was the high bidder at the sale, purchased the property, and sent Paint Rock a letter demanding possession of the sod farm. In early 2010, First Jackson filed an ejectment action. The same day, Paint Rock demanded access to the farm to recover "emblements in the form of sod which is being grown on the real property recently foreclosed upon ...." Paint Rock also requested the return of its equipment. First Jackson denied Paint Rock's request. Paint Rock, relying on a section of the Alabama Code that permits a tenant at will to harvest its crop, counterclaimed for damages for harm suffered as the result of being unable to harvest the sod. Paint Rock also sought damages for conversion of "plats of sod" contained on the sod farm. First Jackson sold the sod farm to Mrs. Goodson, subject to any claim Paint Rock may have to the emblements growing on the property. Paint Rock filed a joint third-party complaint against First Jackson and Mr. and Mrs. Goodson, alleging conversion and detinue, as well as the emblements claim. After the trial court denied motions for a summary judgment filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Paint Rock and Jones's case, the trial court granted a motion for a JML filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons on Paint Rock's counterclaim for emblements on the ground that Paint Rock was not an at-will tenant. After Paint Rock withdrew its detinue claims and the trial court granted a JML on the wantonness claims, leaving only the conversion and negligence claims. The jury awarded Paint Rock damages against First Jackson for conversion of a sod cutter and cut sod that had been loaded on a tractor-trailer when First Jackson took possession of the property. The jury also awarded Paint Rock damages against the Goodsons for conversion of business property and equipment. Paint Rock appealed the JML in favor of the defendants on the emblements claim; First Jackson cross-appealed the judgment awarding Paint Rock damages for conversion of the cut sod. The Supreme Court affirmed with regard to Paint Rock's emblements claim, but reversed on the conversion of the cut sod claim.View "Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff/Petitioner owned a 64-acre site in Jackson, California (comprised of five assessor parcel numbers), which included an 11-acre portion of (historical) arsenopyrite mine tailings, known as “Tim’s Corner” (the property is also known as the Argonaut Mine Tailings Site). In 1998, the Department of Toxic Substances Control, after testing, constructed a fence around plaintiff’s property and posted a lien for $245,306.64. In November 2007, the Department made an imminent or substantial endangerment determination concerning the property. Plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing to contest this determination; no hearing was provided, but the Department sent plaintiff a letter explaining the basis of this determination. Without notice to plaintiff, the Department secured two property inspection warrants, one in 2008 and another in 2010. In early February 2011, the Department advised plaintiff that it intended to update and increase its lien from $245,306.64 to $833,368.19. The Department also advised plaintiff, for the first time, of a right to a hearing concerning the placement of the lien on her property. On February 17, 2011, plaintiff, in a letter to the Department, requested a hearing on four issues, the propriety of the lien increase, the amount of the lien increase, the properties covered by the lien and additional information the Department obtained to justify the work performed. The Department did not provide a hearing as requested. Plaintiff then sued, seeking a writ of mandate to require the Department to hold the hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded that the procedure the Department used to deny plaintiff's appeal violated due process; its lien procedure failed to allow an affected landowner to dispute the amount of the lien, the extent of the property burdened by the lien and the characterization of the landowner as the responsible party.View "Van Horn v. Dept. Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two felony counts of possessing cocaine for sale and the People filed a petition to forfeit the $2,709 in cash found in her possession. Defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the civil forfeiture order because the forfeiture action was "tried" more than two years after she entered her plea, in violation of the statutory mandate that the two actions be "tried in conjunction" with each other; and the trial court's grant of summary judgment violated her constitutional and statutory right to trial by jury. The court rejected defendant's arguments, holding that a civil action to forfeit less than $25,000 cash need not be tried or otherwise settled at the same time that the criminal defendant enters a plea on the "underlying or related" criminal drug charges. Further, defendant's right to a jury trial was not violated where, in this civil forfeiture action, defendant did not raise any procedural improprieties in the trial court's handling of the summary judgment motion, or its earlier order deeming admitted the People's requests for admission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "People v. $2,709 U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

In 1989, land in Waikoloa on Hawai’i Island was reclassified from agricultural to urban to allow for the development of a residential community. The reclassification was made subject certain conditions. The land changed hands several time over the years. In 2009, the landowner, Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC (Bridge), informed the Land Use Commission (LUC) that it intended to assign its interest in the land to DW Aina Le’a Development, LLC (DW). DW subsequently invested approximately $20 million in developing the site. Nevertheless, the LUC voted to revert the land to its former agricultural land use classification on the basis that Bridge and its predecessors in interest had failed to perform according to the conditions imposed. Bridge and DW each sought judicial review of the LUC’s decision and order. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that the LUC erred in reverting the property without complying with the requirements of Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-4; and (2) erred in concluding that Bridge’s and DW’s procedural and substantive due process rights and equal protection rights were violated.View "DW Aina Le'a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife purchased a home in Massachusetts that was encumbered by a mortgage. The mortgage was eventually assigned to Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Defendant ultimately invoked its statutory power of sale and sent a notice of foreclosure sale to Plaintiff’s home address. Plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all counts and denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, holding that none of the grounds advanced by Plaintiff for reversal of the district court’s denial of reconsideration warranted relief.View "Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Regent filed suit against buyer defendants, alleging that they purchased and resold converted property - children's clothing - from other defendants, against which the complaint also alleged conversion. The trial court granted buyer defendants' motions for summary judgment. Buyer defendants concede that they purchased converted goods, of which Regent was the true owner. Buyer defendants argue that the general rule of strict liability does not exist and that, to the contrary, innocent purchasers of converted goods cannot be held liable for conversion. The court held that bona fide purchasers of converted goods are ordinarily liable for conversion; the cases cited by buyer defendants and the Superior Court do not support buyer defendants' contention that innocent purchasers of converted goods cannot be liable for conversion; and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded.View "Regent Alliance v. Rabizadeh" on Justia Law

Section 11-41-2 of the Helena City Code (the Ordinance) places limitations on roofing materials used on structures located within the wildland-urban interface (WUI) district. The City filed suit against homeowners whose property was situated within the WUI zoning district (Homeowners), alleging violation of the Ordinance. Homeowners answered the complaint and petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeowners, concluding that the Ordinance was a building regulation, and the City was not authorized to adopt building regulations under the guise of a zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that the Ordinance was an impermissible building code and not a zoning ordinance; (2) erred by concluding that Homeowners were ineligible for an award of attorney fees; and (3) did not err by denying and dismissing Homeowners' constitutional arguments.View "City of Helena v. Svee" on Justia Law