Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

2 Ton Plumbing, LLC recorded a notice of mechanics’ lien against a lot in a development (Lot 30). Gregory and Kendra Thorgaard later purchased Lot 30 and executed a trust deed in favor of Washington Federal. Thereafter, 2 Ton recorded amended notices of mechanics’ lien against Lot 30 and filed a lien foreclosure claim against the Thorgaards and Washington Federal. Washington Federal, meanwhile, recorded its notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security purporting to release 2 Ton’s original notice of lien. The district court ultimately entered judgment against Lot 30, which included principal and fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) 2 Ton’s amended notices of lien were invalid because they included attorney fees and costs in the value of the mechanics’ lien, but 2 Ton’s original notice of lien remained valid; (2) the Thorgaards’ notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security complied with the statutory requirements, and therefore, the district court erred in refusing to release Lot 30 from the lien; but (3) because the Thorgaards stipulated to the accuracy of the original lien claim, 2 Ton was entitled to recover its costs and a reasonable attorney fees award. Remanded. View "2 Ton Plumbing, LLC v. Thorgaard" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a dispute between two creditors as to whose claim against their debtor's property has priority. Respondents Alan and Marilyn Golub recorded a judgment against their judgment debtor, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (KHD), giving Golubs a judgment lien on property owned by KHD in Kootenai County. KHD claimed to have executed a deed of trust on the property in question several years before Golubs acquired their lien. The beneficiary of the deed of trust was another defendant, Kirk-Scott, Ltd. (KS). The district court granted summary judgment to Golubs, finding that Golubs' duly recorded judgment lien had priority over KS' prior, unrecorded deed of trust. KS appealed. Finding not reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects. View "Alan Golub v. Kirk-Scott, LTD" on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Barker & Little, Inc. (BLI). BLI was a general partner in Barker & Little Limited Partnership III (BLLP) and the operating entity for the management of rental properties, including property titled to BLLP. Doug Hamilton owned BLI, BLLP and Barker & Little Manufactured Homes, Inc. (BLMHI). Great Western Bank extended a line of credit to BLI secured by mobile homes and rent-to-own contracts owned by BLMHI. The Bank later initiated foreclosure proceedings against BLMHI and BLLP. BLI was named as a codefendant in each action. The Bank, however, did not join Plaintiff as a defendant or notify her of the foreclosure actions. The Bank and Hamilton privately negotiated a settlement agreement. When she learned of the Bank’s foreclosure actions, Plaintiff initiated this action against the Bank. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not have an interest in, or lien on, the foreclosure property on the date the Bank filed its foreclosure actions, and therefore, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the Bank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Peters v. Great Western Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned properties located along Farm Road and a ten-foot right-of-way (collectively, the Farm Road), which provided the only means of access to Petitioners’ properties. Petitioners filed suit in the circuit court against the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the Commission) and several other defendants, alleging several claims based on the Commission’s refusal to recognize Farm Road and to issue addresses to Petitioners. The circuit court dismissed the action. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the Court of Special Appeals (1) properly upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of Petitioners’ state constitutional claims for Petitioners’ failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act; (2) properly upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioners’ easement claims for failure to join necessary parties, i.e., adjacent property owners; but (3) erred in determining that Petitioners failed to file their slander of title claim within the statute of limitations. View "Rounds v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an action against a Bank seeking to foreclose his judgment lien against property owned by the Bank. Wells Fargo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint because the judgment lien had expired while the foreclosure action was pending. The district court granted the Bank’s motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Appellant argued that the Court should overturn its precedent holding that a foreclosure action does not toll the expiration of a judgment or hold that the Bank should be estopped from asserting the expiration of the judgment because the Bank unfairly extended the foreclosure litigation past the judgment’s expiration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) filing a foreclosure action does not toll the expiration of a judgment; and (2) principles of equity do not support tolling the expiration of Appellant’s judgment. View "Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - three generations of the Meine family - filed this action against Defendants - a small corporation operated by family members - seeking a determination that they held a prescriptive easement over a road where it crossed Defendants’ land and a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from blocking or impeding the use of this easement. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs established a prescriptive easement over Defendants’ land and permanently enjoined Defendants from blocking or impairing the easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted and applied the law when it found that a prescriptive easement may exist despite the dominant and servient estates being non-contiguous; (2) the evidence supported a finding that Defendants used their land for many lawful purposes; (3) the evidence supported the district court’s finding of a prescriptive easement; and (4) the district court did not err in determining the nature and the scope of the prescriptive easement. View "Meine v. Hren Ranches, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over ownership of parking spaces situated between The Falls Homeowners Association (“The Falls”) and Falls Garden Condominium Association (“Falls Garden”). The Falls and Falls Garden executed a letter of intent in settlement of litigation. After problems arose between the parties, The Falls filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement to implement the letter of intent. The circuit court judge granted The Falls’s motion. The court ordered The Falls to prepare a settlement agreement and a release of all claims and ordered Falls Garden to execute the settlement agreement. On appeal, Falls Garden argued that the Letter of Intent was not binding because the parties did not intend to be bound and because the letter did not contain all material terms. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the letter of intent was an enforceable contract to which the parties intended to be bound; and (2) because the letter of intent was unambiguous and constituted an enforceable contract, the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a plenary hearing on the merits of the motion to enforce settlement agreement. View "Falls Garden Condo. Ass’n v. Falls Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law