Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Loma San Marcos, LLC, Questhaven Pacific View, LLC, and La Paz Sunset, Inc. (collectively "Loma San Marcos") purchased a 15-acre property subject to a security and lien agreement with the City of San Marcos. The agreement was entered into by the property's former owner to securitize fees due pursuant to a conditional use permit that allowed the owners to convert the property from a recycling facility to a movie studio. Under the agreement the property owner was obligated to pay the City impact mitigation fees by dates certain. After purchasing the property and negotiating an amendment to the agreement extending the payment deadlines, Loma San Marcos failed to pay the fees. As a result and based on other terms of the agreement, the City brought a judicial foreclosure action. After trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the City. Loma San Marcos appealed, arguing the fees were not due because: (1) the City had not yet issued permits; (2) the renegotiated agreement was unenforceable because it was not supported by valid consideration; and (3) even if otherwise otherwise enforceable, the fees set in the agreement were illegal under the California Mitigation Fee Act and the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and concluded Loma San Marcos, represented by sophisticated real estate investors, entered a binding agreement with the City to pay the fees at issue or face foreclosure of the property. View "City of San Marcos v. Loma San Marcos" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on an insurance-coverage dispute that began in 2011 between Severin and Stephanie Hegel and The First Liberty Insurance Corporation. The Hegels claimed that First Liberty improperly denied their claim for a "sinkhole loss," defined under their homeowner's insurance policy as "structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity." First Liberty argued that the damage to the Hegels' residence did not qualify as "structural damage," a term that was not defined in either the policy or the version of the Florida sinkhole-insurance statute applicable to their claim. The the district court granted summary judgment for the Hegels, finding that "structural damage" meant any "damage to the structure" and awarded them $166,518.17 in damages. First Liberty appealed. After review, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded: the district court erred in equating the contractual term "structural damage" with any "damage to the structure." The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how much, if any, structural damage to the Hegels' house (as properly defined) was due to sinkhole activity. The district court's determination on this issue will in turn lead to either a new grant of summary judgment for the appropriate party or to a trial on the merits. View "Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a decree of foreclosure giving a suburban improvement district ("HISID") a lien against certain pieces of property for unpaid assessments. Appellant owned one of those properties. The decree stated that the redemption of the properties would be governed by a statute that grants a two-year period in which to redeem the property. HISID was granted the property formerly owned by Appellant subject to Appellant’s redemption rights. HISID then executed a limited warranty deed granting the property to Appellee. More than one year later, Appellant filed a petition to redeem property. Appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that, although the decree applied the two-year redemption period for draining improvement districts, the thirty-day period applicable to suburban improvement districts should apply. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, concluding that Appellant’s petition was untimely because Appellant’s right of redemption was governed by the thirty-day period applicable to suburban improvement districts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee’s collateral attack on the foreclosure decree based upon her allegation that the redemption period cited in the decree could not be sustained. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the grant of summary judgment and a final judgment against Melanie Bosarge. The trial court found that Bosarge was individually liable for the deficiency balance after foreclosure under the terms of a personal guaranty she executed in relation to a secured loan made to her company, Indian Head Station, LLC ("Indian Head"). On appeal, Bosarge argued that a material issue of fact existed, inter alia, as to the value of the property securing the debt, that LWC MS Properties, LLC (LWC) should not have been permitted to maintain suit as a dissolved corporation, and that Bosarge should have been allowed to amend her pleadings and answer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that material facts indeed existed, and reversed and remanded the case with respect to summary judgment. Further, the Court found the second and third issues should have been addressed by the trial court upon remand. View "Bosarge v. LWC MS Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Duane Mueller filed this action against Carolyn Hill, Kevin Thompson, Philomena Keys, and Northwest Shelter Systems, LLC (a company owned by Kevin Thompson and Philomena Keys), to recover damages for trespass after construction debris landed on his property from his neighbor Kevin Thompson's adjoining property. Kevin Thompson had caused cap rock to be installed on the portion of a driveway that was adjacent to the common boundary, replaced an existing culvert, and added a rock catch basin in order to address the problem of water runoff flowing onto the Mueller property. In an attempt to return the Mueller property to its pre-2008 condition, he also hired a company to remove material that had been dumped onto the Mueller property when building a roadway in 2008. In March 2013, the matter was tried to the district court without a jury, and it awarded Mr. Mueller damages for trespass plus court costs and attorney fees. The Defendants then timely appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment except for $1,000 of the damages awarded, and remanded the case for the entry of an amended judgment. View "Mueller v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Board of Tax Appeals' (the BTA) denied appellant Jayo Development, Inc.'s application for a business inventory property tax exemption. In 2012, Jayo Development applied for a property tax exemption pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-602W(4), claiming that the property qualified as site improvements held by a land developer. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied the application. Subsequently, the BTA and the district court both affirmed the denial. On appeal, Jayo Development argued: (1) that the plain language of the statute entitled it to the exemption;, (2) that the district court erred in relying on IDAPA 35.01.03.620 in denying Jayo Development the tax exemption; and (3) that the 2013 amendment of Idaho Code section 63-602W(4) clarified the legislature's intent and supports its interpretation of the statute. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Thomas and Rebecca Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Stanley. In 2012, the City provided notice to the Arnolds (and other interested parties) of the date and time for three public hearings and a regular city council meeting, all scheduled to take place on August 9, 2012. The first of the three public hearings was noticed to begin at 5:00 p.m. and was for the purpose of receiving public comment on proposed Ordinance 189, the ordinance that the Arnolds alleged affected their property rights. The second and third hearings were noticed to begin at 5:15 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., respectively (and were for the purpose of public comment on matters not at issue here). The regular city council meeting was noticed to begin at 6:00 p.m. The first two meetings were held at their scheduled times. The third meeting began five minutes early, at 5:25 p.m., and concluded at 5:29 p.m. The regular city council meeting, scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m., commenced at 5:31 p.m. and adjourned at 6:55 p.m. Prior to the start of the 6:00 p.m. meeting, the City did not amend the notices it had provided or otherwise notify the public that the meetings would begin earlier than scheduled. The early start time of the 6:00 p.m. meeting and the City's failure to provide amended notice of the earlier start time were the issues presented in this appeal to the Supreme Court: it was at the 6:00 p.m. meeting that the mayor and city council deliberated toward a decision on Ordinance 189, eventually voting to adopt the ordinance. Although the Arnolds were fully aware of the agenda items to be discussed at the various meetings, at no time from the outset of the first meeting at 5:03 p.m. until the final meeting adjourned at 6:55 p.m. did they attend the meeting; the Arnolds conceded at oral argument that they had no intention of attending the meeting. Following adoption of Ordinance 189, the Arnolds filed an action against the City under Idaho Code section 67-2347(6), seeking to have the ordinance declared null and void because the City held the 6:00 p.m. meeting in violation of Idaho's open meeting law by starting the meeting early and failing to provide notice of the earlier start time. The district court held the Arnolds lacked standing to bring an enforcement action because the plain language of Section 67-2347(6) allows standing for such an action only to one who is actually affected by a violation of the open meeting law, instead of being affected only by a substantive action taken at the meeting. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on this basis. The Arnolds appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: because a plain reading of the statute contradicted the Arnolds' argument, and because they did not even claim to have been actually harmed by the 6:00 p.m. meeting's early start time, the Court found that their appeal was brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "Arnold v. City of Stanley" on Justia Law

In 2004, Berkeley issued a use permit for construction of a building with 51 residential rental units and ground floor commercial space. Permit condition 10 provides: “Before submission for building permit, the applicant shall submit floor plans and schedules … showing the location of each inclusionary unit and the sales or rental prices…. and that the unit rent or sales price complies with Chapter 23C.12” (Inclusionary Housing Ordinance). The Ordinance was designed to comply with Government Code section 65580, requiring a general plan to contain a housing element stating how the local agency will accommodate its share of regional need for affordable housing. The ordinance requires that 20 percent of all newly constructed residential units be reserved for households with below-median incomes and rented at below-market prices. The development took more than seven years. The city sought a declaration that the condition was valid, conceding that the ordinance has been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, 1954.50), but arguing that it may enforce the condition, the validity of which was not previously challenged. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the city. View "City of Berkeley v. 1080 Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

Sanowicz and Bacal are licensed real estate salespersons. Sanowicz alleges that he and Bacal agreed to share commissions earned by either of them on certain sales of real property, but that Bacal breached that agreement. The two did share some commissions. The trial court dismissed, based on Business and Professions Code section 10137,4 which provides that it is unlawful for a real estate agent to accept compensation from any person other than the real estate broker under whom he or she is licensed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that licensed real estate agents may agree to share commissions earned under certain circumstances. In stating that an agent may pay commission to another licensee, the Legislature did not limit the payee to a licensed broker; instead it required that any such payment be made “through the broker” thus permitting payments to be made to licensed real estate professionals, whether agents or brokers. View "Sanowicz v. Bacal" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners alleging that Petitioners placed certain impediments and obstructions within a twenty-foot right-of-way that existed over a paved roadway that provided deeded access to Respondent’s property. Respondent sought a permanent injunction against the placement of impediments in the right-of-way. The circuit court permanently enjoined Petitioners from placing any impediments or obstructions within the right-of-way. The court also concluded that Respondent had a prescriptive easement for the location of his water line through Petitioner’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting injunctive relief to Respondent prohibiting Petitioner from placing obstructions in Respondent’s easement and concluded that the current location of Respondent’s water line was an appurtenant prescriptive easement through Petitioners’ property. View "Weatherholt v. Weatherholt" on Justia Law