Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Arizona Supreme Court
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In this case, Steven and Mary Drummond, who resided in their 2017 Tiffin Allegro motor home, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed that their motor home was subject to the homestead exemption as a "mobile home" under Arizona law. The trustee objected, arguing that the Drummonds' motor home was not a mobile home under Arizona law. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona certified the question to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona: “Whether a motor home in which a person over 18 years of age resides qualifies as a mobile home for the purpose of claiming an Arizona homestead exemption pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3).” The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that a motor home does not qualify for an exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3). The court reasoned that the statutory context of A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3) suggests that a "mobile home" under the statute describes a dwelling that is not intended to be moved once placed and physically attached to property. Thus, a "motor home" is not a "mobile home" under the homestead statute because it is readily movable and not anchored to land. View "In re: DRUMMOND" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed a lower court's decision involving a dispute over a 135 square foot piece of land between two neighboring property owners, the Becks and the Nevilles. The Becks had landscaped their property and mistakenly installed decorative pavers outside their actual property line, encroaching on the Nevilles' land. The Nevilles claimed ownership of this disputed land based on the doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence" and "adverse possession."The Court held that Arizona law recognizes a cause of action for boundary by acquiescence. To succeed in such a claim, a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) they occupied or possessed the property up to a clearly defined line, (2) the adjoining landowners mutually acquiesced to that line as the dividing line between their properties, (3) they continuously acquiesced for ten years, and (4) the actual boundary was uncertain or disputed.The Court also held that occasionally parking a car partially on an adjoining landowner’s property is insufficient to establish the open and notorious element of an adverse possession claim.In this instance, the Court found that the Nevilles failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of either boundary by acquiescence or adverse possession. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the Becks were the rightful owners of the disputed land. View "BECK v NEVILLE" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Appellants' complaint against Maricopa County for appeal of an administrative action and the final judgment on the County's counterclaim, holding that the plain meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A) did not bar jurisdiction.Maricopa County's Planning and Development Department fined Appellants for violations of the county zoning ordinance, and the decision was affirmed. Appellants filed a complaint against the County requesting declaratory relief and alleging due process violations. The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was deficient. The trial court denied the motion and allowed Appellants to file an amended complaint. Thereafter, Appellants brought an amended complaint seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. The County asserted a counterclaim seeking to enforce the fine. The trial court ruled the complaint failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A), and therefore, Appellants failed timely to file a "notice of appeal." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding that Appellants' complaint complied with section 12-904(A)'s three jurisdictional requirements that the timely filing's substance provide notice of the appeal, identify the decision being appealed, and state the issues argued on appeal. View "Shea v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Jorge Othon, who purchased property from Victalina Carreon but never recorded the deed with the county recorder, may not collaterally challenge a default judgment entered in a separate tax lien foreclosure action.The property Othon purchased was encumbered by delinquent property taxes. Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. (APTL) purchased a tax lien on the property and then filed a tax lien foreclosure action against Carreon. The trial court entered default judgment against Carreon. APTL then filed this quiet title action seeking to establish its title to the property. Othon filed an answer and counterclaim requesting that the trial court determine that the default judgment in the foreclosure action was void due to invalid service on Carreon, and declare that title to the property vested in Othon. The trial court granted summary judgment for Othon. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Othon could not, in this quiet title action, collaterally attack the default judgment entered in the foreclosure action. View "Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Othon" on Justia Law

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In this case concerning the meaning and application of a standard title insurance policy exclusion (Exclusion 3(a)) designed to cover any defects, encumbrances, or adverse claims created or suffered by the insured in the context of construction lending, holding that this Court's opinion in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394 (2008), sets forth the proper interpretation and application Exclusion 3(a).In its underlying rulings, the trial court invoked Action Acquisitions to interpret Exclusion 3(a) in the construction lending context. The court of appeals reversed, instead applying the bright-line rule articulated in BB Syndication Services, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance Co., 780 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) this Court adopts Action Acquisitions' causation test for Exclusion 3(a)'s applicability; and (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the BB Syndication approach. View "Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Osborn III Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the Town of Marana violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 9-463.05 by assigning the entire cost of upgraded and expanded wastewater treatment facilities to future homeowners through development impact fees.\Applying the Home Builders Ass'n of Central Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479 (1997), the court ruled that the development impact fees bore a presumption of validity and that section 9-463.05 was satisfied because the development fees resulted in a beneficial use to the development. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding (1) in applying section 9-463.05 as amended, the court of appeals erroneously applied from City of Scottsdale a presumption of validity to the Town's assessment of development fees; and (2) the Town violated section 9-463.05 by making future development bear 100 percent of the cost of acquiring the wastewater treatment facility and bearing nearly all of the cost of upgrading, modernizing, and improving the facility. View "Southern Ariz. Home Builders Ass'n v. Town of Marana" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that public policy prohibits an agreement between a builder-vendor and a homebuyer to disclaim and waive the warranty of workmanship and habitability implied in every contract entered into between the buyer-vendor and homebuyer and to replace it with an express warranty.Plaintiff entered into a preprinted purchase agreement with M & RC II, LLC to buy a home that M & RC II's affiliate, Scott Homes Development Company, would build. Plaintiff later sued M & RC II and Scott Homes (together, Defendants) for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff had waived the implied warranty per the purchase agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy underlying the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability clearly outweighed enforcement of the waiver of that warranty in the purchase agreement. View "Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC" on Justia Law

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In this marriage dissolution case, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's interest in separate property should begin with trial judges using the "Drahos/Barnett formula" and then adjust the calculation to account for the community's overall contribution of labor and funds to the separate property along with the market appreciation of the property.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the formula laid out in Drahos v. Rent, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985) and refined in Branett v. Jedymak, 219 Ariz. 550 (App. 2009) (the Drahos/Barnett formula) was the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, in order to provide for a fair division of the separate property’s increase in value proportionate to the amount the community contributed to the property. The Supreme Court held that the Drahos/Barnett formula is an appropriate starting point for courts to calculate a marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, thus affirming the trial court's judgment in this case. View "Saba v. Khoury" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that when a debtor defaults on a debt secured by a deed of trust and the trustee chooses to sell the property, the trustee's act of recording and serving a notice of trustee's sale does not accelerate the debt as a matter of law.Plaintiff defaulted on a loan for which he executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust against his residential property. Thereafter, two notices of trustee's sales were recorded, but neither notice invoked an optional acceleration clause included in the promissory note and deed of trust. When the property was not sold, Nationstar Mortgage LLC began servicing the loan. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief, arguing that Nationstar was not permitted to foreclose on the property the six-year statute of limitations contained in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-548(A)(1) had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that the notices of trustee's sales accelerated the debt. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationstar, holding that the recording a notice of trustee's sale, by itself, is not an affirmative act that accelerates the debt. View "Bridges v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case arising from five separate tax lien foreclosure actions the Supreme Court held that reasonable fees and costs incurred after a redemption certificate has issued that were a direct and necessary result of completing that redemption are recoverable even though those expenses were incurred after the redemption.After TFLTC, LLC purchased five liens on five properties it filed an action to foreclosure each property owner's redemption rights. The owners eventually redeemed their tax liens, and certificates of redemption issued. Thereafter, TFLTC sought to recover attorney fees and costs in each separate case pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-18206. Relying on Leveraged Land Co. v. Hodges, 226 Ariz. 382 (2011), the trial courts awarded only fees and costs incurred before redemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that reasonable fees and costs arising from the redemption itself are recoverable even though the expenses were incurred following the redemption. View "TFLTC, LLC v. Ford" on Justia Law