Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two plaintiffs, Glen A. Canner and Louis D. Puteri, who separately sued a condominium association, Governors Ridge Association, Inc., alleging that the foundations supporting their respective units were defective. The units, part of a common interest community, were purchased by Canner and Puteri in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The defendant had affirmed its responsibility for any foundation settlement issues. However, despite the units suffering significant, uneven settling and the defendant hiring several companies to investigate potential repairs from 2012 to 2016, no repairs were ultimately made. The plaintiffs commenced their actions in 2016 and 2017, alleging that the defendant had negligently designed and constructed the foundations and had violated its duties under the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA) by failing to conduct necessary repairs.The trial court concluded that the CIOA claims were time-barred by the statutory three-year limitation period generally applicable to tort actions. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments, concluding that the limitation period set forth in § 52-577 applied because the claims sounded in tort rather than contract. The Appellate Court also agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the declaration and bylaws created no duty to repair because the relevant declaration required the defendant to repair only insured common elements, and there was no requirement that the foundations themselves be insured.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court properly applied the statute of limitations set forth in § 52-577 to the portion of the CIOA claims seeking recovery for negligence during the course of construction of the foundations. However, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s disposition, in favor of the defendant, of the claims that the defendant had violated its contractual duties under the bylaws to maintain, repair or replace common elements when it failed to effectuate repairs to the foundations. The Supreme Court concluded that the claims that the defendant breached its contractual duties imposed under the bylaws by failing to repair the foundations were governed by the six-year limitation period applicable to contract claims in § 52-576. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc." on Justia Law

In this action to foreclose on a mortgage on Defendant's real property, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court upholding the decision of the trial court to grant a motion for a protective order regarding the production of MTGLQ Investors, L.P.'s mortgage file, holding that the trial court erred in granting the protective order.Defendant executed a promissory note that was secured by a mortgage deed on Defendant's residential property. JPMorgan Chase Bank filed the present foreclosure action alleging that Defendant was in default. MTGLQ was subsequently substituted for JPMorgan. When Defendant sought production of MTGLQ's mortgage file relating to the mortgage note and deed at issue in this case and other documents MTGLP moved for a protective order, which the trial court granted to prevent the improper use of discovery. The trial court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of MTGLQ. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting MTGLQ's motion for a protective order, and Defendant established that he was harmed by the granting of the motion for a protective order. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Lakner" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning the state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-265cc through 8-265kk, which is designed to assist homeowners in avoiding foreclosure, the Supreme Court concluded that the EMAP notice requirement in section 8-265ee(a) is not jurisdictional in nature and that section 8-265ee(a) requires that a mortgagee provide an EMAP notice for each foreclosure action initiated.At issue on certified appeal were two questions relating to the requirement set forth in section 8-265ee(a) that mortgagees provide notice to homeowners to inform them of the resources available under EMAP. The Supreme Court concluded (1) an EMAP notice sent before the commencement of a prior foreclosure action by the predecessor mortgagee is not jurisdictional; and (2) an EMAP notice sent before the commencement of a prior foreclosure action by the predecessor mortgagee was not valid for a subsequent action initiated by the successor mortgagee. View "KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure rendered against Defendant on the basis that Practice Book 23-18(a) did not apply as a matter of law in the instant case, holding that the appellate court did not err.In this action to foreclose a mortgage on some of Defendant's real property the trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff as to liability and entered a judgment of strict foreclosure, but the appellate court reversed. Plaintiff argued that the appellate court erroneously concluded that section 23-18(a) did not apply in this case because Defendant had objected to the mortgage debt amount. Plaintiff specifically argued that because Defendant failed to provide evidence supporting his claims that Plaintiff had miscalculated the amount of interest and municipal taxes he owed the trial court correctly allowed him to establish the amount of the debt by affidavit. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court erred allowing Plaintiff to establish the amount of the debt by affidavit. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. Malick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the appellate court determining that the four exclusive commercial real estate listing agreements at issue in this case were unenforceable, holding that the appellate court decided that issue correctly.When this case was first brought to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the listing agreements did not violate state antitrust law. On remand for consideration of the remaining grounds on which Defendants had prevailed at trial, the appellate court concluded that the listening agreements incorrectly failed to specify the duration of the brokerage authorization, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 20-325a(b) and/or (c), thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the listing agreements complied with the statutory durational requirement; (2) the agreements were personal service contracts requiring the personal performance of the named broker, who died in January 2013; and (3) therefore, Defendants were not liable to Plaintiffs. View "Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court denying a property owner's motion for summary judgment in the underlying dispute with a contractor arising from a construction project, holding that the trial court correctly denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment.Defendants hired Plaintiff to serve as a general contractor to renovate a home located on Greenwich property. Defendants later terminated their contractual relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff served mechanics' liens on Defendants and brought this action to foreclose its lien. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court was required to give res judicata effect to the findings of the trial court in a prior action between Plaintiff and one of Defendants' subcontractors. The trial court denied Defendants' summary judgment motion, determine that all four required elements of res judicata were not met. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in holding that the presumption of privity that the Supreme Court held to apply in Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 208 A.3d 1223 (Conn. 2019), did not apply to the instant case. View "Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the trial court to deny Defendant's motion to open the judgment and vacated the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of Plaintiff, The Bank of New York Mellon, holding that the appellate court erred.The trial court concluded that Defendant's motion to open constituted a collateral attack on an earlier judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue foreclosure, and thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the action. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that Defendant's motion to open constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the foreclosure judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the appellate court (1) erroneously concluded that Defendant's motion to open was a collateral attack because, at the time Defendant filed his motion to open, the trial court had jurisdiction to open the judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-212a; and (2) this Court rejects the alternative ground that the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to open in which he claimed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish ownership of a disputed parcel of property by adverse possession but reversed the trial court's determination that Defendant had established its counterclaim for slander of title, holding that the trial court erred in part.Defendant held record title to the disputed parcel at issue, which abutted Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought this quiet title action alleging that her predecessors in title had acquired fee ownership of the parcel by adverse possession. Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging slander of title. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant as to all claims and counterclaims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to establish adverse possession of the parcel; but (2) erred in determining that Defendant established its counterclaim for slander of title. View "Dowling v. Heirs of Bond" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the town of Hamden in this tax dispute, holding that the appellate court correctly determined that the word "submit" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-63c(a) unambiguously requires that an assessor receive income and expense forms by June 1.Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-63c(a) requires the owners of certain rental property to "submit" income and expense information to their municipal tax assessor "not later than the first day of June." Plaintiff in this case mailed the relevant information on May 31, 2016, but the assessor did not receive the forms until June 2, 2016. The assessor imposed a ten percent penalty on Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the penalty was improper because its timely mailing was sufficient under the statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the word "submit" requires receipt of the income and expense forms no later than June 1; and (2) the ten percent penalty imposed on Plaintiff pursuant to section 12-63(d) was valid. View "Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden" on Justia Law