Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a patient, Tommy Harris, who contracted bacterial sepsis due to repeated infections from his dialysis treatment at a clinic in Belleville, Illinois. Harris filed a malpractice lawsuit against the operators of the clinic and later included a claim against Durham Enterprises, Inc., the janitorial company responsible for cleaning the facility. The case primarily concerns Durham’s insurance coverage. Durham submitted the lawsuit to Ohio Security Insurance Company, its insurer, which denied coverage based on the insurance policy’s exclusion for injuries caused by fungi or bacteria. Harris and Durham then negotiated an agreement in which Durham promised not to mount a defense and Harris promised to seek recovery only from the insurer. The state trial judge granted a motion to sever Harris's claim against Durham and set it for a bench trial. The judge held a short, uncontested bench trial and entered judgment against Durham for more than $2 million.Ohio Security was not a party to the state court proceedings and the insurance policy was not in the record. However, the consent judgment includes findings on insurance issues, notably, that the insurer breached its duty to defend and is estopped from asserting any policy defenses. After the judgment became final, Harris filed an amended complaint purporting to add Ohio Security as a defendant. Ohio Security removed the action to federal court and sought a declaration of its coverage obligations. The district court held that the bacteria exclusion precludes coverage.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Harris and Durham jointly appealed, challenging the no-coverage ruling but also raising a belated challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The court found the jurisdictional argument meritless, as the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not block federal jurisdiction over claims by nonparties to state-court judgments. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the policy’s bacteria exclusion precludes coverage for this loss. View "Mitchell v. Durham Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a fatal collision that occurred in May 2016 when Lyle Lima, who was legally blind, drove his truck into a horse-drawn hay trailer on a highway, resulting in the death of one passenger and injuries to others. In April 2015, a doctor at Dakota Eye Institute had declared Lima legally blind and instructed him not to drive. In April 2016, another doctor from the same institute, Dr. Briana Bohn, examined Lima and advised him not to drive at night and only minimally during the day, specifically avoiding highways. The plaintiffs, injured parties and their representatives, claimed that Dr. Bohn was liable for medical malpractice as Lima's eyesight was still below the minimum vision standards required to operate a vehicle in North Dakota.The plaintiffs initially filed a suit against the defendants, which was dismissed by the district court. However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded the decision. On remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case showing a breach of duty and that Dr. Bohn did not proximately cause Lima’s economic injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find Dr. Bohn proximately caused Lyle Lima’s injury.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Dr. Bohn had clearly instructed Lima not to drive on highways, and the accident had occurred on a highway. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to present competent admissible evidence to raise an issue of fact, and thus, the district court had correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Cichos v. Dakota Eye Institute, P.C." on Justia Law

The case involves William Schmidt, an employee of Tesoro Logistics, who was injured while working at a site owned and operated by Hess Corporation. Schmidt claimed that Hess required him to use breathing air equipment, installed by Basin Safety Consulting Corporation, which caused him to trip and fall, injuring his arm and shoulder. He filed negligence and premises liability claims against both Hess and Basin Safety.The District Court of McKenzie County dismissed Schmidt’s claims on summary judgment, ruling that neither Hess nor Basin Safety owed him a duty of care. The court determined that while Hess required Schmidt to wear an air hose, it did not specify the method of using it, thus Hess did not retain control over Schmidt. The court also ruled that Basin Safety did not owe a duty of care to Schmidt as it did not provide training regarding the air hose or have any control over the worksite.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment in favor of Basin Safety but reversed the judgment in favor of Hess. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Hess owed Schmidt a duty of care. The court concluded that evidence indicating Hess required the use of the air hose and prohibited its use in a manner preferred by the workers could be seen as Hess retaining control over the work. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Schmidt v. Hess Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Richard Rodgers, a prisoner with a history of scoliosis and back pain, had steel rods implanted in his back prior to his incarceration. During his time in prison, the rods broke, but this went undetected for over a year due to two radiologists misreading his x-rays. The prison's primary care physician, Dr. William Rankin, discovered the broken rods and arranged for corrective surgery. Rodgers sued the radiologists and Dr. Rankin, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.The district court dismissed Rodgers' claims against the radiologists, finding that he did not state a viable constitutional claim against them. The court allowed Rodgers to proceed against Dr. Rankin but eventually granted summary judgment in his favor. The court found that Rodgers had not provided evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Rankin had violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference toward Rodgers' serious medical condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court agreed that Rodgers' allegations against the radiologists amounted to no more than negligence, which is insufficient to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Regarding Dr. Rankin, the court found that the evidence would not support a reasonable finding that he acted with deliberate indifference to Rodgers' serious medical condition. The court noted that Dr. Rankin was the one who discovered the radiologists' errors and arranged for Rodgers' corrective surgery. View "Rodgers v. Rankin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Brendan Hoover, was struck in the head by a descending elevator gate while working at a Hyatt Hotel. He filed a lawsuit against Hyatt Hotels Corporation and Otis Elevator Company, alleging negligence due to the visibly worn-down condition of the elevator's rubber "astragal," which he claimed caused his injury. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hoover's claim was based on unsupported conjecture.The district court granted summary judgment for Hyatt and Otis, holding that even if the contested expert evidence was admissible, Hoover failed to present anything other than speculation about an observable defect. The court did not rule on the admissibility of the expert evidence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Hoover failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claim that the worn-down condition of the elevator's rubber "astragal" caused his injury. The court also noted that Hoover's expert witness did not provide an adequate foundation for a jury to find that Hyatt and Otis negligently failed to maintain the astragal, resulting in its mis-performance that caused Hoover's injury. View "Hoover v. Hyatt Corporation" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Susan Ann Scholle, acting as the personal representative for the Estate of Daniel B. Scholle, sued the defendants, Edward Ehrichs, M.D.; Michael Rauzzino, M.D.; and HCA-HealthONE, LLC. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' negligence during a back surgery led to severe complications, including cardiac arrest, infection, kidney injuries, stroke, and the need for multiple additional surgeries. The jury found the defendants negligent and awarded the plaintiff over $9 million in economic damages.The defendants argued that the damages should be capped at $1 million, as per the Health Care Availability Act (HCAA). The trial court, however, found good cause to exceed the cap, citing the severity of the plaintiff's injuries, the financial burden on his family, and the unfairness of limiting the damages due to the catastrophic outcome of the surgery.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred by not considering the plaintiff's insurance contract liabilities in its good cause analysis. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's insurers had waived their subrogation rights, meaning the plaintiff was not responsible for repaying the $4.1 million billed by the hospital.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the contract exception to the collateral source statute prohibits a trial court from considering a plaintiff's insurance contract liabilities in determining whether good cause exists to exceed the HCAA's damages cap. The court remanded the case for the trial court to recalculate interest and enter judgment accordingly. View "Scholle v. Ehrichs" on Justia Law

The case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Patricia Kappes against Diana Rhodes and Rhodes Law Firm, LLC. Kappes alleges that Rhodes' negligence resulted in the loss of a legal action against a defendant. The legal action in question pertains to the wrongful death of Kappes' mother, Lula M. Tanner, who was a resident at Deseret Health and Rehab at Rock Springs, LLC. Kappes had sought legal recourse for her mother's death against her mother's healthcare providers. However, Rhodes failed to timely file an application with the Wyoming Medical Review Panel and a wrongful death complaint against Ms. Tanner’s healthcare providers, which Kappes alleges constitutes legal malpractice.The District Court of Laramie County, Wyoming, certified four questions to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. These questions pertained to the role of the collectibility of the judgment in the underlying action in legal malpractice cases in Wyoming. The lower court sought to understand whether the collectibility of a judgment is a relevant consideration in a legal malpractice case, which party bears the burden of proving the underlying judgment would have been collectible, whether collectibility must be pled as an affirmative defense, and whether the Collectibility Doctrine is available as a defense to an attorney who has admitted liability.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that the collectibility of the judgment is an essential part of the causation/damages element of a legal malpractice action. The client, in this case, Kappes, has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any judgment she would have obtained in the underlying action would have been collectible. The court held that the client's burden includes showing she would have obtained a judgment in the underlying action and the judgment would have been collectible. The court did not find it necessary to answer the third and fourth certified questions as they were predicated on the court deciding collectibility is an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the attorney. View "Kappes v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between neighbors in a six-unit condominium building. Robert Dubac, the plaintiff, and Sandra Itkoff and Jonathan Diamond, the defendants, were owners of units in the same building. The defendants made several statements about Dubac, accusing him of various wrongdoings, including discrimination, self-dealing, acting in bad faith, racism, and harassment of their daughter. These statements were made through emails and oral communications to other residents of the building, the homeowners association, and an insurance carrier.The case was initially heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Dubac sued Itkoff and Diamond for defamation, infliction of emotional distress, interference with economic advantage, and civil harassment. In response, the defendants filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, arguing that their statements were made in connection with a public issue. The trial court denied most of the motion, ruling that the majority of the statements did not meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, which required a showing that the statements were connected to a public issue.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight. The defendants appealed the trial court's refusal to strike the majority of Dubac's suit. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the dispute did not involve a public issue or an issue of public interest. The court reasoned that the dispute was essentially a private feud between neighbors and did not contribute to public discussion of public issues. The court also noted that the audience for the defendants' statements was small and confined to the building's residents and associated parties, further indicating that the matter was not of public interest. View "Dubac v. Itkoff" on Justia Law

In April 2020, Christine Thiele, a nurse liaison at Select Specialty Hospital, contracted COVID-19 and developed severe and disabling medical issues as a result. Thiele filed for workers' compensation benefits, arguing that her COVID-19 infection was an occupational disease under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court granted summary judgment in favor of Select and Liberty Insurance, Inc., dismissing Thiele's petition. Thiele appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Thiele's COVID-19 infection, contracted in April 2020, was a compensable occupational disease or a noncompensable disease of ordinary life. The court reasoned that the issue should be assessed by reference to whether her COVID-19 infection was a disease of ordinary life in April 2020, not at the time of the hearing in November 2022. The court concluded that the lower court's focus on the situation in 2022 was erroneous. View "Thiele v. Select Med. Corp." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Laura Graham against International Property Holdings, LLC (IPH) and its sole member, Ovidiu Ene. Graham sustained injuries when she tripped and fell over a sprinkler box on IPH's property. During the trial, Graham moved to assert that Ene was the alter ego of IPH, meaning he should be held personally liable for the injuries she sustained on the company's property.The district court found that Ene, as the sole member and manager of IPH, was indeed the alter ego of the company. The court based its decision on several factors: Ene had his own personal gate code to the property and used it for personal reasons without paying IPH or the property management company; Ene's father maintained a garden and a chicken coop on the property; the property's insurance was in Ene's name; and Ene remained the guarantor on the mortgage loan for the property.The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed with the district court's findings. The court clarified that the alter ego analysis for a limited liability company is the same as the analysis applied to a corporation. The court found that substantial evidence did not support the district court's determination that Ene was the alter ego of IPH. The court concluded that while Ene did influence and govern IPH, there was not a unity of interest and ownership such that Ene and IPH were inseparable. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that recognizing IPH as a separate entity from Ene would sanction fraud or promote injustice. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ene v. Graham" on Justia Law