Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Louisiana Supreme Court
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The property at issue in this case was a small parcel, about 50-feet square, located in the middle of a block in the French Quarter. "Lot AA" was bounded on its north and east sides by an alley that accessed Conti Street to the east. On its west and south sides, the lot was contiguous with three parcels identified as lots 8, A, and B, currently owned by defendant, 1025 Bienville, LLC. Nearby lot 3, bordered on its north and west sides by the alley and fronting on Conti Street, was owned by 1026 Conti Condominiums, LLC, a sister entity of the plaintiff, 1026 Conti Holding, LLC. Bienville and Conti Holding both claimed ownership of lot AA. A dispute arose between the neighbors when Bienville refused to allow the owner of Conti Condominiums, Robert O’Brien, to park on lot AA. In a precursor to the present litigation, Conti Condominiums sued Bienville, alleging a servitude acquired by Conti Condominiums in the purchase of lot 3 granted it the right to park on lot AA. The courts disagreed and found the servitude does not extend to parking. During the course of the proceeding, O’Brien learned the public records did not contain a sell-out of lot AA. O’Brien located two of the lot's previous titleholder's grandchildren and paid them $100 to transfer their interest in the property to Conti Holding, a newly formed entity also owned by O’Brien. The heirs quit-claimed their interest to Conti Holding without warranty in an instrument signed by the parties in 2015. O’Brien also got a judgment of possession in the former titleholder's succession recognizing the grandchildren as the titleholder's only living heirs and reflecting the transfer of their interest in lot AA to Conti Holding. Relying on these documents, Conti Holding filed the underlying proceeding against Bienville seeking a judgment declaring Conti Holding the owner of lot AA. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Bienville acquired ownership of the lot by ten-year acquisitive prescription. View "1026 Conti Holding, LLC VS. 1025 Bienville, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case arose from a dispute regarding the excavation of lots located in the The Grove Subdivision between plaintiff Hidden Grove LLC (“Hidden Grove”), the developer of The Grove, and homeowner defendants Richard and Lisa Brauns (the Braunses). In 2011, the Braunses purchased a home located on Lot 14 of The Grove from a third party not involved in this litigation. The next day, the Braunses purchased Lot 15 from Hidden Grove for $100,000. They also acquired a right of first refusal to purchase Lots 16 and 17. The surface elevations of Lots 16 and 17 were eight feet higher than that of Lot 15. Because the Braunses intended to add on to their home and build a swimming pool on Lot 15, they sought to lower the elevation of Lots 16 and 17 to match the elevation of the lots previously purchased. Hidden Grove agreed the Braunses could lower the elevation of Lots 16 and 17, at their own expense. Before the parties executed a written agreement setting forth the engineering specifications for the excavation, work began in January 2013 on oral permission of Hidden Grove. In June 2013, after the excavation was near completion, disputes arose between the parties, specifically as to whether the Braunses were required to extend the retaining wall onto Lots 16 and 17. When Richard Brauns told Hidden Grove that the wall would terminate at the boundary of Lot 15 and 16, Hidden Grove ordered the Braunses to stop work and “get off the property.” Hidden Grove filed suit against the Braunses alleging breach of contract and requesting specific performance of concluding the excavation and construction of a retaining wall through the backs of Lots 16 and 17. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this matter to review the court of appeal’s determination that Hidden Grove could not assert a claim for enrichment without cause under Civil Code article 2298 for failure to establish the “no other remedy at law” element of the claim. The Court concluded the court of appeal erred and remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of pretermitted issues. View "Hidden Grove, LLC v. Brauns" on Justia Law

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The property at issue was part of a larger tract purchased by Clarence Saloom in 1953 during his marriage to Pauline Womac Saloom. The entire tract was about 80 acres and became known as the “Pine Farm.” Plaintiffs were Clarence and Pauline’s three children: Patricia Saloom, Clarence Saloom Jr., and Daniel Saloom. Pauline died in 1973, and her one-half community interest in the Pine Farm was inherited by plaintiffs. A judgment of possession recognizing them as owners of Pauline’s one-half interest in the Pine Farm, subject to a usufruct in Clarence’s favor, was signed in 1974, and recorded in the public land records of Lafayette Parish. About two years later, the Louisiana Department of Highways (now the Department of Transportation and Development (the “state”)), contacted Clarence about purchasing a piece of the Pine Farm in connection with a project to widen and improve La. Highway 339. The instrument identifies Clarence as “husband of Pauline Womac Saloom” but does not mention Pauline’s death or plaintiffs’ inheritance of her interest in the property. Plaintiffs are not identified in the act of sale, did not sign it, and apparently were unaware of it for several years. In 1985, after learning of their father’s 1976 conveyance, plaintiffs hired an attorney who informed the state that plaintiffs owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. In 2015, about twenty years after Clarence’s death, the state began constructing improvements to Highway 339 on the property. Plaintiffs again contacted the state. In a May 18, 2016 letter, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the same information he had relayed to the state over thirty years earlier, specifically the state did not purchase all of the property in 1976 because Clarence only owned an undivided one-half interest. The state claimed to have acquired all interests in the property at issue and declined payment for plaintiffs' interest. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment was vacated. Because the court of appeal did not consider the state’s remaining arguments in support of its motion and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of the state’s remaining assignments of error. View "Saloom v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev." on Justia Law

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At issue in this matter was an action to quiet title following the tax sale of a parcel of immovable property. Although the district court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff NAR Solutions, Inc., the appellate court held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that proper notice of sale was provided to some of the defendant/property owner’ Brian Kuhn's ancestors-in-title, and the district court’s default judgment against the defendant was vacated. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Kuhn took no action within the prescribed time period to annul the tax sale, that failure was determinative under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, and the judgment of default rendered by the district court in favor of NARS and against Bryan Kuhn was proper. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court ruling and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "NAR Solutions, Inc. v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

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In an issue of first impression for the Louisiana Supreme Court, was what prescriptive period, if any, was applicable to a citizen suit for injunctive relief pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:16 suit. Justin Tureau instituted a citizen suit pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:16, alleging that defendants drilled and operated numerous oil and gas wells on his property, or on adjacent property, as well as constructed and used unlined earthen pits. Specifically, Tureau alleged that said unlined pits were either never closed, or were not closed in conformance with environmental rules and regulations, including Statewide Order 29-B, L.A.C. 43:XIX.101, et seq, which, among other things, requires the registration and closure of existing unlined oilfield pits, as well as the remediation of various enumerated contaminants in the soil to certain minimum standards. The Supreme Court held that a LSA-R.S. 30:16 citizen suit was not subject to liberative prescription. The Court further found that, insofar as the petition alleges that defendants violated conservation laws, rules, regulations, or orders, the allegations were sufficient to defeat an exception of no cause of action. The Court therefore affirmed the appeals court ruling, which overruled defendants’ exceptions of prescription, overruled the exceptions of no cause of action, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Pilcher" on Justia Law

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Vermilion Parish School Board (“VPSB”) filed suit in 2004, alleging oil and gas operations conducted pursuant to a 1935 mineral lease and a 1994 surface lease damaged Section 16 land. VPSB asserted causes of action for negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract, and violations of Louisiana environmental laws. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted rehearing to reconsider its prior decision in Louisiana v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 20-00685 (La. 6/30/21), _So.3d_. The case presented two main issues: (1) the proper interpretation of Act 312 relative to the award of damages for the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage; and (2) whether the strict liability tort claim prescribed. With the benefit of additional oral argument and briefing, the Court affirmed its original decree. View "Louisiana, et al. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Cindy Planchard, filed suit against defendant, the New Hotel Monteleone, LLC. Plaintiff alleged that as she crossed the lobby of defendant’s hotel, she slipped on a foreign substance on the marble floor and fell, sustaining an injury. After discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on a surveillance video of the accident. The video showed a hotel employee dry mopping the lobby area at 8:36 p.m., approximately three minutes before plaintiff’s accident. Two “wet floor” signs are in place in the area. At 8:37 p.m., approximately one minute before plaintiff’s fall, two more “wet floor” signs were added to the area, and an employee continued to dry mop the area. Plaintiff was then seen to fall at 8:38 p.m. Defendant also submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In her deposition, plaintiff acknowledged seeing the signs. Plaintiff also testified she “had to walk around” the signs because there “was no other path to the front door.” As a result, plaintiff stated she “walked to the side of the signs to get to the front door.” Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Relying on her deposition testimony, plaintiff did not dispute that she saw the signs, but asserted that she thought they were “chalkboard” and did not read them. Plaintiff introduced pictures of the signs showing they did not have the traditional bright orange or yellow appearance, but were made of wood and brass. The district court denied the hotel's motion, concluding there were questions of fact concerning the “reasonableness on the part of the defendant” based on the visibility of the signs. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that the undisputed evidence established plaintiff saw the warning signs in the area prior to her fall. "Any failure of plaintiff to read these signs was a product of her own inattentiveness and not a result of the defendant’s failure to take reasonable precautions." View "Blanchard v. New Hotel Monteleone, LLC." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Anne Marie Auricchio and Patrick Hogan, and defendant Lynleigh Harriston, owned neighboring properties. Harriston’s brother lived in a rental apartment on her property. Plaintiffs sued Harriston, contending she refused to stop her brother’s drug use on the property, which interfered with the peaceable use of Plaintiffs’ property. Ultimately, Plaintiffs claimed they moved due to the drug activities. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment, asserting no genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to the following: Harriston invited her brother to live in the apartment despite having full knowledge he was a drug addict who had been repeatedly incarcerated for heroin use, that the brother’s occupancy and drug activity was causing harm to Plaintiffs, and that Harriston did nothing to prevent or eliminate the harm. Harriston moved for a continuance and, alternatively, a motion to file opposition evidence after the Article 966(B)(2) fifteen-day deadline. Harriston’s motion explained her counsel had “some difficulties with COVID-19.” Ten days before the hearing, Harriston filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs opposed both the motion for continuance and the motion for leave to file the late opposition. The trial court denied the motion to continue, but allowed the late opposition. The motion for summary judgment was denied, with the trial court finding the late-filed opposition raised genuine issues of material fact. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review to resolve a split between the courts of appeal relative to the interpretation of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966(B)(2). The Court held that, in the absence of consent by the parties, a trial court has no discretion to extend that article’s fifteen-day deadline for filing an opposition. This case was remanded for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without the late-filed opposition. View "Auricchio v. Harriston" on Justia Law

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Robert Johnson and Beverly Edwin were married for twenty-two years, and together had three children. During their marriage, Johnson signed and recorded an “Affidavit of Usufruct” in favor of Edwin “for the remainder of [Ms. Edwin’s] life even if she remarries.” This lifetime usufruct covered Johnson’s separate property in Walker, Louisiana. During their marriage, Johnson and Edwin lived in a house on the subject property and also rebuilt the house together following a fire. The couple separated in 2002 or 2003, at which time Edwin moved off of the premises, while Johnson continued to live there. The couple divorced in 2006. Johnson died intestate on August 13, 2010. In June 2014, Edwin petitioned to be named administratrix of Johnson’s succession and was initially appointed as such. However, the trial court removed her as administratrix and appointed three of Johnson’s fourteen children to serve as co-administrators, namely: Lorie Parker, Aveis Parker, and Robert Johnson, Jr. In 2018, after a family conflict arose regarding who had a right to use the property, Edwin filed a “Motion to Enforce Conventional Usufruct and Spousal Reimbursement Claim,” contending the house on the property was vacant, the value of the property was depreciating, and it needed repair. Edwin further alleged Johnson’s estate owed her $21,600.00, representing the amount of money she claimed to have expended to clean, maintain, and improve the property due to the alleged neglect of the co-administrators. The co-administrators countered, filing a peremptory exception of prescription in which they argued that Edwin’s usufruct was extinguished by the ten-year prescription of nonuse. In opposition to the exception, Edwin contended that the prescription of nonuse did not apply to a lifetime usufruct. Alternatively, she asserted that she had used the property during the pertinent ten-year period so as to interrupt the accrual of prescription for nonuse. Certiorari was granted in this matter to determine whether a usufruct “granted for life” was subject to the ten-year prescription of nonuse set forth in La. C.C. art. 621; and, if so, whether the lifetime usufruct established in this case was prescribed pursuant to that article. After review of the record and consideration of the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that while a lifetime usufruct may prescribe due to nonuse, the usufruct at issue did not prescribe as there was no ten-year period of continued nonuse. The lower courts’ judgments were reversed. View "In re: Succession of the Estate of Robert Johnson" on Justia Law

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Jessica Petersen and Charles Johnson began living together while Petersen was attending college in Georgia. Although Johnson worked as a mechanic, the couple’s lifestyle was funded almost entirely by a trust created for Petersen’s benefit by her grandfather. In 2000 they returned to Louisiana and purchased a house and surrounding acreage in Ouachita Parish. The act of sale expressly conveyed ownership of the property to Johnson and Petersen, both of whom signed the deed before a notary public and two witnesses. The purchase price was paid in full at closing with funds from Petersen’s trust. Shortly thereafter Petersen and Johnson acquired additional acreage adjacent to the original tract. This second act of sale also conveyed ownership of the property to Johnson and Petersen, and both signed the deed before a notary public and two witnesses. The purchase price for this parcel was paid with funds loaned to Petersen by her mother. At the time of the purchases, Petersen and Johnson were not married. They married soon afterward, had the first of three children, and began a life in their new home. Their relationship ended in divorce in 2006. Petersen was granted exclusive use of the home in the divorce proceeding and remained there until moving out of town and eventually out of state. A prospective buyer offered to purchase the property, but Johnson would not agree to the sale. In 2017 Johnson moved back into the house with his current wife and their children. In 2018 Petersen sold an undivided one-half interest in the property to Fairbanks Development, LLC., which then instituted this proceeding to partition the property, naming both Petersen and Johnson as defendants. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was which of the following determines one’s status as a co-owner of immovable property: the authentic act conveying ownership of the property, or the source of the funds used to pay the purchase price. The Court found the authentic act controlled. View "Fairbanks Development, LLC v. Johnson et al." on Justia Law