Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Nebraska Supreme Court
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The case involves a dispute between developers of rent-restricted housing projects and the Lancaster County Board of Equalization. The Board sought permission from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission to use a different methodology than the statutorily provided income approach for assessing the value of the housing projects. The Board argued that the income approach did not result in actual value and sought to use a different, professionally accepted mass appraisal method. The developers appealed the Commission's decision to grant the Board's request.The Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Commission's decision was a "final decision" subject to appeal. The court concluded that the Commission's decision was not final because it did not approve a specific alternate methodology and did not determine the valuation of the properties. The court further reasoned that the decision could be rendered moot by future developments in the litigation, such as the Board's refusal to approve the County Assessor's proposed valuations. The court held that, because the developers' rights had not been substantially affected by the Commission's decision, it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "A & P II, LLC v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

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In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the Nebraska Construction Lien Act (NCLA) and determined that construction liens can attach to the contracting owner's real estate, even if ownership of the property changed before the liens were recorded. The case arose from a dispute between S & H Holdings, L.L.C. (S&H), Realty Income Properties 19, LLC (RIP), and several contractors. S&H, the original owner of the property, entered into an agreement with Integrated Construction Management Services, Inc. to construct a Burger King on the property. The contractors were not fully paid for their services and materials, so they filed liens on the property. Meanwhile, S&H sold the property to RIP.S&H and RIP argued that the liens did not attach to the property because S&H no longer owned it at the time the liens were recorded. The contractors argued that their liens attached because the transfer of ownership did not affect the liens' attachment. The court rejected S&H and RIP's argument, finding that the contractors' liens attached to the property regardless of the change in ownership. The court held that a construction lien is automatically created whenever a contractor furnishes services or materials and originates from the contracting owner's agreement to improve the real estate, even if the lien has not yet attached to the real estate and is not yet enforceable. The court concluded that the contractors' liens had attached to the property and had priority over RIP's fee interest. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "Nore Electric v. S & H Holdings" on Justia Law

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The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in a dispute involving property tax assessment after a real estate property was damaged by fire due to arson. The issue at the core of the case was whether a fire caused by arson could be considered a "calamity" under state law, thus entitling the property owner, Inland Insurance Company, to a reduction in their property's assessed value.The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) had upheld the decision of the Lancaster County Board of Equalization, maintaining the assessed value of the property without considering the damage caused by the fire as a calamity. The TERC interpreted the word "calamity" as referring only to natural events.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed with TERC's interpretation of the term "calamity." The court held that the term, as used in state law, encompasses any disastrous event, not just natural disasters. The language of the law, the court reasoned, did not limit calamities to natural events. The court therefore reversed TERC's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not consider the Board of Equalization's cross-appeal, which argued that certain tax statutes were unconstitutional, due to a procedural issue. View "Inland Ins. Co. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

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This case involves two consolidated appeals related to Sanitary and Improvement District No. 596 of Douglas County, Nebraska (SID 596) and THG Development, L.L.C. (THG), a real estate owner whose property adjoins but is outside of SID 596's boundaries. The first appeal is from a condemnation action in which SID 596 sought to condemn part of THG's property for public use and the second appeal is from a separate action in which SID 596 sought to levy a special assessment on THG's property, which is outside of SID 596's boundaries, alleging that the property received special benefits from improvements made by SID 596.On the first appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no merit in THG's claims that the lower court erred in allowing the mention of "special benefits" and in permitting certain expert testimony. The Supreme Court also found no merit in the claim that the trial court erred in denying THG's motion for a new trial based on alleged improper conduct by SID 596's counsel during closing argument.In the second appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment granting THG's motion for summary judgment and dismissing SID 596's complaint. The court interpreted the relevant statute, § 31-752, as not authorizing an SID to levy a special assessment on property located outside of the SID's boundaries. As such, the court concluded that SID 596's complaint seeking to levy a special assessment on THG's property was without merit. The court also found no merit in THG's cross-appeal arguing that the lower court erred in denying its motion for attorney fees. View "SID No. 596 v. THG Development" on Justia Law

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A defamation lawsuit was filed by Janet Palmtag, a real estate agent and general candidate for the Nebraska Legislature, against The Republican Party of Nebraska. The case stems from political mailers, sent by the Party, which stated that Palmtag had been disciplined by the Iowa Real Estate Commission for illegal activities and had lost her Iowa real estate license. Palmtag claims these statements are false and defamatory. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Party, finding a genuine issue that the statements were false but no genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. Palmtag appealed this decision, and the Party cross-appealed the district court’s conclusion that Palmtag did not have to plead and prove special damages.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that when the facts presented by Palmtag are viewed in the light most favorable to her, those facts are sufficient for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the Party acted with actual malice. The court also rejected the Party's argument that in all public libel cases the plaintiff must prove special damages, finding that Palmtag's action involves defamation per se, for which no proof of actual harm is necessary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmtag v. Republican Party of Nebraska" on Justia Law

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The case is a dispute over the boundaries of two land tracts, Government Lot 1 (GL1) and Government Lot 7 (GL7), located in Howard County, Nebraska, owned by Judith Puncochar and the Rudolfs and the Sacks (GL7 Owners) respectively. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the boundary between the properties lay at the thread of the Middle Loup River.The appellant, Puncochar, argued that the original government survey generated a metes and bounds description with four linear sides for GL1, instead of a description with a riparian side. However, the court disagreed and found the original government survey and the accompanying field notes showed GL1 to be riparian, meaning it bordered the river. As a result, the court determined that the boundary between GL1 and GL7 is the thread of the river.The court also addressed Puncochar's argument regarding a fixed acreage of 53 acres for GL1 specified in the patent. The court clarified that the original survey, which depicted a riparian boundary and was part of the patent, was controlling and gave no assurance that the size of the riparian property would remain fixed at any particular size.The court affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment establishing the boundary between GL1 and GL7 as the thread of the stream of the Middle Loup River. View "Puncochar v. Rudolf" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Fountain II, LLC, a commercial real estate development company, disputed the denial of special valuation as agricultural or horticultural land, commonly known as "greenbelt status", for a 19.9-acre property it owned in Douglas County, Nebraska. The Douglas County Board of Equalization had denied the company's application for greenbelt status for the tax year 2018, arguing that the property was not primarily used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirmed the county board's decision.Upon appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed TERC's decision and remanded the case with instructions to sustain the company's protest. The court found that TERC erred in considering the property's use as of July 15, 2018, instead of as of January 1, 2018, as required by Nebraska law. The court also found that the county board's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable, and TERC's decision was not supported by competent evidence, as the evidence showed that the property was primarily used for agricultural purposes as of January 1, 2018. View "Fountain II, LLC v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the director of the Department of Natural Resources that each purported objector to an application seeking an interbasin transfer to divert surface water from an over-appropriated Platte River reach to the Republican River Basin, holding that the purported objectors lacked standing.Several objector entities filed objectives to the operative application, but the director dismissed all of those entities for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to have standing in this surface water appropriation case Appellants were required to meet the common-law standard; and (2) because Appellants' allegations did not demonstrate that they had or will suffer an injury in fact each failed to establish standing. View "In re Application A-19594" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's plea in bar alleging that a trial on the pending charges for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act would subject him to Double Jeopardy, holding that forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-431, as amended in 2016, is civil in nature, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar.In his plea in bar, Appellant argued that he was already criminally punished for the same crime in a separate forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 28-431. In denying the plea in bar, the district court concluded that Appellant had failed to demonstrate he was punished by the forfeiture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sanction imposed by forfeiture under section 28-431 is civil and not criminal for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court finding that Nancy Miles, Cheryl Bettin, and Robert Moninger would by unjustly enriched if they were not required to make reimbursement of taxes paid on the property at issue in this case during the time that Boone River, LLC and 11T NE, LLC held the tax certificate and tax deed, holding that the present lawsuit was barred by claim preclusion.Boone River purchased a tax certificate for the property owned by Miles, Bettin, and Moninger and obtained a tax deed. Boone River later transferred the property to 11T. When 11T sued to quiet title to the property the district court voided 11T's tax deed and quieted title to the property in Miles, Bettin, and Moninger. Thereafter, Boone River and 11T brought this lawsuit for unjust enrichment, seeking to be reimbursed for taxes paid on the property while they held they held the tax certificate and tax deed. The district court ruled in favor of Boone River and 11T. Miles and Bettin appealed, but Moninger did not. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Miles and Bettin showed that this action was barred by claim preclusion. View "Boone River, LLC v. Miles" on Justia Law