Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of California
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In this case, the Supreme Court of California held that a trial court has discretion to grant or deny relief from a jury trial waiver under section 631(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court is not required to grant relief just because proceeding with a jury would not cause hardship to other parties or the court. The court should consider various factors, including the timeliness of the request and the reasons supporting the request. The court further held that a litigant who challenges the denial of relief from a jury waiver for the first time on appeal must show actual prejudice to obtain reversal.The case involved TriCoast Builders, Inc. and Nathaniel Fonnegra. Fonnegra hired TriCoast to repair his house after a fire, but he was unhappy with the quality of the work and terminated the contract. TriCoast sued Fonnegra for damages. Fonnegra initially demanded a jury trial, but waived this right on the day of the trial. TriCoast, which had not demanded a jury trial or paid the jury fee, requested a jury trial after Fonnegra’s waiver. The trial court denied their request and a bench trial was held. TriCoast appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their request for a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, concluding that TriCoast had not established the prejudice necessary to justify reversing the trial court's judgment. View "TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of California, the dispute revolved around a residential driveway in Sierra Madre and raised a significant question about the law of easements. The plaintiffs, Tatana Spicakova Romero and Cesar Romero, and the defendants, Li-Chuan Shih and Tun-Jen Ko, owned neighboring properties that were previously a single parcel divided and sold in 1986. An eight-foot-wide strip of land, which belonged to the Romeros but had been used as the driveway for the Shih-Kos' home, was in dispute. The trial court concluded that the parties to the 1986 sale had intended to create an implied easement over this strip of land, allowing the Shih-Kos to continue using it as a driveway. The Court of Appeal reversed, arguing that the law prohibits a court from recognizing an implied easement that precludes the property owners from making all or most practical uses of the easement area.The Supreme Court of California disagreed with the Court of Appeal's interpretation and held that the law does not impose such a limitation on the recognition of implied easements. The court emphasized that the evidentiary standard for recognizing an implied easement is a high one, and it will naturally be more difficult to meet where the nature of the easement effectively precludes the property owners from making most practical uses of the easement area. However, if there is clear evidence that the parties to the 1986 sale intended for the neighboring parcel’s preexisting use of the area to continue after separation of title, the law obligates courts to give effect to that intent. The court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeal to consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that an implied easement existed under the circumstances of this case. View "Romero v. Shih" on Justia Law

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In this challenge to "Measure Z," a Monterey County ordinance, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiffs on preemption grounds, holding that Cal. Pub. Res. Code 3106 preempts Measure Z.Plaintiffs - Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and other oil producers and mineral rights holders - brought six actions against the County challenging Measure Z, a local ordinance banning oil and gas wastewater injection and impoundment and the drilling of new oil and gas wells in the County's unincorporated areas. The trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the County to invalidate two prohibitions in the measure that applied to the County's unincorporated areas. The court of appeal affirmed on grounds of state preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Measure Z contradicts, and therefore conflicts with and is preempted by, section 3106. View "Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal holding that a sidewalk picket purporting to protest a real estate company's business practices after the company evicted two long-term residents from their home did not constitute speech in connection with a public issue under the anti-SLAPP statute's catchall provision, holding that the sidewalk protest constituted protected activity within the meaning of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 425.16(e)(4).The court of appeal held that the sidewalk picket at issue was beyond the scope of anti-SLAPP protection because the picket did not implicate a public issue. Rather, the court of appeal concluded that the picket concerned only a private dispute between the real estate company and the two residents. The Supreme Court reversed after applying both steps of the analysis set forth in FilmOn.com Inc v. DoubleVerify Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019), holding that the sidewalk protest furthered public discussion of the public issues it implicated. View "Geiser v. Kuhns" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Cal. Health & Safety Code 13009 and 13009.1 incorporate the common law theory of respondent superior, and therefore, a corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for the cost of suppressing fires that its agents or employees negligently or unlawfully set or allowed to escape.After a 2016 wildfire burned nearly 7,500 acres of land in California, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) determined that the fire had started on the property of Defendant, Presbyterian Camp and Conference Centers, Inc., when an employee of Defendant removed a smoldering log from a fireplace in one of Defendant's cabins. CalFire brought suit, seeking recovery of its expenses from Defendant. Defendant demurred, contending that sections 13009 and 13009.1 do not contemplate vicarious liability. The trial court overruled the demurrer. Thereafter, Defendant brought a writ petition challenging the trial court's order. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sections 13009 and 13009.1 incorporate the common law theory of respondent superior. View "Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered a question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding which presumption governs the characterization of joint tenancy property in a dispute between a couple and the bankruptcy trustee of one of the spouses.The Supreme Court held (1) Cal. Evid. Code 662 does not apply when it conflicts with the Cal. Fam. Code 760 community property presumption; (2) when a married couple uses community funds to acquire property with joint tenancy title on over after January 1, 1975 the property is presumptively community property under Cal. Fam. Code 760 in a dispute between the couple and a bankruptcy trustee, and for properly purchased before January 1, 1975, the presumption is that separate property interests arise from joint tenancy title; and (3) joint tenancy titling of property acquired by spouses using community funds on or after January 1, 1985 is not sufficient by itself to transmute community property into separate property. View "Speier v. Brace" on Justia Law

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In this inverse condemnation action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court erred in borrowing section 1260.040 from the Eminent Domain Law and using to it making a dispositive pretrial ruling on inverse condemnation liability.The public entity defendants in this inverse condemnation action asked the trial court to use Cal. Code Civ. P. 1260.40, which authorizes a pretrial motion for a ruling on "an evidentiary or other legal issue affecting the determination of compensation," in inverse condemnation procedure. The trial court granted the motions and entered judgment in the defendants' favor. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the procedure at issue did not meaningfully supplement existing pretrial procedures governing a summary judgment motion. Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to import section 1260.070 into inverse condemnation procedure; and (2) the trial erred in entering judgment on the defendants' "Motion for Legal Determination of Liability," holding that the trial court erred in using the procedures because the summary judgment statute was available for that purpose, and any disputes could have been resolved in a bench trial. View "Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's grant of Defendant's demurrer and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant negligently allowed a fire to spread from Defendant's property to Plaintiff's property, harming some of Plaintiff's trees, holding that Plaintiff could not rely on Cal. Civ. Code 3346's extended statute of limitations and that his complaint was otherwise untimely.Section 3346 provides enhanced damages to plaintiffs suffering wrongful injuries to timber, trees, or underwood. The relevant statute of limitations where a plaintiff seeks such damages is five years. In this case, Plaintiff alleged that section 3346's enhanced damages and five-year statute of limitations applied to property damage from a fire negligently allowed to escape from Defendant's property. Defendant filed a demurrer, arguing that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The trial court granted the demurrer. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the three-year statute of limitations in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 338(b) applied to this action for trespass upon or injury to real property. The court of appeal agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 3346 is inapplicable to damages to timber, trees, or underwood from negligently escaping fires and that Plaintiff's complaint was otherwise untimely. View "Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal finding the City of Oroville liable in inverse condemnation for property damage suffered by a dental practice when raw sewage began spewing from the toilets, sinks, and drains of its building, holding that where the dentists did not install a legally required backwater valve on their premises the City was not liable for the property damage.The dentists argued that the City was legally responsible for the property damage because it was caused by the sewer system's failure to function as intended. The City argued in response that the damage occurred because the dentists failed to install the backwater valve that would have prevented sewage from entering their building in the event of a sewer main backup. The trial court concluded that an inverse condemnation had occurred. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the damage was not substantially caused by the sewer system when the dentists failed to fulfill a responsibility to install a backwater valve that would have prevented or substantially diminished the risk of the mishap that occurred in this case. View "City of Oroville v. Superior Court of Butte County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that when an agency considers increasing a property-related fee, the fee payor challenging the method of fee allocation need not exhaust administrative remedies by participating in a Proposition 218 hearing that addresses only a proposed rate increase.Cal. Const. art. XIII D, 6, which was added in 1996 by Proposition 218, requires that before a local governmental agency may impose or increase property-related fees and charges it must notify affected property owners and hold a public hearing. The representative plaintiffs in this class action sought to invalidate a wastewater service charge imposed by a water district, claiming that the district's method for calculating the charge violated one of the substantive requirements of Proposition 218. The trial court concluded that the suit was barred because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies by raising their challenge at public hearings on proposed increases to the rate charged for services. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a Proposition 218 rate hearing was not an administrative remedy that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust under these particular circumstances. View "Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water District" on Justia Law