Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio
by
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the lower court in a case involving AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C., et al. (AWMS) and the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). AWMS sought a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to initiate property appropriation proceedings, arguing that the state had effectuated a regulatory taking of AWMS’s property by suspending operations at its saltwater-injection well. The court of appeals initially granted summary judgment in favor of the state, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded the case, directing the court of appeals to weigh the parties' evidence related to AWMS’s total and partial takings claims.On remand, the court of appeals denied the writ, arguing that AWMS did not have a cognizable property interest for purposes of a takings analysis. AWMS appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had failed to comply with its remand order to weigh the parties' evidence and had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by revisiting whether AWMS had a cognizable property interest.The Supreme Court ruled that AWMS did possess a cognizable property interest in its leasehold right to operate the saltwater-injection well, a point that had been established in the previous appeal and was thus the law of the case. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case once again, instructing the lower court to weigh the evidence to determine whether a total or partial regulatory taking had occurred. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz" on Justia Law

by
In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original action, holding that the trial court in this case lost jurisdiction to proceed on a request for attorney fees after entering final judgment.After a limited remand in this case stemming from a real estate dispute the trial court entered final judgment, and the judgment was subsequently paid. Thereafter, the prevailing parties filed a motion seeking more than $167,000 in additional attorney fees. Petitioner filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition alleging that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the court of appeals' mandate did not give the trial court jurisdiction to entertain an attorney fees request that accrued after the final judgment. View "State ex rel. Mather v. Oda" on Justia Law

by
In this discretionary appeal brought by Discovery Oil and Gas, LLC to determine whether an express indemnification provision in its contract with Wildcat Drilling, LLC evinced a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification set forth in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944), the Supreme Court held that the requirements announced in Globe Indemnity did not apply.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) when the parties have entered into a contract containing an express indemnification provision, the common-law notice requirements set forth in Globe Indemnity do not apply, and the parties are bound by the terms of their contract because the provision evinces a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common law; and (2) the language of the contract in this case evicted the parties' clear intent to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification. View "Wildcat Drilling, LLC v. Discovery Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this complaint brought by Appellant requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Mentor to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of Appellant's property, holding that the court of appeals did not err in granting the City's motion to dismiss.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that the decision of the City to deny a permit that would allow him to place a houseboat on a pond that he owned constituted a taking of his property. The court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the City to commence appropriation proceedings; and (2) the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's remaining claims. View "State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Donna Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation.In denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation the commission concluded that Kidd was capable of sustained remunerative employment at a sedentary level. The Tenth District granted Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission exceeded its discretion by relying on a medical report that outlined limitations on Kidd's capabilities that were "seemingly inconsistent" with the definition of "sedentary work" in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by considering "prevalent workplace accommodations to determine whether Kidd could return to 'sustained remunerative employment' with her medical restrictions." View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals upholding the final determination by the tax commissioner assessing a use tax against Appellant, holding that the Board did not err in upholding that tax commissioner's final determination.The challenged assessment in this action related to items used in the construction of a data center that Appellant contracted to have built. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision upholding the use tax assessed against Appellant, holding (1) Appellant failed to cite to any authority to support its argument that it was not liable for the use tax because a contractor had already paid it on the items in question; (2) Appellant forfeited the arguments under its third and fourth positions of law; and (3) Appellant's first and second propositions of law were moot. View "PCM, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Peter J. Corrigan from proceeding in a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction action, holding that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in the case.United Twenty-Fifth Building, LLC sued Jessica Maron, a party to a pending divorce case, alleging that Jessica was interfering with an easement involving a multistory building in Cleveland. Specifically, United argued that Jessica was preventing access to the building's elevator, lobby, and stairwell and delaying the construction of a restaurant in the building. Jessica filed a prohibition petition seeking to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction in United's case because, under the jurisdictional-priority rule, Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the case involved property that may be subject to equitable division in her divorce case. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jessica failed to show that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Maron v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board authorizing Firelands Wind, LLC to construct, operate, and maintain a wind farm in Huron and Erie Counties, holding that the nineteen nearby residents and the Black Swamp Bird Observatory that brought this appeal (collectively, Appellants) have not established that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable.On appeal, Appellants challenged the Board's determination that the wind farm satisfies the statutory requirements for constructing a major utility facility, asserting, among other things, that the project could kill birds and create excessive noise for residents near the wind farm and that the Board improperly failed to follow its administrative rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable. View "In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law