Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The City sought to annex two undeveloped tracts of land adjacent to its existing boundaries in DeSoto County, Mississippi. One tract, owned by the Bridgforth family, had previously been split between city and county lines after an earlier annexation. The other tract, owned in part by the Bridgforths and in part by the Funderburk family, was near a highway interchange and had been considered for commercial development, including a potential truck stop, though no firm plans were underway. Both tracts were vacant and uninhabited, and landowners petitioned for annexation primarily to obtain municipal services for future development.The DeSoto County Chancery Court previously excluded these tracts from a major 2021 annexation. After the City enacted an ordinance and filed a new petition to annex the tracts, the Chancery Court held a trial with testimony from landowners, city officials, and experts. The court found the annexation unreasonable, citing speculative development plans, potential for jurisdictional confusion, the possibility of annexation being used to bypass county zoning restrictions, and the recent exclusion of these tracts in the 2021 annexation. The court relied on statutory factors, including the City’s need to expand, the adequacy of current county services, and the absence of population in the proposed area.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the chancery court’s denial of annexation was supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court held that the chancery court’s findings were not manifestly wrong and were supported by credible evidence, including the lack of demonstrated need for expansion and the adequacy of existing services. The Court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment, upholding the denial of annexation. View "In The Matter of The Enlarging, Extending and Defining The Corporate Limits and Boundaries of The City of Olive Branch, DeSoto County, Mississippi v. Dobbins" on Justia Law

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited.The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law

H.A.T., LLC entered into a bond-for-deed contract with Greenleaf Apartments, LLC to purchase three buildings in Portland for $1 million, with a down payment and monthly installments. H.A.T. took possession but would not receive title until the note was fully paid, and the parties executed additional agreements to address Greenleaf's concerns and clarify remedies for default. Over time, H.A.T. became delinquent in its payments, and Greenleaf lent additional funds to cover repairs after a series of casualty events. Despite proposals to consolidate debts and efforts to sell the property, H.A.T. remained in default. Greenleaf ultimately exercised its right under a memorandum agreement to terminate the contract without notice upon default, retaking possession of the property.H.A.T. then filed suit in the Maine Business and Consumer Docket, alleging various claims, including breach of contract and entitlement to insurance proceeds, while Greenleaf counterclaimed for breach of contract. The court dismissed claims against Greenleaf's counsel and, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Greenleaf on all claims. The court found that H.A.T. had defaulted on payment obligations, that Greenleaf was justified in terminating the contract, and that H.A.T. was not entitled to insurance proceeds or a setoff. The final judgment awarded Greenleaf costs and attorney fees.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment. The Court held that H.A.T. breached the contract by missing payments, Greenleaf had no obligation to provide H.A.T. with insurance proceeds, and H.A.T. was not entitled to notice of a right to cure because the statutory notice provision for foreclosures did not apply to commercial purchasers like H.A.T. The court concluded the statute was intended to protect homeowners, not commercial investors. Judgment was affirmed. View "H.A.T., LLC v. Greenleaf Apartmetns, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a tenant leased a residential property from a management company in West Fargo, North Dakota. After a disagreement involving a pet-related charge, the tenant failed to pay October rent. The management company served a notice to vacate and subsequently obtained a judgment of eviction, which included an early termination fee as specified in the lease. The tenant vacated the property before the end of the lease term and returned the keys. Later, the landlord sent an itemized list of damages and sought recovery for property repairs, as well as rent for the months following the tenant’s departure, despite having received the early termination fee.Upon commencement of a small claims action by the landlord for damages, the tenant removed the case to the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. The tenant sought summary judgment, arguing that the landlord could not recover both an early termination fee and additional rent, and also contended that the landlord’s failure to timely provide the itemized list of damages should bar recovery. The district court denied summary judgment, held a bench trial, and ultimately ruled that the landlord could not recover both the early termination fee and post-eviction rent. However, the court allowed recovery for property damage, finding that the landlord had reasonable justification to withhold the security deposit despite the untimely itemization, since damages exceeded the deposit. The court awarded damages for repairs as well as attorney’s fees, as the tenant had removed the case from small claims court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the landlord’s failure to timely provide an itemized statement of damages did not bar recovery, as the tenant was not prejudiced. The court also concluded that the tenant’s arguments regarding unconscionability and attorney’s fees were not properly preserved for appeal. The case was remanded solely for determination of additional attorney’s fees on appeal. View "Meridian Property Management v. Cordie" on Justia Law

The case concerns a failed sale of a bar and restaurant in Bismarck, North Dakota. Neil Galpin, as assignee of Galpin Entertainment, sought to recover a $100,000 earnest money deposit after Cantina Holdings, LLC and Clay Butte Holdings, LLC (the buyers) did not complete the purchase. The parties had executed a confidential offer letter, which required the deposit and stated it would become non-refundable after the buyer’s due diligence period expired, unless the buyer notified the seller of its intent not to proceed before that date. Later, the parties signed a standard form purchase agreement that both incorporated the confidential letter and included a conflicting, pre-printed provision stating that if financing failed after a certain date, the earnest money would be returned to the buyer. The transaction never closed, and Galpin Entertainment ultimately sold the property to someone else.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, heard the case in a bench trial. The court concluded that the specially drafted provision in the confidential letter, rather than the standard form language in the purchase agreement, controlled the disposition of the earnest money. It found that the buyers did not properly exercise their right to terminate before the due diligence deadline and that Galpin did not breach the contract by failing to negotiate the contract for deed in good faith. Judgment was entered in favor of Neil Galpin for the earnest money, and the buyers’ counterclaims were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when conflicting contract provisions exist, specially drafted terms control over standard form language, especially where the parties who caused the uncertainty seek to benefit from it. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s finding that Galpin negotiated in good faith. View "Galpin v. Cantina Holdings" on Justia Law

A tenant and her adult son rented a house in Arlington, Virginia, for a year. Several months into the lease, they noticed water leaking through a skylight and informed the landlord. The landlord and a contractor inspected the skylight and confirmed it was leaking, but no repairs were made. After a period of snow and rain, the tenant slipped on water that had accumulated from the leak, suffering significant injuries. She then sued the landlord, alleging breach of contract for failing to complete repairs as required by the lease and state law, and common-law negligence in failing to take steps to prevent injury from the leak.The landlord removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which treated the landlord’s demurrer as a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the negligence claim, finding the complaint did not allege that the landlord or contractor undertook repairs or performed any negligent acts—only that they inspected and confirmed the leak. The court concluded Virginia law does not impose a tort duty on landlords for failing to repair, but only for negligent acts in the course of repair. The breach of contract claim survived the motion to dismiss, but the parties later stipulated to voluntarily dismiss it to allow an immediate appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first determined it had appellate jurisdiction, accepting the tenant's binding representation that she was abandoning the contract claim with prejudice. The court then affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the negligence claim. It held that, under Virginia law, a landlord is not liable in tort for failing to make repairs unless the landlord undertakes repairs and does so negligently. Because the complaint did not allege any negligent repair or positive act, only nonfeasance, the negligence claim failed as a matter of law. View "Metz v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

A group of cities in Idaho, each holding junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer, became subject to curtailment proceedings initiated by senior surface water users represented by the Surface Water Coalition. The Coalition argued that pumping by junior ground water rights holders diminished water available to senior rights holders drawing from the Snake River. In response, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources has periodically updated the methodology used to determine whether material injury to the senior rights has occurred, issuing a series of orders—the most recent being a Sixth Methodology Order.Following the issuance of a Fifth Methodology Order and an associated Post-Hearing Order, the cities challenged those orders in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, raising several concerns about the Director’s factual determinations and legal standards. During the administrative process, the Director simultaneously issued a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities, however, did not include a direct challenge to the Sixth Methodology Order in their petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, supporting the agency’s methodology and factual findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the cities failed to petition for review of the operative Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, as required under Idaho administrative law. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to address the substantive claims raised by the cities. The court also denied requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), finding the statute inapplicable, but awarded costs to the prevailing parties. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

In 2019, the governing body of a Tennessee county adopted a resolution regulating the operation and location of quarries and similar activities in unincorporated areas. The resolution prohibited quarries from being located within 5,000 feet of residences, schools, parks, and various other establishments. After purchasing property and leasing it for quarry operations, the plaintiffs were informed by the county mayor that their quarry violated this resolution and were asked to cease operations. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the resolution was void because it functioned as a zoning ordinance and was not enacted in compliance with statutory zoning procedures. The county, in response, maintained that the resolution was not a zoning ordinance but rather a proper exercise of its police powers.The case was first heard in the Chancery Court for Grundy County, which granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court reasoned that, because the county did not have a comprehensive zoning plan, the resolution could not be considered tantamount to zoning and thus was not subject to the County Zoning Act’s requirements. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds. It held that the absence of a comprehensive zoning plan was not determinative but concluded that the resolution did not divide the county into districts and thus was not a zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts. The Court held that the resolution was, in effect, a zoning ordinance because it divided the county into zones—prohibiting quarrying in certain areas based on proximity to designated establishments—and substantially affected land use. The Court found that the county failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the County Zoning Act, rendering the resolution unenforceable. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Tinsley Properties, LLC v. Grundy County, Tennessee" on Justia Law

The property in question had operated as a tavern under a nonconforming-use exception in an area zoned for residential use. The tavern ceased operations in April 2019 after its liquor license became inactive in January 2019. In March 2022, one of the property’s owners and a representative inquired with the township zoning inspector about the property’s status, prompted by interest from a potential buyer who wanted to reopen the tavern. The inspector responded by email, stating that the property no longer qualified as a nonconforming use due to over two years of discontinued operation and referenced the applicable zoning resolution provision.Following this, the property owners, through counsel, requested clarification and formal notice regarding the property’s zoning status. The township’s legal counsel confirmed the inspector’s position by forwarding the original email as the official communication. The owners then appealed to the Hinckley Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding that the email constituted a “decision” under Ohio law and that the 20-day appeal period had lapsed. The Medina County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the BZA’s dismissal, concluding that the email was a “decision” and that notice was sufficient. On further appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the email was not a formal “decision” under the relevant statutes and therefore did not trigger the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The Court held that the zoning inspector’s email was not a “decision” as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code sections 519.14 and 519.15, and so did not trigger the statutory appeal deadline. The BZA therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the property owners’ appeal. View "729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

Two water users on Mill Creek in Montana claimed rights to divert and use water based on historical court decrees. Their claims, filed in the 1980s as part of Montana’s general water rights adjudication, asserted periods of use that were broader than those described in a 1964 district court decree, the Petrich Decree, which had granted rights to “surplus” water in Mill Creek from May 1 to approximately July 15. The claimants’ filings instead asserted periods stretching from as early as April 1 to as late as October 1. After the Montana Water Court issued a preliminary decree for Basin 43B, Trout Unlimited, a conservation organization, objected, contending that the claimants overstated their periods of use.The Water Court consolidated the objections and granted Trout Unlimited partial summary judgment, limiting the claimants’ decreed periods of use to May 1 through July 15, as reflected in the Petrich Decree. The claimants then requested the generation of “implied claims” for water use outside this period, arguing they had historically used water beyond those dates. The Water Court generated implied claims with later priority dates for those additional periods but made them junior to other existing rights. Both sides appealed: Trout Unlimited challenged the creation of implied claims, and the claimants challenged Trout Unlimited’s standing and the summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the Water Court’s ruling that Trout Unlimited had standing to object and upheld the limitation of the decreed periods of use to May 1–July 15. However, it reversed the Water Court’s generation of implied claims, finding that the claimants had not met their burden to show sufficient evidence of pre-1973 historic use outside the decree and that other water users lacked adequate notice. The Court remanded for further proceedings, requiring notice and specific factual findings regarding any implied claims. View "Petrich Family Limited Partnership v. Trout Unlimited" on Justia Law