Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches.The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law

A real estate developer purchased a vacant parcel of land in Worthington, Ohio, previously owned by a youth home. The property was primarily zoned for public or institutional uses such as parks, hospitals, and churches. The developer sought to build a mixed-use project and applied for rezoning and development plan approval. After public meetings where concerns about greenspace, traffic, and density were raised, the municipal planning commission tabled the initial application. The developer later reduced the number of proposed residential units, but the commission still declined to recommend approval, and the city council denied the rezoning application. Subsequently, the city amended its comprehensive plan to emphasize greenspace. The developer, having purchased the property after waiving a rezoning contingency, filed suit, alleging constitutional violations due to the city’s refusal to rezone and amend the comprehensive plan.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed most of the developer’s claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage, including due process counts, and granted summary judgment to the city on the remaining regulatory takings and declaratory judgment claims. The developer appealed, challenging the dismissal and grant of summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment and dismissal de novo. The court held that the city’s actions did not constitute a regulatory taking under the Penn Central factors, as the developer lacked a reasonable investment-backed expectation of rezoning approval and the city’s actions had legitimate public purposes. The court also found that the zoning ordinance was not unconstitutional beyond fair debate and that the developer failed to allege a cognizable property interest or arbitrary government action for its due process claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Lifestyle Communities, Ltd. v. City of Worthington" on Justia Law

A nonprofit coalition and two individuals challenged a county commission’s conditional approval for the development of a large seasonal RV park on a 21-acre lot in a rural area that had previously been designated for such use in a larger subdivision plan. The proposed site was adjacent to other commercial activity and near two lakes, but had no on-site surface water. The applicants submitted an environmental assessment (EA), which included groundwater well data and described wildlife in the area. The application process included public hearings, during which concerns were raised about groundwater impacts, wildlife, public safety, and increased recreational use.Following the submission of the application, the Lincoln County Planning Department recommended approval, and the Board of County Commissioners held public hearings, received additional agency comments, and ultimately granted conditional preliminary plat approval, requiring, among other conditions, state environmental review and approval of the water and sewer systems. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court, claiming the County’s approval was unlawful for not complying with statutory requirements for environmental review, consideration of probable impacts, and consistency with local plans. The District Court granted summary judgment for the County and intervenors, finding compliance with applicable statutes and plans.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the EA met statutory requirements, whether the County considered specific, documentable, and clearly defined impacts as required by law, and whether the subdivision was consistent with the local neighborhood plan and growth policy. The Supreme Court held that the EA satisfied statutory requirements by providing all available information; the County properly considered impacts using the required legal standard; and the County’s decision was consistent with the relevant policies and not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coalition v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

A non-governmental organization challenged a county planning department’s decision to approve a land division in the Bitterroot Valley. The organization alleged that the planning department authorized a property owner to divide an 80-acre tract into eight parcels using a family transfer exemption, but failed to provide public notice before approving the application. The organization discovered the land division after it had occurred and argued that the lack of public notice violated the county’s subdivision regulations, the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, the Montana Public Participation Act, and constitutional rights to know and participate.The case was first heard in the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, which granted the county’s motion to dismiss all claims. The district court concluded that the applicable county regulations did not require the planning department to provide published notice before reviewing or approving subdivision exemption applications. The court held that the organization had not stated a plausible claim because the regulations required only that the department accept public comments, not that it give notice.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims related to declaratory relief. The Supreme Court held that the county subdivision regulations, while silent on the specific mechanics of notice, require the planning department to provide public notice of pending exemption applications in order to give meaningful effect to the public’s right to comment, as mandated by the regulations. The court emphasized that public comment is meaningless without notice, and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the district court to require the planning department to provide notice and an adequate opportunity for public comment before reevaluating the exemption application. View "Sapphire v. Ravalli County" on Justia Law

Two homeowners purchased a lot in a subdivision that was subject to restrictive covenants, including one prohibiting the installation of solar panels on residences. After their purchase, Missouri’s legislature enacted a statute barring covenants or restrictions that limit or prohibit solar panel installations on rooftops. The homeowners attempted to work with their homeowners’ association to amend the restriction, but the association maintained the ban, later offering only limited permission for panels not visible from the street. The homeowners then sought declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the enforceability of the covenant and the association’s rule on street-facing panels.The Circuit Court of Greene County denied relief to the homeowners, ruling that the new statute applied only to covenants created after its effective date and that applying it to preexisting covenants would impermissibly impair the contractual rights established before the statute’s enactment. The court found that retrospective application of the law was unconstitutional under Missouri’s constitution.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the judgment de novo. The Court held that the legislative intent and the statute’s language supported applicability to all covenants, including those enacted before the statute’s effective date. The Court determined that, while the statute operates prospectively, it renders prior prohibitions unenforceable from the effective date forward, without violating constitutional prohibitions against retrospective laws or impairing contracts. The Court found that the association’s rule prohibiting street-facing solar panels adversely affected cost and efficiency and could not be enforced under the statute.The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, entered judgment for the homeowners, and held that both the covenant banning solar panels and the rule prohibiting street-facing panels were unenforceable under section 442.404.3. View "Eikmeier v. Granite Springs Home Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, a dispute arose among extended family members over the ownership interests in a lakeside property in Vermont. The property was originally conveyed in 1958 by Thelma L. Lillie to Hazel R. Rathbun and her three sons, Leslie, Ernest, and Albert Soothcage. The 1958 deed’s granting clause transferred title to all four individuals, and its habendum clause described the conveyance as being “as joint tenants with right of survivorship their heirs and assigns forever.” In 1977, Hazel Rathbun issued a quitclaim deed transferring her 1/4 interest to her three sons. Over subsequent decades, Leslie and Albert died, and in 2021, Ernest, as the last surviving original grantee, conveyed his interest to his daughters (the plaintiffs), who later filed suit after Ernest’s death, seeking a declaration that they owned the property outright.The case was initially heard in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found that the 1958 deed created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The court determined that the 1977 deed severed Hazel Rathbun’s 1/4 share, converting it to a tenancy in common, but left the remaining 3/4 share as a joint tenancy among the three sons. Upon Ernest’s death, the trial court concluded that his heirs (the plaintiffs) held a 5/6 interest in the property and granted them partial summary judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court held that the 1958 deed did not clearly and definitively express the intent to create a joint tenancy, citing inconsistencies in its language, especially the inclusion of “their heirs and assigns forever.” Therefore, the Court determined the deed created a tenancy in common by default and reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. View "Kirshon v. Abodeely-Mills" on Justia Law

A municipality sought to condemn a parcel of land owned by a private entity along the shore of Malletts Bay for the purpose of constructing a stormwater treatment facility. This parcel, containing a residential structure leased to tenants, was already subject to a longstanding easement permitting the town to maintain a stormwater drainpipe and catch basin. After a pipe rupture in 2019 caused damage, which the owner addressed through a settlement with the town, the town repaired the pipe and subsequently initiated condemnation proceedings, citing the need to facilitate regulatory compliance and reduce potential liability.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial to determine the necessity of the taking as required by Vermont’s condemnation statute. The court found that the town failed to prove the necessity of taking the land. It concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the project was a reasonable means of achieving stated public goals, such as reducing phosphorus runoff. The court also determined that the town did not adequately consider alternative locations, the inconvenience and expense to the property owner, or the effect of the project on local revenues and home rights. Additionally, the court found that the taking was initiated in bad faith.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion or made clearly erroneous findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the town did not carry its burden to prove necessity. The Court found that the town failed to present competent evidence on several statutory factors and did not meaningfully consider alternatives before selecting the property. The Supreme Court did not address the lower court’s finding of bad faith, concluding that the insufficient showing of necessity was dispositive. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

Gunwerks sought to expand its business by constructing a new manufacturing facility in Cody, Wyoming, a project involving public funds and coordinated through Forward Cody Wyoming, Inc. Forward Cody retained Plan One Architects and Sletten Construction of Wyoming, Inc. as the project's designer and general contractor, respectively. Sletten hired various subcontractors, including Big Horn Glass, Inc. (BHG), to perform specific tasks. After completion, Gunwerks alleged numerous construction defects in the facility, including issues with concrete, finishes, HVAC, siding, drainage, ceiling heights, door and window flashings, and the shooting tunnel. Gunwerks sued Forward Cody, Plan One, and Sletten for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.Sletten responded to Gunwerks’s lawsuit by filing a third-party complaint against its subcontractors, including BHG. Sletten claimed that, should it be found liable to Gunwerks, subcontractors responsible for any deficient work should indemnify it for those damages. Sletten did not specifically admit or allege deficiencies in BHG’s work but sought to preserve its right to recovery if any subcontractor was found at fault. Approximately ten months after Sletten’s third-party complaint, BHG moved for summary judgment in the District Court of Park County, arguing that Sletten had not presented evidence showing BHG caused any of the alleged damages. The district court granted summary judgment for BHG, finding that Sletten had not countered BHG’s prima facie showing with disputed facts, relying instead on speculation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, applying the same standard as the lower court and viewing the record most favorably to Sletten. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Sletten failed to present admissible, competent evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding BHG’s liability for any alleged defects. The court found Sletten’s evidence speculative and conclusory, insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The disposition was affirmed. View "Sletten Construction of Wyoming, Inc. v. Big Horn Glass, Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

A Nebraska limited liability company owned by Michael Perkins hired RMR Building Group, LLC, managed and solely owned by Robert M. Ryan II, as a general contractor to redevelop a shopping center. Their contract used a cost-plus billing arrangement, where Perkins paid RMR in advance for specific construction costs, including a substantial sum for HVAC equipment and RMR’s fee. RMR deposited the funds into its general operating account but did not pay for the HVAC equipment; instead, it used the money to cover other business obligations. Perkins terminated the contract after RMR failed to provide proof of payment for the equipment and then sued RMR and Ryan for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and fraudulent misrepresentation, also seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold Ryan personally liable.The District Court for Douglas County found that RMR breached the contract and was liable under theories of money had and received and unjust enrichment, but not for conversion or fraudulent misrepresentation. The court declined to disregard RMR’s corporate entity, finding no sufficient evidence that Ryan diverted funds for personal use or that RMR was a mere facade for Ryan’s dealings. Perkins appealed these findings.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that the corporate veil should be pierced and Ryan held jointly and severally liable for the misappropriated funds, relying on factors from United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Rupe. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence did not establish by a preponderance that RMR’s entity should be disregarded, nor did it support fraud or conversion claims against Ryan. The Supreme Court remanded with direction to affirm the district court’s judgment. View "Perkins v. RMR Building Group" on Justia Law