Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A property owner sought permission from San Luis Obispo County to construct single-family homes on several lots in Los Osos, an already developed coastal community. The County granted the permit, concluding the homes were an appropriate use under local zoning. However, the California Coastal Commission appealed the County’s decision to itself and denied the permit, asserting that it had appellate jurisdiction because the proposed development was situated in a sensitive coastal resource area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP), and because the site was designated for more than one principal permitted use.After the Commission's denial, the property owner filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, contending the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction on both grounds. The superior court sided with the Commission on the SCRA issue but rejected the Commission’s alternative jurisdictional basis. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the Commission properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the SCRA designation and did not address the alternative argument.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and clarified several important principles. It held that courts must exercise independent judgment—not deferential review—when determining the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction if the matter turns on legal interpretation of an LCP. The court further held that, where the Commission and a local government offer conflicting interpretations of an LCP, judicial deference to either is unwarranted when no interpretive advantage is clearly established. Examining the LCP, the court found that the proposed development was not in an SCRA as designated by the LCP. It also ruled the Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction solely because a site has multiple principal permitted uses; jurisdiction arises only if the proposed use is not among those principal permitted. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed. View "Shear Development Co. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired property in Exeter, Rhode Island, in 1997 and later sought to develop a solar farm on it. To proceed, he needed legal access from a public road. A town map suggested such access via an extension of Estate Drive, but in reality, no road existed there—only undeveloped woods, which the town considered a “paper street.” The plaintiff attempted to clear and gravel the area without town approval, prompting the town to block access and send a cease-and-desist letter. The planning board denied his development application, and the zoning board affirmed. The plaintiff then filed multiple lawsuits, including one seeking a declaration that the disputed area was a public road, and later, claims for due process violations and, after losing on the road status issue, for adverse possession and related theories regarding ownership and access.The Superior Court first denied the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the due process case and then denied the town’s motion to dismiss the adverse possession case. The trial justice reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in her view, the facts and legal theories in the new cases were different from the previously litigated issues, such as whether the area was a public road. She further concluded that the town had acquiesced to separate lawsuits and that Davis was not barred from asserting inconsistent or alternative claims in later litigation.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed both cases on certiorari. The Court held that res judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims because all arose from the same set of facts concerning access to the disputed area and could have been raised in the initial litigation. The Court further concluded that collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel also precluded the plaintiff’s adverse possession and related claims, as key factual issues had already been determined. The Court quashed the Superior Court’s orders and remanded for dismissal of both cases. View "Davis v. Wood Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

Two business partners were traveling on Interstate 65 in Kentucky when their rental car hydroplaned during a heavy rainstorm, resulting in a crash that killed one partner and seriously injured the other. The decedent’s widow, on behalf of herself, her children, and her husband’s estate, along with the surviving partner, brought suit against the engineering firms responsible for the design of a highway-widening project completed years earlier. The plaintiffs alleged that the engineers negligently designed the widened highway, causing increased water pooling and a greater risk of hydroplaning in the area where the accident occurred.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the engineers, holding that they were immune from suit as contractors for a governmental entity and that the claims were preempted by federal law because the design complied with required state and federal standards. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that contractors do not automatically share the immunity of the state, that government approval of the design did not insulate the engineers from potential liability for negligent design, and that the state negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by federal law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that private engineering firms hired by a state agency are not entitled to the Commonwealth’s sovereign or derivative immunity simply by virtue of their contract. The court also found that summary judgment was inappropriate on the ground of the engineers’ work being “mandated” by the government because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the design was required or whether the engineers exercised independent judgment. Finally, the court held that Kentucky’s negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by federal law, as the state claims did not impose standards more stringent than those required by federal regulations. View "HMB PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, INC. V. IVES" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the 2016 property tax assessment for a hotel located at Kansas City International Airport. Grady Hotel Investments, LLC purchased the hotel improvements but not the land, which remained owned by the City of Kansas City. As the City is exempt from property taxes, Grady was taxed only on its possessory interest in the hotel improvements. The Platte County assessor valued the property at over $11 million, which was raised to more than $13 million by the Platte County Board of Equalization. On appeal, a State Tax Commission (STC) hearing officer reduced the value, and the full STC ultimately valued it at $0, using a method applicable to leaseholds. The assessor challenged this, and the circuit court found the STC’s valuation method inapplicable, determining Grady owned the improvements rather than holding a leasehold.The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s conclusion that Grady held an ownership interest, not a mere leasehold, and remanded the case for a new valuation. On remand, the STC valued the property at over $6 million. The assessor and Park Hill School District appealed, raising constitutional challenges to the valuation statute, section 137.115.1, arguing it violated provisions of the Missouri Constitution related to due process, tax exemptions, uniformity, and special privileges.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. It held that Park Hill School District lacked standing to challenge the assessment, as its interest in potential funding loss did not confer standing to contest another’s property valuation. The assessor also lacked standing to assert claims under due process and special privilege provisions because, as a political actor, he was not protected by those constitutional rights. However, the assessor did have standing to challenge the statute under the tax exemption and uniformity provisions. The court held that section 137.115.1 neither creates an unconstitutional tax exemption nor violates the uniformity clause. The circuit court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Cox vs. Grady Hotel Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Several New Mexico landowners, holding title to non-navigable streambeds, asserted that they once had the right to exclude the public from walking or wading in these streambeds. They alleged that a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated this right, amounting to a judicial taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The relevant background includes longstanding provisions in New Mexico law declaring all natural waters in the state to be public, subsequent proclamations and statutes requiring permission to access private streambeds, and a 2022 New Mexico Supreme Court decision which clarified that the public had a right to walk and wade in the beds of public water crossing private land, so long as such use was reasonably necessary and minimally invasive.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the landowners’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were not traceable to enforcement by the named state officials, but rather to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision. The district court also concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, reasoning that any relief would require payments from the state treasury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the landowners did have standing, as they faced a credible threat of enforcement by the state officials, and their injuries were traceable to those officials and redressable through prospective relief. The Tenth Circuit also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims and that no abstention or jurisdictional doctrine prevented adjudication.Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the landowners failed to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an established property right to exclude the public from the streambeds, but rather that the New Mexico Supreme Court had merely clarified the scope of the public’s preexisting easement. View "Sanchez v. Torrez" on Justia Law

Three neighbors who own properties in a Wells subdivision hold easement rights over a ten-foot-wide right-of-way that crosses the property of another couple, the Linds, to access the Webhannet River. One neighbor’s deed includes the easement, while another’s does not, but the trial court determined both benefit from an implied easement and Maine's “paper streets” statutes. In 2023, the Linds installed a split-rail fence along the center of the right-of-way and constructed a driveway partly within it. The neighbors, who use the easement to carry items such as kayaks to the river, claimed that the fence and parked vehicles unreasonably interfered with their easement rights.The neighbors filed suit in the York County Superior Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court required joinder of another abutting property owner, then considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that while the Linds’ parking vehicles in the right-of-way did materially impair pedestrian access and thus interfered with the easement, the split-rail fence did not, as the neighbors could still access the river. The court denied the neighbors’ request for summary judgment and granted the Linds’ in part, resulting in a final judgment after dismissal of another claim.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. The court held that the fence, by splitting the right-of-way and reducing practical access to half its width, unreasonably interfered with the neighbors’ easement rights as a matter of law, even if some access remained. It distinguished prior precedent involving minor obstructions and reaffirmed that easement holders are entitled to use the full described width for the easement’s purposes. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on injunctive relief. View "Lytle v. Lind" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization representing manufactured home community owners and a mobilehome park owner challenged the City of Santa Rosa’s enforcement of California Penal Code section 396 during a multi-year wildfire state of emergency. Section 396 prohibits increasing the rental price of mobilehome spaces by more than 10 percent during a declared emergency. The plaintiffs argued that, under Santa Rosa’s rent control ordinance, park owners should be able to impose annual increases according to the ordinance’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) formula, even if those increases cumulatively exceeded the 10 percent cap in section 396. Alternatively, they sought to “reset” post-emergency rents as if the suppressed CPI increases during the emergency had been implemented.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and granted the City’s, finding that section 396’s 10 percent cap was fixed at the rent authorized when the emergency began and that owners could not recoup lost increases after the emergency ended. The court reasoned that allowing such recoupment would defeat the statute’s purpose to protect consumers from excessive rent hikes during emergencies. The court entered judgment for the City after the plaintiffs’ third cause of action was dismissed by stipulation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that section 396’s cap applies to the rent authorized at the start of the emergency and lasts for its duration, regardless of local rent control provisions. The court further ruled that nothing in section 396 or the local ordinance entitles park owners to recoup suppressed rent increases once the emergency ends. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the City and awarded costs to the City. View "Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

Applicants sought to build two principal residences on a single residential property in the Forest Hills neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Because the proposed construction did not comply with the minimum lot width requirement for the area, the applicants, Nezahat and Paul Harrison, requested a special exception for a “theoretical subdivision” from the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA), which would allow multiple principal buildings on one record lot by waiving certain development standards, including lot width. In the alternative, they applied for a variance from the minimum lot width requirement. Neighbors who held an easement over the property opposed the applications, expressing concerns about property values, stormwater drainage, and neighborhood character.The BZA considered both requests. The D.C. Office of Planning and the local Advisory Neighborhood Commission both recommended approval of the special exception, though opinions varied about the variance. After public hearings, the BZA granted the special exception for the theoretical subdivision, thereby waiving the minimum lot width requirement, but denied the request for a variance. The neighbors, Deborah Hernandez and Mary Lee, appealed, arguing that the BZA could not lawfully waive lot width requirements through a special exception while denying a variance for the same requirement.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the BZA’s decision. The court held that the applicable zoning regulations allow the BZA to grant a theoretical subdivision as a special exception and to waive minimum lot width requirements without the need to also grant a variance. The court found that the standards for special exceptions and variances are independent and that the BZA did not act arbitrarily. The court affirmed the BZA’s decision. View "Hernandez v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment" on Justia Law

A developer purchased property in the Brookland neighborhood that included a historic mural and an adjacent parking lot providing clear sightlines to the mural. Another individual, who sought to preserve the mural, had previously contracted to buy the property but the deal fell through amid allegations of contract forgery by the seller. The developer, holding a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, initiated foreclosure and ultimately purchased the property at auction. The unsuccessful buyer accused the developer of fraud and publicly made statements labeling him as corrupt and claiming he had “problems with the DOJ” and had taken the property “by theft and fraud.” These statements were repeated online via a media outlet controlled by the unsuccessful buyer.The developer sued for defamation and false light in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that his statements were protected advocacy on matters of public interest and that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure, thus requiring proof of actual malice. The trial court found the developer to be a limited-purpose public figure and denied most of the motion, allowing the claims to proceed except those related to certain statements outside the statute of limitations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the Anti-SLAPP Act applied because the statements addressed issues of public interest, such as urban development and historic preservation. The court concluded that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure and therefore must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the developer failed to demonstrate that the statements were false or made with actual malice. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capitol Intelligence Group, Inc. v. Waldman" on Justia Law