Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A group of individuals who own or reside in the Makila Plantation neighborhood in Launiupoko, Maui, sought to intervene in a public hearing concerning a special use permit (SUP) application submitted by Goodfellow Bros., LLC. Goodfellow had applied for the SUP to operate a temporary rock-crushing facility on nearby agricultural land, which would process rocks for use in local construction projects. The project had been the subject of community outreach and was publicized through required legal notices and additional informational meetings. The Appellants were not entitled to direct notice as they did not live within 500 feet of the project, but they became aware of the hearing through their homeowners association and submitted written testimony expressing concerns about the project’s impact.Despite knowing about the project and the public hearing, Appellants filed their petition to intervene less than 24 hours before the scheduled hearing, missing the deadline set by the Maui Planning Commission’s (MPC) rules. At the August 8, 2023 hearing, the MPC considered whether there was “good cause” for the untimely filing of the petition. After discussion and testimony from both sides, the MPC found that Appellants had sufficient notice and opportunity to file earlier but did not show good cause for their delay. The MPC voted unanimously to deny the petition to intervene and subsequently approved the SUP application with amended conditions, including prohibiting rock-crushing on the property.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the matter on appeal. The court held that the MPC did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely petition because Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause for their late filing. The court also found no evidence that the MPC’s decision was based on Appellants’ residency status, nor was the MPC required to hold a contested case hearing on the untimely petition. The court affirmed the MPC’s decision. View "Gutschmidt v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

A tenant and her young son resided in a rental property owned by a landlord. The tenant failed to pay rent for August 2024, prompting the landlord to file an eviction action in the Rhode Island District Court for nonpayment. The District Court held a hearing, after which it awarded possession to the landlord and entered a damages judgment against the tenant. The tenant appealed to the Superior Court, raising an affirmative defense and counterclaim based on alleged uninhabitability of the premises due to plumbing problems and a sewage fly infestation.While the appeal was pending in the Superior Court, the landlord moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the tenant’s failure to pay a prorated portion of September rent (covering the period after judgment in District Court but before the next rent due date) mandated dismissal under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The tenant conceded nonpayment of that portion but argued the statute only required payment of full rent due after the appeal was taken, which she had paid in October. The Superior Court agreed with the landlord and dismissed the appeal.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted certiorari and reviewed the statutory interpretation. The Court held that under the plain language of the relevant statutes, a tenant appealing an eviction judgment is obligated to pay rent only on the next scheduled due date after the appeal is filed, not a prorated portion for days between judgment and the next rent due date. The Court further held that after the tenant vacated the apartment, the case ceased to be an action for recovery of real property, and the statutory rent-payment requirement no longer applied. The Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on damages. View "Pioneer Investments, LLC v. McKiernan" on Justia Law

A woman was killed when a construction crane collapsed during a storm, striking her apartment building. Her parents, acting individually and on behalf of her estate, brought a negligence and gross negligence lawsuit against several defendants, primarily three related construction and development entities. Following a jury trial, the jury found these entities had engaged in a joint enterprise that caused the woman’s death and awarded over $360 million in compensatory damages, along with $500 million in exemplary damages (which the trial court later reduced under statutory caps). The court entered judgment holding the entities jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages, with two entities also severally liable for exemplary damages.The defendants, collectively known as the Greystar Entities, filed a single $25 million joint supersedeas bond to suspend execution of the judgment during their appeal. The plaintiffs challenged the sufficiency of this joint bond in the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, arguing that Texas law capped the required bond at $25 million per debtor, not per judgment. The trial court agreed, ruling that each entity needed to post its own $25 million bond and that the joint bond could suspend execution for only one entity unless the defendants designated which one. The Greystar Entities appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals at Dallas, which affirmed the trial court’s order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that, under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 52.006(b), the $25 million cap on supersedeas bonds applies per judgment debtor, not collectively to all debtors in a single judgment. The Court also held that the trial court abused its discretion by immediately invalidating the joint bond without allowing a reasonable time for compliance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted partial mandamus relief, directing the trial court to provide additional time for each entity to post an individual bond. View "IN RE GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, L.P." on Justia Law

A purchaser acquired a large ranch in Texas that was crossed by a decades-old electric distribution line operated by an electric cooperative. The cooperative had constructed the original line in 1947, relying on an unrecorded document from a prior owner’s estate purporting to grant an easement, though this document was never filed in county records. The line was visible and marked in a survey at the time of the purchaser’s acquisition. In 2012, the cooperative undertook a significant upgrade of the line to serve a new customer and substation, tripling the number of poles and nearly doubling the number of wires, without recorded evidence of a valid easement for the expanded use. The purchaser objected, asserting trespass after learning of the upgrade.The trial in the 63rd District Court of Kinney County resulted in a jury finding that the cooperative had not established a written or prescriptive easement, but did hold an easement by estoppel, based on reliance upon the prior owner’s unrecorded document. The jury further found that the upgrade did not exceed the scope of this easement, and the trial court rendered judgment for the cooperative. The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio affirmed, holding that evidence supported both the existence and scope of the easement by estoppel.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that an easement by estoppel existed because the cooperative had detrimentally relied on the prior owner’s representation and the purchaser had actual notice of the line. However, the Court held as a matter of law that the scope of the easement by estoppel was limited to the cooperative’s original use, and that the substantial upgrade—serving new customers and requiring significantly more infrastructure—exceeded that scope. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, rendered judgment for the purchaser on the trespass claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "BOERSCHIG v. RIO GRANDE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC." on Justia Law

Two neighboring landowners in Victoria County, Texas, became embroiled in a dispute after one party, the Kuceras, constructed a dam and berms while developing their property, allegedly altering a creek’s natural flow and causing flooding on the Kolles’ adjacent land. The Kolles, who jointly own and use their property for cattle grazing, sued the Kuceras for violating the Texas Water Code and on several common-law grounds, including nuisance and trespass. The Kuceras attempted to designate Victoria County as a responsible third party, arguing the county’s actions might have contributed to the flooding, but the trial court struck this designation due to lack of evidence that the county violated any legal standard. At trial, a jury found the Kuceras liable under multiple theories, apportioned responsibility among them, and awarded the Kolles both economic and exemplary damages.On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals concluded that the Kolles could not recover damages for loss of use because the injury to their property was permanent, reducing the total economic damages from $425,000 to $175,000. However, the court affirmed the remainder of the trial court’s judgment, including the exemplary damages.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed whether the exemplary damages awarded exceeded statutory limits under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Court held that the statutory cap on exemplary damages must be calculated based on the percentage of economic damages attributable to each defendant, not the total damages awarded. Further, when economic damages are awarded jointly to plaintiffs as a single sum, the cap applies to each defendant based on that single amount. The Court reversed the court of appeals in part and remanded the case to the trial court to reallocate the exemplary damages and consider whether, in light of reduced actual damages, the exemplary awards are unconstitutionally excessive. View "K & K INEZ PROPERTIES, LLC v. KOLLE" on Justia Law

A tenant operating a restaurant under a commercial lease failed to provide written notice of its intent to renew the lease by the contractually required deadline. The lease allowed renewal for additional terms if the tenant gave written notice at least ninety days before the current term expired. In 2022, the tenant closed for renovations without the landlord’s written consent and remained closed for several months, citing purported structural issues. The landlord, finding this closure and unauthorized work to be defaults under the lease, initiated termination proceedings and provided notice of lease termination. Despite several communications and actions by both parties—including the landlord’s filing and dismissal of eviction actions—the tenant did not provide timely written notice of renewal.A magistrate in Johnson County entered judgment and an order of possession in favor of the landlord. The tenant appealed to the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, which affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. The tenant then sought further review, and the case was transferred to the Iowa Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.On discretionary review, the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether the lease had been orally modified to permit renewal without written notice, whether the landlord’s actions had revoked or excused the renewal option, and whether the landlord’s conduct constituted a repudiation of the lease. The court held that the lease’s written notice requirement for renewal was controlling and found insufficient evidence of a modification to permit oral renewal. The court also concluded that the landlord’s termination and eviction actions, taken in good faith in response to the tenant’s breach, did not revoke the renewal option or constitute repudiation. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "MidWestOne Bank v. Short's Burger & Shine, LLC" on Justia Law

A regional airport authority undertook a project to remove a hill from land owned by a private property holder. Instead of purchasing the land outright, the parties entered into an agreement allowing the airport authority to remove the hill and, afterwards, to further lower the elevation of the property by overblasting, which would make future development easier for the owner. The airport authority completed the hill removal but failed to perform the overblasting. The landowner then sued for breach of contract, seeking damages for the incomplete work.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia found that the airport authority had breached the agreement and granted partial summary judgment to the landowner on liability. Both sides submitted expert reports concerning the cost to complete the required overblasting, ultimately agreeing that this cost was over $4 million. However, the district court held that the cost of completion was grossly disproportionate to the value of the property and applied the “gross disproportionality” rule, awarding only nominal damages because it found insufficient evidence of the property’s diminution in value. The landowner appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia the question of whether, how, and by whom the gross disproportionality rule should be applied in such cases.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that, in breach of construction contract cases, the gross disproportionality rule may be applied to limit damages. The court clarified that gross disproportionality is calculated using the diminution in value approach, measuring the difference in value between the property as is and as it should have been if the contract had been fully performed. The court further held that the breaching party bears the burden of invoking and proving gross disproportionality. If the breaching party fails to meet this burden, the non-breaching party’s proven measure of damages applies. View "Corotoman, Inc. v. Central West Virginia Regional Airport Authority" on Justia Law

T-Mobile South, a wireless service provider, applied for a permit to construct a 108-foot cell phone tower on vacant residential property in Roswell, Georgia. The City of Roswell denied the application based on its zoning ordinance, which required permits for new wireless facilities and allowed decision-makers to consider several factors. T-Mobile then sued, claiming the denial both prevented it from filling a service coverage gap and discriminated among service providers. The company sought an injunction compelling Roswell to issue the permit.Proceedings in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia resulted in an initial grant of summary judgment for T-Mobile, which was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court also reviewed the case and remanded it. On remand, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of T-Mobile after a bench trial, applying the “significant gap” test: it found T-Mobile had a significant gap in service that only the proposed tower would remedy and ordered Roswell to approve the necessary permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the “effective prohibition” provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 applies to a single permit denial. The court held that the statutory prohibition on local “regulation” that “prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting” wireless service applies to general rules or regulations, not to individual zoning decisions or permit denials. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard, concluding that T-Mobile must challenge the city’s rules themselves, not individual permit denials, to invoke the effective prohibition clause. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia" on Justia Law

The appellant owned a condominium unit in Old Orchard Beach, Maine, subject to the Tidewater Loft Condominium Association’s declaration, which required payment of fees and assessments. After accruing tens of thousands of dollars in unpaid dues, expenses, and legal fees, she received notice of her right to cure the default, but did not do so. The Association initiated foreclosure proceedings. In response, the appellant filed a counterclaim, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, based on the Association’s alleged failure to accommodate her daughter’s disability in connection with snow removal and trash disposal.The Biddeford District Court held a bench trial, at which the appellant appeared pro se. Although pretrial proceedings had identified her counterclaim as an issue for trial, the court ultimately limited the trial to the foreclosure issues and expressly excluded the counterclaim, preventing the appellant from presenting evidence or cross-examining on matters related to her claim. The court then entered judgment of foreclosure and sale for the Association and also entered judgment against the appellant on her counterclaim, concluding she had presented no persuasive evidence, despite not allowing her to do so.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the procedural due process claim de novo. The court held that the trial court’s failure to permit the appellant to present evidence or be heard on her counterclaim constituted a violation of her procedural due process rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated both the foreclosure judgment and the judgment on the counterclaim, remanding for further proceedings to allow the appellant an opportunity to be heard on her counterclaim. View "Tidewater Loft Condominium Association v. Moskal-Kanz" on Justia Law

EQT Production Company and related entities owned mineral lands containing natural gas reserves in Wise County, Virginia. In 2018, EQT sold these lands to Diversified Production, LLC. The County taxed only the physical infrastructure—gas wells, pipelines, and compressors—for the 2018, 2019, and 2020 tax years, using the cost approach for valuation, but did not assess the value of the gas reserves themselves. The Taxpayers objected, arguing that this method did not reflect fair market value because the well infrastructure cannot be valued independently from the gas reserves. They also argued that the County failed to properly consider the income and market approaches to valuation. The County maintained that it was allowed to exclude the gas reserves and had properly rejected alternative valuation methods.After a trial in Wise County Circuit Court, the court found in favor of the County, holding that it had statutory discretion to value only the improvements and to exclude the reserves. The court also found that the County properly considered and rejected use of the income and market approaches. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, agreeing that because the County had imposed a license tax on gas extraction under Code § 58.1-3712, it was excused from assessing the gas reserves under Code § 58.1-3286. The Court of Appeals further held the County’s assessment was entitled to a presumption of correctness because it considered and rejected the other valuation methods.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. It held that, under Virginia law, imposing a license tax under Code § 58.1-3712 does not excuse the County from also assessing the fair market value of mineral lands—including gas reserves—under Code § 58.1-3286. The Court concluded the County’s assessment was incomplete and therefore plainly wrong. The judgments of the lower courts were reversed and the case was remanded. View "EQT Production Co. v. County of Wise" on Justia Law