Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Parrot Ditch Company (PDC) and its four water rights in the Jefferson River. PDC delivers water to its shareholders through the Parrot Ditch, which runs parallel to the Jefferson River in Basin 41G. The ditch was constructed in 1895, and PDC was organized in 1916 to manage and distribute water through the ditch. PDC issued shares that correspond to water entitlements, and the company stopped issuing shares in 1981. Two of the water rights were litigated in 1926 in the Carney case, which established shareholders' interests in PDC and referenced priority dates and volumes for two water rights.The Montana Water Court issued a Temporary Preliminary Decree in 1989, which included abstracts for PDC's four water rights. PDC objected to the place of use for one of the rights in 1990 and later requested amendments to the flow rate and irrigated acreage. The Water Court adopted various recommendations over the years, ultimately increasing the place of use to 6,710.78 acres. In 2018, the Water Court issued a Preliminary Decree, and PDC objected, seeking a larger service area and other corrections. Objectors (AMD) also raised objections to various elements of PDC's water rights.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Water Court's decisions. The Court held that PDC failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a larger service area beyond 6,710.78 acres. The Court also found that the Carney decision did not adjudicate water rights and that AMD provided sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie status of PDC's claims regarding the Townsend and Methodist rights. Finally, the Court upheld the Water Court's modification of the Nolte flow rate to 100 cfs, based on the lack of notice to affected water users when PDC requested the amendment in 1997. View "Parrot Ditch v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robert Spoklie purchased land neighboring the property of the Paul Phillip Bardos and Mary L. Bardos Revocable Trust (Bardos) near Kalispell, Montana. Spoklie divided his land into smaller parcels for residential development and entered into an Easement Agreement with Bardos, granting mutual easements for access. Spoklie's easement allowed him to use a 60-foot-wide path through Bardos's property for ingress, egress, and utility installation. Spoklie used this easement to transport construction equipment, sometimes parking it temporarily within the easement boundaries, which Bardos contested.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denied Bardos's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of Spoklie. The court found that Spoklie's activities, including temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment within the easement, were within the scope of the easement agreement. Bardos appealed, arguing that material facts were in dispute and that Spoklie's actions constituted trespass and nuisance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the easement's language allowed for temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment as reasonably necessary for ingress and egress. The court also found that Spoklie's actions did not constitute trespass or nuisance since they were within the scope of the easement. Additionally, the court noted that the issue of Spoklie's proposed mailbox structure was not ripe for adjudication as no substantial steps had been taken toward its construction. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the District Court correctly applied the law. View "Bardos Revocable Trust v. Spoklie" on Justia Law

TCR, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability corporation, filed a lawsuit against Teton County, Idaho, after the County refused to record a Condominium Plat for property within a planned unit development (PUD) owned by TCR. TCR sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the lot had already been approved for condominium development, and also alleged breach of a 1996 settlement agreement between the County and TCR’s predecessor. The district court granted TCR’s motion for summary judgment on the declaratory and injunctive relief claim, ordering the County to record the Condominium Plat, but granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.The district court found that the County had previously approved amendments to the PUD Plat in 2018 and 2019, allowing TCR to build sixteen standalone condominiums on Lot 12B. The County’s refusal to record the Condominium Plat was based on an alleged site plan from 1995, which the district court found inadmissible. The district court concluded that the County had no legal basis to refuse the recording and enjoined the County from preventing TCR’s attempts to record the Plat.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to grant TCR’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that the County had no valid reason to refuse the recording. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County on the breach of contract claim, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the County breached the 1996 Settlement Agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue.The Supreme Court also found that the district court erred in denying TCR’s second motion to enforce, which sought to compel the County to issue building permits after the Condominium Plat was recorded. The Court awarded TCR its attorney fees and costs on appeal, concluding that the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law

Les Smith filed a petition for injunction and declaratory relief against Elizabeth and Rebecca Brockway to prevent them from installing a manufactured home on their property, alleging it violated restrictive covenants. The Brockways' property, Lot 13, was part of the Lakewood Village Subdivision, developed by Rainmaker’s Development Company, Inc. The restrictive covenants were referenced in the original warranty deed but were unsigned by the original grantor, Frank J. Steed.The Panola County Chancery Court denied Smith’s petition, finding the restrictive covenants unenforceable because they were not signed by the original grantor, as required by the covenants themselves. The court concluded that without the grantor's signature, the covenants never became a valid contractual obligation and thus did not run with the land.Smith appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, arguing that the restrictive covenants were valid because they were attached to the original warranty deed, which was signed by the grantor. He contended that the covenants should be enforceable as they were intended to run with the land and that all subsequent purchasers, including the Brockways, had notice of them.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancellor’s decision, holding that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable because the original grantor failed to sign them. The court emphasized that the plain language of the covenants required the grantor’s signature to trigger their enforceability. Since the grantor did not sign the covenants, there was no intent to create covenants that would run with the land, and thus, they were never enforceable. View "Smith v. Brockway" on Justia Law

A vintner challenged the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is largely rural, with a small portion used for agriculture, including vineyards. The County had previously regulated vineyards through a 2015 ordinance requiring conditional use permits and development standards. In 2016, the County initiated a comprehensive update to the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which required an environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The draft EIR proposed continued regulation of vineyards but did not include a ban. After public comments, the final EIR maintained this approach. However, the County Board of Supervisors ultimately decided to ban new vineyards entirely when they approved the project in 2021. The vintner argued that this change rendered the EIR's project description unstable and required recirculation for further public comment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the vintner's petition for a writ of mandate, finding no CEQA violation. The vintner appealed, arguing that the vineyard ban fundamentally altered the project and violated Government Code section 65857 by not referring the modification back to the planning commission.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project, thus not destabilizing the project description in the EIR. The court also found that the vintner failed to demonstrate prejudice from the County's procedural error under Government Code section 65857, as there was no evidence that a different outcome was probable if the planning commission had reconsidered the ban. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

High Maine, LLC, challenged the Town of Kittery's issuance of a marijuana retail store license and approval of a change of use and modified site plan for GTF Kittery 8, LLC, to operate a marijuana retail store in the Town’s C-2 zone. High Maine argued that the Town's actions violated local and state regulations, particularly concerning the proximity of the proposed store to a nursery school.The Superior Court (York County) dismissed High Maine's complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that High Maine, as a pre-applicant on the waiting list for a marijuana retail store license, did not suffer a particularized injury. The court concluded that High Maine's status as a prospective license-holder was unchanged by the Town's decisions, and thus, it was not directly affected.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that High Maine had alleged a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The court noted that High Maine's opportunity to obtain the single license available in the C-2 zone was directly and negatively affected by the alleged defects in the licensing process. The court found that High Maine's complaint suggested that GTF Kittery 8 obtained an unfair advantage in the lottery by submitting multiple applications for the same building, which was within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that High Maine's allegations were sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to demonstrate its standing to challenge the Town's actions. View "High Maine, LLC v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

In 2001, Terry Olson, Steffen Olson, Kevin Olson, and their parents signed a "Family Agreement" regarding ownership of land in Renville County, North Dakota. The agreement stipulated that the land, owned by the three sons as co-tenants with their parents retaining a life estate, could not be sold or transferred without unanimous consent and prohibited partition actions. Following the termination of the parents' life estates, Terry Olson and Steffen Olson sought to partition the land due to family conflicts. Terry Olson initiated a lawsuit in 2022 to partition the property by sale. Kevin Olson opposed the sale, favoring physical partition instead.The District Court of Renville County appointed a referee to determine whether the property could be physically partitioned without great prejudice. The referee concluded that physical partition would result in smaller, less marketable tracts and recommended a sale. The district court accepted the referee's report and ordered the property to be sold, subsequently confirming the sale and distributing the proceeds among the co-owners. Kevin Olson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ordering the partition by sale and in distributing the proceeds.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and found that the district court had abused its discretion. The court noted that the referee's report was not properly introduced as evidence and that the district court's findings were conclusory, lacking sufficient evidence to support the determination of great prejudice. The Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proving that physical partition would result in great prejudice lies with the party demanding the sale. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's orders for partition by sale, the award of costs and attorney's fees, and the distribution of proceeds from the sale. View "Olson v. Olson" on Justia Law

A general contractor, Tocci Building Corporation, and its affiliates were involved in a dispute with their insurers, including Admiral Insurance Company, over coverage under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The issue was whether the CGL policy covered damage to non-defective parts of a construction project caused by a subcontractor's defective work on another part of the project. Tocci sought defense and indemnity coverage under the Admiral policy for a lawsuit filed by Toll JM EB Residential Urban Renewal LLC, which alleged various issues with Tocci's work on a residential construction project.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci. The court found that the lawsuit did not allege "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" as required for coverage under the policy. The court reasoned that the damage alleged was within the scope of the project Tocci was hired to complete and thus did not qualify as "property damage." Additionally, the court held that faulty workmanship did not constitute an "accident" and therefore was not an "occurrence" under the policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for different reasons. The appellate court focused on the policy's exclusions, particularly the "Damage to Property" exclusion (j)(6), which excludes coverage for property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because the insured's work was incorrectly performed on it. The court concluded that this exclusion applied to the entire project since Tocci was the general contractor responsible for the entire construction. The court also noted that Tocci did not meet its burden of showing that any exceptions to the exclusion applied, such as the "products-completed operations hazard," because Tocci's work was not completed or abandoned. Thus, the appellate court held that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci in the underlying lawsuit. View "Admiral Insurance Company v. Tocci Building Corporation" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

PSK, LLC purchased a commercial property at a trustee's sale, which included a billboard. A dispute arose over the ownership of the billboard, leading PSK to file a quiet title action against Legacy Outdoor Advertising, LLC, claiming ownership of the billboard. Legacy counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the billboard was its removable personal property.The district court found in favor of Legacy, determining that the billboard was not a fixture but removable personal property. The court noted that the Arents, the previous owners, had sold the billboard to USA Outdoor in 2010 and had entered into a lease agreement allowing USA Outdoor to remove the billboard upon lease termination. The court found that PSK had notice of the separate ownership of the billboard before purchasing the property, as evidenced by a sign on the billboard and testimony from the previous owners and a realtor.PSK appealed, arguing that the billboard was included in its purchase of the real estate and that it had no notice of Legacy's claim. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that PSK failed to prove its ownership of the billboard and that the billboard was indeed Legacy's removable personal property. The court emphasized the importance of the Arents' intention to sell the billboard as personal property and the lease agreement's provision allowing for its removal. The court also found that PSK had constructive notice of the separate ownership due to the sign on the billboard and other circumstances that should have prompted further inquiry. View "PSK v. Legacy Outdoor Advertising" on Justia Law