Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction involving an 80-acre property in Livermore, California. Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. entered into a contract to purchase an interest in the property from the Petersons, after being assigned the DeLimas’ right of first refusal. Defendants, including Edmund Jin, his real estate agent Stephen Marc Chess, and Chess’s firm, interfered with this transaction by negotiating a purchase with the Petersons despite knowledge of the right of first refusal. The Petersons ultimately sold their interest to Jin, prompting Guinnane to file a successful specific performance action against the Petersons and the subsequent conveyance of the property interest to Guinnane.After prevailing in the specific performance action, Guinnane filed a new lawsuit in the Alameda County Superior Court against Jin, Chess, and Chess’s firm, seeking damages for inducement of breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. Guinnane was awarded compensatory damages, including the attorney fees incurred in the specific performance action. Guinnane then sought to recover the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this subsequent “tort of another” action against the defendants. The trial court, presided over by Judge Victoria Kolakowski, denied Guinnane’s motion for these additional fees.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether, under the tort of another doctrine, Guinnane could recover attorney fees incurred in the action against the tortfeasors themselves. The court held that such fees are not recoverable under the tort of another doctrine, as it allows recovery only for fees incurred in litigation with third parties necessitated by the defendant’s tort, not for fees incurred in suing the tortfeasor. The court affirmed the posttrial order denying Guinnane’s motion for these attorney fees. View "Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. v. Chess" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Department of Water Resources (DWR), a state agency with eminent domain authority, which sought entry onto private properties to perform environmental and geological studies as part of the planning for a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. DWR initiated a series of petitions under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which authorize entities with eminent domain power to access property for investigative activities before deciding whether to acquire the property for a public project.Previously, the San Joaquin County Superior Court coordinated the petitions and permitted DWR to conduct environmental studies under certain conditions but denied entry for geological testing, reasoning that such actions constituted a taking requiring a classic condemnation action. The California Court of Appeal initially agreed, but the California Supreme Court reversed in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, holding that the precondemnation entry statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for precondemnation activities, so long as landowners can obtain a jury trial on damages. Following this, the trial court approved DWR’s authority for both environmental and geological tests, and additional entry orders were issued for the Delta Conveyance Project.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether DWR was required to have an authorized and funded project under Water Code sections 250 and 11580 before undertaking precondemnation entry and testing. The court held that these requirements apply only to classic condemnation proceedings, not to precondemnation entry activities. The court affirmed that DWR need only possess general eminent domain authority to utilize the precondemnation entry process, regardless of whether the activities might constitute a taking. The trial court’s entry order was affirmed. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

This case centers on a dispute involving the planned construction of a new cottage by a hotel operator on Martha’s Vineyard. The hotel, situated in a residential area, is considered a preexisting nonconforming commercial use. In 2008, the hotel’s predecessor sought permission for expansion and entered into an agreement with a neighboring property owner, who agreed not to oppose the project or appeal permit decisions, in exchange for promises including the installation and maintenance of vegetative screening. After subsequent changes to the project—including the removal and replacement of screening and the relocation and resizing of the cottage—the neighbor, acting as trustee, objected to the most recent modifications in 2023, claiming inadequate screening and diminished privacy.Following the 2023 decision by the Edgartown zoning board of appeals approving the hotel’s modifications, the trustee filed suit challenging that decision and asserting additional claims against the hotel. The hotel counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that the suit was frivolous and vexatious. The Superior Court denied the trustee’s special motion to dismiss the counterclaim under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the underlying lawsuit was a sham. The trustee appealed. The Appeals Court reversed, finding that it could not determine at that stage whether the trustee’s claims were meritless because the underlying suit was unresolved.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the anti-SLAPP statute requires the party opposing dismissal to prove that the petitioning activity (the lawsuit) was devoid of reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. The court determined that the hotel failed to meet this burden because the trustee’s challenge to the 2023 decision was not frivolous on its face. The order denying the special motion to dismiss was therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings, including an award of attorney’s fees to the trustee. View "Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals who stayed at a San Dimas hotel challenged the hotel’s practice of enforcing a maximum 28-day stay policy. Under this policy, guests were required to check out and completely vacate the property for at least three days before being permitted to re-register, a practice the hotel’s management acknowledged was intended to avoid creating landlord-tenant relationships. The plaintiffs, who stayed at the hotel multiple times between June and November 2022, brought a putative class action alleging violations of California Civil Code section 1940.1 and other related claims, arguing that the hotel’s policy was designed to circumvent tenant protections for those using the hotel as a primary residence.The plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of all individuals who stayed at the hotel for at least 28 consecutive days but fewer than 31 days, from late 2018 to the present. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the class was numerous, ascertainable, and that the plaintiffs’ claims were typical, but denied class certification. The trial court reasoned that individualized questions predominated, because it believed section 1940.1 required proof that each class member used the hotel as their “primary residence” for the hotel to qualify as a “residential hotel” under the statute.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by interpreting section 1940.1 to require individualized proof that each guest used the hotel as their primary residence. The court clarified that whether a hotel is a “residential hotel” under section 1940.1 is a question that focuses on the overall character and intended use of the hotel, not on each individual guest’s circumstances. The order denying class certification was reversed, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to revisit the class certification question under the correct legal standard. View "Aerni v. RR San Dimas" on Justia Law

YC Properties purchased a ranch in Montana in 2020, acquiring a senior water right on Sawtooth Creek. Plaintiffs own junior, upstream water rights. A dispute arose over water usage, leading YC to petition for a water commissioner and, after alleging it was not receiving its full water allocation, to file suit against the plaintiffs. YC sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunctions to prevent the plaintiffs from diverting water until its senior right was satisfied. The District Court granted a TRO but later dissolved it and dismissed all of YC’s claims after the irrigation season ended and found YC lacked standing on one claim.Following dismissal of the underlying water rights action, the plaintiffs sued YC for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. YC moved to dismiss the new complaint, referencing facts and documents from the prior case and analyzing the summary judgment standard. The District Court notified the parties it would treat YC’s motion as one for summary judgment and, after additional briefing, granted summary judgment for YC and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in converting YC’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that the District Court abused its discretion by converting the motion prematurely, as the only dispute was whether the complaint stated a claim and there was no need to consider materials outside the pleadings. The Supreme Court further found the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roaring Lion v. YC Properties" on Justia Law

A purchaser entered into a condominium sales contract with a developer, which incorporated an escrow agreement between the developer and an escrow company. The purchaser was not a signatory to the escrow agreement, nor was the escrow company a party to the sales contract. After the purchaser defaulted on the sales contract by failing to make the required closing payment, the developer sent notices of default and contract termination, copying the escrow company. The termination notices included instructions regarding the disposition of the purchaser’s escrowed deposits—one letter indicated the developer would retain fifteen percent of the purchase price as liquidated damages, while a later letter stated the intent to retain the entire deposit. The escrow company subsequently released the entire escrow balance to the developer.Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the escrow company on the purchaser’s claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that the escrow company had complied with the escrow agreement as incorporated into the sales contract. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed denial of the purchaser’s partial summary judgment motion but vacated summary judgment for the escrow company on the breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims. The ICA found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the escrow company breached its duties by releasing all funds after receiving what it characterized as conflicting instructions from the developer.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the escrow company strictly complied with the terms of the escrow agreement, which, upon default and proper written notice, required release of all escrowed funds to the developer. The court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding breach of contract or fiduciary duty. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment regarding those claims and affirmed summary judgment for the escrow company, remanding only the issue of attorney fees to the ICA. View "Yamaguchi v. Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants constructed an accessory dwelling unit on a property in Fair Oaks without obtaining the required building permit from the County of Sacramento. They initially applied for a permit, but their application was incomplete and they failed to make necessary corrections. Despite receiving multiple notices of violation and stop work orders from the County, defendants completed construction and leased the unit to a tenant without ever obtaining a final permit or a certificate of occupancy, nor did the County inspect the unit for code compliance.After defendants unsuccessfully appealed the first notice of violation to the County Building Board of Appeals and did not challenge subsequent notices, the County filed suit in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. The County alleged that defendants’ conduct violated state and local building codes and constituted a public nuisance per se under local ordinances. Following a court trial, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the County on both causes of action and issued a permanent injunction, finding that building without a permit was a public nuisance per se as declared by County ordinance.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the County lacked standing, that its nuisance ordinances conflicted with state law, and that the trial court misapplied the law in finding a nuisance per se. The appellate court held that the County had the authority and standing to enforce its building and nuisance codes, that its ordinances did not conflict with state law, and that construction without a permit constitutes a nuisance per se as expressly declared by County ordinance. The judgment was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the County. View "County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings" on Justia Law

Several home builder companies challenged fees they were required to pay to a city when connecting to municipal water and sewer systems. These so-called Capital Facilities Fees were imposed as a condition of development between 2016 and 2018. The builders paid these fees directly to the city and allege that the charges were not authorized by state law. They sought to recover the payments and also requested to represent a class of all entities who, like them, paid the fees during the relevant period.In Superior Court, Wake County, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, arguing that their claims and those of other payors shared common legal and factual questions. The trial court certified a class including all entities who paid the fees between January 2016 and June 2018, finding that the class was numerous, the claims predominated over individual differences, and class treatment was the superior method for resolving the dispute. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the merits, but the city appealed only the class certification order directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered only whether class certification was proper. It held that, under the applicable state statute, the right to a refund depends on who made payment to the city, not on who ultimately bore the cost. The possibility that some builders incorporated the fees into home prices did not defeat class certification, as the statute entitles the actual payor to relief. The court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the legal criteria for class certification and did not abuse its discretion. The order certifying the class was therefore affirmed. View "Wardson Constr., Inc. v. City of Raleigh" on Justia Law

A group of Carteret County property owners challenged the county’s policy of charging waste disposal fees. The county does not provide direct trash or recycling collection services but instead offers access to waste disposal sites and a landfill. The county funded these facilities by charging fees to property owners, including both those who potentially used the county sites and those who hired private waste collection services. The plaintiffs argued that the county unlawfully charged these fees to property owners who never used the county sites or who had private waste collection, and also that the total fees collected exceeded the cost of operating the facilities, in violation of state law.Following extensive discovery, the Superior Court in Carteret County considered plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court rejected one proposed class, finding that determining whether each property owner actually used a county site would require individualized inquiries that would predominate over common issues. However, the court certified three other classes: those allegedly charged fees despite using private waste collection services, and those asserting that the county collected fees beyond its actual operating costs. The county appealed the class certification order directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the denial of the first class.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Superior Court’s class certification order. The Court held that it is feasible to ascertain class members who used private waste collection services by relying on the customer lists from the limited number of providers in the county. The Court also determined that issues of predominance and superiority did not bar class certification and that any future developments could be addressed through modification or decertification of the class. Thus, the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Armistead v. County of Carteret" on Justia Law

A renewable energy developer was awarded a standard-offer contract in 2014 to build a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, with a requirement to commission the project by 2016. The developer repeatedly sought and received extensions to this deadline, while simultaneously pursuing a certificate of public good (CPG), which is also required for construction. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) granted the CPG in 2018, but it was appealed, reversed, and ultimately denied on remand due to violations of local land conservation measures and adverse impacts on aesthetics. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the final CPG denial in 2023.While litigation over the CPG was ongoing, the developer continued to seek extensions of its standard-offer contract’s commissioning milestone. The fifth extension request, filed in 2021, asked for a deadline twelve months after the Supreme Court’s mandate in the CPG appeal. The hearing officer recommended granting it, but the PUC did not act on the request until 2024, by which time the developer’s CPG had been finally denied. The PUC dismissed the fifth extension request as moot, finding the contract had expired by its own terms. The PUC also denied the developer’s motion for reconsideration and a sixth extension request, on the same grounds.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the PUC’s actions with deference, upholding its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and its discretionary decisions unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the PUC properly concluded the requested extension was moot, the contract was null and void by its terms, and there was no abuse of discretion. The Court also rejected arguments that the PUC’s actions were inconsistent with other cases or violated constitutional rights. The orders of the PUC were affirmed. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law