Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on two neighboring property owners at Priest Lake, Idaho, whose properties are subject to several easements, and who have a history of disagreements concerning the use of a shared beach, lake access, and parking. The parties previously reached a court-mediated settlement agreement addressing these issues, which included a provision for future mediation and arbitration of disputes. Disagreements soon arose, particularly over the construction of a patio by one owner, leading the parties to arbitration as provided by their agreement. The arbitrator, after considering substantial evidence and briefing, ruled in favor of one party on all contested issues, including the patio’s location and construction, the use of easements, and parking arrangements.Prior to this appeal, the District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, reviewed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. The moving party argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and was biased, primarily because the award was unfavorable and allegedly altered the terms of the court-approved settlement agreement. After considering the arguments, the district court denied the motion, finding that the arbitrator had acted within the scope of his authority and that no evidence of bias was presented.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that under Idaho’s Uniform Arbitration Act, judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited and does not allow for overturning an award simply due to alleged errors in law or fact, or because the outcome was unfavorable. The court found no evidence that the arbitrator exceeded his authority or acted with bias. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party under Idaho Code section 12-121, concluding the appeal was frivolous and without foundation. The district court’s denial of the motion to vacate was affirmed. View "Khalsa v. Ridnour" on Justia Law

Morgan Lohman purchased a 25.8-acre property, knowing that a homeowners’ association, Cave Bay Community Services, Inc., held a permanent easement on 7.31 acres and had an option agreement with the sellers, the Drehers, to purchase the easement land for one dollar once the Drehers’ loans were paid off. Despite concerns about the effect of this option on the value and use of his property, Lohman proceeded with the purchase. After the sale, the Drehers paid off their loans, and Cave Bay exercised its option to buy the easement property for one dollar, which Lohman refused to honor.Cave Bay filed suit against Lohman in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and seeking specific performance of the option agreement. Cave Bay moved for summary judgment only as to the specific performance “claim.” The district court granted summary judgment to Cave Bay on that basis, struck much of Lohman’s opposing declaration, and awarded Cave Bay attorney fees and costs. The court did not address the merits of the underlying breach of contract claim. After the parties dismissed the remaining claims, Lohman appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that specific performance is a remedy, not a stand-alone cause of action. The court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on specific performance without first determining liability on the underlying breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s amended judgment, reversed the summary judgment ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also vacated the award of attorney fees and costs, but awarded appellate costs to Lohman. No attorney fees were awarded on appeal as there was no prevailing party at this stage. View "Cave Bay Community Services v. Lohman" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, operating a camp for children with cancer, owned several buildings situated on land owned by a married couple. The couple, both involved in the nonprofit’s leadership, decided to sell the ranch property that included the camp’s buildings. During negotiations, the couple represented to the nonprofit’s board that appraisals did not specify values for the nonprofit's buildings and that the nonprofit’s share of sale proceeds should be calculated by square footage. Relying on these representations, the nonprofit accepted a portion of the sale proceeds. Subsequently, the nonprofit discovered that the appraisals had, in fact, assigned higher specific values to its buildings, resulting in a claim for damages against the couple for misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District granted partial summary judgment to the couple on certain claims, but, after a bench trial, found in favor of the nonprofit on claims for constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The court calculated the nonprofit’s damages but reduced the award by 50%, applying comparative negligence and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. The court denied attorney fees and prejudgment interest to both parties. Both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the doctrine of election of remedies did not bar the nonprofit’s appeal, as seeking satisfaction of a judgment is not inconsistent with seeking a greater award on appeal. The Court ruled that it was reversible error for the district court to reduce damages based on comparative negligence or a duty to mitigate, as those doctrines did not apply to the equitable and fiduciary claims at issue. The Court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the couple’s affirmative defenses of superseding intervening cause and unclean hands, as well as the finding that the wife breached her fiduciary duty. The denial of prejudgment interest and attorney fees was affirmed, but the nonprofit was awarded costs on appeal. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in the nonprofit’s favor for the full damages amount and reconsideration of prevailing party status. View "Camp Magical Moments, Cancer Camp for Kids, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

A religious organization planned to build a large temple in Heber Valley, Utah, and Wasatch County approved the project through a legislative development agreement. Several nearby property owners, concerned about adverse impacts on their health, welfare, privacy, and enjoyment of their property, filed a lawsuit against Wasatch County. They alleged that the county’s approval violated local land-use regulations and state law. The plaintiffs sought a declaration invalidating the ordinance and requested injunctive relief to halt construction.The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints intervened, and both the Church and Wasatch County moved for summary judgment. The Fourth District Court granted summary judgment fully to the Church and partially to the County, finding that the ordinance was neither preempted nor contrary to law, and that plaintiffs had not overcome the highly deferential standard of review for land use actions. The court dismissed the case, prompting an appeal from the plaintiffs. After the Church began construction, the plaintiffs moved for an injunction to stop construction during the appeal. The district court granted the injunction, reasoning that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if construction proceeded and was later found unlawful.The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the district court’s order, focusing solely on whether the injunction should remain pending appeal. Applying Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 8, the Court found that the plaintiffs had not identified specific irreparable harm that would result from construction during the appeal. The Court concluded that inconvenience or temporary changes to the land did not constitute irreparable harm absent clear evidence of injury that could not be remedied. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Utah granted the Church’s motion and suspended the injunction pending resolution of the appeal. View "VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY" on Justia Law

Several trusts owned by the Garaas family hold mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. operates a well on these lands, which are subject to two distinct spacing units created by orders of the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC): a base unit and an overlapping unit. NDIC issued an order allocating production from the well in the overlapping unit to Section 20, which is part of the base unit but not wholly contained within the overlapping unit. This allocation reduced the Trusts’ royalty interests, prompting them to seek declaratory relief and damages.The Trusts first brought their claims in the District Court of McKenzie County, but the court dismissed the case. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Trusts were required to exhaust administrative remedies before the NDIC. Subsequently, Petro-Hunt applied to NDIC for clarification on production allocation, and NDIC issued Order No. 33453, allocating production from the overlapping unit to the base unit. The Trusts appealed NDIC’s order to the district court, which affirmed NDIC’s order. The Trusts then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that NDIC had legal authority under statute to allocate oil and gas production among spacing units. However, the court concluded that NDIC did not regularly pursue its authority because it failed to follow proper procedures, including providing notice and opportunity to participate to all affected interest owners. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated NDIC Order No. 33453. The request for attorney’s fees by the Trusts was denied, as the record did not show NDIC acted without substantial justification. View "Garaas v. NDIC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a referendum petition submitted in Norman, Oklahoma, regarding a municipal ordinance that adopted the Rock Creek Entertainment District Project Plan. The ordinance created two tax increment financing districts to support the construction of a multipurpose arena, parking garage, and related infrastructure. The increments from local sales and ad valorem taxes were designated to fund the project up to certain financial limits or for a maximum period of twenty-five years. The ordinance was enacted without voter approval, prompting proponents to submit a referendum petition seeking a public vote on the ordinance.After the petition was filed, including 10,689 signatures, a protest was lodged in the District Court of Cleveland County, challenging both the legal sufficiency and signature count of Referendum Petition 2425-1. The protest focused on alleged inaccuracies and omissions in the petition’s gist, which is intended to briefly and accurately describe the purpose and effect of the proposed measure for potential signatories. The District Court, presided over by Judge Jeff Virgin, concluded that the gist was insufficient, specifically finding that it misrepresented the financial triggers and duration of the tax districts, and ordered the petition invalidated and stricken.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the sufficiency of the gist de novo. The Court determined that the gist failed to accurately state the maximum amount of public assistance and omitted the fact that the tax districts would expire upon the earliest of three specified events, not necessarily after twenty-five years. These deficiencies rendered the gist misleading and legally insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order invalidating Referendum Petition 2425-1, holding that the petition’s gist was legally insufficient and therefore the petition could not proceed. View "Allison v. McCoy-Post" on Justia Law

A local government prepared and certified a program-level Environmental Impact Report (EIR) as part of a comprehensive update to its general plan, including an updated housing element. The housing element identified 17 sites, including Site H, to accommodate the town’s projected regional housing needs. Site H was proposed to be rezoned for very high density residential use, increasing its development capacity. No specific housing project had been proposed for Site H or the other sites at the time of the general plan update.The Committee for Tiburon LLC filed a petition for a writ of mandate in Marin County Superior Court, challenging the adequacy of the EIR. The Committee argued the EIR was deficient under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it failed to include a site-specific analysis of environmental impacts related to the potential high-density development of Site H. The petition also alleged the Town’s general plan was internally inconsistent and incompatible, and objected to the rezoning of Site H. The trial court agreed with the Committee and granted the petition, finding the EIR should have included a site-specific analysis for Site H.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that when a local government updates its general plan and housing element, and no specific project is proposed for a listed site, CEQA does not require the EIR to include a site-specific environmental analysis for that site. The absence of project-specific details makes such analysis infeasible, and site-specific review can be deferred until a project is proposed. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the writ, and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the issues of CEQA exemption for rezoning and general plan consistency. View "The Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon" on Justia Law

A Wyoming firearms manufacturer sought to expand its operations by constructing a new facility. The company, unable to directly access specific state economic development funds, partnered with a city and a local non-profit to obtain funding, resulting in a written agreement outlining each party’s roles. The non-profit was charged with managing the project, including hiring architects and contractors. During and after construction, the manufacturer identified substantial design and construction defects, including climate control problems, leaks, and structural issues. The manufacturer sued the non-profit for breach of contract and also sued the architect and contractor, asserting it was a third-party beneficiary of their contracts with the non-profit.In the District Court of Park County, the court dismissed the manufacturer’s claims against the architect and contractor, finding it was not an intended third-party beneficiary under their contracts, and granted summary judgment to the non-profit on all but one claim, determining that the non-profit’s contractual obligations were limited to financial administration of the project. The remaining claim was later dismissed by stipulation.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the manufacturer’s claims against the architect and contractor because, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and considering the relevant contracts, the manufacturer had sufficiently alleged facts that could support third-party beneficiary status and breach of contract. The court also found the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the non-profit, concluding that the contract’s language and context imposed broader duties on the non-profit, including project administration and construction oversight, not merely financial management. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the lower court’s orders of dismissal and summary judgment, allowing the manufacturer’s claims to proceed. View "Gunwerks, LLC v. Forward Cody Wyoming, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a failed attempt to construct an osteopathic medical school in Gaylord, Minnesota. Philip Keithahn formed Minnesota Medical University, LLC (MMU) and retained Heritage Construction Companies, LLC as the general contractor. MMU planned to finance the project through bond proceeds, with a portion immediately available and the remainder contingent on achieving pre-accreditation. Representatives from Heritage sought confirmation of available funds prior to construction, and Keithahn assured them that the project would be funded and that millions would be available after closing. However, after initial payments, MMU ran out of funds when pre-accreditation was denied, leading Heritage to halt construction and terminate its contract.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota oversaw the case after Heritage and its affiliates faced indemnification claims and filed a third-party complaint against Keithahn and MMU. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case proceeded to trial on claims including breach of contract, indemnification, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraud by omission. MMU admitted liability for breach of contract and damages. The jury found the defendants liable on all claims except fraudulent misrepresentation. Post-verdict, the district court denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, addressing issues of jury instructions, violations of in limine orders, improper statements, and impeachment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that Keithahn’s representations regarding available financing were actionable as negligent misrepresentations, as they concerned present facts susceptible of knowledge rather than mere future assurances. The court found no error in the jury instructions, no prejudicial violation of evidentiary rulings, and no cumulative error warranting a new trial. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Heritage Const. Companies, LLC v. Keithahn" on Justia Law

A member of the governing board of a public water district was the subject of internal investigations after allegations of misconduct by district staff, as well as allegations made by that board member against staff. Two lengthy confidential reports, prepared by outside counsel, documented the results of these investigations. The board member was permitted to review, but not remove, the reports from a secure location at the district’s offices. Contrary to these restrictions, the board member took the reports without permission, later making extensive annotations on them. Repeated requests for their return were unsuccessful, leading to her censure by the board.The Santa Clara County Superior Court, upon the district's application under California’s claim and delivery law, granted a writ of possession and a turnover order directing the board member to return the reports. The board member stayed enforcement by posting a counterbond as allowed by statute. While the turnover order was stayed, the district sought a preliminary injunction under the general injunction statutes, again seeking return of the reports. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring turnover of the reports, permitting the board member to redact her handwritten notes.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the claim and delivery statutory scheme does not preclude a party from seeking injunctive relief for the recovery of personal property, even after a writ of possession has been issued and stayed by a counterbond. The appellate court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a likelihood of the district’s success on its conversion claim and in concluding that the balance of harms favored the district. The order granting the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law