Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the approval of the Giovannioni Logistics Center Project, a large warehouse development in the City of American Canyon, California. The project requires American Canyon to certify an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), specifically addressing water supply issues since the city relies on outside sources, including water purchased from the neighboring City of Vallejo under a longstanding agreement. Vallejo’s water comes from the State Water Project and its own appropriative water right (License 7848). Vallejo objected to the EIR, asserting that it did not adequately disclose limitations on water availability, including place of use restrictions on License 7848 and ongoing contract litigation between the cities.Vallejo filed a petition for writ of mandate in Napa County Superior Court, later transferred to Sacramento Superior Court, contending that the EIR failed to meet CEQA and Water Code requirements regarding water supply disclosures and contingency planning. The trial court reviewed Vallejo’s arguments, which included claims that the EIR did not account for actual water delivered, failed to assess legal restrictions on water use, neglected the implications of curtailments during drought, and ignored the impact of contract disputes. After argument, the trial court denied Vallejo’s petition and entered judgment for American Canyon and the project developer, Buzz Oates LLC.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the EIR and water supply assessment complied with CEQA and the Water Code. The court found that the EIR provided sufficient detail about water supply sources and reliability, reasonably addressed foreseeable uncertainties, and did not require more specific disclosures or contingency planning absent evidence of insufficient supply. The court also concluded that any technical omissions were harmless and that Vallejo failed to demonstrate prejudice or a legal deficiency in the environmental review process. View "City of Vallejo v. City of American Canyon" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to land operated as an automotive recycling facility by the defendants. They alleged that environmental contamination from the facility affected their property. The litigation began in 2006, and after years of procedural developments, the first jury trial in 2012 resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court later found that the trial justice had erroneously excluded expert testimony and ordered a new trial.A second jury trial was held in 2020 in the Rhode Island Superior Court. During this trial, plaintiffs’ counsel objected to statements made by defense counsel in his opening, arguing that certain factual assertions were inaccurate. Plaintiffs also objected to the testimony of defense witness Karen Beck, claiming her expert opinion should not include references to a report she had not relied on when forming her initial conclusions. The trial justice issued a curative instruction addressing the opening statement objections and limited Beck’s testimony to certain aspects of the disputed report. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, except for a $10,000 punitive damages award against one defendant, which was later vacated by amended judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, and subsequent procedural delays occurred regarding the transmission of the appellate record.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether the plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed for procedural delay and whether the trial justice erred regarding the curative instruction and Beck’s testimony. The court held that dismissal was unwarranted since plaintiffs timely ordered transcripts and took reasonable steps regarding the record. The court further held that plaintiffs had waived their objection to the curative instruction by failing to object at trial, and that the limitations placed on Beck’s testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The amended judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Paolino v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

Several property owners in a coastal Maine subdivision disputed the right to use a strip of beach land known as Sea Wall Beach. The plaintiffs owned lots abutting this beach and, in 2021, acquired a deed for a previously unallocated portion of the beach between certain lots. Historically, the defendants and their guests had used this beach area for recreation. The plaintiffs sought a court declaration of their exclusive rights to the beach and an injunction to stop the defendants’ recreational use.The case was initially filed in the Maine Superior Court and later transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. After a bench trial, the Business and Consumer Docket found that the defendants held an implied easement by subdivision and sale, allowing recreational use of the disputed beach area. The court also considered competing arguments about the location of the northern boundary of Sea Wall Beach but concluded that neither party provided sufficient evidence to fix the boundary on the ground.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interpretation of the deeds de novo and the factual determinations for clear error. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the implied easement for recreational use was properly established by the subdivision plans and historical usage, consistent with precedent. The Court also affirmed the finding that there was insufficient evidence to locate the northern boundary of Sea Wall Beach on the face of the earth, declining to adopt either party’s proposed boundary. The judgment of the Business and Consumer Docket was affirmed. View "Tappen v. Hill" on Justia Law

Petitioners are owners and residents of units in SoHo and NoHo buildings designated under New York City’s Joint Living-Work Quarters for Artists (JLWQA) program, which, since 1971, has limited legal occupancy to certified artists or those who obtained amnesty through later amendments. In 2021, the City rezoned the area, allowing JLWQA units to be voluntarily converted to unrestricted residential use upon payment of a one-time fee calculated by square footage. The fee supports an arts fund. Petitioners challenged this fee, claiming it was an unconstitutional condition and a taking under the Fifth Amendment.The case was first heard in New York Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition, finding that the fee was a monetary obligation not subject to the Takings Clause. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding that the fee was a permit condition subject to heightened scrutiny under the Nollan and Dolan unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The court found that the City failed to show the fee had an essential nexus to a legitimate governmental interest or was roughly proportional to any harm caused by conversion, declared the fee unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners did not have a compensable property interest within the meaning of the Takings Clause regarding the opportunity to convert their JLWQA units. The fee did not constitute a taking because it did not diminish or extinguish existing property rights, nor was it imposed in lieu of a direct appropriation of property. The Court further clarified that a standalone monetary fee for conversion does not implicate the Takings Clause and that heightened scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan only applies to direct exactions or in-lieu-of-property conditions. Judgment was granted for the City. View "Matter of Coalition for Fairness in Soho & Noho, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute over waterfront access involving two neighboring parties. Donald and Linda Lawson purchased Lot 21, which was situated near the Maquoketa River, in 2002. Their decision to buy the property was influenced by a well-cleared path leading to the water, which they believed was covered by an easement. The easement deed they received purported to grant them access across adjacent lots 19 and 20 to the river. However, the deed contained critical errors: the grantor was incorrectly named, and the legal description of the easement did not actually reach the riverbank or follow the usable path.After Mark and Stacey Fink acquired lots 19 and 20 in 2021, they disputed the Lawsons’ right to use the path and initiated a lawsuit seeking to quiet title, damages, and other relief. The Lawsons defended on the basis of various types of easements and counterclaimed to quiet title for the easement. The Iowa District Court for Delaware County denied the Lawsons’ request for reformation of the easement deed, granted quiet title to the Finks, and rejected the Lawsons’ defenses and counterclaims. The Lawsons appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings but identified an error regarding the prescriptive easement defense.On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and held that the district court had the equitable power to reform the faulty easement deed to reflect the express intent of the grantor and the actual agreement between the original parties. The court found clear, convincing evidence of mutual mistake regarding both the grantor’s identity and the path’s legal description. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for reformation of the easement deed consistent with its opinion. View "Fink v. Lawson" on Justia Law

A residential property was subject to two homeowners' associations (HOAs), Aliante Master Association and Autumn Ridge at Aliante Community Association. The homeowner fell behind on monthly assessments, resulting in both HOAs recording liens against the property. Only Aliante proceeded with a foreclosure sale. Prior to the sale, the homeowner made payments to Aliante which, if applied to the oldest assessments first, would have satisfied the superpriority portion of Aliante’s lien. Collegium Fund LLC Series 16 purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and sought to quiet title against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, which held the first deed of trust.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of Collegium Fund. The district court found that Aliante applied the homeowner’s payments to the lien debt as a whole rather than to the oldest assessments, leaving a small part of the superpriority lien outstanding. Thus, it concluded the sale was a superpriority lien foreclosure that extinguished Deutsche Bank’s deed of trust. Alternatively, the court found that even if Aliante’s superpriority lien had been satisfied, the superpriority portion of Autumn Ridge’s lien also needed to be paid off to convert the sale to a subpriority foreclosure. Since no evidence showed payment to Autumn Ridge, the court held Collegium took the property free of the deed of trust.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the homeowner’s payments should be presumed to satisfy the superpriority portion of Aliante’s lien unless expressly directed otherwise. Additionally, the court held that payment of only the foreclosing HOA’s superpriority lien is required to convert the sale to a subpriority foreclosure; payment of the non-foreclosing HOA’s superpriority lien is not necessary. Therefore, the bank’s first deed of trust survived the foreclosure sale, and Collegium took title subject to the deed of trust. View "DEUTSCHE BANK NAT'L TR. CO. VS. COLLEGIUM FUND LLC SER. 16" on Justia Law

Danielle Pennington was the former owner of a property that was foreclosed and sold in 2019 to the predecessor of First Hand Land, LLC. After the sale, Pennington remained on the property, and First Hand Land subsequently sought to evict her. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted First Hand Land a writ of restitution, permitting Pennington’s eviction from the premises. Pennington, representing herself, appealed this order and requested that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals enjoin her eviction pending the appeal, which the court denied. She was evicted the following day.Following her eviction, Pennington moved for reconsideration, presenting what she claimed was a federal district court order granting her quiet title to the property. First Hand Land responded by asserting that the purported federal order was a forgery, pointing out discrepancies such as the absence of the order from the federal court’s docket and inconsistencies with the actual disposition of Pennington’s federal case, which had been dismissed prior to the date on the alleged order. The Superior Court, in a parallel action, also found the order to be fraudulent and noted further irregularities, including mismatched dates and the submission of the forged order to official agencies.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the materials and found, based on judicially noticeable facts and uncontested evidence, that Pennington had submitted a forged order. The court adopted a standard allowing dismissal of appeals as a sanction for willful deception and conduct grossly inconsistent with the administration of justice. Applying this standard, it dismissed Pennington’s appeal and pending motions as a sanction for her litigation misconduct, concluding that no lesser sanction would be sufficient. View "Pennington v. First Hand Land, LLC" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway, a California railroad corporation, sought to acquire a 20-acre parcel in Willits, California owned by John Meyer through eminent domain. The property is adjacent to Mendocino Railway’s tracks and was intended for the construction and maintenance of rail facilities supporting ongoing and future freight and passenger operations. The company argued that, as a common carrier public utility under relevant statutes, it had the authority to exercise eminent domain for public use. The evidence at trial included testimony about the history of rail service on the line, Mendocino Railway’s acquisition and operations, including passenger excursions and more limited commuter and freight services, and the necessity of the property for expanding its rail facilities.The Mendocino County Superior Court conducted a bench trial and found that Mendocino Railway failed to qualify as a public utility entitled to exercise eminent domain. The court reasoned that the railway’s primary activity was excursion service, which does not confer public utility status, and was unconvinced by the evidence of passenger and freight services. The court further concluded that, even if Mendocino Railway had public utility status, it did not meet the statutory requirements for eminent domain, finding the primary purpose of the proposed taking to be for private business activities rather than public use. The court also found insufficient evidence regarding the project’s impacts on neighboring residents and questioned the credibility and timing of Mendocino Railway’s site plans.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Mendocino Railway met its burden of proving it was a common carrier public utility under California law, and that it satisfied the statutory requirements for eminent domain: public interest and necessity, proper planning for public good and least private injury, and necessity of the property for the project. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding compensation to Meyer. View "Mendocino Railway v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a commercial transaction in which an entity obtained a loan to purchase property, granting the lender a freely assignable and perpetual option to purchase a significant co-tenancy interest in the property. When the borrower later sought to refinance, the lender exercised the option and assigned it to another party. The borrower objected to the option’s exercise, negotiations failed over reimbursement of legal fees, and the refinancing collapsed. Litigation ensued, with the new holder of the option seeking specific performance, while the borrower claimed the option was void under South Carolina’s statutory and common law rules against perpetuities.The Circuit Court for Richland County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the borrower, holding that although the South Carolina Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (SCUSRAP) generally superseded the common law rule against perpetuities (CLRAP), the SCUSRAP did not apply to nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, such as the option in question. The Circuit Court reasoned that the common law rule continued to apply to such interests, rendering the option void. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the statutory construction issue de novo. It held that the SCUSRAP completely abolished the common law rule against perpetuities in South Carolina. The court found that nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, which are excluded from the statutory rule, are not subject to any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise. Therefore, the option was not void under either the SCUSRAP or the CLRAP. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for consideration of the borrower’s waiver defense, which had not been previously addressed. View "Spring Valley Interests, LLC v. The Best for Last, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of landowners are members of a road maintenance association responsible for maintaining private roads serving 22 parcels in Amador County. Initially, a declaration limited annual assessments per parcel to $200, although increases were anticipated. In June 2019, at an annual meeting attended by the minimum quorum, members voted 10-1 to amend the bylaws to eliminate the $200 cap. The following month, the association’s board increased the annual assessment to $1,000 per parcel. Some members challenged this increase, arguing the board’s action was invalid under California law because the required approval from a majority of a quorum of members had not been obtained.The Superior Court of Amador County held a bench trial and issued a statement of decision. The court found the assessment increase was not unlawfully levied, reasoning that the bylaw amendment eliminating the $200 limit was proper and that the limit was unreasonable and unenforceable. The court invoked public policy favoring the association’s ability to fulfill its maintenance obligations and denied the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, determined that the board’s assessment increase was void under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act. The appellate court found that the board neither complied with statutory reporting requirements nor obtained approval from a majority of a quorum of members as required by law. The court rejected the association’s arguments, including claims of emergency conditions and assertions that no remedy was available. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the July 2019 assessment increase is void and invalid under the Act. Plaintiffs were awarded costs on appeal. View "Ruffier v. Volcano Hills Road Maintenance Assn." on Justia Law