Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Two neighboring landowners in Middletown, Delaware, disputed whether a cross-easement existed that would allow one parcel (Reybold’s) to use a highway entrance situated on the other parcel (Summit’s). The properties were originally subdivided from a larger tract owned by Viola Carter. During the subdivision and rezoning process in the 1980s, the developer’s engineer, at the request of government agencies, included a note on the record plan stating that “a cross-easement is hereby established” between the parcels for vehicular and pedestrian access. Carter signed the record plan, certifying her ownership and intent to develop according to the plan. The record plan was recorded, and both properties were subsequently sold to new owners, with deeds referencing the plan.Years later, after Reybold purchased one parcel, it sought to enforce the cross-easement to gain more valuable access to the main road. Summit, the owner of the adjoining shopping center parcel, refused to recognize the easement. Reybold sued Summit in the Court of Chancery. A Magistrate in Chancery found that an express cross-easement had been created and could be enforced by Reybold. However, the Vice Chancellor, on de novo review, disagreed, holding that the record plan note was a “notation” under the County Code, which only the County could enforce, and that there was insufficient evidence of the original owner’s intention to create a private easement.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery. It held that the landowner’s signature and certification on a recorded plan containing a note establishing a cross-easement were sufficient to create an enforceable express easement appurtenant. The Court ruled that Summit, as a subsequent purchaser, is bound by this easement, and entered judgment for Reybold. View "Reybold Venture Group IX, LLC v. Summit Plaza Shopping Center, LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner on West Point Island sought to extend an existing dock into Barnegat Bay. The owner obtained permits from both the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Army Corps of Engineers, and received a tidelands license from the Tidelands Resource Council (TRC). After the extension was completed, it was found to be slightly south of the permitted location, prompting the owner to seek a modified permit and license for the as-built dock. The adjacent property owner objected, arguing the extension created navigational hazards and interfered with their own dock’s use.The TRC held public hearings, considered testimony and written submissions, and ultimately approved the modified license, finding the extension complied with applicable rules and did not interfere with navigation or the rights of the objecting neighbor. The DEP approved the decision. The neighbor appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, arguing that the TRC lacked authority to set or modify pierhead lines through individual license proceedings and that such lines must be established uniformly around islands in advance under Section 19 of the Tidelands Act. The Appellate Division affirmed the TRC’s decision, finding it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and holding that the TRC was permitted to establish or modify pierhead lines in connection with individual licenses.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the Tidelands Act authorizes the TRC to set or modify pierhead lines in the context of reviewing individual tidelands license applications, rather than requiring the TRC to establish uniform pierhead lines around all islands prospectively. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, concluding that the TRC did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the licenses at issue. View "In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

A group comprised of property owners from several Montana cities challenged the constitutionality of several zoning and land use laws enacted in 2023, including statutes requiring municipalities to permit accessory dwelling units and duplexes in single-family zones, and the Montana Land Use Planning Act (MLUPA), which imposed comprehensive planning requirements on larger cities. The group argued that these laws unfairly burdened single-family neighborhoods, undermined the right of citizens to participate in land-use decisions, and violated equal protection by creating arbitrary distinctions between citizens.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court initially granted partial relief to the challengers, enjoining certain statutory provisions it found violated the right to participate, and declared that the new laws could not supersede more restrictive private covenants. The court also held that the housing statutes did not violate equal protection. Parties on both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed these rulings. It first found that the public participation claims were justiciable, as a live controversy remained due to the likelihood of the challenged provisions recurring after temporary legislative amendments expired. The court held that the MLUPA’s public participation procedures did not, on their face, violate the Montana Constitution’s right to participate, as the statutes provided for notice and reasonable opportunity for public input, especially during the development of comprehensive plans, even if not at every stage of the process.The court also affirmed that the statutes did not violate equal protection, because the alleged classes—citizens in cities subject to MLUPA versus those outside, or those with versus without private covenants—were not similarly situated for constitutional purposes. Finally, the court vacated the lower court’s declaratory judgment regarding private covenants, finding it was an improper advisory opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the lower court’s judgment. View "M.A.I.D. v. State" on Justia Law

The dispute concerns neighboring property owners in South Kingstown, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased their home in 2010, and the defendant purchased the adjoining lot in 2021. The contested area, approximately 1,134.9 square feet, is included in the defendant’s deed, but the plaintiffs asserted that they had used and maintained it as their own for over a decade, engaging in activities such as planting grass and trees, mowing, and storing items. The defendant’s property was vacant until he moved in, and tensions arose after he objected to the plaintiffs’ continued use of the area and eventually erected a fence.Following the defendant’s acquisition and subsequent dispute, the plaintiffs initiated a suit in the Washington County Superior Court, seeking title by adverse possession, acquiescence, or a prescriptive easement. The Superior Court conducted a bench trial, during which testimony was heard from both parties, the developer, and an expert. After trial, the judge found the defendant’s evidence more credible, particularly noting conversations in which the plaintiffs acknowledged the superior title of the prior owner by inquiring about purchasing the disputed property and seeking permission for certain uses. The court determined that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated hostile possession or a recognized boundary for the requisite ten-year period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s findings under a deferential standard, considering whether the lower court’s factual determinations were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the elements of adverse possession, acquiescence, or prescriptive easement, specifically the requirements of hostility and recognition of a boundary. The Supreme Court also found that the trial court’s findings were sufficiently detailed under the applicable procedural rule. The judgment for the defendant was affirmed. View "Blechman v. Woodward" on Justia Law

An assisted living residence operated by the defendant charged new residents a one-time “community fee” upon admission. The agreement stated that this fee was intended to cover upfront staff administrative costs, the resident’s initial service coordination plan, move-in assistance, and to establish a reserve for building improvements. The plaintiff, acting as executor of a former resident’s estate and representing a class, alleged that this community fee violated the Massachusetts security deposit statute, which limits the types of upfront fees a landlord may charge tenants. The complaint further claimed that charging the fee was an unfair and deceptive practice under state consumer protection law.The Superior Court initially dismissed the case, finding that the security deposit statute did not apply to assisted living residences, which are governed by their own regulatory scheme. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts previously held in a related decision that the statute does apply to such residences when acting as landlords, but does not prohibit upfront fees for services unique to assisted living facilities. The court remanded the case for further factual development to determine whether the community fee corresponded to such services. After discovery and class certification, both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court judge ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that the community fees were not used solely for allowable services because they were deposited into a general account used for various expenses, including non-allowable capital improvements.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed. The court held that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because uncontradicted evidence showed that the community fees corresponded to costs for assisted living-specific intake services that exceeded the amount of the fees collected. The court emphasized that the statute does not require the fees to be segregated or tracked dollar-for-dollar, and ordered judgment in favor of the defendant. View "Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

The case involves Nadine Realme, who participated in a Thanksgiving “turkey trot” fun run organized by the City of San Antonio. While following the course through a public park, Realme tripped over a metal pole fragment and broke her arm. She sued the City, alleging negligent maintenance of the park. The City asserted that Texas’s Recreational Use Statute barred ordinary negligence liability for injuries occurring during recreational activities on government property, arguing that the turkey trot was a “recreational” activity under the statute.In the 216th District Court, Realme prevailed. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that while an organized footrace is “recreation” in common parlance, the statute required activities to be “associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” The appellate court concluded that the turkey trot, as an organized human event focused on completing the race, was not sufficiently connected to enjoyment of nature to qualify as “recreation” under the statute. It further determined that Realme’s purpose—to have fun and capture a social media picture—did not establish she entered the premises to enjoy nature or the outdoors.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the statutory definition of “recreation,” emphasizing its nonexhaustive list and ordinary meaning. It held that a community fun run is “recreation” because it provides diversion, play, and enjoyment, fitting the statute’s scope. The Court ruled that the Recreational Use Statute immunizes the City from ordinary negligence liability, reversing the Fourth Court of Appeals’ judgment and rendering judgment for the City on that claim. The Court remanded the case to the Fourth Court of Appeals to address Realme’s gross negligence claim, which had not been considered previously. View "CITY OF SAN ANTONIO v. REALME" on Justia Law

In 1951, a deed was executed conveying an undivided 1/128 interest in oil, gas, and other minerals in certain Reeves County land. For nearly seventy years, the grantees and their successors received fixed 1/128 royalty payments without dispute. In 2020, a successor grantee, Johnson, asserted a different interpretation, claiming the deed provided a floating 1/16 nonparticipating royalty interest rather than the fixed 1/128 royalty everyone had understood and paid for decades.The 143rd District Court in Reeves County denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Cliftons and other parties, confirming that the deed conveyed a fixed 1/128 royalty interest. Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas, which relied heavily on Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023). The appellate court applied the “double-fraction” presumption from Van Dyke, concluding that the deed conveyed a floating 1/16 royalty and reversed the trial court’s judgment. It also declined to remand the case to consider the presumed-grant doctrine, holding the Cliftons had forfeited that argument.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that while the Van Dyke double-fraction presumption applied, the plain language of the deed rebutted the presumption, demonstrating that “1/8” was used for its ordinary numerical value, not as a term of art. The Court concluded the deed conveyed a fixed 1/128 royalty interest, not a floating 1/16 royalty. The Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment. The Court did not reach the presumed-grant doctrine issue, as its textual interpretation of the deed resolved the dispute. View "Clifton v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P., owns a pecan orchard in Pecos County, Texas, and relies on several wells to irrigate its trees using water from the Edwards–Trinity Aquifer. Its neighbor, Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. (FSH), historically used water from the same aquifer for agricultural purposes and later started selling it to nearby cities. FSH sought to significantly increase its permitted water usage, leading Cockrell to object due to concerns about the aquifer’s finite supply. FSH pursued several permit applications and amendments, some of which involved Republic Water Company of Texas, LLC, and ultimately resulted in settlement agreements that altered FSH’s permit terms. Cockrell attempted to participate as a party in administrative proceedings regarding these permit applications but was denied party status by the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District.The district court in one instance granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, and in another instance granted summary judgment in favor of the District after denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Cockrell appealed both decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas. The appellate court affirmed the lower court rulings, determining that Cockrell had not exhausted its administrative remedies because it filed suit before waiting the required 90 days after submitting reconsideration requests, as prescribed by Section 36.412 of the Texas Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both consolidated cases. It held that the 90-day exhaustion requirement applies only to permit applicants or parties to the administrative proceeding, which Cockrell was not, since it was denied party status. The Court concluded that Cockrell met all statutory requirements for judicial review under Section 36.251 of the Water Code and properly exhausted its administrative remedies according to local Rule 4.9, which required only a 45-day waiting period. The Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the cases for further consideration. View "COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A college student was killed in a single-car accident when his vehicle left a city street, traveled over sixty feet off the paved road, and struck a large concrete planter situated more than six feet from the road in the City of Milton. The student’s parents brought a suit against the city, alleging negligence in failing to remove the planter, which they contended was a “defect” in the public road, and also claimed the planter constituted a nuisance.After a jury found the city liable under both negligence and nuisance theories, awarding damages reduced for comparative fault, the City of Milton appealed. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the judgment, concluding that the city’s sovereign immunity had been waived under OCGA § 36-33-1(b) because the city has a ministerial duty to maintain streets in a reasonably safe condition. The appellate court analyzed the claim under OCGA § 32-4-93(a), reasoning that the planter was “in the public road” as it was on the city’s right-of-way, and found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine it was a defect of which the city had notice.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to clarify the relationship between OCGA § 36-33-1(b) (waiving immunity for ministerial duties) and OCGA § 32-4-93(a) (limiting municipal liability for road defects). The Court held that OCGA § 32-4-93(a) does not itself waive municipal immunity. While OCGA § 36-33-1(b) can waive immunity for negligence in performing ministerial duties, the ministerial duty to keep streets safe applies only to ordinary travel on parts of the street intended for such use—not to areas outside travel lanes, even if within the right-of-way. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Milton v. Chang" on Justia Law