Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A restaurant operated by PFPCO.’s Noble Pie Parlor leased space in the El Cortez Hotel in Reno, Nevada, which was owned by El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC. After initially peaceful relations, the parties’ relationship deteriorated due to disputes over property maintenance and incidents such as a gas leak and a stolen camera. Tensions escalated when El Cortez locked Noble Pie out, resulting in litigation that ended largely in Noble Pie’s favor, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. Later, Noble Pie permanently closed its restaurant, prompting El Cortez to allege breach of the lease’s agreed-use provision and file a new complaint. Noble Pie moved to dismiss; the district court granted the motion but allowed El Cortez to amend its complaint. After further procedural exchanges, El Cortez filed an amended complaint, and Noble Pie again moved to dismiss.The Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, presided by Judge Egan K. Walker, reviewed El Cortez’s late opposition to the motion to dismiss and its request for an extension of time. El Cortez’s request, based on “professional courtesy,” was submitted just before the deadline. The district court denied the extension, finding no good cause for the delay and noting El Cortez’s pattern of tardiness in filings. The court treated El Cortez’s failure to timely oppose the motion as an admission under DCR 13(3), granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, denied leave to further amend, and awarded attorney fees to Noble Pie as the prevailing party under the lease.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the extension, granting the motion to dismiss, refusing leave to amend, and awarding attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or err in any of these rulings and affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural rules in litigation. View "El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO.'s Noble Pie Parlor" on Justia Law

Two couples entered into a written agreement for the sale and purchase of a condominium in Idaho, using a standard real estate contract form. The property was identified by its street address, unit number, and condominium name. After agreeing to terms and signing the contract, the sellers informed the buyers that they no longer wished to sell. The buyers, who had already paid earnest money, secured financing, and prepared for closing, sought to enforce the agreement. The sellers refused to proceed, claiming the contract was unenforceable due to an inadequate property description under the statute of frauds and asserting the parties had mutually rescinded the agreement.The case was first heard in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the statute of frauds and specific performance, finding factual disputes. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that the property description in the contract was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. At a subsequent jury trial, the jury found that the contract was valid, had not been rescinded or abandoned, and that the sellers breached it, awarding the buyers damages. The district court, however, granted the sellers’ motion for partial summary judgment, finding the remedy of specific performance unavailable because the buyers had not tendered the full purchase price at closing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed that the contract’s property description satisfied statutory requirements and thus dismissed the sellers’ statute of frauds defense. The court held that the district court erred in denying specific performance solely for failure to tender the full purchase price, especially since the sellers’ conduct prevented completion. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the denial of specific performance and remanded for the district court to consider equitable factors. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the buyers and awarded them costs and fees on appeal. View "McLaughlin v. Moore" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned and operated a hotel that had a record of serious structural and safety problems, including a window and a stone falling from the building, and repeated failures to correct code violations. After a fire occurred without activation of the sprinkler system, a follow-up inspection revealed that several fire code violations remained unaddressed, along with new violations. Based on these findings, the city’s building administrator ordered the hotel to be closed immediately, citing imminent safety risks. The owners sought to appeal and demanded hearings, but the city cited the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason for delay and directed them to other appellate avenues. The closure order was lifted once the most urgent hazards were remedied, and the owners eventually fixed all violations.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the city and the building administrator, finding no violations of procedural due process or the Fifth Amendment, and that qualified immunity protected the administrator in his individual capacity. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the procedural due process provided for the closure, the application of qualified immunity, and asserting that the closure constituted a regulatory taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, even assuming a protected property interest existed, the risk of erroneous deprivation was low due to specific regulations and the availability of prompt post-deprivation remedies. The court also found that swift action in the face of public safety threats justified summary administrative action without additional pre-deprivation process. Regarding qualified immunity, the court determined that no clearly established law prohibited the administrator’s conduct. Finally, the court held that the temporary closure was a lawful exercise of police power and did not amount to a compensable regulatory taking. View "reVamped LLC v. City of Pipestone" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises owned an 11.8-acre parcel adjacent to Detroit’s Coleman A. Young International Airport, with about 20 percent of the property falling within a regulated runway “visibility zone” that restricted development. Over time, the City of Detroit acquired other properties in a nearby area for airport compliance but did not purchase HRT’s. By late 2008, HRT’s property had become vacant and vandalized, and HRT alleged it could no longer use, lease, or sell the property due to City actions and regulatory restrictions.HRT first sued the City in Michigan state court in 2002, alleging inverse condemnation, but the jury found for the City; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, HRT sued in federal court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the action without prejudice because HRT had not exhausted state remedies. HRT then filed a second state suit in 2009, which was dismissed on res judicata grounds; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. HRT did not seek further review.In 2012, HRT filed the present action in federal court, alleging a de facto taking under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the City’s preclusion arguments, granted summary judgment to HRT on liability, and held that a taking had occurred, leaving the date for the jury. A first jury found the taking occurred in 2009 and awarded $4.25 million; the court ordered remittitur to $2 million, then a second jury, after a new trial, awarded $1.97 million.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that HRT’s claim was ripe, not barred by claim or issue preclusion, that the district court properly granted summary judgment on liability, and that its remittitur decision was not an abuse of discretion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Craig and Michelle Opperman sought approval from their homeowners association to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) by converting their garage and building a new garage on their property within a planned development managed by Portola Ranch Association. The Design Review Committee, lacking expertise on ADUs, referred the application to the Board of Directors. After retaining an independent consultant and reviewing the application, the Board denied the proposal, citing concerns about traffic and fire safety. During this period, adjacent property owners, Martin and Anna Eng, filed a quiet title action against the Oppermans regarding a non-exclusive easement affecting the area in front of the Oppermans’ garage.In response to the Engs’ action, the Oppermans filed a cross-complaint against the Association, asserting claims including breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with business expectancy, and declaratory relief. The Portola Ranch Association moved for summary judgment, arguing its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and was within its authority under the governing documents. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted summary judgment for the Association, finding that the Board acted properly and that the business judgment rule applied. The court later awarded attorney fees to the Association.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the consolidated appeals. It applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the Board had authority under the Association’s governing documents to review and deny the ADU application based on safety concerns and that its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and the doctrine of judicial deference articulated in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. The court further affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Association. View "Eng v. Opperman" on Justia Law

Several property owners upstream of the Addicks and Barker Dams in Houston, Texas, experienced flooding on their land during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The Army Corps of Engineers, responsible for the design and operation of these dams, had long maintained a protocol to protect downtown Houston from flooding, which involved allowing reservoir water to inundate upstream private property under extraordinary storm conditions. The Corps had previously considered purchasing all land that would flood during such events but ultimately acquired only a portion, leaving other private lands at risk. When Hurricane Harvey produced record rainfall, water exceeded government-owned land and flooded privately owned properties, resulting in significant damage.The property owners brought suit against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the government’s operation of the dams constituted an uncompensated taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment. The court consolidated and subdivided the cases, held a liability trial for thirteen bellwether properties, and found the government liable for taking flowage easements. The court later denied a motion for class certification on grounds of untimeliness and selected six bellwether properties for a damages trial, awarding a total of $454,535.03 plus interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ findings of liability and its denial of class certification. With respect to damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed the awards for leasehold advantage, damaged personal property, and the offsetting of FEMA relief, but vacated the awards for lost rent, displacement, and the valuation of the flowage easement for one property owner, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The main holdings are that the government’s operation of the dams constituted a permanent physical taking of flowage easements, and that certain categories of damages were compensable while others were not. View "ABLAN v. US " on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the owner of a restaurant, alleging violations of accessibility laws and seeking damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The defendant requested an early evaluation conference under the Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act, which allows certain defendants to obtain a stay of proceedings and mandates that the plaintiff provide a statement disclosing, among other things, the amount of claimed attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff objected to disclosing this information, arguing that it was protected by attorney-client privilege, and did not include it in the required statement.The Superior Court of Santa Clara County ordered the plaintiff to comply with the statutory disclosure and, after the plaintiff’s continued refusal, imposed sanctions. The court offered the plaintiff a choice between a ruling that would bar recovery of attorney fees or dismissal of the case with prejudice; the plaintiff chose dismissal. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the requested disclosure was privileged and that the trial court’s process violated due process rights.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement to disclose claimed attorney fees and costs for the purposes of an early evaluation conference does not violate the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the statutory scheme does not provide for a privilege exception, and that requiring disclosure does not frustrate the legislative purpose of promoting early settlement. The appellate court also found no due process violation in the trial court’s sanction process, noting that the plaintiff had the opportunity to be heard on the privilege issue. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. View "Johnson v. Rubylin, Inc." on Justia Law

A property owner claimed an easement for driveway access across his neighbor’s land, based on an alleged oral agreement with a prior owner of the neighboring property. He asserted that this permission influenced where he built his house and that the driveway was essential for fuel deliveries and transporting heavy items. After the neighboring property changed ownership several times, the new owners denied any such easement existed. The property owner continued to use the driveway sporadically for fuel deliveries, but his overall use declined over the years, especially after an alternate easement was arranged on another lot.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, reviewed the dispute after the property owner filed a complaint seeking to establish his right to use the driveway. The current landowners opposed the claim, arguing that there was no legally recognized easement and that the property owner had alternative access routes. The superior court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact, and the case proceeded to trial. After hearing testimony from the parties and witnesses, the court determined that the property owner had not met his burden to prove either an easement by estoppel or a prescriptive easement.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the property owner failed to prove an easement by estoppel because he did not provide clear and convincing evidence of an oral grant of permission. The Court also concluded that, while the property owner’s use may have been continuous and hostile, it was not open and notorious, as a reasonably diligent owner would not have been aware of the driveway due to its lack of visibility. Thus, the claim for a prescriptive easement also failed. The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Koponen v. Romanov" on Justia Law