Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Two homeowners purchased a lot in a subdivision that was subject to restrictive covenants, including one prohibiting the installation of solar panels on residences. After their purchase, Missouri’s legislature enacted a statute barring covenants or restrictions that limit or prohibit solar panel installations on rooftops. The homeowners attempted to work with their homeowners’ association to amend the restriction, but the association maintained the ban, later offering only limited permission for panels not visible from the street. The homeowners then sought declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the enforceability of the covenant and the association’s rule on street-facing panels.The Circuit Court of Greene County denied relief to the homeowners, ruling that the new statute applied only to covenants created after its effective date and that applying it to preexisting covenants would impermissibly impair the contractual rights established before the statute’s enactment. The court found that retrospective application of the law was unconstitutional under Missouri’s constitution.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the judgment de novo. The Court held that the legislative intent and the statute’s language supported applicability to all covenants, including those enacted before the statute’s effective date. The Court determined that, while the statute operates prospectively, it renders prior prohibitions unenforceable from the effective date forward, without violating constitutional prohibitions against retrospective laws or impairing contracts. The Court found that the association’s rule prohibiting street-facing solar panels adversely affected cost and efficiency and could not be enforced under the statute.The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, entered judgment for the homeowners, and held that both the covenant banning solar panels and the rule prohibiting street-facing panels were unenforceable under section 442.404.3. View "Eikmeier v. Granite Springs Home Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, a dispute arose among extended family members over the ownership interests in a lakeside property in Vermont. The property was originally conveyed in 1958 by Thelma L. Lillie to Hazel R. Rathbun and her three sons, Leslie, Ernest, and Albert Soothcage. The 1958 deed’s granting clause transferred title to all four individuals, and its habendum clause described the conveyance as being “as joint tenants with right of survivorship their heirs and assigns forever.” In 1977, Hazel Rathbun issued a quitclaim deed transferring her 1/4 interest to her three sons. Over subsequent decades, Leslie and Albert died, and in 2021, Ernest, as the last surviving original grantee, conveyed his interest to his daughters (the plaintiffs), who later filed suit after Ernest’s death, seeking a declaration that they owned the property outright.The case was initially heard in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found that the 1958 deed created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The court determined that the 1977 deed severed Hazel Rathbun’s 1/4 share, converting it to a tenancy in common, but left the remaining 3/4 share as a joint tenancy among the three sons. Upon Ernest’s death, the trial court concluded that his heirs (the plaintiffs) held a 5/6 interest in the property and granted them partial summary judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court held that the 1958 deed did not clearly and definitively express the intent to create a joint tenancy, citing inconsistencies in its language, especially the inclusion of “their heirs and assigns forever.” Therefore, the Court determined the deed created a tenancy in common by default and reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. View "Kirshon v. Abodeely-Mills" on Justia Law

A municipality sought to condemn a parcel of land owned by a private entity along the shore of Malletts Bay for the purpose of constructing a stormwater treatment facility. This parcel, containing a residential structure leased to tenants, was already subject to a longstanding easement permitting the town to maintain a stormwater drainpipe and catch basin. After a pipe rupture in 2019 caused damage, which the owner addressed through a settlement with the town, the town repaired the pipe and subsequently initiated condemnation proceedings, citing the need to facilitate regulatory compliance and reduce potential liability.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial to determine the necessity of the taking as required by Vermont’s condemnation statute. The court found that the town failed to prove the necessity of taking the land. It concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the project was a reasonable means of achieving stated public goals, such as reducing phosphorus runoff. The court also determined that the town did not adequately consider alternative locations, the inconvenience and expense to the property owner, or the effect of the project on local revenues and home rights. Additionally, the court found that the taking was initiated in bad faith.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion or made clearly erroneous findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the town did not carry its burden to prove necessity. The Court found that the town failed to present competent evidence on several statutory factors and did not meaningfully consider alternatives before selecting the property. The Supreme Court did not address the lower court’s finding of bad faith, concluding that the insufficient showing of necessity was dispositive. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

Gunwerks sought to expand its business by constructing a new manufacturing facility in Cody, Wyoming, a project involving public funds and coordinated through Forward Cody Wyoming, Inc. Forward Cody retained Plan One Architects and Sletten Construction of Wyoming, Inc. as the project's designer and general contractor, respectively. Sletten hired various subcontractors, including Big Horn Glass, Inc. (BHG), to perform specific tasks. After completion, Gunwerks alleged numerous construction defects in the facility, including issues with concrete, finishes, HVAC, siding, drainage, ceiling heights, door and window flashings, and the shooting tunnel. Gunwerks sued Forward Cody, Plan One, and Sletten for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.Sletten responded to Gunwerks’s lawsuit by filing a third-party complaint against its subcontractors, including BHG. Sletten claimed that, should it be found liable to Gunwerks, subcontractors responsible for any deficient work should indemnify it for those damages. Sletten did not specifically admit or allege deficiencies in BHG’s work but sought to preserve its right to recovery if any subcontractor was found at fault. Approximately ten months after Sletten’s third-party complaint, BHG moved for summary judgment in the District Court of Park County, arguing that Sletten had not presented evidence showing BHG caused any of the alleged damages. The district court granted summary judgment for BHG, finding that Sletten had not countered BHG’s prima facie showing with disputed facts, relying instead on speculation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, applying the same standard as the lower court and viewing the record most favorably to Sletten. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Sletten failed to present admissible, competent evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding BHG’s liability for any alleged defects. The court found Sletten’s evidence speculative and conclusory, insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The disposition was affirmed. View "Sletten Construction of Wyoming, Inc. v. Big Horn Glass, Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

A Nebraska limited liability company owned by Michael Perkins hired RMR Building Group, LLC, managed and solely owned by Robert M. Ryan II, as a general contractor to redevelop a shopping center. Their contract used a cost-plus billing arrangement, where Perkins paid RMR in advance for specific construction costs, including a substantial sum for HVAC equipment and RMR’s fee. RMR deposited the funds into its general operating account but did not pay for the HVAC equipment; instead, it used the money to cover other business obligations. Perkins terminated the contract after RMR failed to provide proof of payment for the equipment and then sued RMR and Ryan for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and fraudulent misrepresentation, also seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold Ryan personally liable.The District Court for Douglas County found that RMR breached the contract and was liable under theories of money had and received and unjust enrichment, but not for conversion or fraudulent misrepresentation. The court declined to disregard RMR’s corporate entity, finding no sufficient evidence that Ryan diverted funds for personal use or that RMR was a mere facade for Ryan’s dealings. Perkins appealed these findings.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that the corporate veil should be pierced and Ryan held jointly and severally liable for the misappropriated funds, relying on factors from United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Rupe. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence did not establish by a preponderance that RMR’s entity should be disregarded, nor did it support fraud or conversion claims against Ryan. The Supreme Court remanded with direction to affirm the district court’s judgment. View "Perkins v. RMR Building Group" on Justia Law

Eleven individuals residing in the Town of Rockport, Massachusetts, challenged the creation of a new zoning overlay district that would allow high-density, multi-family housing near a commuter rail station. Some plaintiffs live adjacent to or within the boundaries of the affected overlay district. The plaintiffs argued that the adoption of the district should have required a two-thirds vote at the town meeting under state law, rather than the simple majority used, and alleged that the new zoning would negatively impact their property values and personal expectations regarding their property.After the Town held the vote and adopted the overlay district, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on both state statutory and federal constitutional grounds. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing. In response, the plaintiffs provided additional details in their briefing but did not amend their complaint to allege specific individualized harm. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish standing, and that neither legislative nor abutter standing applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had not adequately demonstrated a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact as required by Article III. General, conclusory allegations about diminished property values and expectations were insufficient. The court also found that statutory “abutter” standing and legislative standing theories did not confer standing in federal court for these claims. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing and subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Kolackovsky v. Town of Rockport" on Justia Law

Several descendants and heirs of Edith Little each own separate parcels of real property in Teton County, Idaho, which were divided and conveyed to Edith’s three children after dissolution of a family partnership in 1993. The deeds for these parcels included restrictive language limiting the owners’ ability to sell, trade, convey, or encumber the properties during their lifetimes or the lifetimes of their living heirs, except that conveyances were allowed only to their siblings, nephews, and nieces—not to their own spouses, children, or grandchildren. Despite the restrictions, over the years, owners conveyed their parcels to spouses and lineal descendants.Plaintiffs, who are current owners of two of the parcels, brought suit in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Teton County seeking to quiet title and obtain a declaratory judgment that the deed restrictions were unreasonable restraints on alienation and void as against public policy. The defendants, also family members, argued the restrictions were enforceable. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the Idaho statutes had abrogated the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and upholding the restrictions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation remains in effect in Idaho and was not abrogated by Idaho Code sections 55-111 or 55-111A. The Court further determined that the restrictions in these deeds are unreasonable because they do not effectively preserve the properties within the immediate family and unduly hinder the owners’ ability to use or benefit from their land. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed its summary judgment order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs as the prevailing party. View "Smallwood v. Little" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

The case concerns a 52.77-acre property in Tioga County, Pennsylvania, owned by an individual who repeatedly failed to pay real estate taxes. The county tax claim bureau conducted an upset tax sale after years of delinquency, selling the property for $83,000—about 18% of its appraised fair market value according to the owner. The owner objected to the sale, arguing both that the statutory notice requirements were not met and that the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price, raising procedural due process and substantive due process arguments.The Tioga County Court of Common Pleas held a hearing, credited the testimony of county officials over the owner, and found that all statutory notice and posting requirements were satisfied. The trial court determined there was no defect in the process and rejected the owner's challenge regarding the allegedly low sale price, finding no legal basis for setting aside the sale on that ground. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, agreeing that the statutory requirements were met and that, under Pennsylvania law, mere inadequacy of price does not justify setting aside a tax sale absent irregularities in the sale process.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the lower courts erred in permitting the sale at 18% of market value. The court held that, under the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, a challenge to an upset tax sale based solely on the alleged inadequacy of the sale price is not permitted unless there is an irregularity or illegality in the sale proceedings themselves. The court found no such irregularities here, affirmed the lower courts’ factual findings and legal conclusions, and held that the statutory scheme precludes equitable relief based solely on the sale price. The order of the Commonwealth Court was affirmed. View "In re: Upset Sale TCB Tioga County" on Justia Law