Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A purchaser entered into a condominium sales contract with a developer, which incorporated an escrow agreement between the developer and an escrow company. The purchaser was not a signatory to the escrow agreement, nor was the escrow company a party to the sales contract. After the purchaser defaulted on the sales contract by failing to make the required closing payment, the developer sent notices of default and contract termination, copying the escrow company. The termination notices included instructions regarding the disposition of the purchaser’s escrowed deposits—one letter indicated the developer would retain fifteen percent of the purchase price as liquidated damages, while a later letter stated the intent to retain the entire deposit. The escrow company subsequently released the entire escrow balance to the developer.Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the escrow company on the purchaser’s claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that the escrow company had complied with the escrow agreement as incorporated into the sales contract. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed denial of the purchaser’s partial summary judgment motion but vacated summary judgment for the escrow company on the breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims. The ICA found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the escrow company breached its duties by releasing all funds after receiving what it characterized as conflicting instructions from the developer.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the escrow company strictly complied with the terms of the escrow agreement, which, upon default and proper written notice, required release of all escrowed funds to the developer. The court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding breach of contract or fiduciary duty. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment regarding those claims and affirmed summary judgment for the escrow company, remanding only the issue of attorney fees to the ICA. View "Yamaguchi v. Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants constructed an accessory dwelling unit on a property in Fair Oaks without obtaining the required building permit from the County of Sacramento. They initially applied for a permit, but their application was incomplete and they failed to make necessary corrections. Despite receiving multiple notices of violation and stop work orders from the County, defendants completed construction and leased the unit to a tenant without ever obtaining a final permit or a certificate of occupancy, nor did the County inspect the unit for code compliance.After defendants unsuccessfully appealed the first notice of violation to the County Building Board of Appeals and did not challenge subsequent notices, the County filed suit in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. The County alleged that defendants’ conduct violated state and local building codes and constituted a public nuisance per se under local ordinances. Following a court trial, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the County on both causes of action and issued a permanent injunction, finding that building without a permit was a public nuisance per se as declared by County ordinance.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the County lacked standing, that its nuisance ordinances conflicted with state law, and that the trial court misapplied the law in finding a nuisance per se. The appellate court held that the County had the authority and standing to enforce its building and nuisance codes, that its ordinances did not conflict with state law, and that construction without a permit constitutes a nuisance per se as expressly declared by County ordinance. The judgment was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the County. View "County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings" on Justia Law

Several home builder companies challenged fees they were required to pay to a city when connecting to municipal water and sewer systems. These so-called Capital Facilities Fees were imposed as a condition of development between 2016 and 2018. The builders paid these fees directly to the city and allege that the charges were not authorized by state law. They sought to recover the payments and also requested to represent a class of all entities who, like them, paid the fees during the relevant period.In Superior Court, Wake County, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, arguing that their claims and those of other payors shared common legal and factual questions. The trial court certified a class including all entities who paid the fees between January 2016 and June 2018, finding that the class was numerous, the claims predominated over individual differences, and class treatment was the superior method for resolving the dispute. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the merits, but the city appealed only the class certification order directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered only whether class certification was proper. It held that, under the applicable state statute, the right to a refund depends on who made payment to the city, not on who ultimately bore the cost. The possibility that some builders incorporated the fees into home prices did not defeat class certification, as the statute entitles the actual payor to relief. The court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the legal criteria for class certification and did not abuse its discretion. The order certifying the class was therefore affirmed. View "Wardson Constr., Inc. v. City of Raleigh" on Justia Law

A group of Carteret County property owners challenged the county’s policy of charging waste disposal fees. The county does not provide direct trash or recycling collection services but instead offers access to waste disposal sites and a landfill. The county funded these facilities by charging fees to property owners, including both those who potentially used the county sites and those who hired private waste collection services. The plaintiffs argued that the county unlawfully charged these fees to property owners who never used the county sites or who had private waste collection, and also that the total fees collected exceeded the cost of operating the facilities, in violation of state law.Following extensive discovery, the Superior Court in Carteret County considered plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court rejected one proposed class, finding that determining whether each property owner actually used a county site would require individualized inquiries that would predominate over common issues. However, the court certified three other classes: those allegedly charged fees despite using private waste collection services, and those asserting that the county collected fees beyond its actual operating costs. The county appealed the class certification order directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the denial of the first class.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Superior Court’s class certification order. The Court held that it is feasible to ascertain class members who used private waste collection services by relying on the customer lists from the limited number of providers in the county. The Court also determined that issues of predominance and superiority did not bar class certification and that any future developments could be addressed through modification or decertification of the class. Thus, the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Armistead v. County of Carteret" on Justia Law

A renewable energy developer was awarded a standard-offer contract in 2014 to build a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, with a requirement to commission the project by 2016. The developer repeatedly sought and received extensions to this deadline, while simultaneously pursuing a certificate of public good (CPG), which is also required for construction. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) granted the CPG in 2018, but it was appealed, reversed, and ultimately denied on remand due to violations of local land conservation measures and adverse impacts on aesthetics. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the final CPG denial in 2023.While litigation over the CPG was ongoing, the developer continued to seek extensions of its standard-offer contract’s commissioning milestone. The fifth extension request, filed in 2021, asked for a deadline twelve months after the Supreme Court’s mandate in the CPG appeal. The hearing officer recommended granting it, but the PUC did not act on the request until 2024, by which time the developer’s CPG had been finally denied. The PUC dismissed the fifth extension request as moot, finding the contract had expired by its own terms. The PUC also denied the developer’s motion for reconsideration and a sixth extension request, on the same grounds.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the PUC’s actions with deference, upholding its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and its discretionary decisions unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the PUC properly concluded the requested extension was moot, the contract was null and void by its terms, and there was no abuse of discretion. The Court also rejected arguments that the PUC’s actions were inconsistent with other cases or violated constitutional rights. The orders of the PUC were affirmed. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after Will Pecue contracted with Gulf Coast Dock Masters/H5K Company, LLC, represented by Ryan Hess, to replace two piers near Pecue's residence. One pier, the "harbor pier," was completed and paid for in full, while the other, the "social pier," was left unfinished after Pecue terminated the contract. Pecue became dissatisfied upon discovering that nontreated lumber was used on the social pier, contrary to contract specifications. Although some boards were replaced, Pecue claimed Hess refused to fix all affected areas and ultimately sent a notice of default. Pecue also asserted that H5K was not a legitimate business entity, which he argued prevented him from obtaining contractual remedies.The Baldwin Circuit Court held a bench trial, during which Pecue pursued only a fraud claim against Hess and H5K, seeking substantial damages. Pecue testified about the alleged misrepresentation of H5K's existence and Hess's refusal to remedy the workmanship issues. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Pecue for $100,000 against Hess and "Ryan Hess D/B/A Gulf Coast Dock Masters." Hess filed a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for fraud, but the motion was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case, applying both the ore tenus and de novo standards of review as appropriate. The court found that the evidence did not support Pecue's claim of fraud. Specifically, there was no misrepresentation of material fact regarding H5K’s existence, and any alleged misrepresentation did not proximately cause Pecue’s damages. Further, there was no evidence of promissory fraud. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Hess on Pecue’s fraud claim. View "Hess v. Pecue" on Justia Law

A redevelopment project in Tunica County, Mississippi, involved a distressed property previously operated as a casino. The county sought to acquire the property from its private owner, TJM Properties, Inc., with plans to redevelop it into a convention center complex. Plaintiffs, including Don Hewitt, Advanced Technology Building Solutions, LLC (ATBS), and Tunica Hospitality & Entertainment, LLC (TH&E), invested significant sums in anticipation of becoming the developer and manager under a series of agreements and extensions. However, the purchase option was never exercised, and a senior lienholder ultimately foreclosed on the property.The Tunica County Chancery Court found that the plaintiffs never acquired title, held no enforceable lien, and were not parties to the key asset-purchase agreement. The court dismissed their claims with prejudice, holding that they lacked a legally cognizable property interest, standing to assert a claim, or entitlement to relief. Additionally, the chancery court enforced a previous agreed order requiring the plaintiffs to pay $200,000 to TJM for property maintenance, a payment that was never made.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court’s dismissal of all claims with prejudice. The court held that the plaintiffs had no valid or enforceable lien on the property because they were not licensed contractors, performed no actual construction, and had previously waived any lien rights by consent order. The court also found no error in enforcing the $200,000 judgment and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the transfer of funds between the county and TJM. The judgment of the Tunica County Chancery Court was therefore affirmed. View "Hewitt v. TJM Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

A bank made a $1.9 million loan secured by a mortgage on over 750 acres of real property. About a year later, a portion of the property was sold to a third party, who financed the purchase with a loan from a second bank. During the closing, a vice president of the first bank assured the title company that the bank would release its mortgage on the sold parcel. Relying on this representation, the title company distributed the proceeds, and the second bank lent money for the purchase. Years later, the first bank attempted to enforce its mortgage against the property, claiming its lien was superior to the interests of the second bank and the purchaser.The Lincoln County Circuit Court heard the case after the original borrowers filed for bankruptcy, which stayed claims against them except for breach of contract and foreclosure. The first bank obtained a default judgment for breach of contract against the borrower, but the case continued against the subsequent purchaser and the second bank. These parties moved for summary judgment, arguing the first bank was estopped from asserting its lien due to its agent’s prior representation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in their favor, and the first bank appealed. The Arkansas Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order due to ambiguous abandonment of unresolved claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the first bank’s abandonment of pending claims in its notice of appeal was sufficient for finality, allowing the appeal to proceed. On the merits, the court found no disputed material facts regarding the agent’s authority or the parties’ reliance on the representation. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that equitable estoppel barred the first bank from enforcing its lien under these circumstances. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was vacated. View "RELYANCE BANK, N.A. v. PHARR" on Justia Law

A company sought to operate a red-dirt surface mine on approximately twenty acres in a part of Washington County that was zoned for agricultural and single-family residential uses. The company, operating as Heritage Farms, applied for a conditional use permit, which the Washington County Planning Board considered and ultimately denied. The company then appealed this denial to the Washington County Quorum Court, which upheld the Planning Board’s decision and adopted an ordinance reflecting the denial. The company further appealed to the Washington County Circuit Court. During the circuit court proceedings, several local residents and a neighborhood association were allowed to intervene. The company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the denial was arbitrary and capricious, while the intervenors and county argued that the proper standard of review was arbitrary and capricious because the action was legislative, and that there was a rational basis for the denial.The Washington County Circuit Court found that the quorum court’s denial of the permit was a legislative act and thus applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review. The court also held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-17-211 was unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted de novo review of legislative zoning decisions. Applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the circuit court concluded there was a rational basis for the denial and affirmed the quorum court’s action. The Arkansas Court of Appeals then affirmed the circuit court’s order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the denial of the conditional use permit was a quasi-judicial act, not a legislative one, because it involved applying existing ordinance provisions to the facts of the application rather than creating new law. Therefore, the circuit court should have conducted a de novo review rather than applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s judgment, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MMSC, LLC V. WASHINGTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

A residential property in Anoka County was foreclosed upon by the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), which then obtained a sheriff’s certificate of sale. Creative Real Estate, Inc. (Creative), a junior creditor with a mechanic’s lien for improvements on the property, filed a Notice of Intention to Redeem. Creative satisfied its mechanic’s lien and, the following day, tendered the redemption money to the county sheriff, who issued a Certificate of Redemption in Creative’s name. Creative then conveyed the property to a third party. The sheriff delivered the redemption funds to MHFA’s counsel, but neither MHFA nor its attorney returned the funds to Creative or the sheriff. Instead, the funds were eventually deposited into the attorney’s trust account, and MHFA challenged the validity of Creative’s redemption in district court.The Anoka County District Court granted summary judgment for MHFA, finding that MHFA did not waive its right to contest the redemption because it had not actively solicited or knowingly waived any irregularities, and because Creative’s mechanic’s lien was no longer valid at the time of redemption. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that MHFA had not accepted or appropriated the redemption funds such that it would be deemed to have waived its right to contest the redemption.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a holder of a sheriff’s certificate of sale waives the right to contest a junior creditor’s redemption by accepting the redemption money. Acceptance occurs when the certificate holder receives the money and fails to return it as soon as administratively possible. The court found that MHFA received and retained the redemption funds without returning them, thereby waiving its right to challenge Creative’s redemption. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Court of Appeals Petition of Minnesota Housing Finance" on Justia Law