Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

The case involves Nadine Realme, who participated in a Thanksgiving “turkey trot” fun run organized by the City of San Antonio. While following the course through a public park, Realme tripped over a metal pole fragment and broke her arm. She sued the City, alleging negligent maintenance of the park. The City asserted that Texas’s Recreational Use Statute barred ordinary negligence liability for injuries occurring during recreational activities on government property, arguing that the turkey trot was a “recreational” activity under the statute.In the 216th District Court, Realme prevailed. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that while an organized footrace is “recreation” in common parlance, the statute required activities to be “associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” The appellate court concluded that the turkey trot, as an organized human event focused on completing the race, was not sufficiently connected to enjoyment of nature to qualify as “recreation” under the statute. It further determined that Realme’s purpose—to have fun and capture a social media picture—did not establish she entered the premises to enjoy nature or the outdoors.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the statutory definition of “recreation,” emphasizing its nonexhaustive list and ordinary meaning. It held that a community fun run is “recreation” because it provides diversion, play, and enjoyment, fitting the statute’s scope. The Court ruled that the Recreational Use Statute immunizes the City from ordinary negligence liability, reversing the Fourth Court of Appeals’ judgment and rendering judgment for the City on that claim. The Court remanded the case to the Fourth Court of Appeals to address Realme’s gross negligence claim, which had not been considered previously. View "CITY OF SAN ANTONIO v. REALME" on Justia Law

In 1951, a deed was executed conveying an undivided 1/128 interest in oil, gas, and other minerals in certain Reeves County land. For nearly seventy years, the grantees and their successors received fixed 1/128 royalty payments without dispute. In 2020, a successor grantee, Johnson, asserted a different interpretation, claiming the deed provided a floating 1/16 nonparticipating royalty interest rather than the fixed 1/128 royalty everyone had understood and paid for decades.The 143rd District Court in Reeves County denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Cliftons and other parties, confirming that the deed conveyed a fixed 1/128 royalty interest. Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas, which relied heavily on Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023). The appellate court applied the “double-fraction” presumption from Van Dyke, concluding that the deed conveyed a floating 1/16 royalty and reversed the trial court’s judgment. It also declined to remand the case to consider the presumed-grant doctrine, holding the Cliftons had forfeited that argument.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that while the Van Dyke double-fraction presumption applied, the plain language of the deed rebutted the presumption, demonstrating that “1/8” was used for its ordinary numerical value, not as a term of art. The Court concluded the deed conveyed a fixed 1/128 royalty interest, not a floating 1/16 royalty. The Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment. The Court did not reach the presumed-grant doctrine issue, as its textual interpretation of the deed resolved the dispute. View "Clifton v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P., owns a pecan orchard in Pecos County, Texas, and relies on several wells to irrigate its trees using water from the Edwards–Trinity Aquifer. Its neighbor, Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. (FSH), historically used water from the same aquifer for agricultural purposes and later started selling it to nearby cities. FSH sought to significantly increase its permitted water usage, leading Cockrell to object due to concerns about the aquifer’s finite supply. FSH pursued several permit applications and amendments, some of which involved Republic Water Company of Texas, LLC, and ultimately resulted in settlement agreements that altered FSH’s permit terms. Cockrell attempted to participate as a party in administrative proceedings regarding these permit applications but was denied party status by the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District.The district court in one instance granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, and in another instance granted summary judgment in favor of the District after denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Cockrell appealed both decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas. The appellate court affirmed the lower court rulings, determining that Cockrell had not exhausted its administrative remedies because it filed suit before waiting the required 90 days after submitting reconsideration requests, as prescribed by Section 36.412 of the Texas Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both consolidated cases. It held that the 90-day exhaustion requirement applies only to permit applicants or parties to the administrative proceeding, which Cockrell was not, since it was denied party status. The Court concluded that Cockrell met all statutory requirements for judicial review under Section 36.251 of the Water Code and properly exhausted its administrative remedies according to local Rule 4.9, which required only a 45-day waiting period. The Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the cases for further consideration. View "COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A college student was killed in a single-car accident when his vehicle left a city street, traveled over sixty feet off the paved road, and struck a large concrete planter situated more than six feet from the road in the City of Milton. The student’s parents brought a suit against the city, alleging negligence in failing to remove the planter, which they contended was a “defect” in the public road, and also claimed the planter constituted a nuisance.After a jury found the city liable under both negligence and nuisance theories, awarding damages reduced for comparative fault, the City of Milton appealed. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the judgment, concluding that the city’s sovereign immunity had been waived under OCGA § 36-33-1(b) because the city has a ministerial duty to maintain streets in a reasonably safe condition. The appellate court analyzed the claim under OCGA § 32-4-93(a), reasoning that the planter was “in the public road” as it was on the city’s right-of-way, and found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine it was a defect of which the city had notice.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to clarify the relationship between OCGA § 36-33-1(b) (waiving immunity for ministerial duties) and OCGA § 32-4-93(a) (limiting municipal liability for road defects). The Court held that OCGA § 32-4-93(a) does not itself waive municipal immunity. While OCGA § 36-33-1(b) can waive immunity for negligence in performing ministerial duties, the ministerial duty to keep streets safe applies only to ordinary travel on parts of the street intended for such use—not to areas outside travel lanes, even if within the right-of-way. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Milton v. Chang" on Justia Law

Several landowners in South Texas leased mineral rights to a company that later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the company, responding to a collapse in oil prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, temporarily halted production on wells within the leased premises for about 40 days before resuming operations. The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the company’s reorganization plan, which included a set deadline for filing administrative expense claims.The landowners, asserting that the company’s temporary cessation of production had automatically terminated their leases under the leases’ terms and Texas law, filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking administrative expense priority for damages related to alleged post-termination trespass. They also sought to have a state court adjudicate whether the leases had terminated and whether trespass damages were owed, arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction or should abstain from deciding these underlying state-law issues. The bankruptcy court determined that it had core jurisdiction to decide the administrative expense claim, which included resolving the validity of the underlying lease-termination and trespass claims. The court found that the temporary cessation did not terminate the leases, denied the administrative expense claim, and declined to abstain. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning jurisdiction, abstention, and the application of Texas law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the administrative expense claim, which necessarily included resolving the underlying state-law lease-termination and trespass issues. The Fifth Circuit further held that, under the express terms of the leases and Texas law, the temporary cessation of production did not result in automatic termination, as production was resumed well within the contractual 120-day period. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. View "Storey Minerals v. EP Energy E&P" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement.After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A man using a cane visited a public beach in Rhode Island and slipped and fell in the bathroom, allegedly due to sand and water on the floor. He suffered several injuries, including a fractured hip, and required medical attention. He filed a negligence lawsuit against the state, claiming the state failed to maintain the bathroom safely, failed to warn of the dangerous condition, and failed to clean the facility. After his death from unrelated causes, his daughter, as administrator of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff.The Rhode Island Superior Court reviewed the case following extensive discovery. The state moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Rhode Island Recreational Use Statute (RUS), which shields landowners from liability for injuries on land open to the public for recreational use unless the injury results from willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. The plaintiff argued there were factual issues regarding the state’s knowledge and actions, relying on complaints about cleanliness and state policies. The Superior Court found no evidence the state had specific notice of the hazardous condition or prior similar incidents, and ruled that the RUS applied, granting summary judgment for the state. The court did not reach the issue of the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the state willfully or maliciously failed to warn against or remedy a known dangerous condition. There was no genuine issue of material fact, and the state was entitled to immunity under the RUS. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the state. View "Estate of Campagnone v. The State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Several homeowners in subdivisions along the North Platte River disputed ownership of a strip of land, known as the “meander land,” that lies between a designated meander line (depicted in historical government surveys) and the current thread (centerline) of the river. Both sides had historically used this land as part of their backyards. The plaintiffs claimed title to this land under the meander line rule, arguing their property extended to the thread of the river, while the defendants asserted that deeds, subdivision plats, and a later quitclaim deed gave them title to the disputed area.The plaintiffs, who owned lots in the Red Butte Subdivision south of the river, initiated quiet title actions, which were consolidated in the District Court of Natrona County. The defendants owned adjacent property and a tract labeled “Park 10” in the Trails West Subdivision, which lies north of the river but was described as extending under the river to the meander line. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, determining that the meander line rule applied and the plaintiffs’ property extended to the thread of the river, not just to the meander line.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s order de novo. It held that the meander line in the relevant deeds and plats was not the true boundary; rather, the property extended to the river’s thread, consistent with Wyoming law and the generally accepted meander line rule. The Court found no clear language in the deeds or plats fixing the boundary at the meander line. It further ruled that subdivision plats could not convey land not owned by the subdivider. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the boundary between the parties’ properties is the thread of the North Platte River. View "Hein v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Two applicants submitted materials to operate medical cannabis cultivation facilities in a Maine town in August 2024. Their initial applications did not include necessary documentation showing that their facilities would be located in a “Registered Cannabis Property,” which was required by the town’s licensing ordinance. Town staff reviewed the applications and placed them on the council agenda for a “first reading,” a step not required by ordinance but adopted by custom. On September 4, 2024, before the first reading of the applications, the Town Council amended the zoning ordinance to add a 1,000-foot setback requirement between cannabis facilities and residential properties—a standard the applicants’ locations could not meet. After the amendment, staff told the council the applications were “complete,” and the first reading occurred. The public hearing and further review were scheduled, and the required property registration was later filed. The council ultimately denied the applications for failing to meet the new setback requirement.The applicants sought judicial review in the Cumberland County Superior Court under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B. The Superior Court affirmed the Town Council’s decision, concluding that the applications were not “pending” at the time of the ordinance amendment and thus were subject to the new setback requirement.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the applications were “pending” within the meaning of 1 M.R.S. § 302 at the time the ordinance was amended. The court held that an application is not “pending” until the reviewing authority has conducted a substantive review of whether it meets the approval criteria. Because the Town Council had not begun substantive review before the zoning amendment was enacted, the applications were not pending and were properly denied under the amended ordinance. The judgment was affirmed. View "Shark Tank Strategies, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law