Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

The case concerns a 52.77-acre property in Tioga County, Pennsylvania, owned by an individual who repeatedly failed to pay real estate taxes. The county tax claim bureau conducted an upset tax sale after years of delinquency, selling the property for $83,000—about 18% of its appraised fair market value according to the owner. The owner objected to the sale, arguing both that the statutory notice requirements were not met and that the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price, raising procedural due process and substantive due process arguments.The Tioga County Court of Common Pleas held a hearing, credited the testimony of county officials over the owner, and found that all statutory notice and posting requirements were satisfied. The trial court determined there was no defect in the process and rejected the owner's challenge regarding the allegedly low sale price, finding no legal basis for setting aside the sale on that ground. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, agreeing that the statutory requirements were met and that, under Pennsylvania law, mere inadequacy of price does not justify setting aside a tax sale absent irregularities in the sale process.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the lower courts erred in permitting the sale at 18% of market value. The court held that, under the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, a challenge to an upset tax sale based solely on the alleged inadequacy of the sale price is not permitted unless there is an irregularity or illegality in the sale proceedings themselves. The court found no such irregularities here, affirmed the lower courts’ factual findings and legal conclusions, and held that the statutory scheme precludes equitable relief based solely on the sale price. The order of the Commonwealth Court was affirmed. View "In re: Upset Sale TCB Tioga County" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the validity of the City of La Habra’s February 2023 revision to its housing element, arguing that the modifications were adopted by the City Manager rather than the City Council and without additional public hearings. The housing element, part of the city’s general plan, is subject to periodic revision and state review. In this instance, after several public meetings and hearings on earlier drafts, the City Council adopted the housing element in September 2022 and authorized the City Manager to make further technical or clerical changes necessary for state certification. The City Manager subsequently approved additional revisions in February 2023, which were submitted to and certified by the Department of Housing and Community Development.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the nonprofit filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking to prohibit the City from treating the February 2023 version as validly adopted. The court denied the petition, finding that the City had met public participation requirements through hearings on prior drafts and online posting of the revised element. The trial court also ruled that the City Council validly delegated authority to the City Manager for minor revisions and determined that any procedural errors were harmless, as required by Government Code section 65010, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The court held that additional public hearings were not required for the February 2023 modifications since they constituted part of the ongoing revision and certification process, rather than a distinct amendment. It further held that the City Council’s delegation of authority to the City Manager was valid and consistent with local law. Finally, the court found no prejudicial error or substantial harm resulted from the process used, upholding the presumption of validity following state certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Californians for Homeownership v. City of La Habra" on Justia Law

Diamond Sands Apartments, LLC owns and operates a 360-unit apartment complex in Las Vegas, Nevada, where units are leased for long-term stays under agreements prohibiting unauthorized subletting. Clark County received numerous complaints regarding short-term rentals in certain units, which included disturbances such as loud parties. The County investigated and verified that some units were being rented for short-term stays through Airbnb. After notifying Diamond Sands of the violations and conducting follow-up inspections, the County issued two administrative citations assessing $2,000 fines for each violation, as permitted under its ordinance, which prohibits unauthorized short-term rentals and allows for fines between $1,000 and $10,000 per violation.Diamond Sands filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, raising facial and as-applied challenges to the County’s ordinance under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The company sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally penalized property owners for short-term rental activity conducted by tenants. The district court denied Diamond Sands’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the fines were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the violations and that Diamond Sands had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion and underlying legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that Diamond Sands bore some culpability due to its knowledge and failure to prevent ongoing violations. The fines imposed were at the low end of the authorized range, and the ordinance aimed to deter harm to residents. The court also determined that Diamond Sands had not shown the ordinance was unconstitutional in every application. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "DIAMOND SANDS APARTMENTS, LLC V. CLARK COUNTY NEVADA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the rezoning of 145 acres of farmland in Canyon County, Idaho for light industrial use. The property owners, the Judith A. Gross Trust and Douglas Gross, sought the rezoning to facilitate future industrial development. The Canyon County Development Services Department and Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval, and the Canyon County Board of County Commissioners ultimately approved the rezoning with conditions, including restrictions on certain uses. Three local businessmen and their agricultural business objected, arguing the rezoning would harm their agribusiness interests by reducing available farmland and impacting crop isolation.After the Board declined to reconsider its approval, the petitioners filed for judicial review in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho, Canyon County. They claimed standing as “affected persons” under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), asserting concrete adverse impacts on their businesses. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to establish “constitutional” standing under the traditional three-part test—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—and declined to consider whether the petitioners met LLUPA’s “affected person” standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that the applicable standing inquiry for judicial review under LLUPA is the “affected person” standard set forth in Idaho Code section 67-6521, rather than the traditional federal three-part test. The Court clarified that Idaho’s standing doctrine is a “self-imposed constraint” and subject to legislative definition. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the petition for review and remanded for consideration of standing under the LLUPA standard. Attorney fees were denied, but costs were awarded to the petitioners. View "Crookham v. County of Canyon" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the sale of property located at 301 Harris Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island. The plaintiff, 1100 North Main LLC, sought to purchase property from the Providence Firefighters Realty Corp. (the Firefighters), contingent on the Firefighters acquiring replacement property. The Firefighters entered into negotiations with the defendant, Shoreby Hill Properties, Inc., to purchase the Harris Avenue property. After several communications, the Firefighters signed a draft purchase and sales agreement for the property, but the defendant refused to execute it and reportedly accepted another offer. The plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking declaratory, equitable, or monetary relief based on the alleged contract, and recorded two notices of lis pendens against the Harris Avenue property.In the Providence County Superior Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, quash the lis pendens, and sought sanctions. The plaintiff argued that the attorneys’ communications constituted assent and that a purported assignment from the Firefighters gave the plaintiff standing. Before the Superior Court justice issued a decision, the plaintiff attempted to amend its complaint to add factual allegations and clarify standing. The trial justice dismissed the complaint and quashed the lis pendens, finding that the allegations failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and did not establish standing. The motion to amend was denied as futile, as no enforceable contract was found.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether a binding contract existed under the statute of frauds and whether denial of the motion to amend was proper. The Supreme Court held that the unsigned purchase and sales agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds and no binding contract existed. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint, quashing of the lis pendens, and denial of the motion to amend. View "1100 North Main LLC v. Shoreby Hill Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Keeling Grubb, acting as president and CEO of Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC, sought a conditional-use permit (CUP) from the City of Eureka Springs to operate the business as a gun and pawn shop. Grubb submitted the application in May 2023, but the City’s Planning Commission denied it at a special meeting, and the denial was subsequently upheld by the Eureka Springs City Council. After these denials, Grubb and Eureka Gun filed a complaint in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the City’s actions and advancing multiple constitutional and statutory claims related to due process, equal protection, property rights, freedom of association and speech, as well as the right to bear arms.In Carroll County Circuit Court, the bench trial was expressly limited to count one of the complaint: an appeal of the City Council’s administrative decision denying the CUP. The remaining claims were reserved for future resolution. During trial, evidence was presented on the nature of the business and community views, but the primary issue was whether Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP under the City's ordinance. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict, finding that Eureka Gun was not entitled to the permit. Additionally, the court ruled that Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) did not apply to the commercial sale of firearms.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It held that the orders appealed from were not final because the circuit court had only adjudicated one of multiple claims, leaving the others pending, and no Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to permit an immediate appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order and declined to address the merits. View "EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC V. THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS" on Justia Law

The case concerns the approval of the Giovannioni Logistics Center Project, a large warehouse development in the City of American Canyon, California. The project requires American Canyon to certify an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), specifically addressing water supply issues since the city relies on outside sources, including water purchased from the neighboring City of Vallejo under a longstanding agreement. Vallejo’s water comes from the State Water Project and its own appropriative water right (License 7848). Vallejo objected to the EIR, asserting that it did not adequately disclose limitations on water availability, including place of use restrictions on License 7848 and ongoing contract litigation between the cities.Vallejo filed a petition for writ of mandate in Napa County Superior Court, later transferred to Sacramento Superior Court, contending that the EIR failed to meet CEQA and Water Code requirements regarding water supply disclosures and contingency planning. The trial court reviewed Vallejo’s arguments, which included claims that the EIR did not account for actual water delivered, failed to assess legal restrictions on water use, neglected the implications of curtailments during drought, and ignored the impact of contract disputes. After argument, the trial court denied Vallejo’s petition and entered judgment for American Canyon and the project developer, Buzz Oates LLC.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the EIR and water supply assessment complied with CEQA and the Water Code. The court found that the EIR provided sufficient detail about water supply sources and reliability, reasonably addressed foreseeable uncertainties, and did not require more specific disclosures or contingency planning absent evidence of insufficient supply. The court also concluded that any technical omissions were harmless and that Vallejo failed to demonstrate prejudice or a legal deficiency in the environmental review process. View "City of Vallejo v. City of American Canyon" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to land operated as an automotive recycling facility by the defendants. They alleged that environmental contamination from the facility affected their property. The litigation began in 2006, and after years of procedural developments, the first jury trial in 2012 resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court later found that the trial justice had erroneously excluded expert testimony and ordered a new trial.A second jury trial was held in 2020 in the Rhode Island Superior Court. During this trial, plaintiffs’ counsel objected to statements made by defense counsel in his opening, arguing that certain factual assertions were inaccurate. Plaintiffs also objected to the testimony of defense witness Karen Beck, claiming her expert opinion should not include references to a report she had not relied on when forming her initial conclusions. The trial justice issued a curative instruction addressing the opening statement objections and limited Beck’s testimony to certain aspects of the disputed report. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, except for a $10,000 punitive damages award against one defendant, which was later vacated by amended judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, and subsequent procedural delays occurred regarding the transmission of the appellate record.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether the plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed for procedural delay and whether the trial justice erred regarding the curative instruction and Beck’s testimony. The court held that dismissal was unwarranted since plaintiffs timely ordered transcripts and took reasonable steps regarding the record. The court further held that plaintiffs had waived their objection to the curative instruction by failing to object at trial, and that the limitations placed on Beck’s testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The amended judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Paolino v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

Several property owners in a coastal Maine subdivision disputed the right to use a strip of beach land known as Sea Wall Beach. The plaintiffs owned lots abutting this beach and, in 2021, acquired a deed for a previously unallocated portion of the beach between certain lots. Historically, the defendants and their guests had used this beach area for recreation. The plaintiffs sought a court declaration of their exclusive rights to the beach and an injunction to stop the defendants’ recreational use.The case was initially filed in the Maine Superior Court and later transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. After a bench trial, the Business and Consumer Docket found that the defendants held an implied easement by subdivision and sale, allowing recreational use of the disputed beach area. The court also considered competing arguments about the location of the northern boundary of Sea Wall Beach but concluded that neither party provided sufficient evidence to fix the boundary on the ground.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interpretation of the deeds de novo and the factual determinations for clear error. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the implied easement for recreational use was properly established by the subdivision plans and historical usage, consistent with precedent. The Court also affirmed the finding that there was insufficient evidence to locate the northern boundary of Sea Wall Beach on the face of the earth, declining to adopt either party’s proposed boundary. The judgment of the Business and Consumer Docket was affirmed. View "Tappen v. Hill" on Justia Law