Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Several landowners in South Texas leased mineral rights to a company that later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the company, responding to a collapse in oil prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, temporarily halted production on wells within the leased premises for about 40 days before resuming operations. The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the company’s reorganization plan, which included a set deadline for filing administrative expense claims.The landowners, asserting that the company’s temporary cessation of production had automatically terminated their leases under the leases’ terms and Texas law, filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking administrative expense priority for damages related to alleged post-termination trespass. They also sought to have a state court adjudicate whether the leases had terminated and whether trespass damages were owed, arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction or should abstain from deciding these underlying state-law issues. The bankruptcy court determined that it had core jurisdiction to decide the administrative expense claim, which included resolving the validity of the underlying lease-termination and trespass claims. The court found that the temporary cessation did not terminate the leases, denied the administrative expense claim, and declined to abstain. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning jurisdiction, abstention, and the application of Texas law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the administrative expense claim, which necessarily included resolving the underlying state-law lease-termination and trespass issues. The Fifth Circuit further held that, under the express terms of the leases and Texas law, the temporary cessation of production did not result in automatic termination, as production was resumed well within the contractual 120-day period. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. View "Storey Minerals v. EP Energy E&P" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement.After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A man using a cane visited a public beach in Rhode Island and slipped and fell in the bathroom, allegedly due to sand and water on the floor. He suffered several injuries, including a fractured hip, and required medical attention. He filed a negligence lawsuit against the state, claiming the state failed to maintain the bathroom safely, failed to warn of the dangerous condition, and failed to clean the facility. After his death from unrelated causes, his daughter, as administrator of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff.The Rhode Island Superior Court reviewed the case following extensive discovery. The state moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Rhode Island Recreational Use Statute (RUS), which shields landowners from liability for injuries on land open to the public for recreational use unless the injury results from willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. The plaintiff argued there were factual issues regarding the state’s knowledge and actions, relying on complaints about cleanliness and state policies. The Superior Court found no evidence the state had specific notice of the hazardous condition or prior similar incidents, and ruled that the RUS applied, granting summary judgment for the state. The court did not reach the issue of the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the state willfully or maliciously failed to warn against or remedy a known dangerous condition. There was no genuine issue of material fact, and the state was entitled to immunity under the RUS. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the state. View "Estate of Campagnone v. The State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Several homeowners in subdivisions along the North Platte River disputed ownership of a strip of land, known as the “meander land,” that lies between a designated meander line (depicted in historical government surveys) and the current thread (centerline) of the river. Both sides had historically used this land as part of their backyards. The plaintiffs claimed title to this land under the meander line rule, arguing their property extended to the thread of the river, while the defendants asserted that deeds, subdivision plats, and a later quitclaim deed gave them title to the disputed area.The plaintiffs, who owned lots in the Red Butte Subdivision south of the river, initiated quiet title actions, which were consolidated in the District Court of Natrona County. The defendants owned adjacent property and a tract labeled “Park 10” in the Trails West Subdivision, which lies north of the river but was described as extending under the river to the meander line. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, determining that the meander line rule applied and the plaintiffs’ property extended to the thread of the river, not just to the meander line.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s order de novo. It held that the meander line in the relevant deeds and plats was not the true boundary; rather, the property extended to the river’s thread, consistent with Wyoming law and the generally accepted meander line rule. The Court found no clear language in the deeds or plats fixing the boundary at the meander line. It further ruled that subdivision plats could not convey land not owned by the subdivider. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the boundary between the parties’ properties is the thread of the North Platte River. View "Hein v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Two applicants submitted materials to operate medical cannabis cultivation facilities in a Maine town in August 2024. Their initial applications did not include necessary documentation showing that their facilities would be located in a “Registered Cannabis Property,” which was required by the town’s licensing ordinance. Town staff reviewed the applications and placed them on the council agenda for a “first reading,” a step not required by ordinance but adopted by custom. On September 4, 2024, before the first reading of the applications, the Town Council amended the zoning ordinance to add a 1,000-foot setback requirement between cannabis facilities and residential properties—a standard the applicants’ locations could not meet. After the amendment, staff told the council the applications were “complete,” and the first reading occurred. The public hearing and further review were scheduled, and the required property registration was later filed. The council ultimately denied the applications for failing to meet the new setback requirement.The applicants sought judicial review in the Cumberland County Superior Court under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B. The Superior Court affirmed the Town Council’s decision, concluding that the applications were not “pending” at the time of the ordinance amendment and thus were subject to the new setback requirement.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the applications were “pending” within the meaning of 1 M.R.S. § 302 at the time the ordinance was amended. The court held that an application is not “pending” until the reviewing authority has conducted a substantive review of whether it meets the approval criteria. Because the Town Council had not begun substantive review before the zoning amendment was enacted, the applications were not pending and were properly denied under the amended ordinance. The judgment was affirmed. View "Shark Tank Strategies, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Esplanade Properties Corporation, a subsidiary of R.H. Macy & Co., owned the Macy’s Parcel in Kenner, Louisiana. In 1992, while Esplanade Properties was under bankruptcy protection and subject to an automatic stay, Jefferson Parish assessed ad valorem taxes for that year. In 1993, the Sheriff conducted a tax sale for nonpayment of those taxes, but the sale was later nullified because it occurred during the bankruptcy stay. For nearly two decades, the Parish took no action to collect the 1992 taxes. After subsequent transfers, the property was acquired by Esplanade Mall Realty Holding, LLC, which in 2018 received notice of a large sum due for past taxes, including the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs. The company disputed the collectibility of the old taxes, citing a statutory three-year limitation on tax sales.The 24th Judicial District Court initially dismissed the suit on procedural grounds, and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded. While proceedings continued, the property was sold to Pacifica Kenner, LLC, which was substituted as plaintiff. The trial court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 47:2131—which prohibits tax sales for taxes more than three years overdue—was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Louisiana constitutional provisions regarding tax collection and prescription. The trial court denied declaratory relief to the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and chose to avoid the constitutional issue, finding it unnecessary to resolve the dispute. Interpreting the relevant statutes, the court concluded that the Sheriff was required to include all statutory impositions, including the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs, in the 2020 tax sale price. The court held that the redemption price for the property must likewise include these amounts. The judgment was reversed, rendered, and remanded to the trial court to calculate the redemption price consistent with this interpretation. View "ESPLANADE MALL REALTY HOLDINGS, LLC VS. LOPINTO" on Justia Law

A public port authority sought to acquire approximately twenty-nine acres of private, unimproved land owned by an individual in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The expropriation was initiated as part of a larger project to develop a liquified natural gas (LNG) and container port complex. The authority intended to lease the acquired property to a private LNG company, Venture Global, for its exclusive development and use, including construction of LNG facilities and docks. The port authority asserted that the expropriation would serve public interests such as economic growth, job creation, energy security, and environmental stewardship, and advanced its mission of expanding port operations.After the port authority deposited the alleged just compensation in court, the landowner filed a motion to dismiss the expropriation, arguing that the taking lacked a public purpose under Louisiana law because its sole intent was to lease the land for private use. The Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines held a contradictory hearing and granted the motion, finding the expropriation unconstitutional since the property would be used exclusively by Venture Global and not by the public port. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reviewed the decision and affirmed, concluding the port authority did not meet the public purpose requirement set by the Louisiana Constitution.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari to address whether a public port authority may lawfully expropriate property for leasing to a private entity. The court held that such a taking, when the property is to be used predominantly by a private company, does not constitute a public purpose as defined in the Louisiana Constitution. The court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, finding the expropriation prohibited and the motion to dismiss properly granted. View "PLAQUEMINES PORT HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. NGUYEN" on Justia Law

Koch Methanol St. James, LLC sought approval from St. James Parish for a land use permit to upgrade its methanol production facility, including the installation of a connecting pipeline that would traverse a wetlands area. The Parish’s Land Use Plan includes specific provisions for allowable uses in wetlands, stating that such areas should remain unoccupied except for unique situations requiring a location in the water. The Parish Planning Commission interpreted this language as permitting Koch’s project under Tier 2 review, since the pipeline was considered a unique situation due to its necessity in connecting to an existing pipeline already located in the wetlands.After the Planning Commission approved the application, plaintiffs appealed to the Parish Council, which unanimously rejected the appeal. Plaintiffs then sought judicial review in the District Court for St. James Parish. The district court upheld the Council’s decision, finding that the Parish’s interpretation of the Plan was reasonable, the process was not arbitrary or capricious, and that Tier 2 review was appropriate for the project. The court also noted that the procedures followed were adequate and left room for reasonable differences of opinion.On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, reversed the district court’s ruling, applying what it termed “de novo review.” The appellate court determined that the Plan required Tier 3 review for any use in wetlands unless specifically listed as allowable, and concluded that the Parish had failed to follow its own ordinance by applying Tier 2 review. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the appellate court erred by applying a de novo standard rather than the proper arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s ruling and reinstated the district court’s judgment, emphasizing deference to the Parish’s interpretation and decision-making authority in land use matters. View "ALEXANDER VS. ST. JAMES PARISH" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased undeveloped property in Westerly, Rhode Island, in 1999. In 2007, they applied to the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for permission to install an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS), a prerequisite for building a residence on their land. DEM denied their application because the groundwater table on the property was only five inches below the surface, while regulations required a minimum of twelve inches. The plaintiffs did not pursue an administrative appeal at that time.In 2020, more than a decade after the denial, the plaintiffs filed suit in Washington County Superior Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensation for an alleged regulatory taking under state and federal law. They also asserted that the regulation violated their rights to equal protection and due process. The state moved to dismiss the action, contending it was time-barred, the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and they lacked standing. The Superior Court agreed, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the lower court’s dismissal was proper. The Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to all claims, and the continuing violation doctrine did not toll the limitations period because DEM’s denial of the permit was a discrete act, not a continuing violation. The Court further found the plaintiffs lacked standing for prospective relief because they did not allege an actual or imminent injury, as any future application might not necessarily be denied. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Majeika v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a series of complex financial transactions involving a Wyoming family and their businesses, a local bank, and a commercial lender. The plaintiffs, including a married couple and their closely held LLC, entered into various loans and mortgages related to their commercial property and business operations. When financial difficulties arose—exacerbated by a downturn in the oil and gas industry—the parties restructured their debt, resulting in a 2017 mortgage and, after the operating company filed for bankruptcy, a 2019 settlement agreement. The plaintiffs later alleged that the bank and lender’s actions and omissions caused them to lose equity in both their home and commercial property, and the defendants counterclaimed for breach of the settlement agreement and sought attorney fees.The District Court of Natrona County dismissed or granted summary judgment for the bank and lender on all claims and counterclaims, finding the mortgage unambiguously secured two loans and the bank had no duty to release it after only one was repaid. It also concluded the plaintiffs could not establish justifiable reliance on any alleged misrepresentations, interpreted the settlement agreement as permitting (but not requiring) the lender to record the quitclaim deed after a sale period, and found no breach by the lender. The district court further ruled the plaintiffs breached the agreement by filing suit, thus entitling the bank and lender to attorney fees.On review, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decisions dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims, holding the mortgage secured both loans and the bank acted within its rights. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the grant of summary judgment to the bank and lender on their counterclaims, finding that filing the lawsuit was not a breach of the settlement agreement or its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Consequently, the award of attorney fees and costs to the bank and lender was also reversed. View "Adams v. ANB Bank" on Justia Law