Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

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Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

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Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a property owner, was ordered by the Pine Orchard Association's zoning enforcement officer to cease and desist from renting his property on a short-term basis. The plaintiff appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Pine Orchard Association, which upheld the cease and desist order. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the board's decision, concluding that the plaintiff's use of the property for short-term rentals was permitted under the 1994 zoning regulations.The defendants, including the zoning board and intervening neighbors, appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the 1994 regulations permitted short-term rentals but remanding the case for a factual determination on whether the plaintiff had established a lawful, nonconforming use of the property.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that the language of the 1994 zoning regulations, which permitted the use of a property as a single-family dwelling, was ambiguous. The court concluded that the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling constituted a permissible use under those regulations. The court reasoned that the terms "home" and "residence" could reasonably be interpreted to mean a structure used as a house or dwelling, without any temporal occupation requirement. The court also noted that the regulations did not differentiate between long-term and short-term rentals, and thus, short-term rentals were permitted. View "Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

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Dwight D. Sikes appealed a judgment from the Choctaw Circuit Court, where Michelle M. Kirkland, representing Kenneth McIlwain's estate, had obtained a judgment against him. The case involved land originally owned by Dwight's father, James Sikes, which was deeded to Dwight's brother, Archie, and subsequently to Kenneth and Patricia McIlwain. The McIlwains sued Dwight, alleging his livestock trespassed and caused damage. Dwight counterclaimed, alleging the McIlwains improperly removed James's personal property, and cross-claimed, arguing James was not competent when deeding the land to Archie.The Choctaw Circuit Court ordered Dwight to remove his livestock but did not rule on his counterclaim. After the McIlwains passed away, Kirkland was substituted as the plaintiff. The court later ruled against Dwight on his cross-claim, finding James competent when deeding the land, but did not address the counterclaim. Dwight appealed this judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and noted that the lower court had not disposed of all claims, specifically Dwight's counterclaim regarding the removal of personal property. The court emphasized that a final judgment must conclusively determine all issues and rights of the parties. Since the trial court's judgment did not address the counterclaim or fully resolve the initial trespass and nuisance claims, it was not a final judgment.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Dwight's appeal due to the lack of a final judgment, as the unresolved claims deprived the court of jurisdiction. View "Sikes v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

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Caroline Adams suffered a spinal cord injury while sledding on property owned by Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, which operates under the name Mack’s Apples. Adams and her husband, Christopher Estrella, filed a lawsuit against Moose Hill for negligence and loss of consortium. The incident occurred in January 2022 when the plaintiffs visited Moose Hill, which allows the public to use a hill on its property for sledding at no charge. Moose Hill also operates a seasonal stand selling hot beverages and other goods to sledders. Adams was injured during sledding and is now paralyzed from the waist down.The Superior Court granted Moose Hill's motion to dismiss the case, citing recreational use immunity under RSA 508:14, I. The plaintiffs argued that the immunity should not apply because they were on the property for a purpose related to Moose Hill's business, which customarily charges for its goods. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Moose Hill qualifies for immunity under RSA 508:14, I, because it allows the public to use its land for recreational purposes without charge. The court distinguished this case from Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, where the ski resort charged for access to its recreational facilities. The court found that Moose Hill's sale of hot beverages was incidental to the free recreational use of the sledding hill and did not negate the "without charge" requirement of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC" on Justia Law

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Debra Stevenson and Eugene Smith co-own a property for which Stevenson initially took out a loan from Wells Fargo. After defaulting, she refinanced with Fremont Investment & Loan, which paid off the Wells Fargo loan. Stevenson defaulted again and filed for bankruptcy. HSBC Bank, as Fremont's successor, sought to enforce its interest in the property through equitable subrogation, claiming the right to stand in Wells Fargo's position.In bankruptcy court, HSBC was found to be the holder of the note and entitled to equitable subrogation for the amount used to pay off the Wells Fargo loan. The federal district court adopted this decision, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that HSBC could enforce its interest despite Fremont's knowledge of Smith's co-ownership and refusal to sign the loan documents.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to HSBC. The court held that Stevenson and Smith were collaterally estopped from relitigating issues decided in federal court, including HSBC's standing and entitlement to equitable subrogation. The court also rejected their Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rescission argument, as it had been previously litigated and decided against them. The court affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that HSBC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

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In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law