Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

KNB Properties LLC and Delta Dawn, LLP, appealed a judgment and an order denying their motion to alter or amend the judgment. They argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cass County. The case revolves around whether KNB needed the County’s approval under its subdivision ordinance for its development of an unplatted parcel of land in Stanley Township, which KNB bought in October 2017. KNB constructed a commercial building on the parcel and later subdivided it into two parcels, conveying one to Delta Dawn by warranty deed in 2021.The District Court of Cass County initially denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, finding disputed issues of material fact. Later, it granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that KNB’s creation of two auditor’s lots and the conveyance of one lot to Delta Dawn in 2021 triggered the subdivision ordinance. The court issued a permanent injunction requiring compliance with the subdivision ordinance before any further development, sale, or transfer of the parcel. KNB and Delta Dawn’s counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the subdivision ordinance was not violated until the act of subdivision in 2021. The court held that the County’s authority was not implicated until KNB platted the parcel into two parcels and conveyed one to Delta Dawn. The court found that the district court erred in granting a permanent injunction and that the proper remedy was to void the conveyance of the 12.451-acre parcel to Delta Dawn, thus restoring the KNB parcel to its original size. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and the order denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment and remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment vacating the auditor’s lots and restoring the parties to their original positions. View "Cass Co. v. KNB Properties" on Justia Law

Laura Lazar sued real estate brokers Lynette Bishop, Shen Shulz, Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., and Shen Realty, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of her father's Malibu house. Lazar's father, Daniel Gottlieb, had assigned his causes of action to her. The complaint alleged that the brokers failed to disclose a dual agency and did not work to obtain the highest possible sale price, resulting in a sale price significantly lower than the house's value.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lazar lacked standing to sue because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was not assignable under Civil Code section 954. The court likened the relationship between a real estate broker and client to that of an attorney and client, which involves a highly personal and confidential relationship, making such claims nonassignable. Lazar appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that a cause of action for breach of a real estate broker’s fiduciary duties, which seeks only damages related to property rights and pecuniary interests, is assignable. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the remaining grounds argued in the defendants' motion. The appellate court found that the transactional nature of the broker-client relationship, unlike the attorney-client relationship, does not involve highly personalized rights of recovery, and thus, the claim is assignable. View "Lazar v. Bishop" on Justia Law

A landlord, JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC (JJD), owns a shopping center in Elk Grove, California, and leased space to Jo-Ann Stores, LLC (Jo-Ann). The lease included a cotenancy provision allowing Jo-Ann to pay reduced rent if the number of anchor tenants or overall occupancy fell below a specified threshold. When two anchor tenants closed, Jo-Ann invoked this provision and paid reduced rent for about 20 months until the occupancy threshold was met again.The Sacramento County Superior Court ruled in favor of Jo-Ann, finding the cotenancy provision to be an alternative performance rather than a penalty. The Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed this decision, distinguishing the case from a previous ruling in Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress For Less, Inc., which found a similar provision to be an unenforceable penalty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the cotenancy provision. The court held that the provision was a valid form of alternative performance, allowing JJD a realistic choice between accepting lower rent or taking steps to increase occupancy. The court found that the provision did not constitute an unreasonable penalty under California Civil Code section 1671, nor did it result in a forfeiture under section 3275. The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced as written, especially when negotiated by sophisticated parties.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the cotenancy provision as a valid and enforceable part of the lease agreement. View "JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

Paul O’Farrell, individually and on behalf of the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, Skyline Cattle Co., and VOR, Inc., filed a lawsuit against Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, and Kelly O’Farrell. Paul alleged that Kelly manipulated their father, Raymond, to orchestrate improper transactions, including a $3.2 million land sale and the non-renewal of Skyline’s lease, causing financial harm to the family entities and himself.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Grant County, South Dakota, presided by Judge Robert L. Spears, dismissed Paul’s claims and awarded attorney fees to the defendants. Paul had requested a change of judge, which was denied by Presiding Judge Stoltenburg, who cited judicial economy and previous submissions by Paul in related cases as reasons for the denial.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Paul and Skyline followed the proper procedure for seeking a change of judge and that neither had waived their right to do so in this specific action. The court found that Judge Spears was disqualified from further proceedings upon the filing of the affidavit for change of judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated all orders entered by Judge Spears in the case and remanded for the appointment of a replacement judge. View "Estate Of O’Farrell v. Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to deregulate certain Manhattan apartments under the luxury deregulation provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) issued deregulation orders for these apartments, but the leases did not expire until after the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) repealed luxury deregulation. The property owner argued that the apartments should still be deregulated despite the repeal.The Supreme Court dismissed the property owner's proceeding, holding that DHCR's interpretation of the HSTPA was reasonable. The court found that the apartments did not become deregulated because their leases had not expired before the HSTPA took effect. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that DHCR's interpretation was correct and that there was no improper delay by DHCR in processing the deregulation applications.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DHCR properly interpreted the HSTPA as eliminating luxury deregulation for apartments whose leases expired after the statute's effective date. The court found that the statutory language and legislative intent supported DHCR's interpretation. Additionally, the court rejected the property owner's argument that DHCR caused undue delay in processing the deregulation applications, finding no evidence of negligence or willfulness by DHCR. The court concluded that the apartments remained subject to rent stabilization under the HSTPA. View "Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

15 Langsford Owner LLC (15 Langsford) acquired eleven condominium units in Kennebunkport between December 2020 and June 2021. The units were previously approved as residential dwellings under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). In April 2021, 15 Langsford began renting the units for short-term stays of less than thirty days. The Town of Kennebunkport, which did not regulate short-term rentals at that time, later contacted 15 Langsford, suggesting that the rentals violated the LUO and the Declaration of Condominium. In June 2021, the Town enacted a Short-Term Rental Ordinance (STRO) requiring licenses for short-term rentals.The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) denied 15 Langsford’s applications for short-term rental licenses in May 2022, reasoning that the units were being operated as a hotel or inn, which are not eligible for licenses under the STRO. 15 Langsford filed complaints in the York County Superior Court seeking review of the CEO’s decision. The Superior Court vacated the CEO’s denial, concluding that the units were “[l]egally existing residential dwelling units” eligible for licenses under the STRO.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the CEO’s denial of the licenses was reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, as the denial involved a ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. The Court determined that 15 Langsford’s units were legally existing residential dwelling units and not hotels or inns under the LUO definitions. Therefore, 15 Langsford was entitled to the short-term rental licenses based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the STRO. View "15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

Ms. Wilson owned a property in the District of Columbia, which she subdivided into three lots: 825, 826, and 827. She sold Lot 826 to Ntaky Management in 2009 and Lot 825 to Ms. Lumbih in 2010. The deed for Lot 826 described it as measuring twenty feet by forty feet, while the deed for Lot 825 described it as thirty-eight feet in length, based on an informal survey by Vyfhuis & Associates. This created a disputed area of eight feet between the properties. Ms. Lumbih installed an HVAC unit and deck in this disputed area. In 2018, Ntaky asked Ms. Lumbih to remove these installations, but she did not comply, leading Ntaky to sue her.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a non-jury trial and ruled that Ntaky owned the disputed area and could remove the encroachments at Ms. Lumbih’s expense. The court also denied Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson and her claim for implied indemnity, which sought to hold Ms. Wilson responsible for the costs associated with removing the encroachments.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court upheld the trial court’s decision regarding Ntaky’s ownership of the disputed area and the removal of the encroachments. However, it vacated the denial of Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson, finding that the trial court did not address whether Ms. Wilson breached her duty to convey a property thirty-eight feet in length. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ms. Lumbih’s claim for implied indemnity, as she failed to identify a non-contractual duty of care owed by Ms. Wilson. View "Lumbih v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The City of Fargo, a home rule municipality, adopted zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition as home occupations and in non-farm commercial use zoned districts. In 2023, the North Dakota legislature passed House Bill 1340, amending N.D.C.C. §§ 40-05.1-06 and 62.1-01-03 to limit the authority of political subdivisions, including home rule cities, regarding firearms and ammunition. Fargo filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 1340 and seeking a declaration that the amended statutes did not void its ordinances.The District Court of Cass County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding that H.B. 1340 did not violate the North Dakota Constitution and expressly preempted and voided Fargo’s zoning ordinances. Fargo appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that H.B. 1340 was a valid exercise of the legislature’s constitutional authority to define the powers of home rule cities. The court concluded that the amended statutes were constitutional as applied to Fargo’s home rule charter and ordinances. The court also determined that H.B. 1340 preempted and rendered void Fargo’s zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition, as the legislature had expressly limited the authority of political subdivisions in this area. View "City of Fargo v. State" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (the "Cabinet") filed a petition to condemn a 30.366-acre tract of land containing subsurface coal in Floyd County for the construction of a highway. The land was part of a larger mineral parcel owned by several individuals, with Leah Atkinson holding the majority share. The owners had a coal lease with SAS Resources, LLC, which had not yet begun mining the property at the time of the condemnation.The Floyd Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the condemned property. The commissioners concluded that the property had a fair market value of $500 both before and after the condemnation. The court adopted this award, but several owners filed exceptions, leading to a trial to determine just compensation. The Cabinet sought to exclude evidence of anticipated royalty income, but the court denied this motion. At trial, the Cabinet's expert valued the property at $145,600 using a comparable sales approach, while the owners' expert valued it at over $2 million using an income capitalization approach, considering future royalty income.The jury awarded the owners $550,000 as just compensation. The Cabinet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the owners' expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the income capitalization approach was permissible.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony that considered the property's capacity to produce future royalty income. The court found that the testimony appropriately accounted for the contingencies and uncertainties of business, making it relevant and admissible. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS V. ATKINSON" on Justia Law

James Javonte Crite appealed the Daviess Circuit Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his apartment. Crite was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, resulting in a two-year sentence and shock probation. He argued that his landlord had no right to enter his apartment without an emergency and lacked authority to grant police entry, making the search and seizure of the firearm illegal.The Daviess Circuit Court denied Crite's motion to suppress, finding that the landlord had the right to enter the apartment under the "emergency entry" clause of the lease due to significant electrical damage that posed a danger to the tenants. The court also concluded that the police entry was reasonable to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician, given the information that Crite was a schizophrenic off his medication, had acted irrationally, and there was a firearm in the apartment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the landlord's entry was justified by the emergency and that the police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment as they were facilitating the landlord's legitimate interest in addressing the emergency.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the landlord's entry was justified under the lease's emergency entry clause due to the electrical damage posing a risk to the tenants. The police entry was deemed reasonable and necessary to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician. The Court also held that the seizure of the AR-15 rifle was lawful under the plain view doctrine, as the officers were lawfully present and the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent. View "CRITE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law