Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The City sought to condemn two portions of property owned by Johnson Properties, located at the intersection of Arrowhead Parkway and Six Mile Road in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, as part of a road realignment project. The property housed the Alibi Bar & Grill, and the City's action resulted in the loss of direct access from Arrowhead Parkway to the business. The City initially offered $32,454 for the property interests, later increasing its offer to $250,000. Johnson Properties rejected these offers, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial solely on the issue of just compensation, with Johnson Properties’ appraiser valuing the loss at $405,000 and the City’s appraiser at $51,711.After a three-day trial in the Second Judicial Circuit Court, the jury awarded Johnson Properties $382,600, which was more than 20% above the City’s final offer. Johnson Properties subsequently moved for attorney fees pursuant to SDCL 21-35-23, submitting evidence of a contingent fee agreement and customary regional practices in eminent domain litigation. The City did not contest the statutory entitlement to fees, the hours worked, or the hourly rate, but argued that the lodestar calculation of $61,740 was sufficient and objected to any enhancement based on the contingency arrangement.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding $139,724.60 in attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly began with the lodestar method and then applied the Kelley factors, including the specialized nature of eminent domain law, customary contingent fee practices, and the substantial results obtained. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the circuit court’s award of $139,724.60 in attorney fees. View "City Of Sioux Falls v. Johnson Properties" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children experienced significant changes in their financial and professional circumstances during their marriage. The husband started several businesses, including an insurance agency and other ventures with local investors. In early 2023, he faced serious legal and regulatory issues, including a large default judgment and revocation of his insurance and gaming licenses, followed by criminal indictments. Amid these developments, the wife discovered evidence of his extramarital affair and initiated divorce proceedings, seeking an equitable division of marital property and debts. During the divorce, the husband retained counsel and used marital funds to commence a lawsuit against his former business partners to recover money he had invested in their shared businesses.The divorce case was tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota. Both parties disputed the classification and valuation of assets, notably the pending lawsuit. The husband argued that the lawsuit should be treated as his separate property due to an alleged pretrial agreement. The wife disputed the existence of such an agreement and asserted that the lawsuit was a marital asset. The circuit court found no binding agreement on the lawsuit’s classification, treated the pending lawsuit as marital property, valued it at $350,000 based on the invested retainer and a percentage of the claimed amount, and assigned it to the husband.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the pending lawsuit as marital property subject to equitable division. The Supreme Court found that the valuation of the lawsuit was not clearly erroneous, as it reasonably reflected the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decisions regarding classification and valuation, and granted the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who were instrumental in the campaign to incorporate the City of Erda sought to prevent approximately 8,000 acres from being annexed out of Erda and into Grantsville City. The controversy arose after an entity, Six Mile Ranch, initiated and amended an annexation petition to move land from Erda’s boundaries into Grantsville, during and after Erda’s incorporation process. The Grantsville City Recorder determined that the annexation petition met statutory requirements and certified it, which was followed by Grantsville approving the annexation by ordinance and entering a development agreement for the property. The sponsors challenged the annexation, alleging it violated both statutory requirements and constitutional provisions, and sought to invalidate the annexation ordinance and prevent the Lieutenant Governor from certifying it.In the Third District Court, Tooele County, the sponsors filed a petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the sponsors lacked statutory, traditional, and alternative standing to challenge the annexation, and denied related motions.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the dismissal but on alternative grounds. The court held that the sponsors, lacking statutory standing, had no other remedy for their statutory claims but failed to demonstrate that rule 65B(d)(2)(B) or the judiciary’s constitutional writ authority permitted relief where a public official had performed their statutory duty, albeit allegedly incorrectly. Regarding the constitutional claims, the court found that a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available through declaratory judgment actions, as clarified by recent appellate decisions. Therefore, the sponsors could not obtain extraordinary relief under rule 65B for either set of claims, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Erda Community Association v. Baugh" on Justia Law

Kyle Dew and Mossy Woods & Waters LLC were sued by Greenwood Leflore Consolidated School District and Mossy Brake Hunting Club, who claimed exclusive ownership of a portion of Mossy Lake located on sixteenth section land in Leflore County, Mississippi. The School District leases this section of the lake to the hunting club for recreational purposes and alleged that Dew trespassed on its property while on Mossy Lake. Dew countered that Mossy Lake is a public waterbody, and as a littoral landowner, he had the right to use the lake. He also argued that the public waters trust should take precedence over the sixteenth section trust.The Leflore County Chancery Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and declaratory judgment. After a hearing and site visit, the chancery court found that the sixteenth section trust was superior to the public waters trust, quieted title to the relevant portion of Mossy Lake in favor of the School District and the hunting club, and enjoined Dew from using that section of the lake. The court also found Dew had not established adverse possession or a prescriptive right and rejected his claims for injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Mossy Lake, being navigable and an oxbow lake, is part of the public waters trust and never accrued to the sixteenth section land. The Court found that the School District does not have the right to exclude citizens who legally access the waters of Mossy Lake. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the judgment of the Leflore County Chancery Court on all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Dew v. Greenwood Leflore Consolidated School District" on Justia Law

Elliott Land Developments LLC sought to rezone approximately 31.8 acres of property owned by Michael and Winona Aguzin in Jackson County, Mississippi, from agricultural (A-1) to single-family residential (R-1) in order to develop a subdivision. The Jackson County Planning Commission held a hearing, where both supporters and opponents presented evidence and arguments. Elliott Land relied on a Land Use Report showing recent development, improved infrastructure, and a purported public need for more housing. Several residents opposed the rezoning, citing concerns about drainage, traffic, and a desire to maintain the rural character of the area. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the rezoning.An adjacent property owner, Marisa Lamey, appealed the Planning Commission’s recommendation to the Jackson County Board of Supervisors. Elliott Land challenged the sufficiency and timeliness of Lamey’s notice of appeal, but the Board chose to hear the appeal. After a hearing with testimony from multiple residents, the Board of Supervisors voted four-to-one to deny the rezoning application, finding insufficient evidence of a change in the character of the neighborhood or a public need for rezoning. Elliott Land appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the appeal was not properly before the Board. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding it was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the appeal was properly before the Board of Supervisors, that the question of whether Elliott Land met its burden was fairly debatable based on substantial evidence from both sides, and that the Board’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Elliott Land Developments, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Walton County, Florida, owned beachfront properties that were affected by a county ordinance enacted during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March and April 2020, the county first closed public beaches, then issued a new ordinance that closed all beaches—public and private—making it a criminal offense for anyone, including private owners, to access or use their own beachfront property. The ordinance was enforced by law enforcement officers who entered private property, excluded owners, and threatened arrest for violations. The ordinance remained in effect for about a month, after which it expired and was not renewed.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, raising several claims, including a Takings Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment, and seeking both damages and prospective relief. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, finding the ordinance had expired and was unlikely to recur. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the county on all damages claims, holding that the ordinance was not a per se physical taking but rather a use restriction, and that the government’s actions during a public health emergency were entitled to deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims for prospective relief, agreeing that the ordinance’s expiration rendered those claims moot. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Takings Clause claim, holding that the ordinance constituted a per se physical taking because it barred owners from their property and allowed government officials to physically occupy and control access. The court remanded for a determination of just compensation, holding that no public emergency, including COVID-19, creates an exception to the Takings Clause. View "Alford v. Walton County" on Justia Law

A group of nonprofit associations representing non-residential property owners in New Castle County, Delaware, challenged a temporary state law enacted in response to a recent county-wide property reassessment. The reassessment, ordered by the Delaware Court of Chancery in a prior case, updated decades-old property valuations to reflect current fair market values, resulting in significant tax increases for many residential homeowners and shifting the overall tax burden toward residential properties. In reaction to public outcry, the Delaware General Assembly passed House Bill 242 (HB242), which authorized school districts in New Castle County to implement a one-year split-rate property tax system for the 2025-2026 tax year, imposing higher rates on non-residential properties and lower rates on residential ones.After the reassessment, school boards set new tax rates and issued tax warrants, and the County mailed revised tax bills. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery against the State, county officials, and school boards, arguing that HB242 and its implementation were unconstitutional and violated state law on several grounds, including the Uniformity Clause of the Delaware Constitution, statutory requirements for tax referenda, fair market value assessment, due process, and HB242’s own revenue neutrality provision.The Court of Chancery reviewed the plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory claims. It held that HB242’s temporary split-rate system did not violate the Uniformity Clause, as reasonable classification between residential and non-residential properties is permitted. The court found that HB242 did not constitute a retroactive personal income tax, nor did it violate due process, given the availability of post-deprivation remedies for property reclassification. Statutory claims regarding referenda, fair market value, and revenue neutrality were also rejected, as HB242’s specific provisions and timing superseded general statutory requirements. Judgment was entered for the defendants on all counts. View "Newark Property Association v. State" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the ownership of a Goldendoodle named Tucker, acquired by two individuals while they were in a romantic relationship. After their separation in May 2022, one party lost contact with Tucker and initiated legal proceedings to regain possession of the dog. Both parties claim a strong emotional bond with Tucker and present evidence regarding their respective abilities to care for him, including testimony from a veterinary behaviorist about Tucker’s anxiety and attachment.The initial legal action was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court, which ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding her to be Tucker’s rightful owner. The respondent appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where a de novo trial was held. The Court of Common Pleas determined that Tucker was jointly owned by both parties, denying the petitioner’s request for replevin. The petitioner then appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the finding of joint ownership. The parties are now estopped from relitigating the issue of joint ownership.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case to determine the appropriate procedure for partitioning a jointly owned companion animal. The court held that, under Delaware law, partition is the remedy for co-owners wishing to sever their interests in personal property, including pets. The court established a presumption that a value-maximizing auction is the default procedure for partitioning a companion animal, but allowed for the possibility of deviation if the equities require it, such as to prevent harm to the animal. In this case, finding no evidence that either party would harm Tucker and that both are suitable owners, the court ordered partition by private auction, appointing a trustee to oversee the process. View "Callahan v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a Delaware law, House Bill 242 (HB242), which permits New Castle County school districts to set different property tax rates for residential and non-residential properties for the 2025-2026 school year. This legislation was enacted after a county-wide property reassessment revealed a significant shift in the tax base, resulting in higher taxes for residential properties. In response to public concern, HB242 allowed school districts to implement a split-rate system, reducing residential rates and increasing non-residential rates, with the stipulation that non-residential rates could not exceed twice the residential rate and that total projected revenue could not surpass the amount projected under the original tax warrant. Subsequent corrections to property classifications led to a net increase in projected tax revenue.The plaintiffs, four property-related associations, challenged HB242 in the Court of Chancery, arguing that it violated the Uniformity Clause of the Delaware Constitution and a “revenue neutrality” requirement in the statute. The Court of Chancery rejected these claims, finding that the General Assembly has the authority to create reasonable property classifications for tax purposes and that the statute’s use of “projected” rather than “actual” revenue allowed for adjustments due to classification corrections.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the constitutionality of HB242 and the statutory interpretation issues de novo. The Court held that the Uniformity Clause does not prohibit reasonable legislative classifications of property for taxation, provided tax rates are uniform within each class. The Court also determined that HB242’s revenue limitation applies to projected, not actual, revenue, and that corrections to property classifications do not violate the statute. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. View "Newark Property Association v. State" on Justia Law

New South Media Group, LLC, along with other plaintiffs, sought to construct four types of signs—flags, artwork, political messages, and event notices—on private property in Rainbow City, Alabama. The city denied their permit applications, determining that the proposed signs were billboards, which are prohibited under Section 214 of the city’s sign ordinance. The plaintiffs believed their signs qualified for exemptions under Section 213, but the city’s definition of “billboard” encompassed their proposed signs. After receiving the denial, New South requested variances, which were also denied by the city’s zoning board.Following these denials, New South appealed in state court and brought federal and state constitutional challenges, which were dismissed in state court and then refiled in federal court. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, New South alleged that several city sign regulations violated the First Amendment and the Alabama Constitution by imposing content-based restrictions, lacking time limits for permit decisions, and granting unbridled discretion to city officials. The district court granted summary judgment to Rainbow City, finding that New South lacked standing because the injury—the denial of the applications—was caused by the unchallenged billboard prohibition, not the provisions New South contested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that New South lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the non-billboard regulations because the injury was not traceable to those provisions and a favorable decision would not redress the harm caused by the billboard prohibition. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Rainbow City and dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "New South Media Group, LLC v. City of Rainbow City" on Justia Law