Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Danny Fox, an active-duty servicemember, purchased a property in Norfolk, Virginia, in 2015. The City of Norfolk determined the property was unsafe and uninhabitable, repeatedly notifying Fox of building code violations. Despite these notices, Fox did not make the necessary repairs. In December 2018, the city demolished the house, deeming it a public nuisance. Fox subsequently sued the city, claiming inverse condemnation, among other things, arguing the property was not a nuisance and that the city's actions were pretextual to increase its tax base.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that Fox's federal constitutional claims were barred by the statute of limitations. It also ruled that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed because, whether or not the property was a nuisance, he could not demonstrate the city's public use requirement. The court found no evidence to support Fox's claim that the city's actions were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed regardless of whether the property was a nuisance. If the property was a nuisance, the city had the authority to abate it without compensation. If it was not a nuisance, Fox could not show a public use, a necessary element for an inverse condemnation claim. The court also found that Fox provided no evidence to support his pretext argument. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the city. View "D.A. Realestate Investment, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system via eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the water system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructures Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action to acquire the system. A day later, Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After extensive proceedings, including a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to Liberty. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the required elements for eminent domain was not satisfied. The court also ruled that Liberty need not submit the administrative record (AR) underlying TAV’s RONs. The trial court held a bench trial and issued a Statement of Decision (SOD) finding that Liberty met its burden, rejecting TAV’s evidence and relying on Liberty’s post-RON evidence. TAV’s objections to the SOD were overruled, and the court entered judgment for Liberty and awarded attorney’s fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof and failed to give appropriate deference to TAV’s decision and findings. The trial court also improperly based its decision on post-RON facts and events. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the trial court to determine whether to allow TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct burdens of proof and standard of review. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

In August 2021, Sean Halling applied for a variance from the Town of Afton to build an accessory building larger than the 900 square feet allowed by the local development code. The variance was approved by the Town Council in September 2021. In February 2022, the Zoning Administrator approved a modification to increase the building's size without public notice. The appellants, neighbors of Mr. Halling, observed the construction and became concerned about the building's size and potential use. They sent a letter to the Town in October 2022 and filed a declaratory judgment action in December 2022.The District Court of Lincoln County dismissed the appellants' action, concluding they failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the matter was moot due to changes in the local development code allowing buildings of the size in question without a variance. The appellants appealed the decision.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the appellants were required to exhaust administrative remedies specified in the Afton Land Development Code before seeking judicial intervention. The court found that the appellants did not appeal the Zoning Administrator's decision to the Town Council acting as the Board of Adjustment within the required timeframe. The court also concluded that the Town Council was acting in its capacity as the Board of Adjustment when it approved the initial variance, and the appellants failed to appeal that decision within a reasonable time. The court emphasized the importance of following prescribed administrative processes for resolving zoning disputes. View "Sorensen v. Halling" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between partners in a limited partnership formed to develop and operate an affordable housing project in Boston. The financing and structure of the project were driven by the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, which incentivizes private investment in affordable housing through tax credits. The partnership agreement included a right of first refusal (ROR) for the nonprofit general partner to purchase the property at a below-market price after the compliance period.In the Superior Court, the judge ruled on cross motions for summary judgment, concluding that the investor limited partner, AMTAX, did not have a consent right over a sale to the nonprofit general partner under the ROR agreement. However, the judge also ruled that the purchase price under the ROR agreement must include the limited partners' exit tax liability. The judge dismissed the remaining claims and counterclaims due to lack of evidentiary support or as a consequence of these rulings.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that AMTAX's consent was not required for the preliminary steps leading to a sale under the ROR agreement. The court also held that the limited partners' exit taxes were "attributable to" the sale of the property and must be included in the purchase price. The court found that the notice of consent rights recorded by AMTAX was accurate and did not constitute slander of title or tortious interference. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference, slander of title, and violation of G. L. c. 93A were dismissed. The judgment was affirmed. View "Tenants' Development Corporation v. Amtax Holdings 227, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1997, Alessandro Roberto purchased a property in Paterson, New Jersey. By 2022, the property was valued at up to $535,000. Roberto failed to pay three sewer tax bills totaling $606, leading the City of Paterson to place tax liens on the property. 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC bought the tax sale certificates at auction. Years later, the company filed a tax foreclosure complaint, and the trial court set the redemption amount at $32,973.15. Roberto did not respond or pay, resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Roberto then moved to vacate the judgment, citing his age, the property's equity, and his financial investments in the property. The trial court vacated the judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f), which allows for relief in exceptional circumstances.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Tyler v. Hennepin County, which held that a homeowner's surplus equity taken under Minnesota’s tax foreclosure law violated the Fifth Amendment. The Appellate Division concluded that Tyler applied to New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law (TSL) and provided grounds to vacate the judgment. The court also determined that Tyler should be given pipeline retroactivity and found no abuse of discretion in granting relief under Rule 4:50-1(f).The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the version of the TSL in effect before its 2024 amendment was unconstitutional to the extent it allowed for the forfeiture of surplus equity without just compensation. The court recognized a property right to surplus equity in New Jersey and determined that private lienholders acting under the TSL could be considered state actors. The court rejected the argument that the surplus equity was not taken for public use and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment as modified, based on the reasoning in Tyler. View "257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Roberto" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeanie Reese, acting as conservator for Leoma Musil, filed a lawsuit against Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and other defendants, alleging violations of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (HBOR) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The dispute arose when SPS recorded a notice of trustee’s sale while Reese’s loan modification application was pending. Reese claimed that SPS violated former section 2923.6 by proceeding with foreclosure actions during the loan modification process.The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but this decision was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court finding a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Reese had submitted a complete loan modification application. Upon remand, Reese amended her complaint, but the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that SPS had not violated former section 2923.6 because it recorded a new notice of trustee’s sale and sold the property more than a year after denying the loan modification application and Reese’s subsequent appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that SPS’s actions did not constitute a violation of former section 2923.6, as the new notice of trustee’s sale recorded in May 2018 cured any previous violation. The court also found that the 18-month delay between the denial of the loan modification application and the new notice of trustee’s sale rendered the initial violation immaterial. Consequently, the court concluded that Reese’s complaint did not state a cause of action under former section 2923.6, and the trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend was appropriate. View "Reese v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Hillsboro, Missouri, enacted ordinances prohibiting new private wells within city limits and requiring residences to connect to the city water system. The Antoinette Ogilvy Trust, owning a 156-acre property within Hillsboro, claimed these ordinances constituted an uncompensated regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trustees, William Becker and Darcy Lynch, argued that the regulations made developing the property financially unfeasible due to the high costs of connecting to the city water system.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the City, rejecting the trustees' claims. The court found that the regulations did not constitute a per se taking, as they did not involve a physical invasion of the property or deprive it of all economic value. The court also determined that the regulations did not fail the Penn Central balancing test for regulatory takings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the regulations did not mandate a permanent physical invasion of the property, as the trustees were not compelled to build structures or dedicate land to the City. The court also found that the property retained substantial value, thus not constituting a taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Additionally, the court declined to consider the trustees' exaction claim, as it was not sufficiently raised in the lower court.Under the Penn Central test, the court concluded that the economic impact on the trustees was not significant enough to constitute a taking, and the regulations did not interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The character of the governmental action was deemed a legitimate exercise of the City's police powers to prevent water contamination and protect the aquifer. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Becker v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

Two lessors, Elizabeth Franklin and Cynthia Peironnet, owned mineral interests in a tract of land in Louisiana. In 2007, Regions Bank, managing their interests, mistakenly extended a lease for the entire tract instead of a portion. Advances in drilling technology increased the tract's value, and the lessors sued Matador Resources, the lessee, to invalidate the extension. Meanwhile, they entered into a new lease with Petrohawk Energy Corporation, contingent on the invalidation of the Matador lease. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the Matador lease, preventing the lessors from benefiting from the more favorable Petrohawk lease.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial in 2021, finding Regions liable for breach of contract. On remand, the court considered extrinsic evidence to determine the lease's royalty provision, concluding it should be based on gross proceeds. The court awarded damages accordingly, including prejudgment interest on past losses and discounted future losses to present value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the lease conveyed a gross proceeds royalty and the admission of extrinsic evidence. However, it reversed the district court's award of royalty damages plus prejudgment interest. The appellate court instructed the district court to consider actual loss data for past years when recalculating damages and to award prejudgment interest from the date each item of past damages was incurred. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these instructions. View "Franklin v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law