Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees.Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees. View "Ramirez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

The City of Indian Wells enacted ordinances regulating short-term rentals (STRs) in response to complaints about nuisances caused by such rentals. Initially, the City imposed a 29-night minimum stay requirement for residential rentals, effectively banning STRs. To accommodate owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wished to operate STRs, the City adopted an ordinance allowing CID members to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, subject to certain conditions. Matthew and Rebecca Parsons, owners of property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID conducted an opt-out vote. When the City denied their permit request, the Parsons filed a petition for writ of mandate, claiming that the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law (specifically Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act) and constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of the Parsons, finding that the City’s opt-out provision was preempted by state law and improperly delegated authority to private parties. The court granted a writ of mandate directing the City to issue an unrestricted STR permit to the Parsons and awarded attorney fees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the case. The court held that the City’s ordinance was not preempted by Civil Code section 4740 because the opt-out vote did not require an amendment to CID governing documents. The court also held that delegating the decision to CID members to opt out of the minimum stay requirement did not violate due process rights. Additionally, it concluded the City did not enact the ordinance arbitrarily or capriciously. The judgment and postjudgment order awarding attorney fees were reversed. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a brother and sister over the ownership of a property in Washington, D.C., purchased in 1999. The brother paid for the property but directed that the title be issued in his sister’s name, allegedly to shield the asset from his estranged wife during a potential divorce. The sister claimed the property was a gift to her in appreciation for her support, and she granted her brother power of attorney so he could manage the property and operate his pharmacy business there. For nearly two decades, the brother managed the property, paid its expenses, and collected rental income, while the sister remained hands off but never revoked the power of attorney. After the brother developed Alzheimer’s disease, a dispute arose between his children—acting as his guardians—and the sister over ownership, leading to litigation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and found that the brother had acquired the property through adverse possession, based on his long period of exclusive management and his public assertion of ownership. The court rejected the sister’s claim that the property was a gift, concluding there was no clear intent to relinquish ownership. It also awarded the brother attorney’s fees and costs without explanation.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the evidence did not support adverse possession, primarily because the brother’s actions were with the sister’s permission via power of attorney, so they could not be considered hostile or adverse. The Court of Appeals also held that the lower court erred by awarding attorney’s fees and costs without explanation. The appellate court vacated the judgment declaring the brother sole owner, vacated the fee award, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Admadu v. Bockai" on Justia Law

A group of residents in the District of Columbia challenged amendments to the District’s Comprehensive Plan, a document that guides land use decisions. The 2021 amendments, enacted after a lengthy planning and public comment process, increased land use densities in certain neighborhoods, prompting concerns among residents about potential harms such as increased risk of displacement, infrastructure strain, and changes to neighborhood character. The residents sued, alleging that the Mayor’s Office of Planning failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment and did not give proper consideration to their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with prejudice, finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court determined that the alleged injuries were too hypothetical and amounted to generalized grievances rather than concrete, particularized harm. Additionally, it concluded that there was no causal link between the Office of Planning’s actions and the claimed injuries, and that the injuries were not redressable because the court could not prevent implementation of the enacted Plan.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the appellants lacked standing, holding that none had alleged an injury-in-fact that was sufficiently concrete or imminent. The court explained that most harms were generalized or speculative and not tied to any specific development project at the time the Plan was enacted. However, the appellate court found that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice; dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but remanded for the trial court to revise the judgment to reflect that it is without prejudice. View "Booth v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over a deed transferring a one-half interest in a farm from a mother to her son, Peter, without consideration, while she was alive. After the mother’s death, her estate, left to four children in equal shares, was inventoried; the contested property was listed as belonging to Peter due to the earlier transfer. David, another son and a beneficiary, objected, claiming that the mother lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she executed the deed. The estate administrator declined to pursue the claim, believing litigation costs would outweigh the benefit. David then initiated a separate action to invalidate the deed and impose a constructive trust, seeking to restore the property interest to the estate.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division held a trial and ruled in favor of David, finding that Peter had unduly influenced the mother and that she lacked capacity at the time of the transfer. The probate court invalidated the deed, deferred ruling on the constructive trust, and awarded attorney’s fees to David. Peter’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court and subsequently moved in probate court to vacate all orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the probate court declined to address the motion, noting the issue was already raised on appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked statutory subject matter jurisdiction over David’s claims. The court found that the claims, concerning an inter vivos property transfer, did not have the direct connection to estate administration or distribution required for probate court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the probate court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among five siblings regarding the distribution of their late mother’s trust. The trust required equal shares for each sibling but included an “equalization provision” permitting the trustee to reduce a beneficiary’s share for unpaid loans or unequal gifts. Over the years, several siblings managed family assets and finances, and there were various informal financial transactions and real estate dealings, including quitclaim deeds and property sales. Tensions increased over suspicions related to the handling of trust assets, leading two siblings to petition the court for an accounting, removal of certain trustees, and other remedies. The other two siblings counter-petitioned to quiet title to certain properties and for other relief.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a lengthy trial and found in favor of the petitioners on most issues. It conducted an extensive audit of financial dealings going back twenty years, treating various rental and sale proceeds as early distributions subject to the equalization provision. The court ruled against the respondents on financial elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty claims, finding them time-barred. It denied the counter-petitioners’ efforts to quiet title to a disputed property and ordered them removed as trustees, required formal accountings, and awarded attorney fees to the petitioners, to be paid from the trust.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the trust’s equalization provision. The appellate court determined that only unpaid loans and gifts could be deducted from a beneficiary’s share, not other financial benefits such as past rental or sales proceeds. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s orders equalizing such proceeds and the attorney fee awards. The court affirmed the denial of the quiet title claim and the remaining orders. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate opinion. View "Sandford v. Sandford" on Justia Law

Two families with a close personal and professional relationship engaged in house-flipping ventures, with one couple (the lenders) providing funds and the other (the remodelers) managing renovations. In 2016, the lenders provided funds for a home project called the Cleveland property, followed by another project, the Rose property, with intertwined finances. The parties consolidated outstanding debts into a single promissory note secured by a deed of trust and set a balloon payment due in March 2018. Disagreements arose about the scope of renovations for the Rose property, leading to a breakdown in their relationship and ultimately litigation. Despite negotiating a purchase agreement and a covenant not to sue, the lenders later claimed that the remodelers had not fully repaid the loan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the remodelers. The trial court found that undisputed evidence showed the lenders had received repayment of the consolidated promissory note through an escrow transfer after purchasing the Rose property. The court also found, in the alternative, that the covenant not to sue barred the lenders’ claims. Partial judgment was initially entered, and after the remodelers dismissed their cross-complaint, final judgment was entered in their favor. The lenders appealed, and the Court of Appeal had previously affirmed a partial judgment in an unpublished opinion, citing deficiencies in the lenders’ opening brief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case independently and affirmed the judgment. The court held that uncontroverted evidence established full repayment of the debt, so the lenders suffered no damages. The lenders’ subjective and unexplained assertions did not create a triable issue of fact. Arguments about other alleged damages were forfeited for lack of timely presentation to the trial court. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the respondents. View "Buchheim v. Anaya" on Justia Law

The State of Idaho sought to build a highway interchange through property owned by Triple Crown Development, LLC. Triple Crown and several related entities, all controlled by Lance Thueson, claimed business damages under Idaho Code section 7-711(2) due to the condemnation. Americrete Land Holding LLC owned land adjacent to the condemned property, and the other intervenor entities conducted business on the Americrete property. Thueson asserted that he intended for River Rock Sand & Gravel LLC to mine gravel on the condemned property, with Thueson Construction, Inc. hauling the material to a concrete plant operated by G&B Redi-Mix on Americrete’s property. However, no mining permits were obtained, and operations never commenced on the condemned property.After the State condemned a portion of Triple Crown’s property and initiated proceedings in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, the parties stipulated to property value and allowed the related entities to intervene. The State moved for summary judgment on the business damages claim, arguing neither Triple Crown nor the intervenors qualified for business damages because Triple Crown did not operate a business on the condemned property and the intervenors' businesses were not located on land owned by Triple Crown. The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing the business damages claims, and denied a motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that, under section 7-711(2), only the fee title owner of the condemned property may claim business damages for a business operating on that property or on adjoining land owned by the same owner. Beneficial or joint venture interests are insufficient to qualify as ownership under the statute. The Court also denied the State’s request for attorney fees, finding the appeal was not frivolous or without foundation. View "STATE v. TRIPLE CROWN DEVELOPMENT, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute concerns damage to a commercial property owned by a company and insured under an all-risk property insurance policy. The tenant, Star Fisheries, Inc., had leased part of the property for over thirty years, during which its operations—particularly the use of water and salt—caused structural deterioration to concrete stairs, walls, and flooring. After initial damage was discovered in 2010, an engineering report recommended several repairs, some of which were completed, while others were not. The tenant was made responsible for remediation costs. No insurance claim was filed at that time. In 2021 and 2022, similar damage was again discovered, confirmed as structural, and the owner filed a claim with the insurer.The insurer investigated and denied coverage, citing policy exclusions for inherent vice, faulty workmanship, settling, and wear-and-tear. The owner requested reconsideration, but coverage was denied again. The owner then sued in Maricopa County Superior Court; the insurer removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. That court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, applying a test from Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace American Insurance Co., which included whether the loss was reasonably foreseeable and almost certain to occur, concluding the loss was not fortuitous.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona regarding the legal definition of a “fortuitous loss.” The Supreme Court of Arizona held that under Arizona law, a fortuitous loss is one that, so far as the parties to the contract are aware, is dependent on chance. A loss is non-fortuitous only if the insured knew, at the time coverage attached, that the loss-causing event had already occurred, was in progress, or was certain to occur because no material contingency remained. The court adopted a subjective standard focused on the insured’s knowledge at the time of contract formation. View "INDUSTRIAL PARK CENTER v GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE" on Justia Law

A group of residents and electors from the city of Trenton proposed an amendment to the city charter that would prohibit the construction of data centers within the city. They submitted a petition with 336 valid signatures to the city council to have this amendment placed on the ballot. The Butler County Board of Elections confirmed the number of valid signatures and reported that 1,277 voters participated in the most recent general municipal election, while 8,197 individuals were registered to vote at that time.The Trenton City Council convened and concluded that the petition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, reasoning that the requirement was ten percent of all registered voters, not ten percent of votes cast. Accordingly, the council refused to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion on the ballot. The residents then filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the council to place the amendment before the voters and to recover court costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the relevant constitutional provisions and its prior decisions. The court held that, consistent with Article XVIII, Sections 8, 9, and 14 of the Ohio Constitution and its decision in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, the required number of signatures for a charter amendment petition is ten percent of the votes cast in the last preceding general municipal election, not ten percent of all registered voters. The court found that the petitioners had exceeded the required number of signatures and ordered the city council to pass an ordinance certifying the petition to the board of elections for submission to the electors at a special election within the constitutionally specified timeframe. The court denied the request for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council" on Justia Law