Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge to Proposition M, a San Francisco measure approved by voters in 2022 that imposed an annual “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of certain residential units kept vacant for more than 182 days in buildings with more than two units. The stated aim was to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase available housing. Plaintiffs included individuals and associations representing property owners, who argued that Proposition M violated statutory and constitutional protections, including property rights and familial relations, and was preempted by the Ellis Act, which protects property owners’ right to withdraw accommodations from the rental market.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted declarations detailing how Proposition M would force them to either rent out units against their wishes or pay substantial taxes, potentially resulting in financial hardship or effective eviction. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that their legal claims failed as a matter of law. After briefing and a hearing, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding that Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, burdened fundamental liberty interests in familial relations, violated equal protection, and infringed upon the constitutional right to privacy. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from administering or enforcing Proposition M.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the City’s appeal. The appellate court analyzed the measure’s conflict with the Ellis Act and concluded that Proposition M imposed a “prohibitive price” on owners’ right not to offer property for rent, directly contravening the Act’s protections. The court found that the Ellis Act preempts Proposition M and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, without reaching additional constitutional claims. The judgment prohibiting enforcement of Proposition M was thus upheld. View "Debbane v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Two condominium owners installed glass artwork on the terrace wall of their unit in a residential complex governed by a nonprofit association. The association, citing its declaration of restrictive covenants, fined one of the owners for this installation and required removal of the artwork, asserting that prior written consent was required for such exterior modifications. The owners paid the fine under protest and removed the artwork, but then brought suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the association had waived enforcement through long-term inaction and that they had relied on this acquiescence to their detriment.The County Court of Harrison County granted summary judgment to the association, ruling that the declaration was unambiguous, the association was entitled to enforce it, and that waiver did not apply. The court adopted the association’s proposed findings and did not address pending discovery requests or motions to compel. The owners appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, arguing that summary judgment was improper prior to completion of discovery, especially given their equitable claims of waiver, estoppel, and laches.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches are fact-intensive and generally require full discovery before summary judgment can be considered. The court affirmed the chancery court’s reversal of summary judgment, finding that the county court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment prematurely and foreclosing discovery necessary to resolve factual issues related to the owners’ equitable claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings in the county court. View "Sea Breeze Condominiums & Resort Owners' Association, Inc. v. Lyons" on Justia Law

A tenant operating a restaurant entered into a five-year commercial lease with the landlord for retail space, which later continued as a month-to-month tenancy after the lease expired. In January 2023, the tenant withheld the rent, claiming entitlement to a previously discussed rent reduction due to pandemic-related difficulties. The tenant deducted the amount he believed he had overpaid from the rent for January and part of February 2023. Despite this, he paid full rent from March 2023 through February 2025. The landlord eventually served the tenant with a three-day notice to pay or quit in February 2025, demanding payment for the amount withheld in January and February 2023.After the tenant did not pay the amount demanded within three days, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking possession and damages. The tenant demurred, arguing that the notice was invalid because it sought rent that had become due more than a year before the notice was served, in violation of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). The trial court overruled the demurrer and, following a bench trial, entered judgment for the landlord, awarding possession, unpaid rent, and holdover damages, reasoning that the lease required payments to be applied to the oldest obligation, thereby keeping the tenant in continual arrears.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed the judgment. It held that section 1161(2) requires a three-day notice to be served within one year after the rent becomes due, and the landlord’s notice, based solely on rent due more than a year prior, was void and could not support the unlawful detainer action or damages. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the tenant. View "Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong" on Justia Law

Two families who had worked together for two decades in home renovation projects developed a dispute after collaborating on the purchase and remodeling of a property known as the Rose home. One couple provided financing, while the other managed the remodeling. Their financial arrangement involved consolidating an outstanding debt from a previous project with new loans for the Rose property into a single promissory note, secured by a deed of trust. The relationship deteriorated over disagreements about the remodeling approach, leading to negotiations for the lender to purchase the property from the remodelers. The transaction closed with the lender receiving a substantial sum from escrow to pay off the promissory note.After the transaction, the lender claimed that the remodelers had not properly repaid the debt, despite the escrow transfer. The lender filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting multiple causes of action including breach of contract and fraud. The remodelers moved for summary judgment, contending that the lender had been fully repaid and that a covenant not to sue barred the claims. The Superior Court granted summary judgment, finding that the debt was repaid and the lender suffered no damages, and entered judgment in favor of the remodelers.Upon appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, independently reviewed the record and affirmed the judgment. The court held that undisputed objective evidence showed the debt had been fully repaid through the escrow process, and that the lender’s subjective assertions were insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute. The court further found that arguments concerning other damages were forfeited because they had not been raised below. The judgment in favor of the remodelers was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondents. View "Buchheim v. Anaya" on Justia Law

Several residents and a public interest foundation sought to block a county’s implementation of an ordinance that authorized the issuance of $25 million in general revenue bonds. The bonds were intended to fund the final phase of a sewer and wastewater treatment project serving only the southernmost part of the county. The ordinance provided for an annual ad valorem tax on all taxable property in the county to support repayment. The plaintiffs argued the ordinance violated the state constitution by levying a county-wide tax for a benefit limited to a specific geographic area.The Oconee County Circuit Court considered the county’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the action was untimely, and that the ordinance was constitutional. The circuit court rejected the county’s arguments on standing and timeliness but granted the motion to dismiss by concluding the ordinance was constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed, and the county cross-appealed, asserting the action should be barred as untimely.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiffs’ action was barred by the twenty-day statute of limitations in South Carolina Code section 11-15-30, which requires any action challenging the issuance of bonds to be filed within twenty days of filing the official record of bond proceedings. The Court determined the plaintiffs’ challenge was “on account of” the bond issuance, as the ordinance authorizing the bonds and their use were inseparable. Because the plaintiffs filed their action more than four months after the required record was filed with the clerk of court, the Supreme Court held the action was untimely. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed as modified, with the Supreme Court declining to address other issues, including standing and constitutionality. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Oconee County" on Justia Law

The dispute concerned ownership of a strip of land at the boundary between two neighboring properties. The petitioner initiated litigation to resolve title to this land, and the respondents answered and asserted counterclaims. With both parties’ consent, a special master reviewed the title issues. The trial court adopted part of the special master’s recommendation, rejected the petitioner’s claims, and vested title in the respondents. Before the respondents’ counterclaims could be tried, they voluntarily dismissed those claims. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s order on title.The Court of Appeals of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the petitioner’s appeal was untimely. The court reasoned that the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s order and held that the voluntary dismissal of the counterclaims did not render the earlier order appealable as a final judgment. The majority relied on Dykes v. Atlanta Paving & Concrete Construction, which held that the date of entry of the original order determines its finality for appeal purposes, not subsequent dismissals of remaining claims. A dissent argued that an order could become final due to subsequent events, such as dismissal of remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and concluded that the appeal was timely. The Court held that when all remaining claims were dismissed, the prior order became a final judgment, triggering the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal. The Court overruled Dykes and similar precedents, clarifying that a judgment can become final due to subsequent events and not solely upon original entry. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. View "NEELY v. PARSELL" on Justia Law

The case concerns a hemp farm operated by Blue 42 Organics, LLC, which was damaged during a drug interdiction operation conducted by the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS). Blue 42, a properly registered hemp grower, alleged that in July 2021, DPS flew helicopters and a fixed-wing aircraft at low altitude over its property, destroying two rows of crops valued at approximately $37,000. Blue 42 also claimed that the operation jeopardized future land leases due to cattle being harassed by the aircraft. Blue 42 filed a claim for inverse condemnation, asserting that its property was damaged for a public purpose without just compensation as required by the Georgia Constitution.The Superior Court (trial court) granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, agreeing with DPS’s argument that the damage occurred during the exercise of the State’s police powers and was therefore barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, holding that all exercises of the police power were categorically exempt from the constitutional requirement to pay just and adequate compensation for property taken or damaged for public purposes.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that there is no categorical exemption from the Just Compensation Clause of the Georgia Constitution for all exercises of the police power. The court clarified that while limited exceptions exist—namely, destruction of property due to abatement of nuisances or in cases of urgent necessity—these did not apply categorically to all police power activities. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the lower courts erred by dismissing Blue 42’s complaint on the basis of a broad police power exemption. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "BLUE 42 ORGANICS, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the right to use a private roadway, Forgotten Lane, which crosses property owned by Shan and Dana Tompkins and abuts parcels owned by Christine Brock as co-trustee of a family trust. The properties, all originally part of a single tract, were divided over several decades by a series of conveyances beginning in the 1940s. The parties disagreed about whether Brock held an easement over Forgotten Lane, the nature of historical use of the road, and whether any rights to use the road continued to exist after the division of the property. In 2016–2017, physical barriers were placed on the disputed road, leading to this litigation after Brock claimed an easement and sought to remove the obstructions.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, first considered only Brock’s claim of an express easement based on a certificate of survey, ultimately denying summary judgment to both sides but inviting Brock to amend her complaint to include implied, prescriptive, and public easement theories. The court permitted the amendment and later bifurcated the proceedings, assigning the express, implied, and public easement claims to a bench trial, while reserving the prescriptive easement and trespass counterclaims for a potential jury trial. After a bench trial, the District Court found Brock did not prove an express easement but held she had established an implied easement across the Tompkins’ property and issued a permanent injunction. When the implied easement was found to provide the relief sought, the District Court dismissed the remaining claims and counterclaims as moot and denied Brock’s request for attorney fees on procedural grounds.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred by not granting summary judgment to the Tompkins on the original express-easement claim, but that this error did not affect the fairness of proceedings on the amended complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment finding an implied easement, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded for further proceedings on any unresolved alternative theories, including public and prescriptive easements, and the trespass counterclaim. It also reversed the procedural denial of Brock’s request for costs and fees, remanding for a new determination after final judgment. Other procedural and bifurcation orders were affirmed. View "Brock v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

In this case, a dispute arose over membership interests in Freedom Pass Partners, LLC, which owns undeveloped property near Big Sky, Montana. Carol Hudson, through her estate and beneficiaries Alan and Jeffrey Johnson, claimed that Hudson funded the purchase of the property based on assurances she would be a member of Freedom Pass. After Hudson’s death, her sons, acting as trustees and beneficiaries of her trust, filed suit asserting multiple claims including breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion, alleging Hudson’s investment entitled her to membership or ownership interests.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court reviewed the claims and granted summary judgment for Freedom Pass Partners, LLC. It found that the Johnsons lacked standing because the estate’s personal representative had not joined the litigation, and concluded that all claims were time-barred based on the statute of limitations. The court also denied Johnsons’ motions to amend the complaint, to compel discovery identifying a prospective property buyer, and for relief from judgment regarding the dissolution of a lis pendens notice.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decisions de novo for summary judgment and for abuse of discretion on the remaining motions. It held that genuine disputes of material fact existed about whether Hudson knew or should have known she was not a member of Freedom Pass, particularly given conflicting evidence and potential concealment or fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court also found the denial of leave to amend the complaint was an abuse of discretion because adding the estate’s personal representative could cure the standing defect. The denial of discovery and failure to consider mootness regarding the lis pendens were also found to be abuses of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hudson Revocable Trust v. Freedom Pass" on Justia Law

The case involves a series of unsuccessful commercial real estate transactions in South Lake Tahoe, where the buyer, Urban Sunrise LLC, was represented by dual agents—David Vogt, a real estate broker, and Ryan Smith, a real estate agent. Urban Sunrise entered into purchase agreements for five properties, intending to complete a tax-deferred exchange under Internal Revenue Code section 1031. The transactions failed because Urban Sunrise could not obtain loans due to the high cost of fire insurance, resulting in the forfeiture of over $1.1 million to the sellers and loss of the anticipated tax benefit.In the Superior Court of El Dorado County, Urban Sunrise and its managing member, Susan Kerr, sued Vogt and Smith for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, constructive fraud, and rescission, alleging six breaches of fiduciary duty. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no triable issues of fact regarding their performance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims, finding no breach of fiduciary duty, and also granted summary judgment in part on Vogt's cross-complaint for commission owed, ordering Urban Sunrise to pay Vogt commission, interest, attorney fees, and costs.Reviewing the trial court’s decisions, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, applied de novo review and affirmed both summary judgment rulings. The appellate court held there were no triable issues of material fact regarding any alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, finding that the dual agents had adequately disclosed their prior relationship, had no duty to further investigate insurance issues beyond contractual obligations, did not act as attorneys in a way that created an unwaivable conflict, and did not improperly recommend the unfavorable terms. The judgment in favor of the defendants and in part for Vogt on his cross-complaint was affirmed. View "Urban Sunrise v. Vogt" on Justia Law