Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Lamont Bair Enterprises, Inc. (“LBE”) was an Idaho corporation based in Idaho Falls that owned residential rental units. One of LBE’s rental units was a four-plex rental property at 547 South Skyline Drive (“the Property”), served by municipal water lines owned and maintained by the City of Idaho Falls (“the City”). On December 28, 2015, a municipal water main broke, causing water to flow beneath the Property’s driveway, crack the concrete basement floor, and flood the basements of all four rental units. The City received an emergency call for assistance in shutting off the water. Believing the incident to be a service line leak (as opposed to a water main break), the City’s response crew first closed the water service line and waited for confirmation that the water flow had stopped. After the crew received notice that water continued to flow into the basement, they isolated the leak to the water main and began repairing the main line. The water was turned back on the following day, and the road and curb were filled back in. None of LBE’s rental units ever experienced flooding from the city’s water lines prior to this flooding incident at the Property. LBE contended the water main “ruptured” due to negligent care (that “the City neglected its water system to the point that literally miles of pipe became past their design life and in need of replacement”) thus failing to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the water supply system. The district court ruled the City was immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in holding that the City is immune from suit pursuant to the discretionary function exception set forth in Idaho Code section 6-904(1). The Court did not reach the merits of the other issues LBE raised on appeal. View "Lamont Bair Enterprises v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that a landlord may be liable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for intentionally discriminating against a tenant who complains about a racially hostile housing environment that is created by and leads to the arrest and conviction of another tenant. In this case, the landlord allegedly refused to take any action to address what it knew to be a racially hostile housing environment created by one tenant targeting another, even though the landlord had acted against other tenants to redress prior, non‐race related issues. In holding that a landlord may be liable in those limited circumstances, the court adhered to the FHA's broad language and remedial scope. The court also held that post-acquisition claims that arise from intentional discrimination are cognizable under section 3604 of the FHA. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the FHA and analogous New York State law, as well as his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 82. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of Belgrade Zoning Board of Appeals (BOA), which denied Appellant's application for commercial use of his property, holding that the superior court did not err in affirming the BOA's decision. Appellant submitted applications to the Town's Planning Board for a seasonal dock and boat rental business at his property. The Planning Board denied both applications, concluding that the property failed to meet the minimum lot standards provided in the relevant zoning ordinance. The BOA upheld the decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the BOA did not err, and the BOA's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Grant v. Town of Belgrade" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that an attorney-in-fact had the authority to gift a principal's real and personal property to herself and her surviving children, holding that the transfers were invalid. Samuel Dickey signed a durable power of attorney document giving his mother, Agnes Davis, certain powers. As Dickey lay dying, Agnes used the power of attorney Dickey had given her to transfer the vast majority of Dickey's personal property to herself. She also executed three deeds of gift transferring Dickey's real property to her surviving children. This suit followed. The circuit court held that the transfers of Dickey's property were validly authorized by the power of attorney document. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in holding that Agnes was authorized to gift Dickey's real and personal property to herself and her two surviving children. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the circuit court dismissing an application for a writ of prohibition, sua sponte, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court erred by dismissing the alternative application for writ of certiorari. Triple K Land, LLC successfully applied to the Hanson County Board of adjustment for a conditional use permit to construct a pig nursery facility. Loren Huber and Amy Nolan-Huber (the Hubers), adjacent property owners, applied for a writ of prohibition, alternatively designating the application as a verified petition setting forth the illegality of the Board's decision. During a hearing, the circuit court granted Triple K's oral motion to intervene. The court then dismissed the application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) insofar as the circuit court dismissed the claim for writ of prohibition, it did not err; (2) the Hubers complied with the requirements of S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-61, and the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter by writ of certiorari; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Triple K's motion to intervene. View "Huber v. Hanson County Planning Commission" on Justia Law

Canyon View appealed from the trial court's orders denying its motion for attorney fees and costs under the Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL). In the published portion of this opinion, the court held that an action need not involve the mobilehome park management-resident relationship or landlord-tenant issues in order for it to "arise out of" the MRL. In this case, because Canyon View's actions against Lakeview, the BONY respondents, and the Household respondents were necessary to perfect Canyon View's right to free and clear title under the MRL, they arose out of the MRL, and Canyon View, as the prevailing party, was entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees and costs. View "Canyon View Ltd. v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' action seeking judicial review of a zoning variance granted by the Town of Duluth to Charles and Carol Danielson-Bille (the Billes), holding that the Billes should have been joined as a necessary party under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. The Billes sought to build a retirement home on Lake Superior. The Town of Duluth Board of Supervisors granted a zoning variance. In appealing the decision, Appellants properly served Duluth within the thirty-day appeal period set forth in the local Duluth ordinance that authorized judicial review of the zoning variance decision but failed to serve the Billes within the same thirty-day period. Duluth and the Billes filed motions to dismiss, asserting that service was improper. The district court dismissed Billes from the case because they had not been timely served and then dismissed the entire action with prejudice, determining that the Billes were a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19.01 and that the action could not proceed without them. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by dismissing the action rather than joining the Billes to the action under Rule 19.01. View "Schulz v. Town of Duluth" on Justia Law

In this complaint for establishment of a private road the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court adopting the viewers and appraisers' recommendations regarding the route conditions and use restrictions, and damages, holding that the court erred in its award of damages. Appellee brought this action proposing that the court designate a route along an existing, unnamed, two-track road that is already subject to easements. The district court appointed three viewers to assess the proposed routes and submit recommendations to the court for the private road, any conditions and restrictions that should be placed on the private road, and damages. The district court determined that the viewers' route represented the most reasonable and convenient route for the private road, declined to impose Appellants' requested restrictions, and adopted the viewers' recommendation as to damages. The Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings on damages, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it designated the viewers' route for Appellee's private road; (2) did not err when it declined to limit use of the private road to a single family dwelling and agricultural purposes and to prohibit Appellee from using it for subdivision; but (3) erred in its award of damages. View "Sharpe v. Timchula" on Justia Law

Appellants Jerry and JoCarol Losee appeal the district court’s decision granting Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s motion for summary judgment, arguing the district court erred by refusing to consider their “Chain of Title Analysis” as inadmissible hearsay. The Losees also argue the district court erred in failing to rule on two of their claims against Deutsche Bank. In 2009, the Losees became delinquent in their mortgage payments, eventually defaulting on their home mortgage loan. Over two years after the foreclosure sale was supposed to take place, a second notice of default was recorded on April 20, 2014. However, the foreclosure sale was postponed when the Losees requested a loss mitigation review. The owner of the loan would not allow loan modification, so the Losees were advised that a short sale of the property was the only loss mitigation available. On August 17, 2015, this case commenced when the Losees, acting pro se, filed their “Original Petition for Breach of Contract, Slander of Title for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Temporary Injunction” (“Complaint”) with the district court. In 2017, the Losees submitted a “Notice of Filing for Judicial Review,” to which they attached a “Chain of Title Analysis.” The “Chain of Title Analysis” was a report resulting from a mortgage fraud investigation conducted by a private investigation company they hired. The district court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, concluding there was no breach of the Deed of Trust, title to the property had not been slandered or become clouded by assignment, and that the Chain of Title Analysis was inadmissible hearsay not appropriate for consideration by the court on summary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court's grant of summary judgment and affirmed. View "Losee v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust" on Justia Law

Under Water Code section 13304, a prior owner of property may be required to participate in the cleanup of wastes discharged from its property that resulted in groundwater contamination if that person “caused or permitted” the discharge. The San Francisco Regional Board named UATC in a cleanup order addressing waste discharges from dry cleaning operations at a shopping center owned by UATC in the 1960s and 1970s. The court of appeal reversed, in favor of the Board. The knowledge component of the statutory element of “permitted” focuses on the landlord’s awareness of a risk of discharge: a prior owner may be named in a section 13304 cleanup order upon a showing the owner knew or should have known that a lessee’s activity created a reasonable possibility of a discharge of wastes into waters of the state that could create or threaten to create a condition of pollution or nuisance. The court rejected UATC’s argument that its liability was discharged in a 2000 bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. Even assuming the Regional Board’s entitlement to a cleanup order was a claim within the meaning of bankruptcy law, it was not discharged in UATC’s bankruptcy proceeding because it did not arise before confirmation of reorganization. View "United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Region" on Justia Law