Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Richard Q. Navarro and his son-in-law, Antonio Oros-Garcia, jointly owned two vehicles, a 2011 Dodge RAM pickup and a 2017 Dodge Challenger, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Navarro paid the entirety of the loans used to finance the vehicles. Subsequently, Oros-Garcia became a fugitive and could not be found. Navarro, still in possession of the vehicles but unable to sell or transfer them due to the joint ownership, filed a lawsuit seeking a partition of the vehicles to resolve the ownership and allow him to act regarding the vehicles without interference.The District Court of Laramie County initially granted Navarro’s motion for entry of default after Oros-Garcia failed to respond. However, the court repeatedly requested a third-party valuation of the vehicles from Navarro to determine jurisdiction. When Navarro did not provide the specific valuation requested, the court dismissed the complaint on its own motion under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), concluding Wyoming’s partition statutes only applied to real property, not personal property, and suggested Navarro could seek relief through a replevin action.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and held that Wyoming law does not preclude partition of personal property merely because the statutes address only real property. The court found that, under common law, joint owners of personal property are entitled to seek partition, and the absence of a statute does not abrogate this right. Additionally, the court determined that partition actions are in rem or quasi in rem proceedings and fall within the jurisdiction of the district courts, not circuit courts, regardless of the property’s value. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Navarro v. Oros-Garcia" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a commercial landlord and tenant after government emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic required non-essential businesses in New York City to close. The tenant, operating a retail clothing store in Manhattan, stopped paying rent, arguing that the lease excused rent payments when government actions prevented it from operating its business. The landlord disagreed, terminated the lease for nonpayment, and sought damages for breach of contract. The tenant vacated the premises and counterclaimed, alleging the landlord wrongfully terminated the lease and wrongfully kept two payments made after termination.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the government’s orders did not constitute a “taking” under the lease because the tenant was not fully deprived of the use or occupancy of the premises. The district court also rejected the tenant’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that the notice-and-cure provision applied and that the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative. The court awarded damages to the landlord, though the landlord cross-appealed, asserting the award was insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court misinterpreted the lease’s takings provision, which excused the tenant from paying rent when it was unable to operate its business due to government orders. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment for the landlord on its breach of contract claim and concluded the tenant was entitled to summary judgment on both its own breach of contract counterclaim and its claim that the landlord improperly terminated the lease. The court further vacated the judgment on the unjust enrichment counterclaim and remanded for further proceedings. The landlord’s cross-appeal on damages was dismissed as moot. View "Delshah 60 Ninth, LLC v. Free People of PA LLC" on Justia Law

In June 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protestors established the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP), occupying a sixteen-block area in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. In response, the Seattle Police Department abandoned its East Precinct and significantly reduced police presence in the affected area, including Cal Anderson Park. The protests and encampments continued to cause disruption, vandalism, and crime for months, with CHOP forcibly disbanded on July 1, 2020, but neighborhood disturbances persisting until December 2020. Two businesses located near Cal Anderson Park, one a restaurant and the other a property owner, claimed that the City’s actions and inaction led to severe economic losses, including lost revenue, property damage, and tenant departures.Previously, these businesses were absent putative class members in the Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which raised similar claims. After class certification was denied and the case settled, the businesses filed individual lawsuits in April and June 2023, consolidated in the district court. The district court dismissed the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, and found their nuisance claims untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but did not initially decide on equitable tolling pending further guidance from the Washington Supreme Court. After the Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC decision, the district court dismissed the nuisance claims and entered final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not extend to purely economic harm and that the cessation of police services did not constitute a compensable taking. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the nuisance claims, holding that equitable tolling under American Pipe is available under Washington law, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

A government-owned water activity enterprise, wholly owned by a regional water conservancy district, sought to acquire permanent and temporary construction easements on property owned by a private landowner for the purpose of surveying, constructing, operating, and maintaining pipelines and related infrastructure as part of a regional water supply and distribution project. This project aimed to provide a reliable water supply to several municipalities and water districts. The enterprise initiated condemnation proceedings in district court, claiming authority under several constitutional and statutory provisions specific to water conservancy districts and water activity enterprises.After the petition was filed, the landowner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the enterprise lacked statutory authority to exercise eminent domain. The Weld County District Court denied the motion, finding that the enterprise did have condemnation authority under the cited provisions. The landowner then sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado under C.A.R. 21, which allows for original proceedings in cases where an appellate remedy would be inadequate due to potential immediate possession and damage to the land during the pendency of an appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that, under the express terms of sections 37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, a water activity enterprise possesses the power to condemn private property in relation to water activities. The Court reasoned that these statutes allow the enterprise to exercise the parent district’s legal authority, including eminent domain, for activities relating to water, and that construction and maintenance of water delivery pipelines and infrastructure fall within this scope. The Court discharged its order to show cause and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "N. Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enter. v. VIMA Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns efforts by the City of Baltimore to redevelop 13.8 acres in the Poppleton neighborhood through an agreement with a private developer. To facilitate the project, the city used eminent domain to acquire hundreds of properties, which were then transferred to the developer at an allegedly favorable price. Over the years, the project was beset by delays and amendments, resulting in only minimal development and leaving much of the area vacant and in disrepair. Plaintiffs, consisting of neighboring property owners and a community organization, claimed the city’s actions reduced their property values and exposed them to environmental nuisances.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. It found they lacked Article III standing for their Fifth Amendment takings claim because their own properties were not subject to eminent domain, and held that their private nuisance claim failed to state a claim under Maryland law. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ injuries, stemming from the taking of their neighbors’ properties, did not give them standing to challenge the use of eminent domain, and that their allegations of nuisance were insufficiently specific or actionable under state law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that both claims must be dismissed but for different reasons. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing for the takings claim because they alleged concrete injury through diminished property values. However, it concluded the takings claim failed on the merits since the plaintiffs did not own any property actually taken. The court also ruled that, because all federal claims were dismissed at an early stage, the district court should have declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law nuisance claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The declaratory judgment request failed as all substantive claims were dismissed. The Fourth Circuit vacated in part and remanded with instructions. View "Poppleton Now Community Association, Inc. v. La Cite Development, LLC" on Justia Law

A business in Connecticut was assessed personal property taxes from 2008 to 2016. The defendant, who had moved to California years earlier and claimed to have left the business by 2007, was never notified of these tax assessments at her California address, despite having provided it to the tax collector in 2011 and 2016. Over the years, the city’s tax collector took funds from the defendant’s bank accounts multiple times via bank executions to satisfy the tax debt, without ever sending her a tax bill or notice at her actual residence.In 2021, the tax collector initiated another bank execution against the defendant. The defendant challenged this action, arguing she had not received due process or required statutory notice. The Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield held an evidentiary hearing and agreed with the defendant, finding the tax collector failed to provide required notice under General Statutes § 12-155 (a) and that the lack of notice deprived her of the opportunity to challenge the tax assessment. The court granted the defendant’s exemption motion, rendering the execution “of no effect.” The tax collector initially appealed but then withdrew the appeal. After sending a written demand to the defendant’s California address, the tax collector initiated a new bank execution, again without providing a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge it.The trial court found the new action was a collateral attack on the earlier judgment and barred by collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the issue of notice and opportunity to challenge had been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that, under Connecticut law, collateral estoppel applies to all independent, alternative grounds actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment, making them preclusive in subsequent actions. Thus, the tax collector was barred from relitigating the notice and due process issues already decided. The Court declined to recognize a public policy exception for municipal tax collection cases. View "Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law

A worker at the Cherry Point oil refinery in Washington was regularly exposed to asbestos-containing insulation during his employment, which began in 1971. The insulation at issue was chosen, supplied, and installed by a subcontractor as part of the refinery’s original construction in the early 1970s. Decades after his exposure, the worker developed mesothelioma and died from the disease. His estate brought claims against numerous defendants, including the subcontractor, based on alleged asbestos exposure at the refinery.The Whatcom County Superior Court first granted summary judgment for the subcontractor, relying on Maxwell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which held that Washington’s six-year construction statute of repose barred such claims. However, the court reconsidered and denied summary judgment after the Washington Court of Appeals issued Welch v. Brand Insulations, Inc., which found there were factual questions about whether the subcontractor’s activities were covered by the statute of repose. Due to conflicting appellate decisions, the Supreme Court of Washington granted direct review.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that claims against the subcontractor arising from its construction activities—specifically, its installation of asbestos insulation as part of constructing an improvement on real property—are barred by the construction statute of repose. However, the court held that claims based on the subcontractor’s independent role as a product seller or supplier, separate from its construction activities, are not barred by the statute of repose. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, survive under theories of product seller or supplier liability. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the statute of repose, as that issue was not timely raised. View "Polinder v. Aecom Energy & Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

A homeowner obtained a home equity line of credit (HELOC) secured by a deed of trust, subsequently defaulted, and faced nonjudicial foreclosure initiated by a party claiming to be the beneficiary. The loan servicer, acting on behalf of the claimed beneficiary, executed a declaration asserting that the beneficiary was the “holder” of the HELOC agreement, as required by Washington’s Deed of Trust Act (DTA) for nonjudicial foreclosure. The homeowner challenged the foreclosure in federal court, arguing that a HELOC is not a negotiable instrument and, therefore, the entity seeking foreclosure could not be its “holder” as contemplated by the DTA.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the homeowner’s quiet title and some statutory claims were dismissed, but other claims were allowed to proceed. Recognizing that state law questions were central and unresolved, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington: (1) whether a typical HELOC is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and (2) whether a party claiming to be a beneficiary can satisfy the DTA’s “holder” requirement by declaring it holds a HELOC agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that a HELOC agreement, as described, is not a negotiable instrument because it does not contain an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money. The court further held that under the DTA, “holder” means the holder of a negotiable instrument as defined by Article 3 of the UCC. Therefore, a party cannot fulfill the DTA’s proof-of-beneficiary requirement for nonjudicial foreclosure simply by declaring it is the holder of a nonnegotiable HELOC agreement. This does not preclude judicial remedies, but nonjudicial foreclosure is unavailable in such circumstances. View "Vargas v. RRA CP Opportunity Tr. 1" on Justia Law

This case concerns a group of landowners in Indiana who own property adjacent to former railroad corridors once operated by the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company (PIRC). The landowners asserted that they also hold fee simple title to the land underlying these corridors. They challenged the federal government's authorization of public recreational trail use on these corridors under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, claiming that this action constituted a taking of their property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the dispute. The main issue was whether PIRC’s interest in the rail corridors consisted merely of easements, rather than fee simple title. The Court of Federal Claims examined two sets of parcels: those associated with a 1907 Indiana Circuit Court quiet title judgment (the Manship Parcels) and those deriving from a lost 1849 instrument (the Vanlaningham Parcels). The Court of Federal Claims concluded that PIRC held only easements in both sets of parcels, meaning that when railroad operations ceased, full title reverted to the plaintiffs under Indiana law. Thus, the court found in favor of the landowners, holding that the government’s issuance of Notices of Interim Trail Use (NITUs) resulted in an uncompensated taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the record demonstrated PIRC’s interests were limited to easements for both the Manship and Vanlaningham Parcels. The court concluded that, under Indiana law and the facts presented, the plaintiffs hold fee simple title to the corridor land, and the government’s actions constituted a taking for which just compensation is required. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was therefore affirmed. View "PRESSLY v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves a tenant, Ms. Craig, who uses a wheelchair and lived in an apartment managed and owned by the appellants. Her rent was paid through a D.C. housing voucher, but she was responsible for utilities and parking. The appellants sought to evict her after alleging she failed to pay these additional charges. At the eviction hearing in the Landlord and Tenant Branch (L&T) of the Superior Court, the appellants claimed to have served Ms. Craig through her brother, but the affidavit described her brother instead of Ms. Craig. Despite this, the L&T court found service sufficient and entered a default judgment against her, resulting in her eviction.After her eviction, Ms. Craig filed motions in the L&T court to vacate the default judgment and for emergency relief, but did not receive prompt action. She then filed a separate complaint and sought a preliminary injunction in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, arguing improper service and irreparable harm. The Civil Division granted a preliminary injunction restoring her to the apartment, pending the L&T court’s decision on her motion to vacate. Subsequently, the L&T court vacated the default judgment and dismissed the eviction action, and Ms. Craig was returned to her apartment.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether the Civil Division could grant temporary injunctive relief from the L&T court’s default judgment while a motion to vacate was pending. The court held that, under limited circumstances where a litigant first seeks relief in the issuing court, a collateral court may grant temporary relief to prevent irreparable harm while awaiting the issuing court’s decision. The court affirmed the Civil Division’s preliminary injunction, holding that such temporary relief does not contravene Rule 60 or res judicata when properly limited. View "Bozzuto Management Co. v. Craig" on Justia Law