Wife moved out of the couple's joint tenancy property and sought dissolution of marriage. The summons included an automatic Family Code section 2040 order, prohibiting the parties from transferring property without the other party's written consent or court order. "Before .... a right of survivorship to property can be eliminated, notice of the change must be filed and served on the other party.” WIfe subsequently created a Trust, naming Raney, as the trustee and the sole beneficiary upon her death. Wife recorded a Deed, stating that she severed the joint tenancy pursuant to Civil Code 683.2; it transferred her interest to Raney, as trustee. Wife notified Husband that she had terminated the joint tenancy. Raney, as trustee, sought partition by sale. Meanwhile, Wife died. The court of appeal affirmed that severance of the joint tenancy substantially complied with the notice requirement but that the transfer to the Trust violated the automatic restraining order. It reformed the Deed to severing the joint tenancy only, concluding that Raney, as personal representative of Wife's estate, is the owner of an undivided one-half interest and entitled to an order of partition by sale. Parties to pending dissolution proceedings are restrained from unilaterally eliminating a right of survivorship unless, in addition to the general. When the Partition Complaint was filed and served on Husband, Wife’s severance of the joint tenancy became effective to eliminate the right of survivorship. When WIfe died, her tenancy in common interest was her separate property and became part of her estate. View "Raney v. Cerkueira" on Justia Law

The Landowners inherited Welty Farm in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, bordered by the Whitewater River. Givens purchased a farm bordering and downstream from the Welty Farm in 1998. Givens maintains a drainage ditch and levee system near the River and is enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), 16 U.S.C. 3831. Under the CRP, landowners can enter into contracts to remove environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production and to manage it in accordance with an approved conservation plan in exchange for monetary compensation from the USDA. Conservation plans for land adjacent to streams or rivers commonly require the maintenance of a “filter strip,” an area of vegetation adjacent to water to remove nutrients, sediment, organic matter, pesticides, and other pollutants from surface runoff and subsurface flow. In 2014, the Landowners sued Givens, alleging that his levee and ditch system resulted in the drainage of wetlands on Welty Farm and “caused unnatural flooding,” which rendered Welty Farm “unfit for cultivation.” The suit was dismissed. The Landowners sued the United States, claiming that the government had taken their property without just compensation by “requiring and/or approving the construction and maintenance” of the Givens levee. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Landowners pled no facts suggesting that the flooding was a direct and intended result of the government’s actions nor have they pled facts sufficient to show that Givens was “coerced” into constructing and maintaining his levee. View "Welty v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the Carroll County Board of Adjustment's denial of Appellants' application for a variance from Carroll County Airport Zoning Ordinance height restrictions, holding that this Court's opinion rejecting Appellants' preemption defense in a companion case, was fatal to Appellants' appeal of the zoning variance denial. Appellants built a grain leg on their farmland that violated the zoning ordinance's height restrictions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made a no-hazard determination. The Carroll Airport Commission disagreed with the FAA's determination and filed an equitable action to have the grain leg declared a nuisance. After Appellants unsuccessfully sought a variance, the district court entered judgment for the Commission on its nuisance claim. In both the nuisance action and the zoning appeal Appellants argued that the FAA's no-hazard determination preempted local regulations as a matter of law. The district court rejected that defense in the nuisance action. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. The district court then affirmed the Board's denial of the variance, again rejecting the preemption defense. Because the nuisance case adjudicated the same federal preemption issue Appellants raised in this preceding, the Supreme Court's opinion rejecting Appellants' preemption defense in the nuisance action was fatal to Appellants' appeal of the zoning appeal. View "Danner v. Carroll County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Buck and Laurie Graybill appealed an award of attorney fees to Regdab, Inc., following entry of a default judgment against them in an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien. Graybill objected to the award of attorney fees and costs because Regdab failed to plead in its complaint a specific dollar amount for attorney fees in the event of default as required by Idaho Rule of Procedure 54(e)(4)(B). The district court ruled that the Rule 54(e)(4)(B) pleading requirement was inconsistent with Idaho Code section 45-513, the provision which mandated an award of certain costs and reasonable attorney fees in mechanic’s lien foreclosure actions. The district court then granted Regdab’s motion for default judgment and awarded the principal amount owed on the mechanic’s lien plus $8,134.62 in attorney fees and costs. Graybill appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Graybill that Regdab was required to plead a specific amount of attorney fees to be awarded in the event of default. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and remanded this case with instruction to enter a default judgment consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Regdab, Inc. v. Graybill" on Justia Law

Starting in February of 2014, Philip McGimpsey (“McGimpsey”) and his wife Jolene leased a home from D&L Ventures, Inc. D&L was a Nevada corporation owned by David Asher and his wife Georgina. The residential property McGimpsey leased from D&L was located in Eagle, Idaho. D&L obtained the Property in a 2013 foreclosure sale and received a trustee’s deed, which excluded any warranties. A dispute arose out of a breach of contract claim between the McGimpsey and D&L, who entered into a combined lease/Buy-Sell Agreement for the property. On discovering that D&L was an unregistered Nevada corporation conducting business in Ada County, McGimpsey failed to close on the purchase of the home in 2017, because he believed D&L to be in violation of Idaho Code section 30-21-502(a). After the closing date passed, D&L informed McGimpsey that the contractual provisions terminated upon his failure to close and reminded McGimpsey he had to vacate the property, pursuant to the Buy-Sell Agreement. About a month later, D&L registered with the Idaho Secretary of State as a Nevada corporation and filed all of its tax returns and paid its other obligations. McGimpsey subsequently filed a complaint against D&L, and the corporation counterclaimed against McGimpsey and third-party defendants. D&L moved for summary judgment that was granted in part and denied in part. The district court ultimately concluded that D&L had the legal ability to convey the property via warranty deed and that McGimpsey breached the Buy-Sell Agreement by failing to close and failing to show that his breach was excused by D&L’s alleged inability to convey marketable title. McGimpsey and third-party defendants timely appealed and their appeals were consolidated. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment to D&L because Idaho Code section 30- 21-502 did not impair the validity of contracts; therefore, D&L had the legal ability to convey the property via warranty deed. View "McGimpsey v. D&L Ventures" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying First Financial, Inc.'s motion for relief from judgment after the court denied its motion to dismiss its foreclosure complaint against Peter and Judith Morrison and granted the Morrisons' motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the trial court did not err. In their motion for judgment on the pleadings the Morrisons asserted that First Financial's notice of default and the right to cure did not comply with the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. First Financial then filed a motion to dismiss its foreclosure complaint without prejudice. The court summarily denied First Financial's motion to dismiss and granted the Morrison's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where evidence of a properly served notice of default and mortgagor's right to cure in compliance with statutory requirements is an essential element to support a judgment of foreclosure, the court did not err in granting the Morrisons' motion for judgment and denying First Financial's motion for dismissal without prejudice. View "First Financial, Inc. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the complaint filed by Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy (Metro) seeking injunctive relief and other claims regarding Defendant's improvements to his property, in violation to Metro's regulations, on the grounds that Metro's claims were not yet ripe, holding that the parties' claims were ripe. Metro was a quasi-governmental entity known as a limited purpose local district, created for the purpose of operating the Salt Lake Aqueduct (SLA). Metro owned land in fee and had various easements along the SLA corridor, and one of those easements crossed Defendant's backyard. When Defendant made improvements to his property in violation of Metro's regulations over non-Metro district use of SLA corridor lands such as Defendant's, Defendant brought this lawsuit. The district court dismissed Metro's claims as not ripe, finding that determining whether Defendant had unreasonably interfered with the easement was speculative. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the parties had present and competing interests in the land at issue and because Metro claimed Defendant was currently violating its alleged regulatory authority, the issues presented in this case were ripe. View "Metro Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy v. Sorf" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of claims brought by DaVinci, alleging conversion and other common law torts against the United States and several U.S. Air Force employees. In 2014, the Air Force agents seized ten military GPS antennas from DaVinci, allegedly under the guise of the Espionage Act. DaVinci sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). DaVinci alleged abuse of process and conversion claims, arguing that the United States conspired to fraudulently and wrongfully coerce DaVinci to surrender the antennas without due process or just compensation. The panel held that the abuse of process claim was barred by section 2680(c) of the FTCA, because the antennas were not seized "solely" for the purpose of forfeiture. Likewise, the conversion claim failed because it was based on the allegedly illegal seizure of goods. The panel held that DaVinci could proceed in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act through a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. In regard to DaVinci's claims against individual defendants, the panel held that DaVinci voluntarily dismissed the case against three individuals and never amended the complaint to include any others. Furthermore, DaVinci's claims against the individual defendants were not part of this appeal. Finally, the district court properly dismissed the Bivens claim against the United States, as the only remaining defendant, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that RoundPoint's motion to reschedule a foreclosure sale (as opposed to canceling it altogether) violated 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(g) of Regulation X. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's case and held that a motion to reschedule a previously ordered foreclosure sale is not a motion for order of sale. In this case, RoundPoint moved only to reschedule the foreclosure sale and thus RoundPoint did not violate Regulation X. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1024.41(g) and that her claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act also failed. View "Landau v. Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court refusing Petitioners' petition for injunctive relief and determining that an easement did not exist across certain property, holding that Petitioners failed to establish either a prescriptive easement or an implied easement. In this dispute among five adult siblings, Petitioners, four siblings, filed a petition for injunctive relief against the fifth sibling, who owned the property at issue, claiming that an easement was necessary for them to access their property. The circuit court refused the injunction, concluding (1) Petitioners' use of the property was permissive so that Petitioners failed to prove adverse use required for a prescriptive easement; and (2) Petitioners failed to establish an implied easement because Petitioners offered no credible evidence of strict or reasonable necessity of prior use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the superior court's judgment. View "Cantrell v. Cantrell" on Justia Law