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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court declining to enter summary judgment for Appellants on the grounds that the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act requires neighbors objecting to fences that encroach on bridle paths to sue all homeowners whose property is subject to the bridle path easement, rather than just those homeowners who have fences that infringe on the path, holding that no such joinder is required. Appellants brought suit alleging that Appellees - four of approximately one hundred homeowners in Bell Canyon Acres Community - intruded upon bridle paths in the neighborhood for the use of residents, thereby violating the restrictive covenants that apply to the lots in Bell Canyon Acres. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment determining the parties' on the bridle paths and declaring that Appellees were encroaching on the bridle paths. The district court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Utah Code 78B-6-403(1) required that all homeowners in the community whose property was subject to the restrictive covenants and the bridle path easement (the outsiders) were required to be joined. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 403 provided no impediment to the declaratory judgment Appellants sought and that the outsiders did not need to be joined as parties. View "Bell Canyon Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. McLelland" on Justia Law

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Yolanda Astorga-Lider pled guilty to six felony counts, including two counts of violating Penal Code section 115 (a). One of those counts, grand theft (count 6), involved Astorga-Lider encumbering certain real property, purchased by Nohemi and Jose Lorenzana with a fraudulent deed of trust. The subject deed of trust listed Sunil Deo as the lender. The Lorenzanas could not afford to buy a home. Astorga-Lider suggested a plan to the Lorenzanas and Nicolas and Elizabeth Corral, which would allow the Lorenzanas to purchase a home. The Corrals could obtain a $350,000 real estate loan, borrow against rental property they owned, and give the loan proceeds to the Lorenzanas. In turn, the Lorenzanas could use the proceeds to buy a home while making payments on the $350,000 loan. The Lorenzanas finalized what they believed to be an all-cash purchase of a house. Astorga-Lider accompanied the Lorenzanas to the bank and provided the transfer information to the bank. Unbeknownst to the Lorenzanas, the account number Astorga-Lider provided the bank was for an account that she controlled and used to funnel stolen funds from multiple fraudulent loans. After Astorga-Lider's guilty plea, the State moved, under section 115 (e), for an order declaring certain record instruments void, including the deed of trust listing Deo as the lender (Deo Deed of Trust). After multiple rounds of briefing, the superior court granted the motion. In doing so, the court found the Deo Deed of Trust void. Deo appealed the order declaring the Deo Deed of Trust void, contending the State's motion was procedurally improper; the Deo Deed of Trust was not a false or forged document under section 115; at most, the Deo Deed of Trust was voidable, not void; civil court, not criminal court, was the appropriate forum for adjudication of the validity of the Deo Deed of Trust; Deo's due process rights were been violated; and the order voiding the Deo Deed of Trust constituted an unlawful taking. The Court of Appeal concluded Deo's arguments were without merit and affirmed. View "California v. Astorga-Lider" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants and upholding the legality of assessments of Plaintiffs' properties following a revaluation - which was a mass appraisal - conducted by the Town of Groton as a direct equalization measure in order to ensure that Plaintiffs' neighborhood was not undertaxed relative to others in the municipality, holding that the trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs' assessments were not manifestly excessive. Plaintiffs argued that Defendants violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-62 and numerous regulations promulgated by the state Office of Policy and Management when they applied a flat, undifferentiated adjustment factor that increased the assessed value of all properties in Groton Long Point by a certain percentage without individualized consideration of the unique characteristics of each property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants validly incorporated ratio studies and direct equalization via adjustment factors to neighborhood strata into the revaluation in order to ensure that Groton Long Point bore its fair share of the Town's municipal tax burden relative to the Town's other neighborhoods. View "Tuohy v. Town of Groton" on Justia Law

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The en banc court stayed proceedings and certified the following question to the Montana Supreme Court: Whether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils constitute "minerals" for the purpose of a mineral reservation. View "Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC" on Justia Law

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In the early 1980s, Ronald and Donna Phelps purchased seven parcels of property in Mores Creek Heights, a subdivision in Boise County. Two of those seven lots are at issue in this appeal (“Lot 26” and “Lot 27”). On October 1, 2004, the Phelpses recorded a quitclaim deed and trust transfer deed, transferring each of the seven lots into their trust. Each deed contained the statement “Mail Tax Statements to: Ronald O. Phelps, Donna J. Phelps, 1 Craftsbury Place, Ladera Ranch, CA 92694.” The Phelpses moved to this address in 2005 and resided there at the time of the bench trial on November 16, 2017. The Phelpses signed for the receipt of certified mail sent to the Ladera Ranch address from Boise County as late as May 18, 2013, and again on December 7, 2015; however, the Phelpses’ mailing address on file with Boise County beginning in 2009, and at all times relevant here, was P.O. Box 1047, El Toro, CA, 92630. Boise County mailed notices regarding property taxes on the lots to the Phelpses at the El Toro address beginning in 2009. The Phelpses did not pay property taxes on the lots for 2010 or any year thereafter. Jeffrey and Johnna Hardy (“the Hardys”) purchased two properties at a tax sale and brought action to quiet title against the Phelpses. The Phelpses counterclaimed against the Hardys and cross-claimed against Boise County, alleging that Boise County failed to provide them proper notice of tax deficiency. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment quieting title to the properties in the Hardys and denying the Phelpses’ counterclaim. The Phelpses appealed, asserting the lack of notice makes the Hardys’ deeds void. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Boise County’s efforts to notify the Phelpses of the tax deed satisfied the notice provisions of Idaho law, and were sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. The Court therefore affirmed judgment in favor of the Hardys. View "Hardy v. Phelps" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court vacating the trial court's order denying David Salinas's motion for a protective order seeking to prohibit the Town of Redding from taking his deposition, holding that there was no appealable final judgment. Redding Life Care, LLC initiated an action against the Town to challenge the assessed value of real property it owned. The Town served Salinas, who had completed two appraisals of that property, with a subpoena compelling him to appear at a deposition. Salinas filed a motion for a protective order seeking to prohibit the Town from taking his deposition, arguing that he could not be compelled to testify as an expert because Connecticut law prohibited the compulsion of such unretained expert testimony. The trial court denied Salinas' motion. Salinas then filed a writ of error. The appellate court granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's order denying Salinas' motion for a protective order was an interlocutory ruling that normally is not appealable; and (2) the order satisfied neither the first or second prong of State v. Curcio, 463 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983), and thus did not constitute an appealable final judgment. View "Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Rowlett on KMS Retail Rowlett, LP's complaint alleging that the City's exercise of its eminent domain authority to take KMS's private road easement and convert it to a public road connecting several commercial retail and restaurant sites, holding that summary judgment was properly granted. Specifically, the Court held that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that (1) chapter 2206 of the Government Code, which prohibits takings for economic development purposes, did not apply to the taking in this case; (2) the City's condemnation was necessary for a constitutional public use; and (3) KMS failed to raise a fact issue as to whether the taking was fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious. View "KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court upholding the decision of the City of Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals denying Appellants' request for a variance from the requirements of Omaha's zoning code based on a claim of unnecessary hardship, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in upholding the Board's decision. Appellants owned a 4.66-acre parcel of land that was zoned for agricultural use. After the City of Omaha Planning Department concluded that the property was being used for activities not permitted by ordinance in an agricultural district Appellants applied for a variance requesting waiver that would allow them to deviate from zoning requirements. The Board denied Appellants' request for a variance. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the district court's findings and its conclusion that Appellants' situation did not warrant a variance under Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-411. View "Bruning v. City of Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, challenging both the Board's tree removal order and the cessation of his water deliveries. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition, holding that the trial court applied the correct substantial evidence standard of review for the administrative decision; substantial evidence supported a finding that plaintiff unreasonably interfered with TID's use of the easement at issue; and TID did not abuse its discretion in withholding plaintiff's irrigation water under its irrigation rules. View "Inzana v. Turlock Irrigation District Board of Directors" on Justia Law

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The Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code 66000) authorizes local agencies to impose fees on development projects to defray the cost of public facilities needed to serve the growth caused by the project if the fees are reasonably related to the burden caused by the development. Boatworks challenged Alameda's development fee ordinance. The trial court concluded the fees are excessive and constitute invalid exactions by imposing on new residents the purported cost of acquiring land for parks, although the city does not need to buy new parkland, and found that the city erred by including in its inventory of current parks two parks that were not yet open and by categorizing certain areas as parks rather than (less expensive) open space. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that the city can properly include Shoreline Park, Osborne Model Airplane Field and two boat ramps in its inventory of parks. With respect to development fees for parks and recreation, the court stated that a fee based in significant part on costs the city will not incur, because it has already acquired ample land at no cost, does not have a “reasonable relationship to the cost of the public facility attributable to the development.” View "Boatworks, LLC v. Alameda" on Justia Law