Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Cuevas Machine Company entered into a subcontract with O’Neal Constructors for fabrication and machining work at a filtration plant owned by Calgon Carbon Corporation in Mississippi. Under the subcontract, Cuevas was to be paid after Calgon paid O’Neal. Despite nonpayment from O’Neal, Cuevas continued its work. In October 2023, Cuevas recorded two construction liens totaling over $1.2 million against Calgon’s property, but the lien documents did not explicitly state the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied—a statutory requirement. Instead, Cuevas attached invoices to the liens, which included dates, but it was unclear whether these dates satisfied the statutory requirement.After Cuevas filed suit to foreclose on the liens in Mississippi state court, Calgon removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and moved to dismiss. The district court granted Calgon’s motion, dismissing Cuevas’s complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded, making an Erie guess, that the liens were unenforceable because they did not clearly specify the required “last date” in the manner demanded by Mississippi law, and found that the attached invoices did not sufficiently cure this defect.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Finding Mississippi law ambiguous on whether attachments that do not plainly state the “last date” can satisfy the statutory requirement, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: whether attaching invoices that do not explicitly state the “last date labor, services or materials were supplied” satisfies the requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-405(1)(b) that a lien “specify the date the claim was due.” The Fifth Circuit did not decide the merits, instead certifying the question for authoritative resolution. View "Cuevas Machine v. Calgon Carbon" on Justia Law

A property owner operating a shopping mall in Orange County, California, faced significant restrictions on access and operations due to government orders issued during the COVID-19 pandemic. These restrictions, which included closures and limited entry, led the owner to file applications with the county tax assessor seeking disaster-related property tax relief under Revenue and Taxation Code section 170, subdivision (a)(1), on the basis that the pandemic and resulting government responses had caused a loss in property value through restricted access.The Orange County tax assessor summarily denied the applications, stating there was no physical damage to the property. The owner appealed this decision to the Orange County Assessment Appeals Board No. 1. The Board found it had jurisdiction but determined that relief under section 170(a)(1) required evidence of physical damage to the property, either direct or indirect, and that neither the pandemic nor the associated government orders constituted such damage. The Board’s decision made further proceedings unnecessary. The property owner then sought review in the Superior Court of Orange County, which, after a court trial, agreed with the Board’s interpretation and ruled that the owner was not entitled to relief because there was no physical damage to the property as required by the California Constitution and relevant statutes.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to obtain reassessment under section 170(a)(1), physical damage to the property—either direct or indirect—remains a constitutional requirement. The court found that neither the presence of the virus nor government-imposed access restrictions amounted to physical damage. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and both parties’ requests for judicial notice were denied. View "The Retail Property Trust v. Orange County Assessment" on Justia Law

A sign operator installed two advertising signs near Interstate 85 in Atlanta in 1993, after obtaining permits under the city’s 1982 sign code. These permits were renewed several times. In 2015, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the city amended its sign code, removing several content-based provisions but allowing lawful, nonconforming signs to remain. When the sign operator later sought to upgrade the signs, the city approved the changes, but private parties challenged the decision. The Superior Court of Fulton County found that the original permits were unlawful under the 1982 code, making the signs illegal. The city then ordered removal of the signs and issued citations when the order was not followed.The sign operator, joined by the property owner and its president, sued the City of Atlanta in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that the 1982 sign code was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The district court initially dismissed some claims for lack of jurisdiction, then reconsidered and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the code was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, which the city had not attempted to satisfy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs only had standing to challenge the provision of the 1982 code that applied to their signs—section 16-28.019(7)—rather than the entire code. The court further held that this provision, which distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, was content-neutral under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and injunction and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the provision meets the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard. View "Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia" on Justia Law

A property owner, Gary Binning, purchased land in Wyoming that was subject to a conservation easement held by The Nature Conservancy (TNC). This easement restricted the types of structures that could be built on the property, allowing only one single-family residential structure per parcel. Binning sought to build a guest house in addition to a main house, but TNC denied his request, citing the easement’s terms. This dispute led to litigation, and the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the easement did not permit construction of any guest house or secondary residential structure.Following this decision, Binning met with TNC’s Wyoming state director, Hayley Mortimer, who, according to Binning, suggested during an informal lunch meeting that he could build a structure accommodating overnight guests as long as it was not called a “guest house” and did not include a kitchen. Binning later sought approval for new building plans, but TNC rejected them, and Mortimer’s subsequent written communication did not confirm any such oral promise. Binning then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting a claim of promissory estoppel based on Mortimer’s alleged statements.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TNC, finding that Binning failed to establish the required elements of promissory estoppel under Wyoming law: a clear and definite promise, reasonable reliance, and that enforcement was necessary to avoid injustice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that Mortimer’s alleged statements were not sufficiently clear and definite to constitute a promise, any reliance by Binning was unreasonable under the circumstances, and no injustice would result from refusing enforcement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Four B Properties v. The Nature Conservancy" on Justia Law

The case centers on a real estate transaction involving Ernest and Martha Anderson, who agreed to sell their property to Noah Messinger and Brandy Chaplin. The property was subject to a “first right of purchase” covenant held by Wyoming Fall Creek, LLC (WFC), which owned the neighboring lot. After the Andersons and Messinger entered into a purchase agreement, WFC expressed an interest in exercising its purchase right but ultimately did not finalize an agreement with the Andersons within the specified period. The Andersons and Messinger extended their closing date multiple times as they awaited resolution regarding WFC’s position. Eventually, the Andersons unilaterally terminated the contract with Messinger, citing his failure to close, and continued negotiations with WFC, which never resulted in a sale.The District Court of Teton County first reviewed the matter. It found that WFC had not timely exercised its first right of purchase, declared the Andersons’ termination of the contract with Messinger unjustified, and ordered specific performance of the purchase agreement. The court also found that WFC tortiously interfered with Messinger’s contractual rights and awarded Messinger attorney fees and costs, holding the Andersons and WFC jointly and severally liable for some of those fees, and WFC solely liable for the remainder. WFC’s actions were also deemed willful and wanton, justifying an award of punitive damages in the form of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeals. It affirmed the district court’s findings, holding that the Andersons breached the purchase agreement by terminating it without justification, and specific performance was properly ordered. The Supreme Court also upheld the finding that WFC intentionally and improperly interfered with Messinger’s contract. Finally, it concluded that the punitive damages award, including attorney fees against WFC, was not unconstitutional. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Wyoming Fall Creek, LLC v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A group of three major construction firms formed a joint venture to undertake Florida’s largest infrastructure project: the reconstruction and expansion of a major interstate. The venture’s contractual and financial structure was complicated, involving a public-private partnership in which a concessionaire entity financed the project, hired the joint venture to perform the actual construction, and would gain long-term maintenance rights. One member of the joint venture, aware of mounting losses, proposed a strategy for the venture to attempt to exit the project or use the threat of termination as leverage in negotiations. This strategy relied on a contested interpretation of the contract and was opposed by the other members, who considered it dangerously speculative and likely to cause greater harm.As losses increased, the dissenting member stopped contributing required capital to the joint venture, accusing the managing partner of breaching its fiduciary duties by refusing to pursue the proposed termination strategy, and alleging a conflict of interest due to overlapping ownership between the managing partner and the concessionaire. The other members responded by contributing additional funds to keep the project solvent and countersued for breach of contract and indemnity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held a bench trial and found that the managing partner had not breached any fiduciary duty or acted with gross negligence. The court also found that the dissenting member had materially breached the joint venture agreement by refusing to pay its share of capital calls, and ordered it to reimburse the other members, including prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the managing partner had acted in the best interest of the joint venture by not pursuing the proposed termination, and that there was no actionable conflict of interest under Florida partnership law. The court also concluded that the dissenting member’s failure to fund was a material breach, entitling the other members to indemnification and statutory prejudgment interest. View "The Lane Construction Corporation v. Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc." on Justia Law

Gerald Lorbiecki, a steamfitter, was diagnosed with and later died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by asbestos exposure. He alleged that part of his exposure occurred while working at Pabst Brewing Company’s brewery in the mid-1970s, where he was employed by an independent contractor. The facility contained extensive asbestos-insulated piping, and Lorbiecki and other workers removed and replaced this insulation using methods that generated airborne asbestos dust. Evidence showed that Pabst was aware of the presence and dangers of asbestos during this period but did not undertake abatement or enforce protective measures.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, after dismissing Lorbiecki’s common-law negligence claim, allowed his claim under Wisconsin’s safe-place statute to proceed. At trial, a jury found Pabst liable under the statute for failing to provide a safe workplace, awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and apportioned liability among Pabst and several non-party companies. The court entered judgment for Lorbiecki against Pabst, applying statutory caps to certain damages and including a portion of liability attributed to another company based on the non-delegable duty under the safe-place statute.On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Pabst could be liable under the safe-place statute to an employee of an independent contractor, as the statute imposes a heightened, non-delegable duty of care that supersedes common-law limitations. The Court also found sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. However, it ruled that the statutory cap on punitive damages applies only to the compensatory damages recoverable from the sole remaining defendant, Pabst, and not to the total compensatory damages found by the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. View "Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Company" on Justia Law

Two former tenants sued the owner and manager of a residential apartment complex, alleging that they were charged unlawful rental application fees and excessive lock change fees, in violation of the Massachusetts security deposit statute and consumer protection laws. They sought to represent a statewide class of similarly situated tenants. After contentious discovery, the Superior Court sanctioned the defendants, precluding them from contesting certain liability facts. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the security deposit claims but denied summary judgment on the consumer protection claims. Before trial, the parties reached a proposed class action settlement that established a fund for class members, with unclaimed funds to be distributed partly to charities and partly returned to the defendants.The Superior Court, after scrutiny and required revisions, approved the settlement. The court capped the amount of unclaimed funds that could revert to the defendants and required that a portion go to designated charities. However, the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee, a nonparty potentially entitled to notice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3), was not notified prior to settlement approval. After final approval and claims processing, the committee received notice for the first time and objected to the final distribution of unclaimed funds, arguing that the lack of timely notice violated the rule and that final judgment should be set aside. The motion judge agreed there was a violation but declined to vacate the settlement, finding no prejudice.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the IOLTA Committee had standing to appeal the denial of its procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the disposition of residual funds, but lacked standing to challenge the overall fairness or structure of the settlement. Assuming a violation of the rule occurred, the Court found no prejudice because the committee ultimately received the opportunity to be heard before judgment entered. The judgment was affirmed. View "Ortins v. Lincoln Property Company" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

The case involves a series of petitions filed by a state agency seeking to enter privately owned properties to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations related to a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The agency pursued these entries under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which allow entities with eminent domain authority to access property for studies necessary to determine suitability for public projects, before initiating formal condemnation proceedings. The landowners opposed these entries, arguing that, under specific provisions of the Water Code, the agency could not conduct such activities unless the project was fully authorized and funded.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County coordinated the various petitions and, after hearings, ultimately granted the agency’s requests to enter property and conduct the proposed activities. The trial court expressly found that the agency had eminent domain authority, did not need to initiate a classic condemnation action for these precondemnation activities, and was not required to comply with the project approval and funding prerequisites set forth in the Water Code. The landowners appealed these orders, maintaining their position that the agency’s authority was limited by the Water Code’s project approval requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the appeal. The appellate court held that the Water Code’s project approval and funding requirements apply only to formal condemnation proceedings and not to precondemnation entry and testing activities authorized by the precondemnation entry statutes. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, which established that these statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for temporary entry and testing, regardless of whether such activities amount to a taking. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the agency entry to perform the investigative activities. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law