Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A business specializing in adult products sought to open a store in downtown Fargo, North Dakota, in a zone designated for mixed-use development. The proposed store intended to sell items such as lingerie and sexual wellness products, but not sexually explicit media like books or DVDs. To proceed, the business’s landlord applied for a change-of-use permit to allow retail sales and service at the location. The City of Fargo, through its Director of Planning and Development, denied the application, concluding that the business constituted an "Adult Bookstore" as defined by the city’s municipal code, which prohibited such establishments in the downtown zone. The city’s decision was upheld by both the Fargo Board of Adjustment and the Board of City Commissioners.Following these administrative decisions, the business filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, raising constitutional claims including violations of the First Amendment, the imposition of a prior restraint, denial of procedural due process, and unconstitutional vagueness in the city’s code. The business also challenged the Commissioners’ decision under state law, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. While the lawsuit was pending, Fargo amended its code to explicitly prohibit “Sexual Device Shops” in the relevant zone.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims, holding that the business’s planned activities were not protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the permit process was not a prior restraint, and the business received adequate procedural process. The court also found the city’s ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. However, the court determined that denying the permit as an “Adult Bookstore” was arbitrary and capricious under state law, reversed the dismissal of the state-law claim, and remanded for further proceedings regarding possible relief. View "Romantix-Fargo, Inc. v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

The plaintiff financed his home with a VA loan in 2003, qualifying due to his military service. After failing to make payments for at least ten years, the loan was assigned to HSBC Bank USA and serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). HSBC eventually foreclosed on the property in 2022 and sold it to Northsky, LLC. The VA Servicing Guidelines, which were incorporated into the mortgage contract, required HSBC to notify the plaintiff of the default and explore options to cure it. SLS claimed to have mailed multiple payoff statements and a notice of default to the plaintiff, but he asserted he never received these communications.The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court against HSBC, SLS, and Northsky, alleging violations of federal and Texas law and seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale. HSBC and SLS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, permitting the plaintiff to proceed on claims for violations of the VA Servicing Guidelines, quiet title, and trespass to try title. At a bench trial, HSBC and SLS presented circumstantial evidence of mailing, relying on business records and testimony from a corporate representative. The district court found this evidence sufficient and, applying the mailbox rule, presumed the plaintiff received the notices, concluding the defendants fulfilled their obligations under the VA Servicing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying a deferential standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of receipt. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Rummans v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

An employee of an independent contractor was injured after falling through a skylight while working on equipment located on the roof of a warehouse. The warehouse owner had leased roof space and related access to a tenant (Verizon) expressly for the installation and maintenance of communications equipment. The tenant, in turn, hired a general contractor to perform work at the site, who then sent the injured employee to perform the task. The area where the accident occurred was not part of the leased roof section, but the employee accessed it while attempting to complete his assignment. It was undisputed that the general contractor, not the warehouse owner, was responsible for the means, methods, and safety of the work.After the accident, the injured worker brought a lawsuit against both the tenant and the warehouse owner in the Superior Court of Alameda County, asserting claims of negligence and premises liability. The warehouse owner moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the Privette doctrine, which generally shields those who hire independent contractors from liability for workplace injuries, it was not liable. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that because the warehouse owner was a landlord and not the entity that directly hired the independent contractor, the Privette doctrine did not apply. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the tenant on Privette grounds, and the plaintiff did not appeal that ruling.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the Privette doctrine protects not only the party that directly hires an independent contractor but also applies to others in the “chain of delegation,” such as non-hiring landlords whose lease agreements contemplate the use of independent contractors for contracted work. The court directed the trial court to vacate its denial of summary judgment and to enter judgment for the warehouse owner, holding that the Privette doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims. View "Schurman Family Company TIC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Dennis O’Connor had two non-interest-bearing financial accounts with private companies. After O’Connor lost contact with these companies, they transferred his accounts to the State of Michigan under the state’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, which governs the handling of unclaimed property. Michigan took custody of O’Connor’s accounts and deposited the funds into its general fund, where the money could generate interest for the state. When O’Connor learned of this, he contended that the state’s failure to pay him the interest earned while holding his money violated his constitutional rights.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed all of O’Connor’s claims, finding that the state took ownership of his accounts and thus owed him no interest. On an earlier appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his takings claims but vacated the dismissal of his due process claims and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again dismissed O’Connor’s due process claims, reasoning that Michigan’s ownership of the accounts meant O’Connor had no right to the interest and that the procedures provided were constitutionally sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that under Michigan law, the state only assumes custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property, and the original owner retains title to both the principal and any interest generated. The court found that the district court erred by following contrary state appellate precedent and by concluding that O’Connor had no property interest in the funds or the interest. The court vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing the due process claims and remanded for further proceedings, directing the lower court to analyze the due process claim based on the correct understanding that O’Connor retained ownership rights. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

The property at issue has a long history of agricultural use, initially for tobacco farming and processing. This activity predates the Town of Suffield’s zoning regulations, making it a legal nonconforming use. In 2019, the plaintiff obtained state approval to cultivate and process hemp at the property, which was determined by local officials to fall within the scope of the existing nonconforming tobacco use. Following Connecticut’s legalization of recreational cannabis in 2021, the plaintiff sought a zoning determination that cannabis cultivation and processing would also be a lawful continuation of the existing nonconforming use. The zoning enforcement officer denied this request, citing distinct licensing and regulatory requirements for hemp and cannabis.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield upheld the zoning officer’s decision, relying primarily on the legal and regulatory distinctions between hemp and cannabis. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. The trial court applied the factors from Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals to assess whether the proposed cannabis use impermissibly expanded the scope of the nonconforming use. The court found that the regulatory differences were relevant but not dispositive and concluded that cannabis cultivation and processing were sufficiently similar to the existing hemp operation to constitute a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. The trial court reversed the board’s decision.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. It held that a difference in state licensing or regulatory schemes is relevant but not determinative in assessing whether a proposed use constitutes an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. Instead, courts must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry, considering the nature, purpose, character, and effects of the use. Here, the Supreme Court found no evidence that cannabis cultivation and processing would materially change the property’s use or impact the neighborhood. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment, allowing the cannabis operation as a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. View "Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

A developer formed a company in 2006 and purchased property in the Town of West Yellowstone, Montana, intending to construct a 48-unit condominium project. The developer obtained a building permit and a “Will Serve Letter” from the Town, confirming that water, sewer, and storm drainage services would be provided. Construction began in 2007 but ceased in 2011, after which the building permit expired due to inactivity. The developer did not reapply for a permit, nor did it renew related approvals. In 2019, the Town adopted a resolution limiting new wastewater connections due to capacity concerns. In 2020, the developer attempted to sell the property, contingent on confirmation that service connections would still be honored. The Town responded that hookups would be permitted when capacity allowed but did not guarantee immediate service.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the Town’s argument that the developer’s claims were time-barred under statutory limitations, ruling that the claims accrued only when the Town refused to guarantee connections in 2020. However, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Town on the merits, finding that the Will Serve Letter did not create an enforceable contract or vested right to service after years of inactivity and expired permits, and that the Town did not owe a special duty under the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that the developer’s claims were timely but that, even assuming a contract existed, any right to service under the Will Serve Letter expired after a prolonged period of project inactivity and lapsed permits. The Court further held that the Town owed no special duty to the developer beyond its general obligations to the public, and summary judgment for the Town was appropriate. View "West Development, LLC v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

Two families who had a long-standing personal and professional relationship worked together on real estate projects, with one family providing financing and the other managing remodeling. Their arrangement involved consolidating outstanding debts from two properties into a single promissory note secured by a deed of trust, with a substantial balloon payment due after one year. After disagreements arose about the scope of renovations for a particular property, their relationship deteriorated. Eventually, the financier purchased the property from the remodelers through an escrow process in which a portion of the purchase price was transferred back to the financier to satisfy the outstanding note.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the remodelers. The court found that the financier had been fully repaid through the escrow process and, as a result, suffered no damages. Additionally, the court held that a covenant not to sue, which had been negotiated as part of the property sale, barred the financier’s lawsuit. In a prior appeal regarding other parties, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a similar summary judgment due to the financier’s failure to cite record evidence. After the remaining cross-claims were dismissed, final judgment was entered for the remaining defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case independently and affirmed the judgment. The court held that when undisputed evidence shows a debt has been repaid, subjective beliefs or unexplained testimony cannot create a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court rejected the financier’s argument that the repayment was illusory or self-funded, as the objective record showed the debt was satisfied through the escrow transfer. The court also ruled that arguments regarding other forms of damages were forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. Costs were awarded to the respondents. View "Buchheim v. Anaya" on Justia Law

In December 2024, two individuals, Drushal and Eager, initiated a civil action in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas seeking to enforce satisfaction of a prior judgment from the Jackson County Court of Common Pleas against Tyler Miller. The plaintiffs aimed to seize the Millers’ interest in a land contract for real property in Pike County, which the Millers had contracted to purchase from Glenn and Sharon Nickell. The complaint attached the Jackson County certificate of judgment, creating a lien on property owned by Tyler Miller in Pike County. After none of the defendants answered or appeared, Drushal moved for default judgment requesting substitution in the land contract and a writ of possession, as well as a declaration voiding the Nickells’ interest.The Pike County Court of Common Pleas granted a default judgment on May 15, 2025, substituting Drushal for the Millers in the land contract, granting possession to Drushal, and nullifying the Nickells’ interest. The judgment was recorded with the county recorder on June 2, 2025. The Nickells timely appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals but did not obtain a stay of execution or post a supersedeas bond. They also filed a motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(B), which remained unresolved. The appellate court dismissed their appeal as moot, reasoning that the recording of the judgment satisfied it, relying on Blodgett v. Blodgett, and denied the motion to remand for consideration of the Rule 60(B) motion.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeals. It held that the record did not show a voluntary satisfaction of judgment by the Nickells, as the recording of the judgment was executed by Drushal, not the Nickells. The absence of a stay did not render the appeal moot because restitution could still be available if the judgment were reversed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Pike County Court of Common Pleas for consideration of the Nickells' motion for relief from judgment. View "Drushal v. Miller" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2008, which were eventually assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In 2015, Wells Fargo initiated a foreclosure action against the defendants, alleging default on the mortgage. During the pendency of the proceedings, Wells Fargo assigned the mortgage to UMB Bank, National Association, which was substituted as the plaintiff. A central issue in the case was whether Wells Fargo possessed the original promissory note at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed, a requirement for standing to foreclose.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit first denied Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion, finding insufficient admissible evidence of note possession at the time the lawsuit commenced. Later, UMB as successor plaintiff submitted additional declarations and business records in support of a renewed summary judgment motion. The circuit court found these sufficient and ruled in favor of UMB on standing. Shortly before trial, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding certain facts, including that Wells Fargo held the note before the action began and was the current holder, but the stipulation did not specify continuous possession or possession specifically on the complaint’s filing date. The circuit court relied on both the earlier summary judgment ruling and the stipulation, ultimately issuing a foreclosure decree for UMB. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing enforcement of the stipulation.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wells Fargo possessed the note when the complaint was filed. The court found the evidence submitted by UMB ambiguous and the stipulation insufficiently specific to establish standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this factual issue. View "UMB Bank, N.A. v. Tupulua" on Justia Law

A town served by a privately owned water utility experienced significant rate increases after the utility was sold to an investment fund. Responding to community concerns, the town decided to pursue public ownership of the water system. In 2015, it adopted two resolutions of necessity to begin eminent domain proceedings, aiming to take over the utility’s assets both within and just outside its boundaries. The utility, now owned by a new company, did not challenge the procedural validity of the resolutions but argued that the requirements of public necessity and more necessary public use, as mandated by California’s Eminent Domain Law, were not satisfied.The San Bernardino County Superior Court, presiding over a bench trial, determined that special statutory rules for takings of privately owned public utilities applied. The court found that, in this context, the utility could rebut the presumption of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than being limited to showing gross abuse of discretion by the public entity. After trial, the court found in favor of the utility, concluding that the town had not established the requisite elements to justify the taking. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed, holding that the trial court should have reviewed the town’s findings only for gross abuse of discretion and had failed to give proper deference to the town’s determinations.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the matter and held that, under the 1992 amendments to the Eminent Domain Law, a public entity’s resolution of necessity for taking privately owned utility property creates only a rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive one. Therefore, the trial court is to exercise independent judgment as the trier of fact, determining whether the utility owner has rebutted the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchos Water" on Justia Law