Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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Several property owners in and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, brought an action alleging that a plastics manufacturing facility released airborne toxic chemicals, specifically perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which subsequently contaminated local drinking water sources, including both private wells and the municipal water supply. They claimed harm to their property interests due to this contamination and sought damages for diminution in property value, costs of remediation, and loss of use and enjoyment, among other injuries.After the case was removed from New Hampshire state court, it proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of property owners in the affected geographic area. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability issues on trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to warn, but denied certification for nuisance and for damages issues, which it found to be individualized. The district court bifurcated proceedings, planning to address liability on a class-wide basis first, with damages to be determined in later, individualized proceedings. Saint-Gobain, the principal defendant, was granted permission to appeal the certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court reversed the class certification as to negligence and negligent failure to warn, finding that injury and causation on those claims would require individualized, property-by-property proof that predominated over common issues. However, the court affirmed class certification for liability on the trespass claim, concluding that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiffs need only prove the intentional physical invasion of their property by PFOA attributable to the facility, which could be established on a common basis. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

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A father owned a tract of land in Carbon County, Montana, called Lot 9, which was about six and three-quarters acres. In 1969 and again in 2001, he had portions of the property surveyed, ultimately creating a one-acre parcel designated in a document known as COS 491A. In 2003, after being charged with aggravated assault and fearing potential civil liability, the father executed a warranty deed transferring “Lot 9 of Plat 474” to his daughter. An exhibit attached to the deed included a metes and bounds description of the one-acre parcel from COS 491A. The daughter later deeded the one-acre parcel to her brother in 2007. The father was found incapacitated in 2005 and died in 2015, leaving no probate estate. In 2022, the daughter sold another portion of the land.The brother sued in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County, claiming the 2003 deed conveyed only the one-acre parcel, not all of Lot 9, or that, alternately, a constructive trust or fraudulent transfer occurred, or that he was entitled under a 2010 will. The District Court granted summary judgment to the sister, holding that the deed transferred all of Lot 9, that the brother lacked standing to assert a constructive trust or claim under the fraudulent transfer statute, and that the will had not been probated.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and determined that, as a matter of law, the 2003 deed was ambiguous because it could reasonably be interpreted as transferring either all of Lot 9 or just the one-acre parcel. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the ambiguity issue and remanded for further proceedings to consider extrinsic evidence about the parties’ intent. The Court affirmed the lower court’s rulings on standing regarding the constructive trust and fraudulent transfer claims. View "Barrett v. Jesperson" on Justia Law

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The case concerns a dispute arising from a purchase and sale agreement for a Hilton-branded hotel near the Nashville airport. The seller and purchaser agreed to a contract with a $79 million purchase price and an initial $1.75 million earnest money deposit, later increased through twenty-four amendments over fifteen months to a total of nearly $19 million. Each amendment extended deadlines and required additional nonrefundable earnest money, with the contract stipulating that, in the event of the purchaser’s default, the seller’s sole remedy would be retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages. When the purchaser failed to close by the final deadline, the seller terminated the agreement and retained the earnest money. The purchaser sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the damages provision was an unenforceable penalty.The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted summary judgment to the seller, concluding the provision was an enforceable and reasonable prediction of actual damages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, finding the seller had not provided sufficient evidence that the liquidated damages amount was a reasonable estimate of potential damages and holding that contractual language alone was insufficient to establish enforceability.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee clarified the state’s standard for liquidated damages provisions. The court held that when contracting parties expressly agree that actual damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and that the liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate, there is a presumption of enforceability. The party seeking to avoid enforcement must then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the provision is actually an unenforceable penalty. The court found the purchaser had not raised a material factual dispute to overcome this presumption. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC" on Justia Law

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Gregg B. Colton, a mineral-interest owner, initiated a lawsuit against several Lime Rock entities, alleging that Lime Rock failed to pay statutory interest on late royalty payments, in violation of North Dakota law. He also asserted that Lime Rock breached mineral-interest leases by improperly deducting post-production costs from oil royalties. Colton sought to represent two classes of owners, and included declaratory judgment claims for each class. After the district court dismissed the declaratory judgment claims, Colton filed a second amended complaint with revised class definitions and reasserted his claims for statutory violations and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota reviewed the case. It granted Lime Rock’s motion to strike the class allegations, finding that the proposed classes failed to satisfy the typicality and predominance requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and (b)(3). Colton did not pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f). Subsequently, the parties submitted a stipulation for entry of judgment, awarding Colton the full amount of damages claimed on his individual claims. The district court entered this stipulated judgment, which did not include costs or fees, and preserved Colton’s right to appeal the order striking class allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Colton’s appeal regarding the stricken class allegations. The court determined that, because Colton voluntarily consented to the stipulated judgment that resolved his individual claims in full, he no longer maintained a continuing personal stake in the class allegations. As a result, the appeal was deemed moot, and the court dismissed it for lack of Article III jurisdiction. The court clarified that parties cannot confer appellate jurisdiction by agreement, and Colton’s attempt to preserve his right to appeal did not alter this outcome. View "Colton v. Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP" on Justia Law

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Several residents of the Town of Harpers Ferry challenged the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Tourism Development District Act. The Act allows the creation of tourism development districts in municipalities with a population of 2,000 or less, for projects with projected costs of at least $25 million, and limits the number of districts to five statewide. Within these districts, qualifying tourism projects are exempt from most local regulations, including zoning, land use, licensing, and building codes, and are instead regulated by state agencies. The only tourism development district approved since the Act’s adoption was for a luxury hotel redevelopment in Harpers Ferry, which prompted the lawsuit by local residents.After the complaint was filed, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Act had a rational basis for its classifications and was reasonably related to legislative policy goals, so it did not violate equal protection principles or the constitutional prohibition on special laws. The court also found no constitutional right to “self-rule” and ruled that there was no violation of the right to vote, as municipalities possess only powers granted by the legislature. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal, concluding that the Act was a general law, rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and did not infringe upon municipal regulatory rights or voting rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that the Act does not violate the constitutional prohibitions on special laws or equal protection, and does not infringe upon any inherent right to self-rule or the right to vote. The classifications in the Act were found to be reasonable and uniformly applicable to all qualifying municipalities and projects. The Court affirmed the decisions of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. View "Fleming v. Herridge" on Justia Law

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The case arises from a series of contractual and property disputes among three parties in Vermont. In 2015, one party sold land to another, then was hired to construct a pond on a separate property owned by the buyer. The pond builder subcontracted a third party to clear-cut land for the pond and also hired this subcontractor to cut timber on his own property. Disagreements ensued regarding payment, completion of work, and use of equipment, resulting in a lawsuit in 2017. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract and violations under Vermont’s Prompt Pay Act against the buyer, as well as conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims against the subcontractor included breach of contract and conversion. Both defendants counterclaimed, including allegations of consumer protection violations, assault, and extortion.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, conducted a jury trial on most claims. The plaintiff was awarded $7,500 for breach of contract against the buyer, plus interest. The buyer received $5,000 for assault, and the subcontractor was awarded $15,100 on his civil extortion claim. Both the plaintiff and buyer requested attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act, each arguing they were the substantially prevailing party. The court denied both motions, finding neither party substantially prevailed in the construction dispute. The court also allowed the subcontractor’s civil extortion claim to proceed.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. It held that the determination of a substantially prevailing party under the Prompt Pay Act is within the trial court’s discretion and confirmed that neither party substantially prevailed. The Supreme Court also upheld the recognition of a civil claim for restitution based on economic duress, consistent with Vermont precedent, and affirmed the damages awarded for extortion. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Lamson v. Goode" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff alleged that since 2018, stormwater runoff from a drainage easement in a residential subdivision caused damage to his property. He first sued the homeowners’ association and the four owners of lots nearest his property, resulting in a jury verdict against the association and pro tanto settlements with three lot owners. After continued drainage issues and difficulties collecting the judgment, the plaintiff brought a new suit in 2024 against the homeowners’ association, a newly formed association, all 21 lot owners, and the boards of both associations. The central claim against the lot owners was their alleged undivided interest in the common property, including the drainage easement.In the Mobile Circuit Court, most non-board-member lot owners moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing they did not own the drainage easement and had no involvement in causing the drainage problem. Two lot owners, Wallace and Smith, additionally asserted that prior settlement agreements barred further claims against them. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss the non-board-member lot owners and enforced Wallace’s and Smith’s releases. Claims against the homeowners’ association and the six board members remained pending. The court certified its dismissal orders as final under Rule 54(b), allowing the plaintiff to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the circuit court’s Rule 54(b) certification was proper. Applying a de novo standard to the question of finality and reviewing for excess of discretion, the Court concluded the certification was improper. The Court found the dismissed claims and those still pending were too closely intertwined, and the possibility that the remaining claims could moot the need for appellate review weighed against certification. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment and did not reach the merits. View "Carpenter v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

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A rental company, Pharming Capital, became involved in a dispute after a portable cabin was delivered to land in Geneva County, Alabama, under a rent-to-own contract with a third party, Leland Hedlund. Although the contract documents inconsistently listed addresses in both Florida and Alabama, the cabin was ultimately placed on property owned by James R. Turner. Turner had agreed to sell this property to James Gough in 2021, but the final deed conveying ownership to Gough and his wife was not recorded until July 22, 2024, after the events in question. When repossession of the cabin was attempted due to nonpayment, access was prevented by a locked gate. Pharming Capital, relying on property searches and public records, believed Turner was the record owner and sued him for possession of the building.The Coffee Circuit Court (trial court) first granted summary judgment in favor of Pharming Capital regarding some of Turner's counterclaims, but allowed negligence/wantonness and punitive damages claims to proceed to trial. After a jury trial, Turner was awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Pharming Capital moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, which were denied. Pharming Capital then appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing a copy of the complaint filed by Pharming Capital to be taken into the jury room, contrary to Rule 51 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits pleadings from being sent to the jury room. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court did not reach or resolve other arguments raised on appeal, as the error regarding the complaint was dispositive. View "Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner" on Justia Law

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A dispute arose following a 2016 chlorine gas leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia, where IPI, Inc. employees, including its president, Matthew Joseph Taylor, were injured and IPI’s equipment was damaged while performing power washing and industrial painting services for Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corporation and Westlake Natrium LLC (collectively Westlake). The parties operated under two interrelated service agreements containing indemnity provisions. After the incident, IPI and Taylor sued Westlake for personal injury and property damage. Westlake counterclaimed, arguing that IPI breached the indemnity agreements by bringing suit and owed Westlake indemnification for Taylor’s claims.The Circuit Court of Marshall County applied Pennsylvania law, granted summary judgment to Westlake, and found the indemnity agreements clearly required IPI to indemnify Westlake, even for claims arising from Westlake’s own negligence, except in cases of Westlake’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court ruled that IPI’s claims fell within the scope of the agreements, including damages from the chlorine gas release, and certified its order as final under Rule 54(b). On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the application of Pennsylvania law but concluded that the circuit court erred by not analyzing the possible conflict between the two indemnity provisions and by insufficiently explaining why the claims fell within their scope. The ICA remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo, holding that the two indemnity provisions should be read together, not in conflict, and that both unequivocally require IPI to indemnify Westlake for its own negligence. However, the court found ambiguities regarding the scope of indemnity and the application of exceptions, necessitating factual development through parol evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to the circuit court. View "Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 1902, F.W. Severin conveyed 117.55 acres of land in Doddridge County, West Virginia, to L.D. Nicholson, reserving “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” for himself. Over time, Nicholson’s successors leased their oil and gas interests, and, in 2017, production began, resulting in royalty payments. Disputes arose regarding the respective interests of Severin’s and Nicholson’s successors in the oil and gas estate, leading to litigation. The central issue was whether Severin’s reservation in the deed constituted a one-sixteenth or a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate.The Circuit Court of Doddridge County, in a declaratory judgment order dated September 28, 2022, concluded that the deed was unambiguous and that Severin had reserved a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate. The court reasoned that, in the context of 1902 West Virginia oil and gas law, a reservation of one-sixteenth operated as a reservation of one-half of the mineral estate. The Nicholsons appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment on November 13, 2023. The ICA found the deed unambiguous and determined that Severin reserved only a one-sixteenth interest in the oil and gas minerals under the land.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. The Court held that the 1902 deed was unambiguous and that Severin’s reservation of “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” meant exactly one-sixteenth of the oil and gas mineral estate. The Court rejected arguments for construing the deed in light of historical industry practice or adopting the “estate misconception theory” used in Texas. The ICA’s decision was affirmed. View "Severin POA Group, LLC v. Nicholson" on Justia Law