Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

ACC OP (Oxford, Mississippi), LLC owns a student-housing property in Oxford, Mississippi. For the 2021 and 2022 tax years, the Lafayette County Tax Assessor appraised and the Board of Supervisors approved the property's value at approximately $21.3 million. ACC believed the property was overvalued by $8–9 million and objected in writing to the Board's assessments, submitting documentation as required. Prior to the Board hearing, the Tax Assessor, through her office, requested additional documents via a form referencing Mississippi Code Section 27-1-23 and directed submission to the Assessor’s Office, not the Board. ACC responded to each item, explaining that some requested documents did not exist, and submitted others.The Board denied ACC’s objections, citing ACC’s failure to submit “required documentation” and, for 2021, also referencing ACC’s absence at the Board meeting. ACC appealed both denials to the Lafayette County Circuit Court, which consolidated the appeals. After extensive litigation, the County moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that ACC’s noncompliance with document requests barred the circuit court’s jurisdiction under Mississippi Code Section 27-35-97. The circuit court denied the motions, finding that Section 27-35-97’s preclusion applies only to a demand from the Board, not the Tax Assessor, and that ACC had complied with the written objection requirement.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the County’s motions to dismiss de novo. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Assessor’s document request was an informal request under Section 27-1-23, not a Board demand under Section 27-35-97, and thus carried no penalty for preclusion. The Board itself never made a demand for documents, and ACC satisfied the written objection requirement under Section 27-35-93. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lafayette County Board of Supervisors v. ACC OP" on Justia Law

The case concerns several quarry operations in Chester, Vermont. Chandler Quarry, operated on an eight-and-a-half-acre parcel, had been exempt from Vermont’s Act 250 land use permitting requirements since its operations predated the Act’s passage in 1970. In 2018, a landowner acquired Chandler Quarry, as well as North and South Quarries located nearby. The landowner then began coordinating operations across all three quarries, including processing stone from North and South at Chandler Quarry and constructing a new building to house processing equipment. This expanded activity increased quarrying, noise, and traffic, resulting in complaints from neighboring landowners.Following these complaints, the District 2 Environmental Commission issued a jurisdictional opinion in 2023, determining that Chandler Quarry’s integration into the larger quarry operation constituted a substantial change, subjecting it to Act 250 permitting requirements. The landowner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which, in March 2024, affirmed that Chandler Quarry’s coordinated operation with the other quarries triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. Afterward, the Land Use Review Board (LURB) issued an administrative order in June 2025, imposing a civil penalty and a stop-work order, requiring cessation of Chandler Quarry operations until appropriate permits were obtained. The landowner requested a merits hearing, during which it was shown that Chandler Quarry operations had been reduced to pre-2018 levels and decoupled from North and South Quarries.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that Chandler Quarry remains subject to Act 250 jurisdiction, despite the reduction of operations, because the expanded, unpermitted commercial activity persisted for years and caused lasting environmental impacts. The Court distinguished this case from In re Audet, finding that the landowner’s sustained jurisdiction-triggering activities could not be undone simply by reverting to previous operational levels. The Court also held that the Environmental Division’s affirmation of the stop-work order was not an abuse of discretion, as the Division reasonably considered statutory factors, including economic effects on employees. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "Land Use Review Board v. 3643 VT Route 103, N, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights.Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners regarding an express easement for ingress and egress known as Canyon Creek Lane in Butte County, South Dakota. The express easement was created as part of a property sale and recorded, obligating each owner to contribute to maintenance costs. Tanya Lorenz acquired one of the parcels benefiting from the easement but later constructed her own driveway with direct access to Highway 34. Plaintiffs alleged that Tanya’s easement rights should be extinguished due to abandonment and lack of necessity, pointing to her nonuse, installation of a gate, lack of maintenance contributions, and creation of a new access. They also alleged nuisance conduct by Tanya.In the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their claims, finding Tanya had abandoned the easement and that it was extinguished due to lack of necessity. The court also found Tanya’s conduct constituted a nuisance, but did not award damages for that claim. At trial, the court determined Tanya was responsible for nine years of maintenance costs for the easement and awarded Plaintiffs $6,750 in damages. Tanya appealed the summary judgment and damages award.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that summary judgment on abandonment was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding Tanya’s intent and use of the easement. The Court also reversed the extinguishment of the easement for lack of necessity, noting that such a condition does not apply to express easements unless specified in the agreement. Summary judgment on the nuisance claim was also reversed due to insufficient evidence of substantial or unreasonable interference. The Court affirmed the award of damages for maintenance costs and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maher v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on real property originally acquired by John and Constance Clark as part of a family farming operation. In 1988, two parcels were conveyed to their son, Jay Clark, who subsequently transferred the properties to Clover Hollow Farms, Inc., a corporation formed shortly before the conveyance with John Clark as its sole shareholder. Jay Clark served as vice-president and director of Clover Hollow. According to Jay Clark, his parents promised that Clover Hollow would hold the property in trust for him as a premarital asset, to be returned upon demand or subject to his exclusive control. Years later, Jay Clark assigned his interests in one of the properties to C & H Properties, LLC, operated by his children.After John Clark was placed under a conservatorship, the conservator, Judith Appleby, adopted corporate resolutions nullifying Jay Clark’s authority and authorizing the corporation to join litigation seeking a declaration that Jay Clark had no interest in the corporate stock, real property, or tangible property. Jay Clark filed counterclaims challenging the validity of these resolutions and seeking to regain title to the properties. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, granted summary judgment to the Estates and Clover Hollow. It ruled that judicial estoppel barred Jay Clark’s claims due to his failure to disclose the properties in bankruptcy and found that his claims under constructive trust, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the corporate resolutions enacted by Appleby.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Ms. Appleby, as executor, lacked authority under Clover Hollow’s bylaws and the Idaho Business Corporation Act to convene a special shareholder meeting and enact corporate resolutions, rendering those actions invalid. Consequently, Clover Hollow was never properly joined in the litigation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Jay Clark’s sixth counterclaim, and remanded the case with instructions to allow reasonable time for proper joinder of Clover Hollow as a party. View "Estate of Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

San Francisco voters approved Proposition M in November 2022, which imposed an “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of residential units in buildings with more than two units if any unit was kept vacant for over 182 days in a tax year. The tax, designed to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase housing availability, applied on a tiered scale based on the unit’s size and length of vacancy, with certain exemptions. Plaintiffs, including individual property owners and housing associations, challenged the proposition, arguing it violated statutory and constitutional protections, particularly the Ellis Act, which guarantees the right of property owners not to offer their units for rent.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the tax would force them to rent out units or pay substantial sums, affecting their personal use, privacy, and familial arrangements. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that Proposition M was lawful. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court found plaintiffs had standing and granted their motion, holding Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, and infringed on due process, equal protection, and privacy rights. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from enforcing Proposition M.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court focused on the Ellis Act preemption claim, finding that Proposition M, by imposing a substantial tax on owners who choose not to rent out residential units, directly conflicted with the Ellis Act’s protection of an owner’s right not to offer their property for rent. The court held that Proposition M was preempted by the Ellis Act and affirmed the judgment, declining to reach the constitutional issues. The plaintiffs were awarded costs on appeal. View "Debbane v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction.The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law

Two neighboring owners in a condominium complex disputed the ownership of a garage parking space labeled 38G-a. Plaintiff WCST Enterprises, LLC owns Unit 38, while Defendant Berit Ling owns Unit 39. Although Ling had used garage space 38G-a for many years, both parties’ grant deeds identified different garage spaces appurtenant to their units. WCST purchased Unit 38 with knowledge of the ongoing dispute and filed a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to garage space 38G-a, among other claims.The Superior Court of Orange County initially ruled in favor of Ling after a bench trial. This decision was reversed by the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, which remanded for a new trial. After a trial de novo, the Superior Court granted judgment quieting title in favor of WCST, finding the grant deeds showed WCST was the rightful owner of garage space 38G-a. WCST waived its remaining claims and the judgment named WCST as the prevailing party and provided that attorney fees could be determined by appropriate motion.After judgment, WCST moved for attorney fees under Civil Code section 5975 and a contractual provision in the complex’s CC&R’s. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding WCST was not entitled to fees under either source because its quiet title action did not seek to enforce any rights under the CC&R’s or other governing documents, but rather sought to enforce rights under its grant deed. WCST appealed the fee order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees. The court held that a statement naming a party as “prevailing party” in the judgment does not automatically entitle that party to fees. The trial court retains discretion to deny fees where the prevailing party has not established entitlement under statute or contract. View "WCST Enterprises, LLC v. Ling" on Justia Law

A married couple with three minor children separated after more than a decade together, leading to divorce proceedings focused on property and custody issues. The central dispute concerned the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, which had been purchased in part with funds that one spouse received as an inheritance. During the marriage, the home increased in value, and the parties disagreed about whether the inheritance funds and their appreciated value should be considered separate or marital property. Additional disputes included whether proceeds from the sale of a neighboring property to a family member should be part of the marital estate and whether credits or adjustments were owed for post-separation expenses and exclusive use of the marital home.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, conducted a property division trial. The court credited the wife’s testimony that her inheritance funds used for the down payment remained her separate property, but classified the increase in the home’s value as marital. It ordered an equal division of marital property, enforced a payment promised by the wife to the husband to facilitate the home sale, denied claims for credits and imputed rental value, and required each party to pay their own attorney’s fees. The court issued a child support order based on information provided by the wife after the husband failed to submit requested documentation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling that the inheritance funds remained separate property, holding that when separate property is commingled with marital property, a presumption arises that it becomes marital unless rebutted by sufficient evidence. Uncorroborated testimony about intent is insufficient to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed the remainder of the Superior Court’s rulings, including the equal division of marital property, denial of credits and imputed rental value, enforcement of the agreed payment, child support award, and attorney’s fees. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Dickerson v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law