Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a real estate dispute where plaintiffs, represented by Kenneth J. Catanzarite, alleged they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in a limited liability company. The dispute was ordered into arbitration at the plaintiffs' request, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendant, Plantations at Haywood, LLC. Plantations then petitioned the court to confirm the arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County confirmed the arbitration award and granted Plantations' motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, imposing $37,000 in sanctions. The court found that Catanzarite's opposition to the petition was frivolous and factually unsupported. Catanzarite appealed the sanctions, arguing he was statutorily allowed to file an opposition and contest the arbitrator's award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Catanzarite's arguments were without merit and unsupported by existing law or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sanction award against Catanzarite. Additionally, the court granted Plantations' motion for sanctions on appeal, finding the appeal to be frivolous and without merit. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded, with the option for Catanzarite to stipulate to the amount requested by Plantations. The order was affirmed, and Plantations was entitled to its costs on appeal. View "Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC" on Justia Law

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Kehinde Adeyemi Elebute challenged the foreclosure sale of his property in bankruptcy court but was unsuccessful. Years later, he attempted to challenge the foreclosure again in state court. To prevent duplicative litigation, the suit was removed to the bankruptcy court, which reopened and subsequently dismissed Elebute’s case for want of prosecution after he failed to appear at a hearing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Elebute’s challenge to the reopening and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal. Elebute then appealed both rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order reopening the proceedings, as it was a non-final, interlocutory order. The court agreed with the defendants, Village Capital & Investment, L.L.C., and Michael Weems, that the reopening order was only a preliminary step and did not resolve substantive issues. Therefore, the court dismissed this portion of Elebute’s appeal.Regarding the dismissal for lack of prosecution, the court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over Elebute’s claims. The court noted that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction extends to all civil proceedings related to bankruptcy cases. Since Elebute’s state action challenged Village Capital’s interest in the property central to the earlier bankruptcy case, the actions were related. Consequently, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to dismiss the adversary proceeding.The Fifth Circuit dismissed Elebute’s challenge to the reopening order for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects. The defendants’ amended motion to dismiss a portion of Elebute’s appeal was denied as moot. View "Elebute v. Village Capital" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Vaughn, a self-described Moorish National, was convicted by a jury of six counts of offering a false instrument for filing or record, two counts of simulation of summons, complaint, judgment, order, or other legal process, and two counts of intimidating a public officer. Vaughn sent documents to his landlords and the Clark County Recorder's office, claiming ownership of properties he did not own and threatening public officers when his documents were not recorded. He was sentenced as a habitual criminal to an aggregate prison term of 5-20 years and ordered to pay $19,600 in restitution.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County adjudicated Vaughn as a habitual criminal and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Vaughn represented himself at trial with standby counsel and was convicted on all counts. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing several grounds including the denial of his motion to dismiss, insufficient evidence, prejudicial witness testimony, misleading jury instructions, improper habitual criminal adjudication, and an unsupported restitution award.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that the State failed to prove the elements of the charges under NRS 239.330(1) because the documents Vaughn attempted to record were not of a type that could be recorded under state or federal law. Consequently, the court reversed Vaughn's conviction on the six counts of offering a false instrument for filing or record. The court also reversed the restitution award, finding that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. However, the court affirmed Vaughn's conviction on the remaining counts and upheld the habitual criminal adjudication and the sentence imposed for those counts. View "VAUGHN VS. STATE" on Justia Law

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VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) initiated an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline) under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the eviction should have been a compulsory counterclaim in his pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust. The circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, and after a court trial, granted the eviction, ordering Paul to vacate the property within ten days and allowing the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, his request for a jury trial, and his request for a continuance. The court proceeded with a court trial and granted the eviction in favor of the Landlords. The court also ordered that any personal property left by Paul after ten days would be considered abandoned and could be kept by the Colony. Additionally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the Landlords.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that the FED statutes did not allow for pre-answer motions to extend the time for filing an answer and that the eviction action was not a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s undue influence lawsuit. The court also held that Paul’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance or in excluding evidence of undue influence. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in ordering the forfeiture of Paul’s personal property and remanded the case to revise the judgment accordingly. The court awarded VOR and the Colony combined appellate attorney fees of $9,000. View "Vor, Inc. v. Estate of O'Farrell" on Justia Law

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Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC, a commercial real estate developer, entered into a purchase and sale agreement with MBD Realty LLC for a property in Portland. MBD was aware that the City of Portland planned to redevelop the area, which would involve condemning part of the property, but did not disclose this to Alrig. The agreement included clauses allowing Alrig to terminate the agreement and receive a refund of its deposit under certain conditions, including eminent domain. Alrig extended the inspection period multiple times, paying additional deposits, and eventually waived its due diligence and title review contingencies, making the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default. Alrig later learned of the redevelopment plans and terminated the agreement, seeking a refund of the deposit, which MBD refused.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted MBD’s motion to dismiss Alrig’s complaint for breach of contract and fraud, concluding that MBD had no duty to disclose the redevelopment plans. Alrig appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the amendment to the agreement unambiguously made the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default, and thus Alrig’s contract claim failed. Additionally, the court found that MBD did not actively conceal the City’s planned condemnation, and there was no special relationship imposing a duty to disclose. Therefore, Alrig’s fraud claim also failed as a matter of law. The court concluded that Alrig was not entitled to relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of its claims. View "Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC. v. MBD Realty LLC" on Justia Law

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Scott and Karen Larsen purchased two adjoining lots in the McGuiness Tracts subdivision in the late 1980s, intending to build a house and retire there. Keith and Danielle Sayers, who bought a lot in the same subdivision in 2012 and another adjoining lot in 2016 or 2017, built a freestyle motocross course on their properties. The Larsens, disturbed by the noise and dust from the motocross activities, sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Sayerses, which was ignored. Consequently, the Larsens filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief for breach of restrictive covenant, nuisance, and trespass. The Sayerses counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Second Judicial District Court held a bench trial and ruled that the Sayerses' motocross activities did not violate the restrictive covenants of the subdivision, denying the Larsens' claims for injunctive relief and nuisance. However, the court granted the Larsens' request to enjoin Keith from hitting golf balls onto their property. The court also denied the Sayerses' counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Larsens' motion for attorney’s fees was not ruled upon by the District Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the Sayerses' freestyle motocross course constitutes a breach of the restrictive covenants limiting the use of the property to residential or agricultural purposes. The court reversed the District Court's ruling on this basis and remanded the case for the District Court to award the Larsens reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's determination that Keith's ramp-building activities did not violate the covenants' restriction against commercial activity. View "Larsen v. Sayers" on Justia Law

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GBSB Holding, LLC (GBSB) is the developer of Baker 80, a proposed subdivision adjacent to Whitefish Hills Village (WHV) in Flathead County. GBSB sought to use WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80, which was opposed by Flathead County, Whitefish Village, LLC, and the WHV Homeowners Association. GBSB also challenged the abandonment of a portion of Brady Way, a county road within WHV, by Flathead County.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court prohibited GBSB from using WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80. The court concluded that the public access easements on WHV roads did not include primary access for Baker 80 residents. Additionally, the court found that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the public access easements on WHV roads were easements in gross, benefiting the public at large and not specifically Baker 80 residents. The court determined that the scope of the public access easements did not extend to primary access for Baker 80. The court also upheld the District Court's conclusion that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way, as the abandonment process complied with statutory requirements and substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. View "GBSB Holding v. Flathead County" on Justia Law

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A developer purchased a historical property in Newton, Massachusetts, and began restoration work. The Newton Historical Commission issued a stop-work order, claiming the developer violated the permit by demolishing large portions of the building. The developer, 29 Greenwood, LLC, disagreed but complied with the order and submitted revised proposals, all of which were denied. The developer then filed a lawsuit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and state law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dispute was a typical zoning issue not rising to the level of a constitutional taking. The developer appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Commission acted in bad faith and would never permit the reconstruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two related actions were pending in state court, which could potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional issues. The court decided to abstain from ruling on the federal issues until the state court proceedings concluded, invoking the Pullman abstention doctrine. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court cases. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Paula M. Montaquila, appealed a decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Flagstar Bank, FSB, regarding the foreclosure sale of property located at 33 Zella Street in Providence, Rhode Island. Ms. Montaquila and her son had obtained a mortgage with Flagstar in 2008, using the property as collateral, and later executed a partial claim mortgage in 2016. Flagstar sent a notice of intent to foreclose to the property via certified mail and conducted a foreclosure sale, which Ms. Montaquila challenged, alleging that Flagstar failed to comply with statutory notice requirements by not sending the notice to her last known address at 25 Enfield Avenue.The Superior Court granted Flagstar's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was affirmed in part and vacated in part by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Flagstar had satisfied the statutory notice requirements as to Ms. Montaquila. On remand, Flagstar filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had complied with the notice requirements by sending the notice to the property address, where Ms. Montaquila was listed as an assessed owner.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Flagstar's compliance with the statutory notice requirements. The court held that the last generally recognized address for Ms. Montaquila, relating to the real estate subject to the mortgage, was 33 Zella Street. Flagstar had complied with the statutory requirements by sending the notice to that address. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, granting summary judgment in favor of Flagstar. View "Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

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James M. Day appealed a decision by the Town of Hiram Planning Board, which granted Brian and Sarah Schnell a conditional use permit to construct a microbrewery on a property in the Town’s Residential District. Day argued that the Board erred in its interpretation of the "need" factor required by the Town of Hiram’s Zoning Ordinance, which mandates consideration of the necessity of a particular location for the proposed use.The Superior Court (Oxford County) initially remanded the case to the Planning Board for findings of fact. After the Board reaffirmed its decision with additional findings, Day appealed again. The Superior Court then affirmed the Board’s decision, leading Day to appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly. The Court found that the Board had misinterpreted the "need" factor by focusing on the Schnells' lack of alternative properties rather than the community's need for the proposed microbrewery at that specific location. The Court clarified that the "need" factor should consider the community's need for the proposed use in the proposed location, not the applicant's personal need for that location.The Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case to the Town of Hiram Planning Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Board may reopen the record to allow for additional evidence relevant to the correct interpretation of the "need" factor. View "Day v. Town of Hiram" on Justia Law