Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a property dispute in Hampstead, New Hampshire, where the owners of a non-conforming lakefront cottage sought a special exception from the zoning ordinance to add a second story to their seasonal residence. Because their lot is smaller than what the ordinance requires and lacks sufficient frontage, any alteration required a special exception from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. The owners applied for the exception, and after a hearing where they described their plans but did not address how their proposal met the ordinance’s criteria, the Zoning Board granted the exception. The petitioner, an abutter whose property faces the cottage across the road, objected that the addition would block her lake view and decrease her property value, and she introduced photographic evidence.After the Zoning Board of Adjustment granted the exception without making specific written findings, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was denied. She then appealed to the New Hampshire Housing Appeals Board, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the special exception criteria, specifically the requirement that the project not diminish surrounding property values. The Housing Appeals Board affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision, concluding that it was not unreasonable or unlawful.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the applicants did not meet their burden of proof to show their addition would not diminish surrounding property values, as required by the zoning ordinance. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicants was insufficient, and the Zoning Board’s implicit finding to the contrary was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Housing Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the Zoning Board’s grant of the special exception. View "Appeal of Murray" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank initiated a foreclosure action against Grace Doberdruk, alleging default on a promissory note secured by a mortgage. After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted Wells Fargo’s motion, denied Doberdruk’s, and entered a judgment of foreclosure. Despite Doberdruk’s efforts to secure a stay, including posting motions to stay the sheriff’s sale and confirmation of sale, she was unable to post the required supersedeas bond. The property was sold at auction, the sale was confirmed, and proceeds were distributed to the judgment creditors.Doberdruk appealed both the judgment of foreclosure and the confirmation of sale to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The Eighth District denied her motions to stay further proceedings and distribution of sale proceeds. The court subsequently ordered briefing on whether her appeal was moot due to her failure to obtain a stay. Relying on its own precedent, the Eighth District concluded that, absent a stay and after confirmation and distribution of proceeds, Doberdruk’s appeal was moot and dismissed it. The court also certified a conflict with several other Ohio appellate districts that had interpreted the statutory remedy differently.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, addressing whether an appeal of a judgment of foreclosure is moot after sale proceeds are distributed when the appellant sought but could not secure a stay. The court held that the statutory remedy of restitution under R.C. 2329.45 remains available even after the distribution of proceeds, preserving a live controversy and enabling appellate relief. Therefore, the appeal is not moot solely because a stay was not obtained or proceeds were distributed. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s dismissal and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. View "Wells Fargo Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Doberdruk" on Justia Law

Sunpin Energy Services, LLC and Ralph P. Lapinkas, Jr. sought to construct a large-scale ground-mounted solar energy system on a parcel of undeveloped, mostly forested land in Petersham, Massachusetts. Because the proposed site was outside the town’s designated solar electric overlay district, Sunpin applied for a special permit from the Zoning Board of Appeals. The project would require clearing trees from approximately 14.3 acres, and Sunpin secured an order of conditions from the town conservation commission under the Wetlands Protection Act. The permit application was denied after one of three board members voted against it, citing concerns about deforestation and referencing the town’s bylaw goals of maintaining the town’s beauty and proper land use.The plaintiffs challenged the board’s denial in the Land Court Department. The Land Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the board, concluding that the board member properly applied the zoning bylaw criteria, including the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, and concerns about tree removal. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court vacated the judgment, holding that the board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, improperly favoring forest preservation over solar energy siting and relying on speculation about future development.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that, under the Dover Amendment’s solar provision (G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth paragraph), municipalities must provide reasonable opportunities for solar energy systems and may not deny a special permit unless it is necessary to protect public health, safety, or welfare. The Court found that the denial, based on general concerns about tree cutting, amounted to a blanket prohibition in a town that is ninety-seven percent forested, which was improper. The Court vacated the Land Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sunpin Energy Services, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Petersham" on Justia Law

A homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments and placed a levy on the homeowner’s property. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment prior to a sheriff’s auction, and the property was sold to a third-party purchaser. After the auction, but before the court ratified the sale, the homeowner satisfied the judgment by paying the full amount to the association. The association then asked the court to vacate the sale and return the purchase funds to the buyer, arguing that the post-sale satisfaction of the judgment should nullify the auction outcome.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County agreed with the association, finding it proper to vacate the sale since the judgment was satisfied before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a de novo hearing and affirmed the District Court’s decision, maintaining that the sale was not complete until ratified and thus could be undone by satisfaction of the judgment at that stage. The purchaser sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment cannot be raised as an exception to a sheriff’s sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). The Court explained that such satisfaction is not an irregularity with respect to the sale, and that a purchaser acquires an inchoate equitable interest after the auction, with a right to the ratification process. Allowing satisfaction of the judgment after the sale to void the auction would undermine that right and negatively affect the sheriff’s sale system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, permitting the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale under the proper rule. View "Baltimore XV Props. V. Newsteps' Choice N." on Justia Law

Two neighboring property owners became embroiled in a dispute when the plaintiffs, who reside at 141 Post Road in Warwick, Rhode Island, began experiencing persistent and disruptive noises from the adjacent property at 175 Post Road, owned by the defendants. The plaintiffs moved into their home in 2021 without incident, but beginning in July 2024, they reported loud construction-related noises including hammering, vehicle alarms, and machinery, linked first to activities by JOGO Corporation, a tenant of a crane company on the defendants’ property, and later to other similar operations. The plaintiffs and their witnesses described the sounds as intolerable and detrimental to their use and enjoyment of their home, affecting their emotional well-being and daily activities. Additionally, plaintiffs complained of intrusive conduct, including filming or photographing by the defendants.The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court in October 2024, seeking damages and injunctive relief for private nuisance. After a multi-day evidentiary hearing with testimony from neighbors, police officers, and the parties, the Superior Court judge found that the plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on their nuisance claim, irreparable harm, that the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs, and that injunctive relief would preserve the status quo. The court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from harassing, filming, or interfering with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property and from conducting activities that violated the city’s noise ordinance or unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs’ use of their home.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Supreme Court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, finding that the requirements for such relief—including likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balancing of equities, and preservation of the status quo—were properly considered and satisfied. The Court also held that objections to the specificity of the order were waived. View "Carlton v. Avagyan" on Justia Law

A landlord leased a rental property unit to a tenant, who later filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The HRC, acting on behalf of the tenant, filed suit against the landlord, seeking legal and equitable relief for these alleged violations. After the suit was filed, the landlord died. His wife, who jointly owned the property, then also passed away. Ownership of the rental property shifted by operation of law and through an enhanced life-estate deed to their four adult children. No estate was opened in the landlord’s name.After being notified of the landlord’s death, the HRC moved in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, to substitute the landlord’s four children and his wife’s estate as parties, intending to amend the complaint to impose liability on the new parties due to their receipt of the property. The trial court denied this motion, concluding the proper party for substitution under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 25 would be the decedent’s estate or those standing in its place, not unrelated individuals against whom new claims were sought. The court gave HRC an opportunity to file further pleadings to name a proper party but, when HRC declined, dismissed the case without prejudice.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 25 in denying substitution. The Supreme Court held that, although the underlying remedial claim survived the landlord’s death, the HRC failed to demonstrate that the proposed substitute parties—the children and wife’s estate—were proper parties for substitution under Vermont law, as there was no evidence they were executors, heirs, devisees, or legatees of an estate. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to substitute and upheld the dismissal. View "Human Rights Commission v. Durkee" on Justia Law

A coalition of trade associations, real estate brokerage firms, landlords, and related entities challenged New York City’s Fairness in Apartment Rental Expenses Act (FARE Act), passed in November 2024. The Act prohibits brokers from charging tenants fees for apartments where they have published listings with a landlord’s permission or agreed to work for the landlord, and prevents landlords from making rental conditional on prospective tenants hiring agents. The plaintiffs argued that the Act infringed their federal and state free speech rights, particularly by burdening their ability to publish listings and receive compensation, and violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution by rendering certain existing agreements unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York heard the case, with the City opposing injunctive relief and moving to dismiss the claims. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, finding the FARE Act to be content-neutral regulation of commercial speech that survived intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on those claims. As for the Contracts Clause argument, the district court denied the City’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that factual issues remained, but denied a preliminary injunction after finding plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits. The district court also rejected a state preemption claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the FARE Act regulates commercial speech in a content-neutral manner and is valid under the Central Hudson test. It also concluded that the Act does not violate the Contracts Clause, as plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on that claim. The court thus affirmed denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of the constitutional claims. View "Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. v. The City of New York" on Justia Law

Several property owners and ranching entities challenged amendments adopted in 2023 by the Albany County Board of County Commissioners to the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ) regulations. The Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents of Albany County and the City of Laramie, had been the subject of prior regulatory efforts. The 2023 amendments included a 35-acre minimum lot size requirement and revised procedures for changing the APOZ boundaries. Appellants argued that the Board exceeded its authority, violated equal protection guarantees, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the amendments.Previously, in Bienz v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Albany, 2024 WY 102 (Bienz I), the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether amendments to the APOZ regulations were subject to direct judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The district court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction, finding the Board's actions legislative and not reviewable under the WAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legislative agency actions are reviewable, and remanded the case for the district court to consider the merits. While litigation was pending, the Board further amended the APOZ regulations, requiring the district court to identify which amendments remained at issue. The district court ultimately upheld the Board’s authority and the amendments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed whether the Board exceeded its authority, whether the amendment procedures violated equal protection, and whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to agency legislative action. The Court held the Board acted within its statutory authority in protecting the Casper Aquifer, the distinct procedures for overlay zone amendments did not violate equal protection guarantees, and agency legislative actions are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It concluded the 2023 APOZ amendments, including the 35-acre minimum lot size, were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione" on Justia Law

A developer applied to the zoning board of a New Jersey township for a use variance to construct a senior living facility on a residentially-zoned eight-acre property. The proposed development, which included independent, assisted living, and memory care units, was undisputedly an “inherently beneficial use” as defined by the state’s Municipal Land Use Law. The application also sought several bulk variances. The planning board had previously declined to include the property in a newly created Senior Housing Overlay Zone, following public opposition and a policy goal of preserving farmland and open space. After a multi-day hearing, the zoning board denied the variance, finding that the detrimental impact on the zoning plan and ordinance, including concerns about density, impervious coverage, drainage, traffic, and prior zoning decisions, outweighed the public benefits of the proposed use.The developers challenged the denial in the Superior Court, Law Division, which reversed the board’s decision, finding insufficient evidence of substantial negative impact and remanding for the imposition of reasonable conditions, but barring reduction in the number of units. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the zoning and master plan did not specifically preclude the use, and that the board’s concerns did not justify denial under the deferential review standard.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to clarify the standard for granting use variances for inherently beneficial uses after a 1997 legislative amendment to the Municipal Land Use Law. The Court held that the fourth step of the Sica v. Board of Adjustment of Wall test must be revised: before balancing positive and negative criteria, the zoning board must now specifically determine whether the applicant has shown that the variance “will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.” The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded for application of the revised standard. View "Monarch Communities, LLC v. Township of Montville" on Justia Law

A group of homeowners and their associations opposed amendments to a planned unit development in Baltimore City, actively communicating their disapproval to the Planning Commission. After the Commission approved the amendments, the developer filed suit against the homeowners and associations, seeking damages and alleging breach of contract and tortious interference. The homeowners and associations, believing the suit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), moved to dismiss under Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissal, citing evidence that the suit was intended to deter the homeowners from exercising their rights.Two years after the Appellate Court affirmed the SLAPP dismissal, the homeowners and associations filed a class action for malicious use of process against the developer, its law firm, and its attorney. They alleged unique injuries, including emotional distress, intimidation, diminished property values, and burdensome discovery demands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the “special injury” required for malicious use of process. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the alleged injuries were typical of litigation and not “special” as required by Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for malicious use of process because they did not plead a special injury. The Court clarified that litigation expenses, temporary property value diminution, emotional distress, and chilling of constitutional rights are not special injuries under Maryland law. The Court also declined to adopt a rule that victims of a SLAPP inherently satisfy the special-injury requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA" on Justia Law