Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A woman and her husband, after marrying, received a parcel of real estate from her parents, which they held as tenants by the entirety in Massachusetts. They planned and undertook substantial renovations, initially funded by gifts from the husband’s parents. When those funds ran out, the husband’s parents provided over $1.5 million more, which was later documented as a loan in a promissory note signed only by the husband, not the wife. The couple’s marriage deteriorated, leading to divorce proceedings. During the divorce, the husband’s parents obtained a default judgment against the husband (but not the wife) for the loan and secured a writ of execution against his interest in the property, which was recorded. After the divorce, the family court awarded the property solely to the wife, free from any claim by the husband, and clarified that it could not adjudicate the parents’ rights under the promissory note.Subsequently, the husband’s parents transferred their judgment to a family trust, which noticed a sheriff’s sale of the husband’s purported interest in the property. The wife sued in state court to stop the sale, the case was removed to federal court, and both sides sought summary judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to the wife, holding that the divorce and property distribution extinguished the creditor’s interest and that, even if the loan were valid, the wife was not jointly liable because the funds were not spent on “necessaries” under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s prediction of state law concerning the effect of divorce on a creditor’s interest and remanded for factual findings on the validity of the loan as to the wife. The court also found that neither preclusion nor the state’s domestic relations exception barred the wife’s challenge, and that factual disputes remained as to whether the loan was spent on necessaries. The court affirmed, reversed, and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Cosel v. Wendt" on Justia Law

In this case, residents of Baltimore experienced a sewage backup in their basement in 2019, after having no prior issues during their nine years at the property. The backup was caused by a clog in the City’s main sewage line. The residents contacted the City’s nonemergency line, and a cleaning crew arrived roughly 17 hours later to resolve the situation. Expert testimony at trial indicated there were no written industry standards for response time to such incidents, and there was no evidence that the City’s actions were negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous, nor was there an ongoing problem—only a single, isolated event.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the City’s requests for judgment as a matter of law, allowing both the negligence and private nuisance claims to proceed to the jury. The jury found in favor of the City on negligence but held the City liable for private nuisance, awarding damages to the residents. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the interference with the residents’ property was significant and could be considered continuous or repetitive, thus supporting private nuisance liability despite the absence of negligent conduct.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court clarified that, under Maryland common law, private nuisance liability requires not only a substantial interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property but also wrongful conduct by the defendant—such as negligence, recklessness, abnormally dangerous activity, or conduct causing a continuous or recurring unreasonable intrusion. Since the City’s actions did not meet these criteria and the incident was a single event, the Supreme Court held there was insufficient evidence for private nuisance liability and ordered judgment in favor of the City. View "Mayor of Baltimore v. Abel" on Justia Law

A company was ordered by a local Board of Zoning Appeals to remove LED displays from a billboard it was constructing. Disagreeing with this directive, the company sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Fulton County and brought additional claims. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision regarding the displays but left the company’s other claims unresolved.After this partial ruling, the company submitted a discretionary application for review to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application in an unpublished order, determining that the superior court’s decision was not final and thus not subject to discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which governs appeals from superior court reviews of certain administrative actions. The appellate court also considered, but did not resolve, whether the superior court’s order functioned as an interlocutory injunction under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(4), which could have permitted an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Court of Appeals erred by not considering whether the superior court’s order should be treated as an interlocutory injunction, which would allow immediate appeal by discretionary application. The Supreme Court clarified that OCGA §§ 5-6-34(a) and 5-6-35 are not conflicting but may overlap, and that certain immediately appealable orders may still require a discretionary application. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s dismissal and remanded the case for the appellate court to determine if the superior court’s order qualifies as an interlocutory injunction and whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC v. NORTH FULTON OUTDOOR, LLC" on Justia Law

The appellant operated businesses from two mixed-use properties in San Francisco for decades, but lost ownership of these properties through foreclosure in 2020. After foreclosure, he entered an agreement with the new owners allowing him to remain in possession, pay rent, and repurchase the properties for $10.5 million, with escrow deadlines extended multiple times via addenda. Ultimately, the final deadline to close escrow was set for September 29, 2022. The appellant failed to meet this deadline and then filed suit seeking declaratory relief, arguing that certain statutory disclosure requirements were conditions precedent to his performance, that he had the right to conduct a further environmental assessment required by his lenders, and that the sellers’ refusal to allow such testing excused his nonperformance.In the Superior Court of San Francisco County, the defendants repeatedly moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted these motions, initially with leave to amend, and ultimately dismissed the case without leave to amend. The operative complaint alleged four causes of action for declaratory relief, based on alleged failures by defendants to provide required disclosures and to permit environmental testing.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that, even assuming statutory disclosures under Civil Code section 1102 were required, the parties’ contract and subsequent addenda made clear that such disclosures were not a condition precedent to the appellant’s obligation to perform. The court also found no allegation that the sellers had knowledge of hazardous substance releases requiring disclosure under Health and Safety Code section 25359.7. Further, the court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to suspend closing or to conduct additional environmental testing beyond the contract’s terms, and that the sellers’ refusal did not constitute breach. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Nasey v. Fell Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

A municipality sought to acquire a hotel property through eminent domain, passing a resolution and subsequently an ordinance authorizing the acquisition. The ordinance cited general reasons such as promoting the health, safety, and welfare of residents and stated the taking was for a public use and purpose, but it did not specify the particular public use intended for the property. The property owner questioned the asserted public use and claimed inadequate notice of the appraisal and negotiations. After correspondence between the parties, the municipality filed a condemnation complaint.The Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice, finding that the ordinance’s failure to specify a particular public use rendered the procedure deficient. The municipality then filed an amended complaint that explicitly identified the intended use as a public parking lot with electric vehicle charging infrastructure. The trial court denied the property owner’s renewed motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that neither the Eminent Domain Act nor the Local Lands and Buildings Law required the ordinance itself to specify the public use, and that the municipality’s process satisfied statutory and constitutional requirements.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to address whether a municipal ordinance authorizing condemnation must specify the particular public use intended for the property. The Court held that neither statute nor existing case law imposes such a requirement; municipalities are not legally obligated to set forth the intended public use within the text of the ordinance. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, but emphasized that municipalities should, as a best practice, identify the intended public use as early as practicable to ensure transparency and facilitate meaningful participation by affected owners. View "Borough of Seaside Park v. Shree Jyoti, LLC" on Justia Law

A nonprofit healthcare organization based in the Bering Strait region owns a seven-unit apartment building in Nome, Alaska, located near its hospital. The building’s primary use is to house doctors, nurses, and newly hired hospital employees, most of whom are recruited from outside the region. The organization provides this housing to ensure that medical staff are available to quickly respond to emergencies, especially given the acute shortage of short-term housing in Nome. While the majority of occupants are hospital staff, a small percentage of the units are temporarily used by new hires, who receive free rent for the first 30 days and are then charged a nominal amount.The City of Nome denied a property tax exemption for the apartment building, reasoning that it was not used exclusively for hospital purposes. The matter was reviewed by the City of Nome Board of Equalization, which upheld the denial. The Board found that although the building housed hospital staff, it was also used for private residential purposes and that such use was not “vitally necessary” to the provision of medical care. The Board also rejected arguments based on federal preemption. On appeal, the Superior Court of Alaska reversed the Board’s decision, holding that the apartment building qualified for a hospital purposes exemption.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s judgment. The court held that while the apartment building is not used exclusively for hospital purposes because it also serves private residential needs, it is exempt from taxation because its use is directly incidental to and vitally necessary for hospital operations. The court found that, given the lack of local housing and the requirement for on-call staff, the apartment building meets the requirements for exempt use. The court also concluded that nominal rent charged to some tenants did not disqualify the property from exemption, as the issue was not properly raised or developed in the lower proceedings. View "City of Nome Equalization Board v. Norton Sound Health Corp." on Justia Law

A railroad company operates lines throughout Indiana, holding various property interests in its corridors, such as easements and fee simple ownership. A telecommunications utility installed fiber optic cables above and below some of these railroad tracks without the railroad’s permission, safety review, or payment of licensing fees required by the railroad. The railroad claimed that under Indiana law, its easements gave it exclusive rights to the airspace and subsurface, including the right to exclude third parties and charge for installations.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the railroad asserted claims including trespass, theft, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed all claims related to Illinois sites for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the Indiana properties where the railroad held only easements, the district court ruled that the railroad lacked standing to assert trespass and rent claims, finding that its easements did not necessarily include the right to exclude others from the air or subsurface where there was no interference with railroad operations. The court also held that claims based on older installations were time-barred, determining these did not constitute continuing trespasses under Indiana law.Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the railroad argued its easements included exclusion and licensing rights, and that the installations were continuing trespasses. The Seventh Circuit held that, under Indiana law, railroad easements do not necessarily include the right to exclude third parties from the air or ground below the tracks, nor the right to charge licensing fees for such installations unless the railroad’s operations are disturbed. The court also affirmed that these installations are not continuing trespasses and that claims outside the applicable statute of limitations are barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v Zayo Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A family purchased two parcels of land by warranty deed from a trust, through its successor trustee. After the purchase, the buyers adjusted fence lines to match the legal descriptions in the deed. A third party then sued the buyers, seeking to quiet title to portions of the land based on adverse possession. The buyers notified the trust and trustee and requested a defense against the claim, asserting a duty under the warranty deed, but the trust and trustee refused.The third-party action was heard in the District Court for Douglas County. The buyers moved for partial summary judgment, and the court quieted title in their favor. Their counterclaims for slander and attorney fees were denied. The court found the third party had a colorable claim but lacked legal expertise. The buyers subsequently sued the trust and trustee, seeking reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in defending the title, alleging anticipatory repudiation and breach of the warranty deed. After a stipulated bench trial, the district court ruled that Nebraska law does not allow recovery of attorney fees from a grantor when the grantee successfully defends title; a breach of the covenant of warranty only occurs upon an unsuccessful defense resulting in eviction or surrender. The buyers appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law. The court held that the covenant of warranty in Nebraska does not impose a separate duty to defend against third-party claims, and attorney fees are compensable only if the grantee suffers eviction or surrender under a paramount title. Because the buyers successfully defended their title and were not evicted, there was no breach, and neither the trust nor its trustee was liable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Dall" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over real property in Harrison County, Mississippi, after the land was sold to the state for unpaid taxes in August 2017 and subsequently conveyed to Jermille Johnson via forfeited tax land patents in 2021. Elizabeth Cleveland, who had lived on the property since the 1980s, filed a complaint in the Harrison County Chancery Court seeking to quiet title through adverse possession and to void the tax sale due to lack of proper notice. Cleveland asserted that she had acquired ownership by adverse possession over more than twenty years.The Harrison County Chancery Court found that Cleveland had standing to challenge the tax sale and land patents, and determined the sale was void because the required notice had not been given. The chancellor cancelled the land patents and returned the property to the county. Johnson appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s judgment, holding that Cleveland lacked standing to challenge the tax sale and that Mississippi Code Section 29-1-21 barred such claims once land was struck off to the state. The appellate court remanded the case for consideration of Johnson’s counterclaim to quiet title.On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed only the issue of Cleveland’s standing. The Court held that Cleveland has standing to challenge the tax sale because her adverse possession claim, if true, would have vested title in her by operation of law. Additionally, the unique facts of the case demonstrated an adverse impact sufficient to confer standing, as Cleveland faced losing her home. The Court rejected Johnson’s statutory argument, holding that other statutes permit challenges to tax sales. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court. View "Johnson v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Jason Wylie, a farmer and business owner, experienced significant financial distress following a serious illness in 2018 that left him unable to manage his farm and businesses. Over the preceding years, Wylie and his mother, Kathleen Sullivan, engaged in several financial transactions, including property transfers and loans. In August 2019, Wylie transferred three pieces of real property back to Sullivan by quitclaim deed, with two properties still subject to mortgages. The parties executed a “Mutual Release in Full” to settle the debt. In August 2020, Wylie filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, seeking to discharge nearly $2 million in debt. The bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Sullivan to avoid one of the property transfers, alleging it was constructively fraudulent and intended to shield assets from creditors.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that Wylie received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the property transferred to Sullivan, determining the transfer was constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). The court ordered Sullivan to return one of the properties to the estate. Sullivan appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, with no deference to the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Wylie did not personally guarantee the business loan to Sullivan, the Mutual Release did not cover damages from a prior conversion of funds, and the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by ordering recovery of the transferred property rather than its value. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Sullivan v. Miller" on Justia Law