Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Owners of residential property in Indian Wells, California, challenged a city ordinance that placed a 29-night minimum stay requirement on short-term rentals (STRs), effectively banning them. In response to property owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wanted to permit STRs, the city enacted an ordinance allowing CIDs to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, provided certain conditions were met. The plaintiffs, who owned property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID certified an opt-out vote, but the city denied the permit. The plaintiffs argued the opt-out procedure conflicted with California Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, which protects owners from prohibitions on rentals adopted after they acquire title. They also asserted the city had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to private parties.The Superior Court of Riverside County found in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the city’s opt-out procedure was preempted by section 4740 and conflicted with statutory voting requirements for amending CID governing documents. The trial court ruled the city had a duty to issue an STR permit and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The city appealed, arguing that section 4740 was not implicated and the delegation was permissible.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the city’s opt-out provision was not preempted by section 4740, as a vote to opt out did not amend CID governing documents or prohibit rentals, and compliance with both laws was possible. The court further held that the delegation of authority to CID members was constitutional and did not violate due process. It also determined the city had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in enacting the ordinance. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment award of attorney fees, ordering costs in favor of the city. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

A group of preservation organizations challenged a city’s decision to amend its Historic Resources Element by eliminating references to an inventory of historic properties compiled in 1981. This inventory, which had identified over 700 pre-1940 structures deemed to have retained architectural integrity, had previously been recognized by city resolution as listing significant historical examples. Over the years, the city argued the inventory became both outdated and inaccurate, including properties that no longer existed or had been altered, and omitting others. Instead of updating the inventory, the city chose to remove all references to it, expand incentives for its separate, voluntary historic property register, and clarify owner consent as a criterion for that register. The city supported these changes with a negative declaration, concluding there would be no significant adverse impact on historic properties.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by the plaintiffs, who argued that an environmental impact report was required before amending the element. The trial court found that the inventory properties were presumptively protected under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) but concluded that the city had shown the inventory as a whole was ineffective due to its inaccuracies. The court therefore denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, disagreed with the trial court’s analysis. It held that properties on a city-recognized inventory are presumptively historical resources under CEQA and that rebutting this presumption requires an individualized determination that each property lacks historical significance, rather than a blanket finding that the inventory is outdated or flawed. The court found that the city’s amendment, by eliminating CEQA protections for all inventory properties without such analysis, was invalid and likely to have a significant adverse environmental effect. The appellate court reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to set aside the city’s approvals pending appropriate CEQA review. View "Laguna Beach Historic Pres. Coalition v. City of Laguna Beach" on Justia Law

A town and its select board challenged a state law enacted to address the Massachusetts housing crisis. The law requires municipalities served by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to have at least one district where multifamily housing is permitted as of right. The town attempted to adopt compliant zoning amendments, but town meeting voters rejected these proposals. The select board subsequently decided not to pursue further compliance steps. After being notified by the state agency responsible that it was noncompliant and at risk of losing state grant funding, the town and board filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.The action was filed in the Superior Court Department. The Commonwealth and the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate or unlawfully interfered with the town’s zoning authority. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the dismissal. It held that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate because the costs described were either incidental local administration expenses or voluntarily incurred. The Court also held that the town and board lacked standing to assert constitutional voting rights claims on behalf of town meeting voters. Addressing the public importance of the issue, the Court concluded that the law is a valid general law and does not violate the Home Rule Amendment or conflict with the Zoning Act. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Marshfield v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan.The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law

The Republic of Kosovo applied to the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) for permission to locate its chancery at an address in the Massachusetts Avenue Heights neighborhood, which is zoned as low-density residential. The application could only be approved if the property was found to be in a mixed-use area. Kosovo proposed a broader area for consideration, including nearby institutional uses across Massachusetts Avenue, arguing those were part of the local context. The Office of Planning (OP) largely agreed with this area, and the BZA held a public hearing. The Massachusetts Avenue Heights Citizens Association (MAHCA) and its members, some of whom live nearby, objected to the application, raising concerns about traffic, parking, and the impact on the residential character, and argued the proposed area was gerrymandered and inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan.The BZA decided not to disapprove Kosovo’s application, accepting Kosovo’s proposed area with minor modifications and finding it was a mixed-use area. The BZA relied on the OP’s determination regarding municipal interest and did not address objectors’ arguments about the Comprehensive Plan or the exclusion of certain residential areas. The BZA also declined to impose additional conditions on the chancery’s approval. MAHCA appealed, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia affirmed the BZA's decision, reasoning that the Comprehensive Plan was not binding and that the inclusion of non-residential uses across Massachusetts Avenue was reasonable.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that MAHCA had standing and reviewed the BZA’s decision de novo with reasonable agency deference. The court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment, remanding for further proceedings. The main holdings are that the BZA must address whether Comprehensive Plan provisions should inform the mixed-use determination, whether residential areas closer to the site should be included, the reviewability and role of municipal interest determinations, and whether conditions should have been imposed, as the BZA had not adequately explained its reasoning on these issues. View "Massachusetts Ave. Heights Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment" on Justia Law

Several owners of shoreline properties along Lake Austin challenged a 2019 ordinance enacted by the City of Austin. The ordinance declared that their properties had always been within Austin’s full-purpose jurisdiction, repealed a 1986 ordinance that had previously classified the properties as limited-purpose (which restricted taxation until city services were provided), and subjected the properties to full taxation. The plaintiffs alleged that Austin taxed their properties as if they were full-purpose residents but provided fewer municipal services than other full-purpose residents, raising federal and state law claims.Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims under the Tax Injunction Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of all but two claims and remanded the case. Upon remand, the City reasserted several grounds for dismissal, including the political-question doctrine, Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended Pullman abstention, which the district court adopted, dismissing the claims without prejudice and entering final judgment. The plaintiffs appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and held that the case was not moot, as recent state legislation neither refunded taxes nor automatically disannexed the properties. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Pullman abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ federal equal protection claim did not hinge on any uncertain or disputed question of Texas law. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the City’s remaining grounds for dismissal, expressly declining to reach those grounds itself. View "Harward v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Several companies owning and operating commercial properties in Denver’s River North Art District filed a lawsuit against a cement company, alleging that cement dust emitted from the defendant’s terminal was damaging their properties and business operations. Their initial complaint included claims for trespass, nuisance, and negligence, and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. The cement company responded by denying liability, and neither party initially requested a jury trial or paid the required jury fee, so the case was scheduled for a bench trial.Almost a year later, and two months before the scheduled bench trial, the plaintiffs sought permission to amend their complaint. The amended complaint added clarifying factual details and included new claims for continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and exemplary damages, along with a demand for a jury trial for the first time. The defendant opposed this amendment, arguing that it was untimely and did not raise any new triable issues, thus not reviving the right to a jury trial. The District Court for the City and County of Denver granted both the motion to amend and the jury demand, relying on its interpretation of the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Mason v. Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case in an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21. It held that, under C.R.C.P. 38, a party who previously waived its right to a jury trial cannot revive that right by amending its complaint unless the amendment raises new triable issues not previously asserted. The court found that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint merely presented new legal theories and clarifying details based on the same basic facts and did not raise new triable issues. Therefore, the jury demand was untimely and ineffective. The Supreme Court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. View "In re SCP 3330 Brighton OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

Several companies sought to develop a property in Centerville, Ohio, proposing a gas station, convenience store, and drive-through restaurant. The Centerville Planning Commission approved their major site plan, but some community members, including Bethany Village and Epiphany Evangelical Lutheran Church, opposed the project and appealed to the Centerville City Council. The city council reversed the planning commission’s approval, blocking the development.After the city council’s reversal, the companies filed two actions in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The first was an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506, challenging the council’s decision. The second was a separate lawsuit seeking damages and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the city, city council, and other interested parties as defendants. The city and council removed the § 1983 action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The administrative appeal succeeded, with the common pleas court finding the city council’s reversal was improper.Following the administrative appeal’s outcome, the federal court questioned whether the doctrine of res judicata barred the § 1983 action, since it arose from the same transaction as the administrative appeal. The federal court noted conflicting precedents and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio answered the certified question in the negative, holding that res judicata does not bar a party from bringing claims for damages or declaratory relief in a subsequent action when such claims could not have been brought within an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal. The court clarified that administrative appeals are limited to judicial review and cannot address damages or declaratory relief, so claim preclusion does not apply to those subsequent claims. View "Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Proposition M, a San Francisco measure approved by voters in 2022 that imposed an annual “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of certain residential units kept vacant for more than 182 days in buildings with more than two units. The stated aim was to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase available housing. Plaintiffs included individuals and associations representing property owners, who argued that Proposition M violated statutory and constitutional protections, including property rights and familial relations, and was preempted by the Ellis Act, which protects property owners’ right to withdraw accommodations from the rental market.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted declarations detailing how Proposition M would force them to either rent out units against their wishes or pay substantial taxes, potentially resulting in financial hardship or effective eviction. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that their legal claims failed as a matter of law. After briefing and a hearing, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding that Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, burdened fundamental liberty interests in familial relations, violated equal protection, and infringed upon the constitutional right to privacy. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from administering or enforcing Proposition M.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the City’s appeal. The appellate court analyzed the measure’s conflict with the Ellis Act and concluded that Proposition M imposed a “prohibitive price” on owners’ right not to offer property for rent, directly contravening the Act’s protections. The court found that the Ellis Act preempts Proposition M and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, without reaching additional constitutional claims. The judgment prohibiting enforcement of Proposition M was thus upheld. View "Debbane v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Two condominium owners installed glass artwork on the terrace wall of their unit in a residential complex governed by a nonprofit association. The association, citing its declaration of restrictive covenants, fined one of the owners for this installation and required removal of the artwork, asserting that prior written consent was required for such exterior modifications. The owners paid the fine under protest and removed the artwork, but then brought suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the association had waived enforcement through long-term inaction and that they had relied on this acquiescence to their detriment.The County Court of Harrison County granted summary judgment to the association, ruling that the declaration was unambiguous, the association was entitled to enforce it, and that waiver did not apply. The court adopted the association’s proposed findings and did not address pending discovery requests or motions to compel. The owners appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, arguing that summary judgment was improper prior to completion of discovery, especially given their equitable claims of waiver, estoppel, and laches.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches are fact-intensive and generally require full discovery before summary judgment can be considered. The court affirmed the chancery court’s reversal of summary judgment, finding that the county court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment prematurely and foreclosing discovery necessary to resolve factual issues related to the owners’ equitable claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings in the county court. View "Sea Breeze Condominiums & Resort Owners' Association, Inc. v. Lyons" on Justia Law