Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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Roger and Therese Hutchinson purchased rural property in Madison County, Montana, in 2016, which included an easement for access via a private road. They obtained a title insurance policy from Old Republic National Title Insurance Company. Disputes arose with Nugget Creek Ranch, the owner of the adjoining property, over the use and control of gates on the easement. In 2020, the Hutchinsons sued Nugget Creek, which counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, trespass, nuisance, negligence, slander, defamation, vexatious litigation, and reverse adverse possession. The reverse adverse possession claim was dismissed by the court.The Hutchinsons requested Old Republic to defend them against Nugget Creek's counterclaims, but Old Republic denied coverage, citing policy exclusions for disputes arising from the easement and for actions taken by the insured after the policy date. The Hutchinsons filed a lawsuit against Old Republic for breach of contract and unfair claim settlement practices. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Old Republic, finding no duty to defend because the policy excluded coverage for disputes related to the easement and for actions occurring after the policy date.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that Old Republic had no duty to defend the Hutchinsons because the policy explicitly excluded coverage for disputes arising from the easement and for actions taken by the insured after the policy date. The court also noted that the policy did not cover tort claims or actions that occurred after the policy's effective date. Thus, the court concluded that Old Republic unequivocally demonstrated a lack of coverage under the policy. View "Hutchinson v. Old Republic" on Justia Law

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Gerard A. Kirsch, a member of Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc., was injured while building a storage barn on the church's property. Kirsch fell from a ladder and sustained a severe arm injury. He sued the church, alleging negligence for failing to provide safe equipment and proper supervision.The Vanderburgh Superior Court denied the church's motion for summary judgment, which argued that Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 limited the church's liability. The court held that a jury must decide if the church breached any duty to Kirsch. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, interpreting the statute narrowly to apply only to parts of the premises used primarily for worship services, thus allowing Kirsch's claim to proceed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the term "premises" in Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 includes the entire parcel of land owned by the church, not just the areas used primarily for worship services. Since the church's entire property is used primarily for worship services, the statute applies, limiting the church's liability to warning of hidden dangers and refraining from intentional harm. Kirsch admitted the church breached neither duty, leading the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the church. View "Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

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Independence Water and Sanitation District (Independence) sought to amend an augmentation plan to provide water services for a proposed residential development in Elbert County, Colorado. The original 2006 decree allowed Independence to withdraw groundwater from the Denver Basin and included an augmentation plan for not-nontributary groundwater from the Upper Dawson aquifer for specific uses on the property. Independence applied to amend this plan to include additional uses both on and off the property.The Division 1 water court faced opposition from Franktown Citizens Coalition II, Inc. and West Elbert County Well Users Association (Opposers), who argued that the anti-speculation doctrine should apply, requiring Independence to show a non-speculative intent to use the water. The water court denied Opposers' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with Independence that the anti-speculation doctrine did not apply to the amendment of the augmentation plan, based on the precedent set in East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District v. Rangeview Metropolitan District.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to applications to amend augmentation plans for not-nontributary groundwater. The court reasoned that the anti-speculation doctrine and augmentation plans serve different purposes: the former prevents water hoarding within the prior appropriation system, while the latter allows out-of-priority diversions without injuring existing water rights. The court concluded that the sole inquiry for a water court reviewing an augmentation plan is whether the plan will cause injury to existing water rights, not the applicant's intent to use the water. The court found no clear error in the water court's determination that Independence's amended augmentation plan would not result in injury to existing water rights. View "Franktown Citizens Coal. II v. Indep. Water & Sanitation Dist." on Justia Law

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The case involves a real estate dispute where plaintiffs, represented by Kenneth J. Catanzarite, alleged they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in a limited liability company. The dispute was ordered into arbitration at the plaintiffs' request, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendant, Plantations at Haywood, LLC. Plantations then petitioned the court to confirm the arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County confirmed the arbitration award and granted Plantations' motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, imposing $37,000 in sanctions. The court found that Catanzarite's opposition to the petition was frivolous and factually unsupported. Catanzarite appealed the sanctions, arguing he was statutorily allowed to file an opposition and contest the arbitrator's award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Catanzarite's arguments were without merit and unsupported by existing law or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sanction award against Catanzarite. Additionally, the court granted Plantations' motion for sanctions on appeal, finding the appeal to be frivolous and without merit. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded, with the option for Catanzarite to stipulate to the amount requested by Plantations. The order was affirmed, and Plantations was entitled to its costs on appeal. View "Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC" on Justia Law

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Kehinde Adeyemi Elebute challenged the foreclosure sale of his property in bankruptcy court but was unsuccessful. Years later, he attempted to challenge the foreclosure again in state court. To prevent duplicative litigation, the suit was removed to the bankruptcy court, which reopened and subsequently dismissed Elebute’s case for want of prosecution after he failed to appear at a hearing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Elebute’s challenge to the reopening and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal. Elebute then appealed both rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order reopening the proceedings, as it was a non-final, interlocutory order. The court agreed with the defendants, Village Capital & Investment, L.L.C., and Michael Weems, that the reopening order was only a preliminary step and did not resolve substantive issues. Therefore, the court dismissed this portion of Elebute’s appeal.Regarding the dismissal for lack of prosecution, the court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over Elebute’s claims. The court noted that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction extends to all civil proceedings related to bankruptcy cases. Since Elebute’s state action challenged Village Capital’s interest in the property central to the earlier bankruptcy case, the actions were related. Consequently, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to dismiss the adversary proceeding.The Fifth Circuit dismissed Elebute’s challenge to the reopening order for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects. The defendants’ amended motion to dismiss a portion of Elebute’s appeal was denied as moot. View "Elebute v. Village Capital" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Vaughn, a self-described Moorish National, was convicted by a jury of six counts of offering a false instrument for filing or record, two counts of simulation of summons, complaint, judgment, order, or other legal process, and two counts of intimidating a public officer. Vaughn sent documents to his landlords and the Clark County Recorder's office, claiming ownership of properties he did not own and threatening public officers when his documents were not recorded. He was sentenced as a habitual criminal to an aggregate prison term of 5-20 years and ordered to pay $19,600 in restitution.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County adjudicated Vaughn as a habitual criminal and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Vaughn represented himself at trial with standby counsel and was convicted on all counts. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing several grounds including the denial of his motion to dismiss, insufficient evidence, prejudicial witness testimony, misleading jury instructions, improper habitual criminal adjudication, and an unsupported restitution award.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that the State failed to prove the elements of the charges under NRS 239.330(1) because the documents Vaughn attempted to record were not of a type that could be recorded under state or federal law. Consequently, the court reversed Vaughn's conviction on the six counts of offering a false instrument for filing or record. The court also reversed the restitution award, finding that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. However, the court affirmed Vaughn's conviction on the remaining counts and upheld the habitual criminal adjudication and the sentence imposed for those counts. View "VAUGHN VS. STATE" on Justia Law

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VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) initiated an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline) under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the eviction should have been a compulsory counterclaim in his pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust. The circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, and after a court trial, granted the eviction, ordering Paul to vacate the property within ten days and allowing the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, his request for a jury trial, and his request for a continuance. The court proceeded with a court trial and granted the eviction in favor of the Landlords. The court also ordered that any personal property left by Paul after ten days would be considered abandoned and could be kept by the Colony. Additionally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the Landlords.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that the FED statutes did not allow for pre-answer motions to extend the time for filing an answer and that the eviction action was not a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s undue influence lawsuit. The court also held that Paul’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance or in excluding evidence of undue influence. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in ordering the forfeiture of Paul’s personal property and remanded the case to revise the judgment accordingly. The court awarded VOR and the Colony combined appellate attorney fees of $9,000. View "Vor, Inc. v. Estate of O'Farrell" on Justia Law

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Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC, a commercial real estate developer, entered into a purchase and sale agreement with MBD Realty LLC for a property in Portland. MBD was aware that the City of Portland planned to redevelop the area, which would involve condemning part of the property, but did not disclose this to Alrig. The agreement included clauses allowing Alrig to terminate the agreement and receive a refund of its deposit under certain conditions, including eminent domain. Alrig extended the inspection period multiple times, paying additional deposits, and eventually waived its due diligence and title review contingencies, making the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default. Alrig later learned of the redevelopment plans and terminated the agreement, seeking a refund of the deposit, which MBD refused.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted MBD’s motion to dismiss Alrig’s complaint for breach of contract and fraud, concluding that MBD had no duty to disclose the redevelopment plans. Alrig appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the amendment to the agreement unambiguously made the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default, and thus Alrig’s contract claim failed. Additionally, the court found that MBD did not actively conceal the City’s planned condemnation, and there was no special relationship imposing a duty to disclose. Therefore, Alrig’s fraud claim also failed as a matter of law. The court concluded that Alrig was not entitled to relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of its claims. View "Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC. v. MBD Realty LLC" on Justia Law

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Scott and Karen Larsen purchased two adjoining lots in the McGuiness Tracts subdivision in the late 1980s, intending to build a house and retire there. Keith and Danielle Sayers, who bought a lot in the same subdivision in 2012 and another adjoining lot in 2016 or 2017, built a freestyle motocross course on their properties. The Larsens, disturbed by the noise and dust from the motocross activities, sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Sayerses, which was ignored. Consequently, the Larsens filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief for breach of restrictive covenant, nuisance, and trespass. The Sayerses counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Second Judicial District Court held a bench trial and ruled that the Sayerses' motocross activities did not violate the restrictive covenants of the subdivision, denying the Larsens' claims for injunctive relief and nuisance. However, the court granted the Larsens' request to enjoin Keith from hitting golf balls onto their property. The court also denied the Sayerses' counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Larsens' motion for attorney’s fees was not ruled upon by the District Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the Sayerses' freestyle motocross course constitutes a breach of the restrictive covenants limiting the use of the property to residential or agricultural purposes. The court reversed the District Court's ruling on this basis and remanded the case for the District Court to award the Larsens reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's determination that Keith's ramp-building activities did not violate the covenants' restriction against commercial activity. View "Larsen v. Sayers" on Justia Law

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GBSB Holding, LLC (GBSB) is the developer of Baker 80, a proposed subdivision adjacent to Whitefish Hills Village (WHV) in Flathead County. GBSB sought to use WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80, which was opposed by Flathead County, Whitefish Village, LLC, and the WHV Homeowners Association. GBSB also challenged the abandonment of a portion of Brady Way, a county road within WHV, by Flathead County.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court prohibited GBSB from using WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80. The court concluded that the public access easements on WHV roads did not include primary access for Baker 80 residents. Additionally, the court found that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the public access easements on WHV roads were easements in gross, benefiting the public at large and not specifically Baker 80 residents. The court determined that the scope of the public access easements did not extend to primary access for Baker 80. The court also upheld the District Court's conclusion that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way, as the abandonment process complied with statutory requirements and substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. View "GBSB Holding v. Flathead County" on Justia Law