Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

BMK Enterprises purchased a commercial property from Bailey Enterprises in 2018. As part of the transaction, the parties agreed to a provision granting BMK a right of first refusal if Bailey decided to sell the adjacent Bolinger Property, which contained storage units. In 2019, Bailey informed BMK of its intent to sell the Bolinger Property, but BMK did not purchase it at that time. Bailey later sold the Bolinger Property to a third party in 2021 without further notice to BMK. BMK subsequently filed suit against Bailey for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that Bailey failed to honor the right of first refusal provision. BMK also sued the real estate broker and agent involved in the sale, but those claims were dismissed and are not part of this appeal.The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District granted summary judgment in favor of Bailey. It concluded that the right of first refusal provision was unenforceable as a matter of law because it inadequately described the property subject to the right and failed to specify the price, rendering the contract provision ambiguous and void. The court declined to consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties’ intent, reasoning that the ambiguity could not be resolved through legal canons or extrinsic evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. It held that while the provision was ambiguous, the District Court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent and resolve the ambiguity. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether extrinsic evidence could clarify the object of the contract and render the right of first refusal enforceable. View "BMK Enterprises v. Bailey" on Justia Law

A property owner initiated a forcible entry and detainer action in county court against tenants who allegedly failed to pay rent on a commercial lease. The lease included options for the tenants to purchase the property during future terms, granted credits for rent paid toward the purchase price, and restricted the owner's ability to sell the property without giving the tenants an opportunity to exercise their purchase option. The owner sought possession, past due rent, and other costs. The tenants argued that the lease provisions created an equitable interest, thereby raising a title dispute that deprived the county court of jurisdiction.The county court rejected the tenants’ argument, finding that it had jurisdiction and ordering restitution of the premises to the owner. On appeal, the tenants failed to include the county court’s judgment in the transcript, which led the District Court for Douglas County to affirm the county court’s order without addressing the jurisdictional issue. The tenants then moved to alter or amend the judgment and supplement the record with the omitted judgment, but the district court denied this motion.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It determined that when a lease includes provisions that arguably create an equitable interest and restrict the owner’s rights, a title dispute is present. In such circumstances, a county court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide a forcible entry and detainer action. The Supreme Court also held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow supplementation of the record when it was necessary to determine jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with directions to vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Martens v. BB's Childcare" on Justia Law

A catastrophic storm in March 2016 caused unprecedented rainfall in the Sabine River basin, leading the operators of the Toledo Bend Dam—jointly managed by the Sabine River Authority of Texas and the Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana—to open nine spillway gates. This action released significant amounts of water into the Sabine River over several weeks. Downriver landowners experienced extensive flooding and property damage. More than 700 landowners brought suit, alleging that the dam operators’ actions constituted a compensable taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment.The case began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where the defendants raised several defenses, including sovereign immunity, which was litigated and ultimately denied. Discovery disputes arose over the admissibility and timeliness of the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits and reports, which were found to rely heavily on an untested graduate thesis. The magistrate judge struck the challenged affidavits as untimely, and the plaintiffs did not object. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the dam’s operation caused the flooding, nor that a taking had occurred. The court also found the necessity doctrine might shield the defendants but did not decide the case on that ground.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the untimely expert affidavits. Affirming summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation—specifically, that the dam’s operation, rather than the unprecedented storm itself, caused additional flooding beyond what would have occurred without the dam. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Bonin v. Sabine River Authority" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on whether a party established a prescriptive easement over a dirt and gravel road, known as the M-1 Road, which crosses a large tract of privately owned timberland in northern Idaho. The appellant acquired three lots in a subdivision by Spirit Lake in 1999, and accessed these lots using the M-1 Road, which traversed land owned by the respondent. This land, the Brickle Creek Unit, spans approximately 20,000 acres and was primarily used for forestry, with only logging roads as improvements. The appellant and their predecessors used the road for various purposes, including construction and recreation, alongside other property owners and the general public. In 2016, the respondent installed a gate and began requiring permits for road access, which the appellant refused to obtain.The case was initially heard by the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, which granted summary judgment to the appellant, finding a prescriptive easement existed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. After remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that although the appellant’s use of the road was open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted, it was presumptively permissive due to the wild, unenclosed, and unimproved character of the land. The court ruled the use did not become adverse until 2016, when access was restricted and the appellant refused to sign a usage agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that the land’s wild and unimproved nature created a presumption of permissive use, which the appellant failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence of adverse, non-permissive use for the statutory period. The Court also found no actual or imputed knowledge of adverse use by the landowner prior to 2016. The denial of the prescriptive easement was upheld. View "Spirit Lake Cabins v. Inland Empire" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs obtained significant monetary judgments against a defendant, Deutsch, relating to a failed real estate project. Over the next several years, the plaintiffs attempted to enforce these judgments by seeking information about alleged fraudulent transfers from Deutsch to his wife, Baird, and their children. Multiple lawsuits and post-judgment discovery proceedings in Minnesota and New York courts ensued, including actions alleging Baird and her children received valuable assets as fraudulent conveyances. Repeated discovery efforts were largely unsuccessful, with courts in New York and during bankruptcy proceedings consistently finding no evidence justifying further inquiry into Baird’s finances. Despite these setbacks, the plaintiffs continued to pursue information about Baird’s assets, including through federal court subpoenas after a default judgment recognized the original state court awards.In the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, a magistrate judge had previously limited discovery into Baird’s finances, explicitly stating that further discovery would only be permitted if the plaintiffs produced new evidence of fraudulent or voidable transactions. Ignoring this warning, the plaintiffs sought leave to depose their former counsel, the Scher Law Firm, regarding its prior investigations into the alleged fraudulent transfers. The magistrate judge denied the motion, finding that the requested discovery concerned Baird’s finances and that the plaintiffs had not presented any new evidence as required. The judge also imposed sanctions, ordering the plaintiffs to pay Baird’s costs and fees for responding to the motion, citing their willful disregard of court orders and ongoing harassment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Eighth Circuit held that denying the motion for leave to depose the Scher Law Firm was not an abuse of discretion, as the plaintiffs failed to meet the court’s condition for further discovery. The appellate court also upheld the imposition of sanctions, finding the plaintiffs’ conduct justified penalties and that the district court acted within its inherent authority. View "Lupe Development Partners, LLC v. Baird" on Justia Law

The county commission in a South Dakota county adopted an ordinance amending its zoning regulations. The key change was to substitute the “board of adjustment” in place of the “county commission” and “planning and zoning board” as the authority to consider conditional use permit (CUP) applications and variances. Save Centennial Valley Association, a local group, submitted a petition to the county auditor seeking to refer the ordinance to a public vote, arguing that the amendments were legislative actions subject to referendum under state law. The auditor, after consulting with the commission, rejected the petition, determining the ordinance was administrative and not subject to referendum. The petitioners then requested a writ of mandamus from the circuit court to compel the auditor to refer the ordinance to a vote.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, considered the pleadings and granted judgment on the pleadings to the county, denying the request for mandamus. The court found that the ordinance did not constitute a legislative decision and was therefore not subject to the referendum process. The petitioners appealed this determination.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the matter de novo, considering whether the ordinance was legislative or administrative under SDCL 7-18A-15.1. The court held that the ordinance merely executed a plan already adopted by the governing body or by the Legislature and did not create a new rule or policy. The court also clarified that decisions on CUPs, whether made by the commission or the board of adjustment, are quasi-judicial and not subject to referendum. Therefore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the ordinance was an administrative decision not subject to the referendum process, and the petitioners were not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Save Centennial Valley Association v. Mcgruder" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding ownership of surface and mineral interests along the Yellowstone River near the North Dakota-Montana border. The land in question included two areas known as the “North Island” and the “West Bank.” Whiting Oil and Gas Corporation, a well operator, initiated an interpleader action to determine the rightful owners of oil and gas interests. The State of North Dakota later filed a quiet title action to adjudicate ownership of the same lands, including surface rights. The parties stipulated to the location of the ordinary high water mark and provided evidence about how the disputed lands were formed, focusing on whether their formation resulted from gradual accretion or sudden avulsive events.The District Court of McKenzie County bifurcated the proceedings. After trial, the court found the Yellowstone River was navigable at statehood. The court determined the State did not own the North Island, concluding it was formed by an avulsive event that separated farmland from the shore, not by accretion in the riverbed. The court initially determined the State owned the West Bank as it had formed as an in-channel island that later attached to the west bank. On summary judgment, however, the district court ruled that a 1950 deed from the State to Norby conveyed the West Bank, interpreting the lots’ western boundary to be the state line rather than the river. The court rejected defenses of laches and statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court’s finding that the North Island formed by avulsion was not clearly erroneous and affirmed that the State does not own the North Island. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the West Bank was never part of the government lots conveyed by the State’s deed, so the State retains ownership of the West Bank. The judgment was affirmed in part as to the North Island and reversed in part as to the West Bank. View "State v. Leland" on Justia Law

Richard Q. Navarro and his son-in-law, Antonio Oros-Garcia, jointly owned two vehicles, a 2011 Dodge RAM pickup and a 2017 Dodge Challenger, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Navarro paid the entirety of the loans used to finance the vehicles. Subsequently, Oros-Garcia became a fugitive and could not be found. Navarro, still in possession of the vehicles but unable to sell or transfer them due to the joint ownership, filed a lawsuit seeking a partition of the vehicles to resolve the ownership and allow him to act regarding the vehicles without interference.The District Court of Laramie County initially granted Navarro’s motion for entry of default after Oros-Garcia failed to respond. However, the court repeatedly requested a third-party valuation of the vehicles from Navarro to determine jurisdiction. When Navarro did not provide the specific valuation requested, the court dismissed the complaint on its own motion under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), concluding Wyoming’s partition statutes only applied to real property, not personal property, and suggested Navarro could seek relief through a replevin action.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and held that Wyoming law does not preclude partition of personal property merely because the statutes address only real property. The court found that, under common law, joint owners of personal property are entitled to seek partition, and the absence of a statute does not abrogate this right. Additionally, the court determined that partition actions are in rem or quasi in rem proceedings and fall within the jurisdiction of the district courts, not circuit courts, regardless of the property’s value. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Navarro v. Oros-Garcia" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a commercial landlord and tenant after government emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic required non-essential businesses in New York City to close. The tenant, operating a retail clothing store in Manhattan, stopped paying rent, arguing that the lease excused rent payments when government actions prevented it from operating its business. The landlord disagreed, terminated the lease for nonpayment, and sought damages for breach of contract. The tenant vacated the premises and counterclaimed, alleging the landlord wrongfully terminated the lease and wrongfully kept two payments made after termination.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the government’s orders did not constitute a “taking” under the lease because the tenant was not fully deprived of the use or occupancy of the premises. The district court also rejected the tenant’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that the notice-and-cure provision applied and that the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative. The court awarded damages to the landlord, though the landlord cross-appealed, asserting the award was insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court misinterpreted the lease’s takings provision, which excused the tenant from paying rent when it was unable to operate its business due to government orders. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment for the landlord on its breach of contract claim and concluded the tenant was entitled to summary judgment on both its own breach of contract counterclaim and its claim that the landlord improperly terminated the lease. The court further vacated the judgment on the unjust enrichment counterclaim and remanded for further proceedings. The landlord’s cross-appeal on damages was dismissed as moot. View "Delshah 60 Ninth, LLC v. Free People of PA LLC" on Justia Law

In June 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protestors established the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP), occupying a sixteen-block area in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. In response, the Seattle Police Department abandoned its East Precinct and significantly reduced police presence in the affected area, including Cal Anderson Park. The protests and encampments continued to cause disruption, vandalism, and crime for months, with CHOP forcibly disbanded on July 1, 2020, but neighborhood disturbances persisting until December 2020. Two businesses located near Cal Anderson Park, one a restaurant and the other a property owner, claimed that the City’s actions and inaction led to severe economic losses, including lost revenue, property damage, and tenant departures.Previously, these businesses were absent putative class members in the Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which raised similar claims. After class certification was denied and the case settled, the businesses filed individual lawsuits in April and June 2023, consolidated in the district court. The district court dismissed the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, and found their nuisance claims untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but did not initially decide on equitable tolling pending further guidance from the Washington Supreme Court. After the Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC decision, the district court dismissed the nuisance claims and entered final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not extend to purely economic harm and that the cessation of police services did not constitute a compensable taking. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the nuisance claims, holding that equitable tolling under American Pipe is available under Washington law, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law