Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
United States v. Rhodes
Norman Rhodes operated two businesses in Michigan—Rhodes Graphics and D&G Sign Company—until the 1990s, when he sought to shield himself from liability and avoid taxes by restructuring his businesses and his home ownership using “common-law trusts.” He created three trusts: Signmaker and Graphic Associates for his businesses, and July Thirtyfirst for his home, appointing Brent Johnson as “fiduciary owner” and retaining operational control. Rhodes stopped filing tax returns and paying taxes on income from these businesses, believing the trust structure exempted him from tax obligations. The IRS audited Rhodes, found no business or personal tax returns, and used a bank deposits analysis to determine his income, concluding Rhodes owed substantial back taxes and penalties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the government, finding that Rhodes was personally liable for income earned through the businesses, as the trusts did not shield him from tax liability. The court also determined that July Thirtyfirst did not qualify as a valid trust under Michigan law because it lacked definite beneficiaries, so Rhodes and his wife remained the owners of their home. The court ordered the sale of the home to satisfy Rhodes’s tax debt and denied Rhodes’s motion to amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Rhodes was liable for taxes on income from the businesses, as every rational factfinder would conclude he earned that income. It also held that July Thirtyfirst lacked the necessary elements to be a valid trust under Michigan law, so the government’s tax lien attached to the property and its sale was proper. The Sixth Circuit concluded the district court’s judgment was final and properly executed. View "United States v. Rhodes" on Justia Law
Davidson v. Schleedlewitz, LLC
Three siblings inherited interests in two parcels of land near Saratoga, Wyoming: the Davidson Ranch and a nearby Commercial Property. After years of disputes and litigation, one sibling, Sue, became the sole owner of the Davidson Ranch but retained an easement over a road across the Commercial Property, which was owned by her siblings Chuck and Deb through various business entities. Chuck and Deb entered into a land sale agreement with the Platte Valley Healthcare Project (PVHP) to sell part of the Commercial Property for construction of a hospital. During this process, Sue learned of the sale, filed a lis pendens on the property related to other ongoing litigation, and made additional demands during easement negotiations with PVHP. PVHP terminated the deal after discovering the lis pendens clouded title.The Carbon County District Court consolidated the parties’ disputes, including claims by Sue regarding interference with her easement and counterclaims by Chuck and Deb for intentional interference with the PVHP land sale. Following a bench trial, the district court found against Sue on her claims and ruled in favor of Chuck and Deb on their intentional interference claim, awarding them damages equal to the unpaid contract price from the failed sale, less earnest money retained, and ordering Sue to pay to relocate the easement road.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly found Sue liable for intentional interference with a business expectancy, concluding that her filing of lis pendens was not absolutely privileged and that she acted without good faith. The court also upheld the district court’s damages award and its use of the appropriate legal standard for damages in intentional interference cases. Finally, the Supreme Court declined to consider Sue’s challenge to the allocation of relocation costs for the easement road because it was raised for the first time on appeal. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Davidson v. Schleedlewitz, LLC" on Justia Law
Hinrichsen v. RCTS Properties
RCTS Properties, L.L.C. purchased a building from the Hinrichsens in 2010, financing $100,000 of the purchase price with a promissory note secured by a deed of trust. The note required monthly installment payments, which RCTS made for just over a year before ceasing payments after May 2012. A member of RCTS, Messersmith, personally guaranteed the debt and filed for bankruptcy in August 2012. The Hinrichsens filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy for the balance due, but did not expressly demand immediate payment or state they were accelerating the debt. Messersmith’s personal liability was discharged, and the Hinrichsens received no payment.Upon RCTS’ demand for reconveyance of the deed of trust in 2022, the Hinrichsens refused and later demanded payment in 2023, including default interest and referencing possible acceleration. In 2024, the Hinrichsens initiated judicial foreclosure. RCTS defended on statute of limitations grounds, contending that the limitations period began in 2012 due to acceleration triggered either by the bankruptcy filing or the proof of claim. The District Court for Buffalo County found that neither event constituted clear and unequivocal action by the Hinrichsens to accelerate the debt under Nebraska law, and entered a decree of foreclosure for the full amount due, including all missed installments.On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, RCTS renewed its arguments. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that neither Messersmith’s bankruptcy nor the Hinrichsens’ proof of claim constituted an acceleration of the debt for purposes of starting the statute of limitations. The Court also held that the 10-year statute of limitations for foreclosure actions applies, not the 5-year statute for contract actions, and that all missed installments could be included in calculating the indebtedness. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Hinrichsen v. RCTS Properties" on Justia Law
PriorityOne Bank v. JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC
Harvey Lott, an employee of PriorityOne Bank, contracted with JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC to build his home and encouraged the contractor to obtain a construction loan from his employer. Dissatisfied with the construction, Lott sued JSC, and JSC counterclaimed, alleging Lott improperly pressured them into a bank loan and raised several contract-related claims. The parties settled, executing a release that broadly discharged all claims between them, including any against PriorityOne Bank relating to the home construction and financing.Subsequently, Jason Ray Temple and his wife, who had also hired JSC to build their home and financed it through PriorityOne Bank, sued JSC and PriorityOne for defects in their home. JSC filed a cross-complaint against PriorityOne Bank in this new lawsuit, raising claims similar to those previously settled. PriorityOne Bank moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the earlier settlement barred these claims. Judge Matthew Sullivan of the Covington County Circuit Court initially dismissed the cross-complaint but later recused himself. Judge Stanley Sorey reinstated the cross-complaint and denied PriorityOne Bank’s renewed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, prompting this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi determined that the release from the prior settlement was clear and unambiguous, expressly naming and protecting PriorityOne Bank as a third-party beneficiary from claims related to the Lott home construction and its financing. The Court held that the cross-complaint in the Temple lawsuit raised only issues already addressed and settled in the previous litigation. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the circuit court’s order, rendered summary judgment in favor of PriorityOne Bank, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PriorityOne Bank v. JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC" on Justia Law
CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS
Paul Calvert owned several rental properties in Conway, Arkansas. Over several years, the City cited these properties for various code violations, including the presence of trash, dilapidated structures, and health hazards. When Calvert did not resolve the violations, the City performed cleanups, billed him for the costs, and, after hearings, placed liens on three properties—512 Third Avenue, 1135 Ash Street, and 1900/1902 Dave Ward Drive. Calvert did not always attend the hearings, and some invoices were paid by tenants or through sale proceeds when the properties were sold.Calvert filed suit in the Faulkner County Circuit Court, challenging the liens and raising additional claims, including alleged violations of due process, unlawful search and seizure, excessive fines, and seeking a declaratory judgment. The circuit court found that Calvert’s appeals of the liens for the Third Avenue and Ash Street properties were untimely and dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The lien on the Dave Ward property was found to be moot because it was paid when Calvert sold the property and there was no evidence the lien affected the sale price. On Calvert’s other claims, the court granted summary judgment to the City, finding adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, that the search was conducted under a valid warrant, and that the City acted within its authority.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the lien appeals, agreeing that the first two were untimely and the third was moot. The court also affirmed summary judgment on Calvert’s constitutional and statutory claims, holding that he did not present sufficiently developed legal arguments or evidence, and that the City acted under the appropriate statutory authority. View "CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
Anderson vs. City of Minneapolis
Several residents of North Minneapolis alleged that the City of Minneapolis failed to adequately enforce housing code violations in their neighborhoods, resulting in unsafe and unsanitary rental conditions. They claimed that the City’s housing inspectors were disproportionately assigned to more affluent and less diverse wards, and that complaints from racially diverse wards (Wards 4 and 5) were often unresolved or marked as resolved without inspection or remedial action. The residents argued that these practices had a disparate racial impact, violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and the Minnesota Constitution. Their lawsuit sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to order the City to reform its inspection and enforcement practices; they did not request damages.The Hennepin County District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Minnesota’s common-law official immunity doctrine barred the residents’ claims for equitable relief under the MHRA and breach of duty claims. The district court also dismissed the residents’ equal protection claim for failure to allege sufficient facts of disparate impact, but clarified the dismissal was without prejudice, permitting the claim to be re-pled. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that official immunity applied to all claims against public officials, regardless of whether the relief sought was damages or equitable relief.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case to decide whether common-law official immunity extends to claims seeking only prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. The court held that official immunity does not bar claims for purely prospective equitable relief, such as injunctions or declaratory judgments, but only applies to claims for damages. The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Anderson vs. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law
Soland v. ZHB E. Bradford Twp
The dispute centers on a property in East Bradford Township, Pennsylvania, owned by John Marshall and Dara Gans Marshall. Their land contains several historic structures: the Paxson House (a Class I historic resource and their main residence), the Tenant House (a Class II historic resource, previously a veterinary clinic), and a barn. The Marshalls sought to operate a bed-and-breakfast using the Paxson House as their residence and the Tenant House for guest rooms. However, the local zoning ordinance restricts guest accommodations for bed-and-breakfast estates to owner-occupied Class I historic resources, which excludes the Tenant House’s proposed use.After the Marshalls applied for a use variance to allow guest rooms in the Tenant House, the East Bradford Township Zoning Hearing Board granted their request. The Board reasoned that the variance was de minimis due to the property's unique circumstances and the minimal impact on public policy. Neighboring property owners, Dorothy and Daniel Soland, along with the East Bradford Township Board of Supervisors, appealed to the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. That court reversed the Zoning Hearing Board’s decision, finding that the Marshalls did not demonstrate an unnecessary hardship and that the requested variance was not de minimis. The Marshalls appealed again, and the Commonwealth Court reinstated the Zoning Hearing Board’s decision, holding that a use variance could be considered de minimis under certain circumstances.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It held that the de minimis doctrine does not apply to use variances, as such relief would improperly undermine legislative determinations about permitted land uses. The Court concluded the Zoning Hearing Board erred in granting a de minimis use variance, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order, and reinstated the trial court’s decision denying the variance. View "Soland v. ZHB E. Bradford Twp" on Justia Law
Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
Several property owners in and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, brought an action alleging that a plastics manufacturing facility released airborne toxic chemicals, specifically perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which subsequently contaminated local drinking water sources, including both private wells and the municipal water supply. They claimed harm to their property interests due to this contamination and sought damages for diminution in property value, costs of remediation, and loss of use and enjoyment, among other injuries.After the case was removed from New Hampshire state court, it proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of property owners in the affected geographic area. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability issues on trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to warn, but denied certification for nuisance and for damages issues, which it found to be individualized. The district court bifurcated proceedings, planning to address liability on a class-wide basis first, with damages to be determined in later, individualized proceedings. Saint-Gobain, the principal defendant, was granted permission to appeal the certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court reversed the class certification as to negligence and negligent failure to warn, finding that injury and causation on those claims would require individualized, property-by-property proof that predominated over common issues. However, the court affirmed class certification for liability on the trespass claim, concluding that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiffs need only prove the intentional physical invasion of their property by PFOA attributable to the facility, which could be established on a common basis. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law
Barrett v. Jesperson
A father owned a tract of land in Carbon County, Montana, called Lot 9, which was about six and three-quarters acres. In 1969 and again in 2001, he had portions of the property surveyed, ultimately creating a one-acre parcel designated in a document known as COS 491A. In 2003, after being charged with aggravated assault and fearing potential civil liability, the father executed a warranty deed transferring “Lot 9 of Plat 474” to his daughter. An exhibit attached to the deed included a metes and bounds description of the one-acre parcel from COS 491A. The daughter later deeded the one-acre parcel to her brother in 2007. The father was found incapacitated in 2005 and died in 2015, leaving no probate estate. In 2022, the daughter sold another portion of the land.The brother sued in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County, claiming the 2003 deed conveyed only the one-acre parcel, not all of Lot 9, or that, alternately, a constructive trust or fraudulent transfer occurred, or that he was entitled under a 2010 will. The District Court granted summary judgment to the sister, holding that the deed transferred all of Lot 9, that the brother lacked standing to assert a constructive trust or claim under the fraudulent transfer statute, and that the will had not been probated.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and determined that, as a matter of law, the 2003 deed was ambiguous because it could reasonably be interpreted as transferring either all of Lot 9 or just the one-acre parcel. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the ambiguity issue and remanded for further proceedings to consider extrinsic evidence about the parties’ intent. The Court affirmed the lower court’s rulings on standing regarding the constructive trust and fraudulent transfer claims. View "Barrett v. Jesperson" on Justia Law
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Montana Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC
The case concerns a dispute arising from a purchase and sale agreement for a Hilton-branded hotel near the Nashville airport. The seller and purchaser agreed to a contract with a $79 million purchase price and an initial $1.75 million earnest money deposit, later increased through twenty-four amendments over fifteen months to a total of nearly $19 million. Each amendment extended deadlines and required additional nonrefundable earnest money, with the contract stipulating that, in the event of the purchaser’s default, the seller’s sole remedy would be retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages. When the purchaser failed to close by the final deadline, the seller terminated the agreement and retained the earnest money. The purchaser sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the damages provision was an unenforceable penalty.The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted summary judgment to the seller, concluding the provision was an enforceable and reasonable prediction of actual damages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, finding the seller had not provided sufficient evidence that the liquidated damages amount was a reasonable estimate of potential damages and holding that contractual language alone was insufficient to establish enforceability.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee clarified the state’s standard for liquidated damages provisions. The court held that when contracting parties expressly agree that actual damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and that the liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate, there is a presumption of enforceability. The party seeking to avoid enforcement must then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the provision is actually an unenforceable penalty. The court found the purchaser had not raised a material factual dispute to overcome this presumption. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC" on Justia Law