Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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Dwight D. Sikes appealed a judgment from the Choctaw Circuit Court, where Michelle M. Kirkland, representing Kenneth McIlwain's estate, had obtained a judgment against him. The case involved land originally owned by Dwight's father, James Sikes, which was deeded to Dwight's brother, Archie, and subsequently to Kenneth and Patricia McIlwain. The McIlwains sued Dwight, alleging his livestock trespassed and caused damage. Dwight counterclaimed, alleging the McIlwains improperly removed James's personal property, and cross-claimed, arguing James was not competent when deeding the land to Archie.The Choctaw Circuit Court ordered Dwight to remove his livestock but did not rule on his counterclaim. After the McIlwains passed away, Kirkland was substituted as the plaintiff. The court later ruled against Dwight on his cross-claim, finding James competent when deeding the land, but did not address the counterclaim. Dwight appealed this judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and noted that the lower court had not disposed of all claims, specifically Dwight's counterclaim regarding the removal of personal property. The court emphasized that a final judgment must conclusively determine all issues and rights of the parties. Since the trial court's judgment did not address the counterclaim or fully resolve the initial trespass and nuisance claims, it was not a final judgment.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Dwight's appeal due to the lack of a final judgment, as the unresolved claims deprived the court of jurisdiction. View "Sikes v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

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Caroline Adams suffered a spinal cord injury while sledding on property owned by Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, which operates under the name Mack’s Apples. Adams and her husband, Christopher Estrella, filed a lawsuit against Moose Hill for negligence and loss of consortium. The incident occurred in January 2022 when the plaintiffs visited Moose Hill, which allows the public to use a hill on its property for sledding at no charge. Moose Hill also operates a seasonal stand selling hot beverages and other goods to sledders. Adams was injured during sledding and is now paralyzed from the waist down.The Superior Court granted Moose Hill's motion to dismiss the case, citing recreational use immunity under RSA 508:14, I. The plaintiffs argued that the immunity should not apply because they were on the property for a purpose related to Moose Hill's business, which customarily charges for its goods. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Moose Hill qualifies for immunity under RSA 508:14, I, because it allows the public to use its land for recreational purposes without charge. The court distinguished this case from Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, where the ski resort charged for access to its recreational facilities. The court found that Moose Hill's sale of hot beverages was incidental to the free recreational use of the sledding hill and did not negate the "without charge" requirement of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC" on Justia Law

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Debra Stevenson and Eugene Smith co-own a property for which Stevenson initially took out a loan from Wells Fargo. After defaulting, she refinanced with Fremont Investment & Loan, which paid off the Wells Fargo loan. Stevenson defaulted again and filed for bankruptcy. HSBC Bank, as Fremont's successor, sought to enforce its interest in the property through equitable subrogation, claiming the right to stand in Wells Fargo's position.In bankruptcy court, HSBC was found to be the holder of the note and entitled to equitable subrogation for the amount used to pay off the Wells Fargo loan. The federal district court adopted this decision, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that HSBC could enforce its interest despite Fremont's knowledge of Smith's co-ownership and refusal to sign the loan documents.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to HSBC. The court held that Stevenson and Smith were collaterally estopped from relitigating issues decided in federal court, including HSBC's standing and entitlement to equitable subrogation. The court also rejected their Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rescission argument, as it had been previously litigated and decided against them. The court affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that HSBC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

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In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

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Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC (Phoenix Capital) sought to recover mineral royalties as a life tenant and alternatively to reform the deed that established its life estate. The dispute arose from a series of property transfers beginning in 1977, when Mr. and Mrs. Peterson transferred a parcel of real property to Alva and Velma Woods, retaining a life estate in the mineral estate. In 2003, Alva and Velma deeded the property to their son Paul and his wife Cheryl, intending to retain a life estate in the mineral estate. However, the 2003 deed did not reserve this life estate, leading to a 2006 deed that conveyed a life estate in one-half of the mineral estate to Alva and Velma. Subsequent leases were executed, and in 2021, Velma sold her life estate to Phoenix Capital.The District Court of Laramie County dismissed Phoenix Capital’s claims. It concluded that under the doctrine of waste, a life tenant does not have the right to receive royalties unless expressly stated in the deed or agreed upon with the remainderman. The court also found that the claim to reform the deed was barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the deed was recorded in 2006.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the doctrine of waste precludes a life tenant from receiving royalties without an agreement with the remainderman or express language in the deed. The court also held that the statute of limitations for reformation claims begins when the deed is recorded, making Phoenix Capital’s 2022 reformation claim untimely. The court found no error in the district court’s application of settled law and affirmed the dismissal of Phoenix Capital’s claims. View "Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC v. Woods" on Justia Law

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Dylan R. Isham and Billy C. Jack entered into an agreement to exchange Isham’s manufactured home for Jack’s travel trailer, with an option for Jack to purchase a garage attached to the manufactured home for $3,000 by May 11, 2020. Jack declined the option via a message on June 3, 2019, which Isham read but did not respond to. In February 2021, Isham contacted Jack to either receive payment for the garage or remove it, leading to a dispute as Jack had integrated the garage into his home.The District Court for Butler County found in favor of Jack, concluding that Isham had abandoned his rights to the garage by failing to act on them for over 20 months. The court noted that Isham’s lack of communication and actions indicated abandonment, and it would be inequitable to enforce Isham’s right to remove the garage after such a delay. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that Isham had waived his right under the contract and that the district court’s finding of abandonment was not clearly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Jack did not meet the burden of proving abandonment, as mere nonuse and the passage of time are insufficient to establish abandonment without clear and convincing evidence of intent. The court found that Isham’s actions, such as exploring options to move the garage, did not demonstrate an intent to abandon. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to reverse the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings to determine the value of the garage, given its integration into Jack’s home. View "Isham v. Jack" on Justia Law

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Lazy D Grazing Association manages a 25,000-acre ranch along the Colorado-Wyoming border, which lacks sufficient surface water for irrigation. In 2020, Lazy D sought a determination from the water court that the groundwater beneath the ranch in the Upper Laramie Aquifer is nontributary, meaning it is not subject to Colorado's prior appropriation system. This designation would allow Lazy D to control the use of the groundwater. The State Engineer determined that the groundwater was nontributary, prompting opposition from various entities, including the Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins, who feared it would harm their water rights.The District Court for Water Division 1 in Greeley found in favor of Lazy D, determining that the groundwater was nontributary. The Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins appealed, arguing that the State Engineer exceeded his authority, the water court improperly presumed the truth of the State Engineer's findings, and that the court relied on sources not in evidence while discrediting expert testimony without justification.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the State Engineer was within his rights to determine the facts regarding whether the groundwater is nontributary, but the final determination is a mixed question of fact and law for the water court. Although the water court erred in giving a presumption of truth to the State Engineer's legal conclusion, this error was deemed harmless as the water court independently concluded that the groundwater was nontributary. The court also found that the water court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the Cities and did not rely on information outside the record. The water court's reliance on expert testimony was found to be appropriate, and the decision to allow Lazy D to use the nontributary groundwater was upheld. View "City of Sterling v. Lazy D Grazing Association" on Justia Law