Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer began constructing and selling duplex-style condominiums in Bonner County, Idaho, using a standard real estate purchase and sale agreement (PSA) form. The buyers, including a real estate agent and his wife, entered into PSAs for two units, planning to use them as personal and investment properties. The PSAs referenced detailed “Plans and Specifications” for the construction and finishes of the units, but no such documents were attached or ever created. Disputes later arose over the scope and quality of the promised finishes, especially after the developer communicated price increases and clarified the options for base and upgraded finishes. The buyers sued to enforce the contracts and sought specific performance, while the developer counterclaimed for a declaration that the PSAs were invalid due to indefiniteness.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, conducted a bench trial. It found that the PSAs for the disputed units were missing essential material terms, specifically the absent Plans and Specifications, which left the scope of work, finishes, and price adjustments undefined. The court concluded that no enforceable contract was formed and denied the buyers’ request for specific performance. The developer was ordered to return deposits but was deemed the prevailing party, entitling him to attorney fees and costs. The district court also conditioned a stay of its judgment pending appeal on the posting of an additional bond.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the PSAs were invalid and unenforceable because they omitted material terms necessary to define the contractual obligations. The buyers’ challenge to the additional bond was deemed moot given the disposition of the contract claims. The award of attorney fees to the developer was upheld, and the Supreme Court granted him attorney fees and costs for the appeal as the prevailing party. View "SCHUSTER v. MILBRATH" on Justia Law

Marline and Melvin Stein were the beneficial owners of a property in Wilmette, Illinois, held in trust with Chicago Title Land Trust Company as trustee. In June 2011, the Steins executed a promissory note in favor of Sara Watkin, trustee of the Sara Watkin 2000 Revocable Trust, for $150,000, secured by a mortgage on the Wilmette property. The Steins never made any payments. In June 2022, just before the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure, Watkin filed a foreclosure action. Chicago Title moved to dismiss, arguing Watkin had not provided evidence of an acceleration notice. The Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed Watkin’s foreclosure claim without prejudice, and Watkin did not amend her claim.One year after the limitations period lapsed, Chicago Title initiated a quiet title action, seeking to declare Watkin’s mortgage lien void due to the lapse of the statute of limitations. Watkin moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expiration of the limitations period barred only foreclosure, not the existence of the mortgage lien. The circuit court granted Watkin’s motion. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning that the lapse of the limitations period bars enforcement but does not extinguish the underlying obligation or the lien, and cited section 13-116 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a mortgage lien survives for 20 years after the last payment is due.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case. It held that the expiration of the 10-year limitations period for foreclosure actions does not extinguish the mortgage lien, which persists for at least 20 years pursuant to section 13-116, unless released or extended by agreement. The court affirmed the lower courts’ judgments, rejecting the quiet title action and upholding the continued existence of Watkin’s mortgage lien. View "Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. Watkin" on Justia Law

In 2016, a condominium seller was charged $470 by a property management company for preparing and delivering statutorily required disclosure documents related to the sale of his unit. The seller alleged that these fees were excessive and unreasonable, asserting that the management company’s services were of minimal value because the documents were maintained electronically and sellers had already paid for their preparation through association fees. After the seller’s death, the successor trustee continued the action, representing a proposed class of similarly situated condominium sellers.The Circuit Court of Cook County reviewed the seller's second amended complaint, which included claims for violation of the Condominium Property Act, violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act), and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed all but the Consumer Fraud Act claim. Following developments in a related case, Channon v. Westward Management, Inc., the appellate court stayed the appeal. After Channon was decided, holding that section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act does not provide an implied private right of action for sellers against property managers, the circuit court reconsidered and dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act claim. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the statutory amendment clarified the permissible fee and capped it at $475, making the $470 charge not actionable.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the appeal and affirmed the judgments of both the circuit and appellate courts. The court held that the complaint failed to state a legally sufficient claim under the Consumer Fraud Act because the alleged high fee, absent additional evidence of unfair business practices, did not violate public policy or constitute oppression or substantial injury under the Act. The court further noted that the relevant statutory scheme was intended to protect buyers, not sellers, and the legislature had implicitly rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the value and payment for the disclosure services. View "Greenswag v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Following significant property damage due to a rainstorm in January 2023, several local government entities in Merced County, including the City of Merced and a school district, filed suit against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW). They alleged that the CDFW’s restrictions on cleaning and maintaining waterways contributed to flooding that caused the damage. Subsequent to this initial complaint, other parties—including homeowners, businesses, and insurers—filed related actions against CDFW, the City, and the County. These cases were ultimately consolidated in Merced County Superior Court.After consolidation, CDFW became the sole nonresident defendant in the case. In late 2025, CDFW sought to transfer the venue out of Merced County, citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 394 and 397, which generally allow for venue changes to guard against local prejudice in actions involving local government plaintiffs and nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Superior Court of Merced County ruled that venue was proper in Merced County under Government Code section 955.3, which specifically governs actions brought by local agencies against the State of California. The court also found CDFW’s motion untimely.CDFW then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue. The Court of Appeal denied the petition, holding that Government Code section 955.3 expressly provides that such actions may be tried in the county where the local government plaintiff is situated, notwithstanding any other provision of law. The court concluded that section 955.3 supersedes section 394 and that the Attorney General’s ability to seek a venue change under section 397 is limited to a pre-answer motion, which was not made here. The stay previously issued was lifted, and costs were awarded to the real parties in interest. View "Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A landowner sought to establish a private road across a neighboring ranch property to access an isolated parcel it owns, which is largely surrounded by the neighbor’s land. The landowner made unsuccessful attempts to negotiate an easement, then filed a petition under Wyoming’s private road statute to secure access. The parcel in question lacks legally enforceable vehicle access except through the neighbor’s land. Various options for routes, including one passing through public land, were considered, but physical and legal barriers precluded public access.The District Court of Albany County held a bench trial, appointed viewers and appraisers to review potential routes, and ultimately established a private road along the landowner’s proposed route, finding it to be the most reasonable and convenient. The court awarded damages to the neighbor based on a “before and after” appraisal, and imposed several conditions on the private road. The landowner appealed three of those conditions, while the neighbor cross-appealed, challenging the findings of good faith, necessity, route selection, damages, and denial of an agricultural-use-only restriction.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s findings of good faith, necessity, route selection, and damages, as well as its rejection of the agricultural-use-only restriction. The court concluded that the parcel was landlocked and that neither the purported public land route nor alternative bypasses provided legally enforceable access. It found the chosen route was most reasonable and convenient and that damages were properly calculated. However, the Supreme Court reversed two conditions imposed by the district court—specifically, the requirement that the landowner repair any damage regardless of fault, and the restriction on vehicles with more than four axles—because they were not supported by evidence. The remaining challenged condition and the denial of the agricultural-use-only restriction were affirmed. View "Wagonhound Land & Livestock Company, LLC v. Little Medicine Creek Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

The appellant owns a one-story home in Laramie County, Wyoming. In April 2024, the Laramie County Assessor valued her property at $188,822. After the appellant objected, field appraisers inspected the home, which led to a series of adjustments, ultimately lowering the valuation to $164,939. Throughout these valuations, the home’s condition was rated as “average” and its quality as “low.” The appellant contended that her home’s value should be reduced further, citing its age, lack of updates, limited livable space, and certain deficiencies such as a non-livable basement and outdated construction features.Following an appeal by the appellant, the Laramie County Board of Equalization held a contested hearing. The appellant presented evidence including her home’s purchase price, its physical shortcomings, and comparisons to other neighborhood homes. The Board heard testimony from the Assessor regarding the process for property valuation and the guidelines for assigning condition ratings. Despite the field appraisers’ assessment, the County Board, by a 3-2 vote, determined that the condition should be downgraded from “average” to “fair” and remanded the matter to the Assessor for reclassification. The Board based its decision on limited photographic evidence and the appellant’s testimony.The Assessor appealed to the Wyoming State Board of Equalization, which reversed the County Board’s decision, finding it was not supported by substantial evidence. The district court affirmed the State Board. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed only the County Board’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the County Board’s determination to downgrade the property’s condition was not supported by substantial evidence, as the appellant did not present credible evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the Assessor’s valuation. The Supreme Court reversed the County Board’s decision. View "Gummel v. Laramie County Assessor" on Justia Law

Owners of residential property in Indian Wells, California, challenged a city ordinance that placed a 29-night minimum stay requirement on short-term rentals (STRs), effectively banning them. In response to property owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wanted to permit STRs, the city enacted an ordinance allowing CIDs to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, provided certain conditions were met. The plaintiffs, who owned property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID certified an opt-out vote, but the city denied the permit. The plaintiffs argued the opt-out procedure conflicted with California Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, which protects owners from prohibitions on rentals adopted after they acquire title. They also asserted the city had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to private parties.The Superior Court of Riverside County found in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the city’s opt-out procedure was preempted by section 4740 and conflicted with statutory voting requirements for amending CID governing documents. The trial court ruled the city had a duty to issue an STR permit and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The city appealed, arguing that section 4740 was not implicated and the delegation was permissible.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the city’s opt-out provision was not preempted by section 4740, as a vote to opt out did not amend CID governing documents or prohibit rentals, and compliance with both laws was possible. The court further held that the delegation of authority to CID members was constitutional and did not violate due process. It also determined the city had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in enacting the ordinance. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment award of attorney fees, ordering costs in favor of the city. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

A group of preservation organizations challenged a city’s decision to amend its Historic Resources Element by eliminating references to an inventory of historic properties compiled in 1981. This inventory, which had identified over 700 pre-1940 structures deemed to have retained architectural integrity, had previously been recognized by city resolution as listing significant historical examples. Over the years, the city argued the inventory became both outdated and inaccurate, including properties that no longer existed or had been altered, and omitting others. Instead of updating the inventory, the city chose to remove all references to it, expand incentives for its separate, voluntary historic property register, and clarify owner consent as a criterion for that register. The city supported these changes with a negative declaration, concluding there would be no significant adverse impact on historic properties.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by the plaintiffs, who argued that an environmental impact report was required before amending the element. The trial court found that the inventory properties were presumptively protected under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) but concluded that the city had shown the inventory as a whole was ineffective due to its inaccuracies. The court therefore denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, disagreed with the trial court’s analysis. It held that properties on a city-recognized inventory are presumptively historical resources under CEQA and that rebutting this presumption requires an individualized determination that each property lacks historical significance, rather than a blanket finding that the inventory is outdated or flawed. The court found that the city’s amendment, by eliminating CEQA protections for all inventory properties without such analysis, was invalid and likely to have a significant adverse environmental effect. The appellate court reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to set aside the city’s approvals pending appropriate CEQA review. View "Laguna Beach Historic Pres. Coalition v. City of Laguna Beach" on Justia Law

A town and its select board challenged a state law enacted to address the Massachusetts housing crisis. The law requires municipalities served by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to have at least one district where multifamily housing is permitted as of right. The town attempted to adopt compliant zoning amendments, but town meeting voters rejected these proposals. The select board subsequently decided not to pursue further compliance steps. After being notified by the state agency responsible that it was noncompliant and at risk of losing state grant funding, the town and board filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.The action was filed in the Superior Court Department. The Commonwealth and the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate or unlawfully interfered with the town’s zoning authority. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the dismissal. It held that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate because the costs described were either incidental local administration expenses or voluntarily incurred. The Court also held that the town and board lacked standing to assert constitutional voting rights claims on behalf of town meeting voters. Addressing the public importance of the issue, the Court concluded that the law is a valid general law and does not violate the Home Rule Amendment or conflict with the Zoning Act. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Marshfield v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law