Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A mortgage issuer, Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC (RMF), participated in a federal program allowing it to securitize reverse mortgages. When RMF entered bankruptcy, Texas Capital Bank provided debtor-in-possession financing, secured by RMF’s interests in certain collateral, specifically incremental balances on the mortgages known as “tails.” After RMF defaulted on its agreement, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), under its statutory and contractual authority, extinguished RMF’s interests in the underlying mortgages and assumed ownership of the loans, also extinguishing Texas Capital’s lien interest in the mortgage tails. Texas Capital argued that Ginnie Mae’s actions violated federal law and Texas tort law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially allowed Texas Capital’s claims for statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and tortious interference to proceed, but dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to sovereign immunity. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Ginnie Mae, finding it acted within its statutory authority and concluding that the extinguishment of RMF’s interests necessarily eliminated Texas Capital’s derivative interest in the mortgage tails. The court also dismissed Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim, citing sovereign immunity and a lack of legal basis, and refused to consider Texas Capital’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory because it was not sufficiently pled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Ginnie Mae acted within its statutory and contractual authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g)(1) in extinguishing both RMF’s and Texas Capital’s interests in the mortgages. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim barred by sovereign immunity and ruling that Texas Capital’s failure to plead an arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory justified the district court’s refusal to consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Texas Captl Bank v. Govt Natl Mtge" on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired real property via a tax deed after the previous owner, a limited liability company, failed to pay property taxes. The property had originally been purchased by two individuals who later transferred ownership to the LLC. When the LLC did not pay taxes for 2015, the county sold the property at a tax sale, with the plaintiff eventually purchasing the tax certificate and being assigned it in 2020. The plaintiff attempted to serve notice of intent to take a tax deed on the LLC at multiple addresses and ultimately provided the notice to the Minnesota Secretary of State, which accepted service as the LLC’s registered agent. The LLC did not redeem the property, and the county issued a tax deed to the plaintiff.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the tax deed was void because notice was not personally served on the LLC. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota previously reversed that decision in Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, holding that service on the Secretary of State constituted personal service. On remand, the plaintiff sought an order quieting title, but the circuit court denied this, later granting the defendants’ motion to make redemption and ordering the county to issue a certificate of redemption to the defendants. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the defendants were entitled to redeem the property. The Court held that the plaintiff properly acquired the tax deed under SDCL chapter 10-25 and followed the statutory procedure for quieting title under SDCL chapter 21-41. Because the LLC, the owner of record, did not timely redeem, the plaintiff owns the property in fee. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order granting redemption to the defendants and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including a residents association, an affordable housing advocacy group, and several former residents, challenged actions taken by the City of Stanton over approximately 17 years regarding a low-income neighborhood comprised of fourplexes. The City gradually acquired most of the properties using redevelopment funds, allowed units to deteriorate and become uninhabitable, left many vacant units unrented, and demolished several fourplexes, which effectively removed substantial low-income housing from the market. Despite plans for redevelopment and affordable housing construction, little progress was made, and the City failed to replace demolished units or update relocation plans for displaced residents.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of San Diego County. Plaintiffs filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the City violated statutory obligations by not adopting a replacement housing plan, failing to provide replacement housing, and neglecting to adopt or update a relocation plan. The defendants demurred, claiming the petition was uncertain and insufficiently pled. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, citing ambiguity and failure to identify actions triggering statutory duties.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the petition was not uncertain and that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action under the Community Redevelopment Law and the California Relocation Assistance Act. Specifically, the court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged violations for not adopting a replacement housing plan, not providing replacement housing within statutory periods, and not maintaining a compliant relocation plan. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrer. View "Tina-Pacific Residents Assn. v. City of Stanton" on Justia Law

Three adjacent residential parcels in Los Gatos were subject to a lot line adjustment application in 2023, submitted by the owners’ architect. One parcel had an existing house, while two were unimproved and nonconforming with zoning requirements. The adjustment sought to resolve nonconformities, including minimum lot size and street frontage. As a condition, the Town required an offer of dedication for a cul-de-sac easement to provide new access and satisfy frontage requirements. The Town accepted this dedication, resulting in a mapped cul-de-sac extension.The Town’s development review commission approved the adjustment, and subsequent appeals by an adjacent homeowner, Alison Steer, were denied by the planning commission and Town Council. Steer argued the approval was discretionary, not ministerial, due to the Town’s acceptance of the dedication, which she claimed triggered the need for environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Town filed a notice of exemption, stating the approval was ministerial and thus exempt from CEQA. Steer then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, alleging CEQA violations. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the dedication was for zoning compliance and the Town lacked discretion to refuse it, making the approval ministerial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while lot line adjustments are typically ministerial, this approval included a discretionary element—the Town’s acceptance of the property dedication for the cul-de-sac. The court found that the Town had discretion to accept, modify, or reject the dedication, which made the project discretionary for CEQA purposes. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, concluding the Town violated CEQA by relying on the ministerial exemption. View "Steer v. Town of Los Gatos" on Justia Law

BBC, LLC, contracted Germer Construction, Inc. to provide construction services for a subdivision development. A dispute arose regarding the amount owed, leading to arbitration as required by contract. The arbitrator awarded Germer nearly $1,000,000, including costs and fees. BBC sought a court order to vacate the arbitration award, while Germer requested confirmation of the award and entry of judgment. Germer also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming BBC was dissipating assets. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order restricting BBC’s asset transfers. At a hearing, the district court required BBC to post a $1,000,000 surety bond and Germer a $250,000 bond, characterizing them as “equivalent” to supersedeas bonds, then dissolved the restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive relief.BBC petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for writs of prohibition or mandamus to vacate the district court’s order and prohibit further pre-judgment asset restrictions, arguing the district court lacked authority to require the bond or injunctive relief solely to secure a potential monetary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and sought briefing from Germer and the Attorney General.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court exceeded its authority by requiring BBC to post a surety bond to secure a potential money judgment for an unsecured debt. The court found no rule, statute, or inherent equitable power authorizing such relief in this context. The court issued a writ of review, vacating the district court’s order, including both bond requirements. BBC was found to have no adequate, speedy remedy at law, and the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus were denied. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

ACC OP (Oxford, Mississippi), LLC owns a student-housing property in Oxford, Mississippi. For the 2021 and 2022 tax years, the Lafayette County Tax Assessor appraised and the Board of Supervisors approved the property's value at approximately $21.3 million. ACC believed the property was overvalued by $8–9 million and objected in writing to the Board's assessments, submitting documentation as required. Prior to the Board hearing, the Tax Assessor, through her office, requested additional documents via a form referencing Mississippi Code Section 27-1-23 and directed submission to the Assessor’s Office, not the Board. ACC responded to each item, explaining that some requested documents did not exist, and submitted others.The Board denied ACC’s objections, citing ACC’s failure to submit “required documentation” and, for 2021, also referencing ACC’s absence at the Board meeting. ACC appealed both denials to the Lafayette County Circuit Court, which consolidated the appeals. After extensive litigation, the County moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that ACC’s noncompliance with document requests barred the circuit court’s jurisdiction under Mississippi Code Section 27-35-97. The circuit court denied the motions, finding that Section 27-35-97’s preclusion applies only to a demand from the Board, not the Tax Assessor, and that ACC had complied with the written objection requirement.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the County’s motions to dismiss de novo. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Assessor’s document request was an informal request under Section 27-1-23, not a Board demand under Section 27-35-97, and thus carried no penalty for preclusion. The Board itself never made a demand for documents, and ACC satisfied the written objection requirement under Section 27-35-93. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lafayette County Board of Supervisors v. ACC OP" on Justia Law

The case concerns several quarry operations in Chester, Vermont. Chandler Quarry, operated on an eight-and-a-half-acre parcel, had been exempt from Vermont’s Act 250 land use permitting requirements since its operations predated the Act’s passage in 1970. In 2018, a landowner acquired Chandler Quarry, as well as North and South Quarries located nearby. The landowner then began coordinating operations across all three quarries, including processing stone from North and South at Chandler Quarry and constructing a new building to house processing equipment. This expanded activity increased quarrying, noise, and traffic, resulting in complaints from neighboring landowners.Following these complaints, the District 2 Environmental Commission issued a jurisdictional opinion in 2023, determining that Chandler Quarry’s integration into the larger quarry operation constituted a substantial change, subjecting it to Act 250 permitting requirements. The landowner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which, in March 2024, affirmed that Chandler Quarry’s coordinated operation with the other quarries triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. Afterward, the Land Use Review Board (LURB) issued an administrative order in June 2025, imposing a civil penalty and a stop-work order, requiring cessation of Chandler Quarry operations until appropriate permits were obtained. The landowner requested a merits hearing, during which it was shown that Chandler Quarry operations had been reduced to pre-2018 levels and decoupled from North and South Quarries.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that Chandler Quarry remains subject to Act 250 jurisdiction, despite the reduction of operations, because the expanded, unpermitted commercial activity persisted for years and caused lasting environmental impacts. The Court distinguished this case from In re Audet, finding that the landowner’s sustained jurisdiction-triggering activities could not be undone simply by reverting to previous operational levels. The Court also held that the Environmental Division’s affirmation of the stop-work order was not an abuse of discretion, as the Division reasonably considered statutory factors, including economic effects on employees. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "Land Use Review Board v. 3643 VT Route 103, N, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights.Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners regarding an express easement for ingress and egress known as Canyon Creek Lane in Butte County, South Dakota. The express easement was created as part of a property sale and recorded, obligating each owner to contribute to maintenance costs. Tanya Lorenz acquired one of the parcels benefiting from the easement but later constructed her own driveway with direct access to Highway 34. Plaintiffs alleged that Tanya’s easement rights should be extinguished due to abandonment and lack of necessity, pointing to her nonuse, installation of a gate, lack of maintenance contributions, and creation of a new access. They also alleged nuisance conduct by Tanya.In the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their claims, finding Tanya had abandoned the easement and that it was extinguished due to lack of necessity. The court also found Tanya’s conduct constituted a nuisance, but did not award damages for that claim. At trial, the court determined Tanya was responsible for nine years of maintenance costs for the easement and awarded Plaintiffs $6,750 in damages. Tanya appealed the summary judgment and damages award.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that summary judgment on abandonment was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding Tanya’s intent and use of the easement. The Court also reversed the extinguishment of the easement for lack of necessity, noting that such a condition does not apply to express easements unless specified in the agreement. Summary judgment on the nuisance claim was also reversed due to insufficient evidence of substantial or unreasonable interference. The Court affirmed the award of damages for maintenance costs and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maher v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on real property originally acquired by John and Constance Clark as part of a family farming operation. In 1988, two parcels were conveyed to their son, Jay Clark, who subsequently transferred the properties to Clover Hollow Farms, Inc., a corporation formed shortly before the conveyance with John Clark as its sole shareholder. Jay Clark served as vice-president and director of Clover Hollow. According to Jay Clark, his parents promised that Clover Hollow would hold the property in trust for him as a premarital asset, to be returned upon demand or subject to his exclusive control. Years later, Jay Clark assigned his interests in one of the properties to C & H Properties, LLC, operated by his children.After John Clark was placed under a conservatorship, the conservator, Judith Appleby, adopted corporate resolutions nullifying Jay Clark’s authority and authorizing the corporation to join litigation seeking a declaration that Jay Clark had no interest in the corporate stock, real property, or tangible property. Jay Clark filed counterclaims challenging the validity of these resolutions and seeking to regain title to the properties. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, granted summary judgment to the Estates and Clover Hollow. It ruled that judicial estoppel barred Jay Clark’s claims due to his failure to disclose the properties in bankruptcy and found that his claims under constructive trust, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the corporate resolutions enacted by Appleby.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Ms. Appleby, as executor, lacked authority under Clover Hollow’s bylaws and the Idaho Business Corporation Act to convene a special shareholder meeting and enact corporate resolutions, rendering those actions invalid. Consequently, Clover Hollow was never properly joined in the litigation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Jay Clark’s sixth counterclaim, and remanded the case with instructions to allow reasonable time for proper joinder of Clover Hollow as a party. View "Estate of Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law