Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After the foreclosure sale of a residential property in Charles Town, West Virginia, the purchasers sought to evict the previous owners, who had defaulted on their mortgage. The former owners responded by filing counterclaims and third-party claims against the mortgage servicing company and others, alleging breach of contract, tortious conduct, and violations of West Virginia’s consumer protection laws. The litigation centered on whether the mortgage servicer had properly handled a payment intended to cure the default: the former owners claimed they mailed a cashier’s check that was delivered before the sale, but were repeatedly told by customer service representatives that the check had not been received. The dispute focused on what actually happened to the payment and what representations were made by the servicer’s employees.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County initially denied the mortgage servicer’s request for a protective order and granted the former owners’ motion to compel depositions of two customer service employees located outside the United States. The circuit court determined these individuals were “managing agents” because they made decisions regarding the disputed payment and its investigation, thus subject to deposition upon notice alone. PHH Mortgage Corporation argued that international procedures, such as those in the Hague Convention, were required and that the depositions would be unduly burdensome and duplicative.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the petition for a writ of prohibition. The court held that, under West Virginia’s procedural rules, a corporate party’s managing agents located outside the United States may be deposed upon notice alone, without resort to international procedures. It clarified the factors courts should consider in determining “managing agent” status. Finding no clear legal error or abuse of discretion by the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Appeals denied the requested writ of prohibition and upheld the circuit court’s discovery order. View "State ex rel. PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Hammer" on Justia Law

A property owner in rural Teton County, Idaho, brought a suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding responsibility for snow removal and maintenance costs for a segment of East 5250 South, a road providing access to several properties, including his own. The dispute centered on whether the Overlook at Fox Creek Subdivision Owners’ Association (HOA), the developer GNJ Properties, LLC, and various individual property owners were obligated to share or bear maintenance costs for the road. The owner argued that either the HOA was solely responsible under subdivision covenants or, alternatively, all property owners using the road should equitably share the costs. For years, he had paid these costs himself, despite demand letters sent to the HOA and neighbors.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Teton County, initially dismissed the owner's complaint, concluding he lacked standing because he was not in privity of contract with the HOA or GNJ under the subdivision’s covenants or the development agreement. The court also granted summary judgment for the respondents on their counterclaims, finding insufficient evidence that the disputed road segment was within the subdivision and thus not subject to the HOA’s maintenance obligations. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees and costs to the respondents.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case de novo. It held that the district court erred by failing to address the owner’s alternative equitable claims and by prematurely dismissing his complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found unresolved factual issues regarding the road’s location relative to subdivision boundaries, making summary judgment improper. The court reversed the dismissal and summary judgment, vacated the attorney fee awards, and remanded for further proceedings to resolve these factual and legal determinations. The respondents’ request for attorney fees on appeal was denied. View "Colton v. The Overlook at Fox Creek Subdivision " on Justia Law

A homeowner in Meridian, Idaho, rented space on his property to the owner of a mobile tiny home, which was certified as a recreational vehicle and hooked up to utilities. Shortly after the tiny home was installed, a neighbor complained to the city’s code enforcement office. The city investigated both the property with the tiny home and another nearby property, determining that the tiny homes violated city ordinances because they were not affixed to improved foundations and were being used as residences outside of approved RV parks. The city issued notices of violation and orders to abate. The property owner erected a privacy fence and claimed the tiny home was vacated, but city officials remained unconvinced.The property owner and the tiny home’s owner filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho, Ada County. Their amended complaint challenged several city code provisions on substantive due process grounds and alleged selective enforcement under the Idaho Constitution’s equal protection clause. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the substantive due process claims as moot, finding that even if some ordinances were unconstitutional, the plaintiffs would still be denied a permit due to the unified ownership requirement. It also dismissed the selective enforcement claim with prejudice, finding no disparate treatment as enforcement was triggered by a neighbor's formal complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the substantive due process claims, but on ripeness grounds rather than mootness, holding that the plaintiffs’ pre-application challenge was too speculative for judicial review since they had not actually applied for a permit. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim, finding substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that enforcement was based on a formal complaint rather than unconstitutional selective enforcement. Costs were awarded to the city. View "Decker v. City of Meridian" on Justia Law

During the summer of 2018, housing advocates interacted with tenants at the Yale Park Apartment Complex in Omaha, documenting alleged building code violations and submitting complaints to the City. Based largely on this information, the City’s Chief Housing Inspector applied for and received an inspection warrant. Subsequent searches led to the closure of the complex, and tenants were forced to relocate. The City later provided AB Realty, LLC—the owner—and Kay and Janae Anderson with a list of violations and barred reopening until repairs were made. AB Realty attempted to challenge the closure through the Property Management Appeals Board and faced ongoing notices and prosecution for code violations. After completing repairs and reopening the complex in 2021, AB Realty and the Andersons initiated a lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and stayed proceedings pending the outcome of Kay Anderson’s criminal trial. After a state-court jury convicted Kay on a few counts but acquitted him of most, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against the City of Omaha and associated defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the search warrant, even excluding disputed information, was supported by probable cause based on the complaints and evidence of violations. It further determined that violations of Nebraska state law regarding warrants did not sustain a federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also found AB Realty’s procedural due process allegations insufficiently specific to identify constitutionally protected interests or responsible parties. Finally, the court ruled that AB Realty failed to plead either a per se or regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment, as the City did not physically appropriate the property and the closure for code violations did not constitute a regulatory taking. All claims against all defendants were dismissed. View "AB Realty, LLC v. Lane" on Justia Law

A man and a woman jointly purchased a house in Iowa, taking title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The man alone signed the promissory note for a loan from Wells Fargo to finance the purchase, but both he and the woman signed the mortgage as “Borrower.” The mortgage explicitly listed both as “Borrower” and obligated them to make payments but stated that only the person who signed the note had personal liability; the woman, who did not sign the note, was not personally liable for repayment. After the man moved out, the woman remained in the house, which was her homestead. When the loan went into default, Wells Fargo sent a notice of right to cure only to the man at both his old and new addresses, but sent no notice to the woman. The woman later asserted that, had she received such a notice, she could have cured the default.The foreclosure action was filed in the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County against both parties. The district court granted summary judgment for the lender, holding that the woman was not a “borrower” under Iowa Code section 654.2D because she did not sign the note and therefore was not entitled to notice of her right to cure. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed on the same basis.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a part-owner and resident of a homestead who signs the mortgage as “borrower,” even if not personally liable on the note, is a “borrower on a mortgage” under Iowa Code section 654.2D and is therefore entitled to notice of the right to cure before foreclosure. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newrez LLC v.McMillen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into an oral lease agreement with the defendant for the rental of a dump trailer for seven days at a flat rate. During the lease period, the plaintiff was arrested while using the trailer, and the trailer was impounded by law enforcement. The defendant retrieved the trailer from the impound lot before the lease term ended. The plaintiff was released from custody before the lease expired and alleged that the defendant breached the contract by repossessing the trailer early and converted his property contained in the trailer, which he claimed to be valuable.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Muddy Boyz Drywall LLC, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the alleged breach of contract and conversion. After procedural steps involving the dismissal of counterclaims and certification under Rule 54(b), the plaintiff appealed the certified judgment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the terms of the oral contract, whether its conditions were breached, whether the defendant’s performance was rendered impossible, and whether the plaintiff suffered damages. The Court also found that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged a conversion claim and that factual disputes existed regarding ownership, value, and the defendant’s disposal of the plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Gum v. Muddy Boyz Drywall" on Justia Law

A family dispute arose after the deaths of William and Elaine Stramer, who had five children and owned farmland in North Dakota. Their 2013 wills gave Douglas the option to purchase the farmyard around his house and Todd the option to purchase the remaining farmland for $100 per acre within one year of the surviving spouse’s death, provided Todd moved back to North Dakota and “actively farmed” the land. After William died in 2015, various trusts were created to hold the land, with Todd named as trustee. Elaine died in 2022, and Todd became personal representative of her estate. Subsequently, Douglas and Ann filed actions challenging Todd’s management and the exercise of the purchase options.The District Court of Emmons County consolidated the cases and conducted a bench trial. The court found the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust void due to lack of capacity. It determined Douglas’s option encompassed 25 acres as identified in a 2014 plat, while finding Todd had not “actively farmed” and therefore did not validly exercise his purchase option. The court invalidated Todd’s self-executed contracts for deed, removed him as trustee and personal representative, and appointed Steve Stramer instead. The court declined to award damages for Todd’s use and possession of the farm from 2023 to 2025, citing insufficient information.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the district court did not err in finding Todd had not actively farmed the land within the meaning of the will, nor in removing Todd from his fiduciary roles. However, it concluded the district court erred in finding Douglas’s option included 25 acres, holding instead that it should be limited to 5.96 acres identified as the farmyard. The Court also held that the district court misapplied the law on damages and remanded for a determination of damages for Todd’s wrongful occupation of the farm. View "Stramer v. Stramer" on Justia Law

Derek and Keisha Hall hired Jose Silva to construct their new home and financed the project through Priority One Bank, where Harvey Lott served as the loan officer. The Halls later discovered construction defects and alleged that Silva, Lott, and the bank engaged in a secret arrangement for personal profit, including unauthorized loan disbursements and a failure to conduct proper inspections. The Halls also claimed Silva lacked a contractor’s license and that the relationship between Silva and Lott involved improper payments. Both Lott and the bank denied these allegations, asserting that bank inspections were for their own benefit and that loan advances sometimes occurred before work was completed, in line with their agreement.The Halls brought several claims against the bank, Lott, and Silva in the Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court, including breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy. In response, the bank and Lott sought summary judgment, but the circuit court denied their motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained. Subsequently, the Halls moved to strike a provision in the loan agreement, arguing it was unconscionable and deprived them of legal remedies. The circuit court granted this motion, holding the provision was void, invalid, and unconscionable.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the Halls’ “Motion to Strike Contract Provision” was not an appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge the enforceability of a contract provision, as motions to strike under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) are limited to pleadings, not contract clauses. The court reversed the circuit court’s order striking the provision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that any challenge to the provision’s enforceability must follow the proper procedures for dispositive motions. View "Priority One Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

A property once owned by the Vinings in Ravalli County, Montana, had two groundwater wells historically used for commercial beaver pens, with statements of claim filed in 1982. The property also included a pond not originally specified in the water rights claims. After the mid-1990s, the Vinings discontinued use of the wells for beaver pens, instead using the water for irrigation and livestock, without obtaining the required authorization to change the beneficial use. In 2020, YC Properties, LLC acquired the property and associated water rights. In 2023, YC Properties sought to amend the claims to include the historic pond, prompting objections from neighboring landowners who argued the water rights had been abandoned.The Montana Water Court consolidated the claims and, after motions from both sides, granted summary judgment to the objectors. The Water Court determined that use of the water for irrigation and livestock by the Vinings and YC Properties, instead of the claimed commercial beaver pen use, constituted unauthorized use. The Water Court concluded that the long period of unauthorized use was the functional equivalent of non-use and intent to abandon, thus triggering a presumption of abandonment. The court found YC Properties failed to rebut this presumption and dismissed the water rights claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the Water Court erred in its abandonment analysis. The Supreme Court held that while post-1973 conduct could be considered in abandonment determinations, unauthorized water use is not per se equivalent to intent to abandon under Montana’s common law. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that abandonment is a factual question requiring consideration of all circumstances, including whether water was continuously put to beneficial use, even if unauthorized. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. View "YC Properties v. Connolly" on Justia Law

A group of local United Methodist churches, through their trustees, sought to disaffiliate from the United Methodist Church while retaining ownership of their church property. This dispute arose amid a broader doctrinal disagreement within the denomination, particularly regarding the ordination of homosexual clergy and performance of same-sex weddings. The Conference, representing the denomination’s regional authority, asserted that church property was held in trust for the benefit of the entire denomination and could not be retained by a local church upon disaffiliation except as authorized by church law. The local churches alleged that the Conference engaged in fraudulent and collusive conduct, including misrepresentations about the procedures and timing for lawful disaffiliation, which caused them to miss the window for disaffiliation with property under denominational rules.The Circuit Court of Mercer County initially dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine since the dispute required interpretation of church doctrine and governance—a matter reserved for the church’s highest tribunals. The court found that the allegations of fraud and collusion did not pertain to the procurement of a final ecclesiastical adjudication. However, following a Rule 59(e) motion by the local churches, a different judge vacated the prior dismissal, determining that the allegations of fraud and collusion raised factual questions for a jury and reopened the case.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of prohibition. The court held that constitutional limitations under the First Amendment and the West Virginia Constitution prevented civil courts from adjudicating disputes involving church doctrine, discipline, or governance. The court further clarified that the fraud or collusion exception only applies if such conduct procured a final ecclesiastical adjudication, which was not alleged here. The writ of prohibition was granted, barring enforcement of the order reopening the case, and reaffirming the circuit court’s lack of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Trustees of the West Virginia Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Wills" on Justia Law