Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A buyer entered into a contract to purchase a cranberry bog property that was assessed and taxed as agricultural land under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 61A. The contract acknowledged that the sale was contingent on the town’s waiver of its statutory right of first refusal. The buyer informed the seller that it intended to subdivide two lots for non-agricultural use and keep the rest agricultural. This intended use was incorporated into the notice of intent to sell, which was sent to the town as required. Later, the buyer changed its position and stated it intended to maintain the property for agricultural use, and together with the seller, attempted to withdraw the notice of intent. However, the town declined the withdrawal and exercised its option to purchase the property through its affordable housing trust.The Superior Court reviewed cross motions for summary judgment. The judge found that the notice of intent sufficiently triggered the town’s right of first refusal and that the town’s right ripened into an irrevocable option, precluding withdrawal of the notice. Judgment was entered against the buyer, who then appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court for review.The Supreme Judicial Court held that the notice of intent to sell, which stated an intention to subdivide two lots for non-agricultural use, was sufficient under chapter 61A to trigger the town’s right of first refusal. The Court ruled that the town’s option to purchase vested upon receipt of the notice and could not be withdrawn by the seller and buyer. Additionally, the town’s option applied to the entire parcel as described in the purchase and sale agreement, not just the subdivided lots. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Watermark LLC v. R H Benea Cranberry Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns landowners whose property in Harris County, Texas, was condemned by the State for a highway project. After initially offering compensation, the State initiated condemnation proceedings, and the parties settled on a value for the property. Years later, the planned highway route was altered, leaving a portion of the condemned land unused. When the State indicated that some of the property was now considered surplus but refused to sell it back, the landowners assigned their rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, to pursue a statutory right of repurchase under Texas law.JRJ filed suit in a Harris County civil court at law against the State of Texas and the Director of Right of Way, asserting a statutory right to repurchase the surplus property. The State responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign immunity and lack of justiciability. The trial court granted the State’s plea and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed the dismissal as to the repurchase claim, holding that the State’s sovereign immunity was waived for such claims, that the property had been acquired “through eminent domain,” and that the county court at law had jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. It held that the State is not immune from statutory repurchase claims arising under Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code when condemned property is no longer necessary for public use. The court clarified that property acquired through a condemnation suit, even if settled before judgment, is acquired “through eminent domain.” It also held that a landowner may repurchase only the portion of property no longer necessary for public use and that county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction over these claims. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "THE STATE OF TEXAS v. JRJ PUSOK HOLDINGS, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of developers and the City of Des Moines entered into a development agreement for a multi-use project in downtown Des Moines, including a parking garage, a residential tower, and a theater. The project was delayed multiple times due to issues with property title, design changes, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The developers notified the City of enforced delays under the agreement’s force majeure clause. Despite ongoing negotiations for contract amendments, the City issued default notices in June 2020 for failure to meet construction deadlines, which caused the project's lender to initiate foreclosure. The City later purchased the garage at foreclosure, extinguishing the developers’ debt but preventing them from completing the project and realizing contractual gains.The Iowa District Court for Polk County found the City breached the development agreement by issuing default notices without providing the required opportunity to cure and during an enforceable pandemic-related delay. The court awarded the developers over $4.3 million in damages for lost contractual benefits. The court also found the City liable for tortious interference with the developers’ loan agreement but denied other claims by both sides, including additional damages sought by the developers and fraud and unjust enrichment claims by the City.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case for errors at law. It affirmed the district court’s finding that the City, not the developers, breached the agreement, upholding the damages award for breach of contract. However, it reversed the judgment against the City for tortious interference with contract, holding that a breach of contract alone, without additional improper conduct, does not support such a tort claim. The court affirmed the denial of all additional damages sought by the developers and rejected the City’s arguments for immunity, damages limitations, and reclaiming property titles. The developers’ cross-appeal was denied. View "5th and Walnut Parking, LLC v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over a 1.5-acre tract of land in Lafayette County, Mississippi, after Beulah Belcher claimed ownership based on a deed from her parents in 1984. The deed’s legal description did not match the land Belcher and her family occupied, but she believed she owned the tract. Belcher’s sisters, Bessie Jones and Cora Jenkins, lived on the property at various times with her permission, sometimes paying rent or making payments related to mobile homes situated there. In 2001, John Ashford Sr. executed a quitclaim deed purporting to convey the disputed tract to Bessie, which later led to competing claims between Belcher and the Ashford family after Bessie conveyed the property back to Ashford Sr. in 2012. Both Belcher and Bessie used the land as collateral and paid taxes on it at different times.The Lafayette County Chancery Court heard the case and found that Belcher’s permission for her sister to live on the property precluded Bessie from acquiring title through adverse possession. The court determined that Bessie’s occupancy was always with Belcher’s consent, and there was insufficient evidence to show that Bessie ever possessed the land in a manner hostile to Belcher’s ownership.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the Chancery Court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that permission given by Belcher prevented Bessie from meeting the requirements for adverse possession under Mississippi law. It also concluded that Bessie did not adversely possess the property from 2001 to 2012, as any potential hostility was dispelled when Belcher allowed her to remain after a brief dispute. The judgment of the Lafayette County Chancery Court was affirmed. View "Ashford v. Belcher" on Justia Law

A Virginia-based partnership owned a property in the District of Columbia. In 2002, this partnership and a limited liability company (LLC), both related entities, executed a merger under Virginia law, with the LLC surviving and acquiring the property. The merger documents referenced Virginia statutes governing mergers, and the transaction resulted in the property being transferred from the partnership to the LLC. No deed was recorded at the time, and no recordation or transfer taxes were paid.In 2019, when the LLC sought to sell the property, it attempted to record a deed reflecting the 2002 transfer as a no-consideration event, claiming the transaction was a non-taxable conversion rather than a taxable merger. The Recorder of Deeds (ROD) determined the 2002 transaction was a merger, requiring payment of recordation and transfer taxes based on the property’s 2019 fair market value, since no consideration was paid. LHL, the taxpayer, paid the taxes under protest and pursued an administrative refund, which was denied. The taxpayer then challenged the decision in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, finding the transfer was a taxable merger, not a conversion, and upholding the calculation of taxes based on the 2019 value. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the 2002 transaction was a merger between two distinct entities, making the property transfer taxable, and that taxes on no- or nominal-consideration transfers are properly based on the property’s fair market value at the time of recordation. The court also upheld the trial court’s finding of excusable neglect regarding the District’s untimely filing of its answer. View "LHL Realty Company DC LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Andrea Dale Dye was named as a defendant in a timber trespass lawsuit after her neighbors, the Bradleys, discovered in 2017 that timber had been removed from their property. Ms. Dye had previously entered into a contract in 2016 with Jones Hauling, allowing them to remove timber from her property, but the Bradleys alleged that their property was wrongfully timbered as a result. The Bradleys sought damages against Ms. Dye and others, including claims for treble damages. Ms. Dye was insured by Farmers & Mechanics Mutual Insurance Company of West Virginia (F&M), which defended her under a reservation of rights while seeking a judicial declaration on whether coverage was owed under the policy.The Circuit Court of Marion County granted summary judgment in favor of F&M, finding that an exclusion in the homeowner’s policy precluded coverage for Ms. Dye. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, agreeing that the policy’s business exclusion barred coverage, though it did so based on a different portion of the exclusion than the circuit court. The lower courts also rejected Ms. Dye’s claims that F&M had waived or was estopped from asserting coverage defenses, finding no evidence of intentional relinquishment or detrimental reliance.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals. The court held that the “business” exclusion in the insurance policy applied to exclude coverage for the timbering activities, even though the business was conducted by a third party from Ms. Dye’s property. The court also held that neither waiver nor estoppel could operate to create coverage where none existed under the clear policy terms, and found no bad faith by the insurer that would warrant an exception to this rule. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment in favor of F&M. View "Daye v. Farmers & Mechanics Mutual Insurance Company of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord leased an apartment to the defendant tenant, offering a discounted rent with the understanding that the rent would increase after the first year. As the renewal approached, the landlord sought to raise the rent to the higher amount. The tenant filed a complaint with the Hartford Fair Rent Commission, alleging the increase was excessive. While the commission’s review was pending, the landlord attempted to collect the increased rent and, when the tenant continued paying the lower amount, initiated eviction proceedings for nonpayment. The commission ultimately ruled in the tenant’s favor, finding the increase unfair and that the eviction attempt was retaliatory. The commission ordered the landlord to maintain the lower rent and to cease and desist from the eviction.After the commission’s decision, the landlord began a summary process (eviction) action in the Superior Court and also filed an administrative appeal challenging the commission’s ruling. In the summary process action, the tenant raised defenses of retaliation and sought dismissal based on the commission’s order. The trial court, Housing Session of the Superior Court in Hartford, granted the tenant’s motion to stay the eviction action pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The landlord’s motion to reconsider was denied, prompting an interlocutory appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, certified as a matter of substantial public interest.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court had inherent authority to stay the summary process action, despite the expedited nature of such proceedings, because the commission’s findings about the proper rent and retaliation could directly affect the merits of the eviction case. The court concluded that the trial judge properly balanced the interests of both parties, the commission, and judicial efficiency, and did not abuse its discretion in granting the stay. The Supreme Court affirmed the stay order and declined to address the landlord’s constitutional challenges and other issues not yet decided by the trial court. View "TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez" on Justia Law

Eric A. Wolfe and Brenda G. Wolfe, a married couple, acquired Lot 3, Lost Wells Butte Filing No. 1, in Fremont County, Wyoming, through a contract for deed. After the seller died without transferring title and with no probate estate opened, the Wolfes initiated a quiet title action in 2012. The district court issued a Judgment and Decree Quieting Title, naming them "husband and wife" and confirming their ownership of Lot 3, free of any claims from the seller’s heirs. Mr. Wolfe later passed away in January 2025, after which Mrs. Wolfe filed an affidavit asserting sole ownership of Lot 3 as a surviving tenant by the entirety.Ms. Lewis, their daughter, filed a declaratory judgment action in May 2025, claiming the 2012 judgment created a tenancy in common, not a tenancy by the entirety, and that Mr. Wolfe’s share should pass to his estate. Mrs. Wolfe moved to dismiss, arguing that Wyoming law presumes a conveyance to “husband and wife” creates a tenancy by the entirety, and that the statutory and common law requirements were met. The District Court of Fremont County found the judgment was a conveyance under Wyoming Statute § 34-1-102 and, applying § 34-1-140(b), held that the language “husband and wife” established a tenancy by the entirety. The court dismissed Ms. Lewis’s complaint.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the dismissal de novo. It concluded that the law in effect in 2012, as clarified in subsequent statutes and prior Wyoming decisions, recognized a presumption that a conveyance to “husband and wife” creates a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified. The Court held that the Judgment and Decree Quieting Title manifested intent to create a tenancy by the entirety, making Mrs. Wolfe sole owner upon Mr. Wolfe’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Lewis’s complaint. View "Lewis v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The case concerns the sale of a manufactured housing community in Bourne, Massachusetts, owned by the Charles W. Austin Trust. The trust entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Crown Communities, LLC for $3.8 million, subject to the statutory right of first refusal afforded to resident tenants under the Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, § 32R. After receiving notice of the pending sale, a group of residents formed an association and submitted a signed petition indicating support from more than fifty-one percent of resident tenants to exercise the right of first refusal and purchase the property. Despite gathering sufficient signatures, the association failed to secure a binding financing commitment within ninety days of executing its purchase and sale agreement with the trust.A civil action commenced in the Massachusetts Superior Court, with Crown asserting claims for declaratory relief regarding its rights to purchase the property. The association counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief and alleging unfair practices and tortious interference by Crown. After a jury-waived trial, the Superior Court judge found that the association did not validly exercise its right of first refusal, relying on the number of signed membership agreements rather than petition signatures, and concluded that the trust must sell to Crown. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment, finding error in the Superior Court’s methodology and holding that the signed petition constituted reasonable evidence of support. The Appeals Court also ruled that Crown was estopped from challenging the association’s failure to meet the financing deadline due to its filing of a lis pendens.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that a petition signed by resident tenants is “reasonable evidence” under § 32R, but found that the association’s failure to obtain financing within the statutory ninety-day period terminated its right of first refusal. The Court reversed the amended judgment that had required the trust to sell to the association and affirmed the rulings in favor of Crown on the association’s counterclaims. View "Crown Communities, LLC v. Austin" on Justia Law

A landowner and his neighbors disputed the location of a retaining wall built along their shared property line. The landowner, representing himself, claimed the wall encroached onto his lot and sought its removal and compensation. The neighbors, one of whom is an attorney, denied any encroachment and alternatively asserted that if any part of the wall did extend onto the landowner’s property, they had acquired that portion by adverse possession. The landowner relied on a survey and email evidence to support his claims, while the neighbors cited a prior survey and their continuous use of the area.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, oversaw the proceedings. The landowner filed several motions, including for admission of evidence, recusal of the judge, and a jury trial, but each was denied for procedural reasons such as untimeliness or failure to comply with court rules. The neighbors filed counterclaims, including one for adverse possession and another to quiet title. Discovery disputes arose, and the court compelled the landowner to comply and permitted the neighbors to enter his property for further survey work. At trial, the landowner repeatedly interrupted proceedings and disregarded the court’s instructions, leading to his participation being restricted to remote access and, after continued disruptions, his removal from the trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in removing the landowner from trial due to his disruptive conduct and that the award of attorney’s fees to the neighbors was proper. The court also determined that most of the landowner’s claims on appeal were waived due to inadequate briefing. The order of the superior court was affirmed. View "Humphrey v. Reges" on Justia Law