Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A local government prepared and certified a program-level Environmental Impact Report (EIR) as part of a comprehensive update to its general plan, including an updated housing element. The housing element identified 17 sites, including Site H, to accommodate the town’s projected regional housing needs. Site H was proposed to be rezoned for very high density residential use, increasing its development capacity. No specific housing project had been proposed for Site H or the other sites at the time of the general plan update.The Committee for Tiburon LLC filed a petition for a writ of mandate in Marin County Superior Court, challenging the adequacy of the EIR. The Committee argued the EIR was deficient under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it failed to include a site-specific analysis of environmental impacts related to the potential high-density development of Site H. The petition also alleged the Town’s general plan was internally inconsistent and incompatible, and objected to the rezoning of Site H. The trial court agreed with the Committee and granted the petition, finding the EIR should have included a site-specific analysis for Site H.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that when a local government updates its general plan and housing element, and no specific project is proposed for a listed site, CEQA does not require the EIR to include a site-specific environmental analysis for that site. The absence of project-specific details makes such analysis infeasible, and site-specific review can be deferred until a project is proposed. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the writ, and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the issues of CEQA exemption for rezoning and general plan consistency. View "The Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon" on Justia Law

A Wyoming firearms manufacturer sought to expand its operations by constructing a new facility. The company, unable to directly access specific state economic development funds, partnered with a city and a local non-profit to obtain funding, resulting in a written agreement outlining each party’s roles. The non-profit was charged with managing the project, including hiring architects and contractors. During and after construction, the manufacturer identified substantial design and construction defects, including climate control problems, leaks, and structural issues. The manufacturer sued the non-profit for breach of contract and also sued the architect and contractor, asserting it was a third-party beneficiary of their contracts with the non-profit.In the District Court of Park County, the court dismissed the manufacturer’s claims against the architect and contractor, finding it was not an intended third-party beneficiary under their contracts, and granted summary judgment to the non-profit on all but one claim, determining that the non-profit’s contractual obligations were limited to financial administration of the project. The remaining claim was later dismissed by stipulation.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the manufacturer’s claims against the architect and contractor because, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and considering the relevant contracts, the manufacturer had sufficiently alleged facts that could support third-party beneficiary status and breach of contract. The court also found the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the non-profit, concluding that the contract’s language and context imposed broader duties on the non-profit, including project administration and construction oversight, not merely financial management. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the lower court’s orders of dismissal and summary judgment, allowing the manufacturer’s claims to proceed. View "Gunwerks, LLC v. Forward Cody Wyoming, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a failed attempt to construct an osteopathic medical school in Gaylord, Minnesota. Philip Keithahn formed Minnesota Medical University, LLC (MMU) and retained Heritage Construction Companies, LLC as the general contractor. MMU planned to finance the project through bond proceeds, with a portion immediately available and the remainder contingent on achieving pre-accreditation. Representatives from Heritage sought confirmation of available funds prior to construction, and Keithahn assured them that the project would be funded and that millions would be available after closing. However, after initial payments, MMU ran out of funds when pre-accreditation was denied, leading Heritage to halt construction and terminate its contract.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota oversaw the case after Heritage and its affiliates faced indemnification claims and filed a third-party complaint against Keithahn and MMU. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case proceeded to trial on claims including breach of contract, indemnification, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraud by omission. MMU admitted liability for breach of contract and damages. The jury found the defendants liable on all claims except fraudulent misrepresentation. Post-verdict, the district court denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, addressing issues of jury instructions, violations of in limine orders, improper statements, and impeachment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that Keithahn’s representations regarding available financing were actionable as negligent misrepresentations, as they concerned present facts susceptible of knowledge rather than mere future assurances. The court found no error in the jury instructions, no prejudicial violation of evidentiary rulings, and no cumulative error warranting a new trial. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Heritage Const. Companies, LLC v. Keithahn" on Justia Law

A member of the governing board of a public water district was the subject of internal investigations after allegations of misconduct by district staff, as well as allegations made by that board member against staff. Two lengthy confidential reports, prepared by outside counsel, documented the results of these investigations. The board member was permitted to review, but not remove, the reports from a secure location at the district’s offices. Contrary to these restrictions, the board member took the reports without permission, later making extensive annotations on them. Repeated requests for their return were unsuccessful, leading to her censure by the board.The Santa Clara County Superior Court, upon the district's application under California’s claim and delivery law, granted a writ of possession and a turnover order directing the board member to return the reports. The board member stayed enforcement by posting a counterbond as allowed by statute. While the turnover order was stayed, the district sought a preliminary injunction under the general injunction statutes, again seeking return of the reports. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring turnover of the reports, permitting the board member to redact her handwritten notes.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the claim and delivery statutory scheme does not preclude a party from seeking injunctive relief for the recovery of personal property, even after a writ of possession has been issued and stayed by a counterbond. The appellate court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a likelihood of the district’s success on its conversion claim and in concluding that the balance of harms favored the district. The order granting the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

A Delaware limited liability company entered into an agreement to purchase real property in Jefferson County, Alabama, from an Alabama limited partnership. The agreement included provisions for the recovery of attorneys’ fees by the prevailing party in litigation arising from the contract. Disputes arose regarding whether the buyer satisfied conditions to extend the closing date, leading the seller to declare the agreement terminated. The buyer sued the seller, the seller’s general partner (a California corporation), and various individual limited partners (in both their personal capacities and as trustees of family trusts), seeking among other relief, damages for breach of contract and a declaration of rights under the agreement. The contract also provided for reimbursement of transaction costs and attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances.The case proceeded in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The court granted summary judgment for the buyer on liability, finding the seller had breached the agreement, and set the issue of damages for a jury trial. Subsequently, disputes arose about whether attorneys’ fees should be decided by the jury or the court. The circuit court ruled that attorneys’ fees recoverable by the prevailing party under the contract would be determined by the court after trial, not by the jury. The seller, general partner, and limited partners sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing they were entitled to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to a jury determination of prevailing party attorneys’ fees under the contract, because they did not adequately show that the Alabama Constitution or statutes provide such a right for this type of claim. The Court declined to overrule the circuit court’s decision to reserve the issue of attorneys’ fees for judicial determination following the trial on damages. View "Ex parte Vestavia Hills, Ltd." on Justia Law

A law firm leased office space in downtown Washington, D.C. from a commercial landlord. In the spring of 2020, following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to orders issued by the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the law firm curtailed most of its in-office operations and directed employees to work remotely. The firm subsequently invoked a rent abatement provision in its lease, arguing that the pandemic and the government’s orders constituted a force majeure event, which resulted in a material interference with its use and enjoyment of the premises due to an alleged interruption of the essential building service of “secure access” or “prompt access” to the building.The law firm filed a breach of contract suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia after the landlord denied the rent abatement request. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court denied the law firm’s motion and granted summary judgment to the landlord. The court found that the contract was unambiguous, and that there was no interruption of “secure or prompt access” to the premises, as the building remained physically accessible and the landlord did not impede entry. The court also determined that the government’s orders did not amount to a force majeure “taking” as defined by the lease. The law firm appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the plain meaning of the lease, “secure and prompt access” refers to physical ability to enter the premises, as provided by the landlord, and not to a generalized right to use the premises free from government restrictions. Because the law firm’s access to the building was never impeded by the landlord, the rent abatement provision was not triggered. View "Crowell & Moring, LLP v. Trea 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue Trust" on Justia Law

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches.The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law

A real estate developer purchased a vacant parcel of land in Worthington, Ohio, previously owned by a youth home. The property was primarily zoned for public or institutional uses such as parks, hospitals, and churches. The developer sought to build a mixed-use project and applied for rezoning and development plan approval. After public meetings where concerns about greenspace, traffic, and density were raised, the municipal planning commission tabled the initial application. The developer later reduced the number of proposed residential units, but the commission still declined to recommend approval, and the city council denied the rezoning application. Subsequently, the city amended its comprehensive plan to emphasize greenspace. The developer, having purchased the property after waiving a rezoning contingency, filed suit, alleging constitutional violations due to the city’s refusal to rezone and amend the comprehensive plan.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed most of the developer’s claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage, including due process counts, and granted summary judgment to the city on the remaining regulatory takings and declaratory judgment claims. The developer appealed, challenging the dismissal and grant of summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment and dismissal de novo. The court held that the city’s actions did not constitute a regulatory taking under the Penn Central factors, as the developer lacked a reasonable investment-backed expectation of rezoning approval and the city’s actions had legitimate public purposes. The court also found that the zoning ordinance was not unconstitutional beyond fair debate and that the developer failed to allege a cognizable property interest or arbitrary government action for its due process claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Lifestyle Communities, Ltd. v. City of Worthington" on Justia Law

A nonprofit coalition and two individuals challenged a county commission’s conditional approval for the development of a large seasonal RV park on a 21-acre lot in a rural area that had previously been designated for such use in a larger subdivision plan. The proposed site was adjacent to other commercial activity and near two lakes, but had no on-site surface water. The applicants submitted an environmental assessment (EA), which included groundwater well data and described wildlife in the area. The application process included public hearings, during which concerns were raised about groundwater impacts, wildlife, public safety, and increased recreational use.Following the submission of the application, the Lincoln County Planning Department recommended approval, and the Board of County Commissioners held public hearings, received additional agency comments, and ultimately granted conditional preliminary plat approval, requiring, among other conditions, state environmental review and approval of the water and sewer systems. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court, claiming the County’s approval was unlawful for not complying with statutory requirements for environmental review, consideration of probable impacts, and consistency with local plans. The District Court granted summary judgment for the County and intervenors, finding compliance with applicable statutes and plans.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the EA met statutory requirements, whether the County considered specific, documentable, and clearly defined impacts as required by law, and whether the subdivision was consistent with the local neighborhood plan and growth policy. The Supreme Court held that the EA satisfied statutory requirements by providing all available information; the County properly considered impacts using the required legal standard; and the County’s decision was consistent with the relevant policies and not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coalition v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

A non-governmental organization challenged a county planning department’s decision to approve a land division in the Bitterroot Valley. The organization alleged that the planning department authorized a property owner to divide an 80-acre tract into eight parcels using a family transfer exemption, but failed to provide public notice before approving the application. The organization discovered the land division after it had occurred and argued that the lack of public notice violated the county’s subdivision regulations, the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, the Montana Public Participation Act, and constitutional rights to know and participate.The case was first heard in the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, which granted the county’s motion to dismiss all claims. The district court concluded that the applicable county regulations did not require the planning department to provide published notice before reviewing or approving subdivision exemption applications. The court held that the organization had not stated a plausible claim because the regulations required only that the department accept public comments, not that it give notice.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims related to declaratory relief. The Supreme Court held that the county subdivision regulations, while silent on the specific mechanics of notice, require the planning department to provide public notice of pending exemption applications in order to give meaningful effect to the public’s right to comment, as mandated by the regulations. The court emphasized that public comment is meaningless without notice, and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the district court to require the planning department to provide notice and an adequate opportunity for public comment before reevaluating the exemption application. View "Sapphire v. Ravalli County" on Justia Law