Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Landowners Anne and Mark Guillemette appealed an Environmental Division order denying their motion to dismiss neighbor Michael Casey’s appeal and remanding the matter to the Monkton Development Review Board (DRB) for consideration on the merits. Casey had challenged the zoning administrator’s decision that the Guillemettes’ wood-processing facility was exempt from enforcement due to the fifteen-year limitations period. Casey filed his appeal late, relying on incorrect instructions from the zoning administrator.The Environmental Division concluded that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) allowed Casey’s appeal to proceed despite the untimely filing, as disallowing the appeal would result in manifest injustice. The court remanded the matter to the DRB for consideration on the merits.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Environmental Division’s decision. The Supreme Court held that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) does not apply to appeals from the decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as zoning administrators. Instead, it applies only to appeals from municipal regulatory proceedings to the Environmental Division. Therefore, the finality provision at 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred Casey’s untimely appeal, and the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction to permit the appeal to proceed. View "In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal" on Justia Law

Myers-Woodward, LLC (Myers) owns 160 acres in Matagorda County, Texas. In 1947, Myers’s predecessors retained the surface estate but transferred the mineral estate to the predecessor of Underground Services Markham, LLC and United Brine Pipeline Company, LLC (collectively, USM). The mineral deed granted USM’s predecessor an interest in all oil, gas, and other minerals on the land, along with rights necessary for mining and transporting these minerals. In 2008, USM acquired all of Texas Brine Company’s interest in the salt on the property. Disputes arose over the ownership of caverns created by salt mining and the calculation of royalties owed to Myers.The district court ruled that USM owned the subsurface caverns created by its salt mining activities but denied USM’s request to use the caverns for storing hydrocarbons produced off-site. The court agreed with Myers that USM could only use the land for purposes specified in the 1947 deed. Regarding royalties, the district court ruled that Myers was entitled to a one-eighth royalty based on the market value of the salt at the point of production, which amounted to $258,850.41. Myers appealed, challenging the royalty calculation and the ownership of the caverns. USM cross-appealed, contesting the limitation on its use of the caverns.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision that Myers, as the surface estate owner, retains ownership of the empty spaces within the salt formations. The court held that the mineral estate does not include ownership of the empty spaces created by salt mining. However, the court reversed the lower courts’ calculation of Myers’s royalty payments, ruling that Myers is entitled to an in-kind royalty of one-eighth of the net proceeds from the sale of the salt. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MYERS-WOODWARD, LLC v. UNDERGROUND SERVICES MARKHAM, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the authority of the Red Lake Watershed District (the District) to conduct improvement proceedings for Polk County Ditch 39, which lies within the District but under the drainage authority of the Polk County Board of Commissioners. In 2017, landowners filed a petition with the District to improve Ditch 39, aiming to increase its capacity and length to capture overflow from another ditch, Ditch 66. The District accepted the petition and initiated proceedings, but Keystone Township and several landowners challenged the District's order, arguing that the District lacked authority as the ditch was not transferred from the county.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Keystone, ruling that the District did not have the authority to order the improvement because it had not taken over the ditch from the county. The court of appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the District had the authority to conduct the improvement proceedings and that the proceedings substantially conformed to statutory requirements.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The court held that under Minn. Stat. § 103D.625, subd. 4, the District was authorized to conduct improvement proceedings for Ditch 39 without first taking over the ditch from the county. The court also concluded that the District's proceedings conformed to the statutory requirements, despite the involvement of county officials being inconsistent with the Watershed Law. The court rejected Keystone's procedural challenges, including the timeliness of the property owners' report and the final hearing notice, affirming that these did not affect the District's authority to establish the improvement project. View "In the Matter of Keystone Township vs. Red Lake Watershed District," on Justia Law

Burnsville Medical Building, LLC owns a three-story medical office building in Burnsville, Minnesota. Dakota County assessed the value of the property for 2021 taxes at $8,007,800. The taxpayer challenged this assessment, arguing that it overstated the property's value. The property was 25 years old, with 47,894 square feet of rentable space and an occupancy rate of 90.13 percent. The taxpayer presented an appraisal report by Kelsey K. Hornig, who used both the sales comparison approach and the income capitalization approach to value the property at $7,075,000 and $7,175,000, respectively.The Minnesota Tax Court held a trial and found that the taxpayer's appraisal overcame the prima facie validity of Dakota County's assessment. However, the tax court rejected Hornig's occupancy adjustment under the sales comparison approach, finding her testimony not credible and her adjustments internally inconsistent. The tax court also rejected Hornig's use of effective net rent to calculate potential gross income under the income capitalization approach, determining that the taxpayer did not present sufficient evidence to support reducing potential gross income by tenant improvement allowances or free rent.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the tax court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the tax court did not err in using market rent rather than effective net rent to calculate the property's potential gross income, as there was no evidence that the tenant improvement allowances or rent concessions were excessive or atypical. The Supreme Court also upheld the tax court's rejection of Hornig's occupancy adjustment, finding no clear error in the tax court's credibility determinations and factual findings. The final valuation of the property was set at $9,300,000. View "Burnsville Medical Building, LLC vs. County of Dakota" on Justia Law

A landlord sought to terminate a rental agreement with a tenant due to extensive property damage caused by the tenant's guinea pigs. The landlord issued a 30-day termination notice stating that no cure opportunity was available because the damage was too extensive to repair while the tenant remained on the premises. The tenant did not vacate, leading the landlord to initiate an eviction action.The trial court ruled in favor of the landlord, finding that the termination notice complied with ORS 90.392(3)(c) because the repairs were too costly and extensive for the tenant to complete within the minimum 14-day cure period. The tenant appealed, arguing that the notice was invalid because it did not inform him of his right to cure the violation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a landlord's termination notice need not state that a violation can be cured if the landlord determines that it is unreasonable to believe that any tenant could cure the violation within the prescribed time period.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a termination notice under ORS 90.392 must state that a violation can be cured when, as a matter of law, the tenant has a right to cure the violation. The court concluded that a tenant has a right to cure all violations that can be the basis for termination under ORS 90.392, except for certain repeat violations described in ORS 90.392(5). Because the violation in this case was one that the tenant had a right to cure, the landlord's notice was invalid for failing to state that the violation could be cured. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire" on Justia Law

In the late 1980s, Ronald Koziol purchased property in Central Falls, Rhode Island, zoned for heavy industrial use. In 1992, the zoning changed to residential, making the existing automotive repair business a legal nonconforming use. In 2022, Koziol Firearms, Inc. was formed to operate a firearms business on the property. The City’s zoning official denied the request, stating the property was in a residential zone, requiring a use variance. The Zoning Board of Review denied the variance application, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, also seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1992 zoning amendment was invalid.The Superior Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to present additional evidence and dismissed the zoning appeal, finding the property had a viable use as an automotive repair business. The court dismissed the declaratory judgment count without prejudice, stating it lacked sufficient evidence to rule on the validity of the 1992 zoning amendment.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The plaintiff argued the trial justice overlooked material evidence and that the zoning classification was in dispute. The City contended the case was moot, the plaintiff lacked standing, and the claim was barred by laches. The Supreme Court found the trial justice did not conduct necessary fact-finding for the declaratory judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new hearing to determine if the plaintiff should be granted declaratory relief. View "Koziol Firearms, Inc. v. Marchand" on Justia Law

Neely, acting as his own general contractor, hired Grosvold to perform excavation work on his property under an oral contract. Grosvold worked from April to October 2021, but their relationship deteriorated, and Neely refused to pay for an invoice amounting to $55,858. Neely sent Grosvold a notice of alleged defects in the work, which Grosvold disputed. Grosvold then filed a complaint for breach of contract and prejudgment interest, while Neely counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and construction defect.The District Court of the Third Judicial District in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County tried the case before a jury. The court refused to instruct the jury on Neely’s construction defect and negligence claims, reasoning that the evidence did not substantiate the work was done to a residence and that the case was strictly a breach of contract matter. The jury found Neely had breached the contract and awarded Grosvold $60,512.60 in damages. The court denied Grosvold’s request for prejudgment interest, finding the damages were not certain until the jury’s determination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the construction defect claim, holding that the residential construction defect statute did not create an independent cause of action beyond breach of contract or tort. The court also affirmed the refusal to instruct the jury on negligence, finding that Neely’s substantial rights were not affected as the breach of contract instructions adequately covered the disputed subject matter. Finally, the court upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, concluding the amount of recovery was not capable of being made certain until the jury’s verdict. View "Grosvold v. Neely" on Justia Law

Brownphil, LLC and Peter Kofi Amihere Cudjoe have competing claims to ownership of an undeveloped lot in Bibb County. Both parties possess deeds to the property, but Cudjoe's deed lacks a continuous chain of title. Cudjoe claims ownership through adverse possession under color of title, while Brownphil argues that Cudjoe's involvement with the land is insufficient for adverse possession and asserts ownership through its deed and unbroken chain of title.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cudjoe and denied Brownphil's motion. Brownphil appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Brownphil then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was granted. The case was argued orally in December 2024.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether possession of a recorded deed is sufficient to establish both the notice and land-possession requirements of adverse possession under color of title. The court concluded that a recorded deed alone cannot establish the land-possession requirement for adverse possession. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision, which had incorrectly held that a recorded deed could establish constructive possession without actual possession of any part of the property. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine if Cudjoe actually possessed the property or any portion of it. View "BROWNPHIL, LLC v. CUDJOE" on Justia Law

In 2017, Gratiot County foreclosed on Donald Freed’s home due to unpaid taxes. Freed’s property, valued at $98,800, was sold for $42,000, although he owed just under $1,110. The county kept all proceeds from the sale, as Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (GPTA) did not require returning surplus proceeds to the property owner. Freed sued Gratiot County and its treasurer, Michelle Thomas, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Michigan intervened to defend the GPTA’s constitutionality.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Freed’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Wayside Church v. Van Buren County. Freed appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, recognizing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Knick v. Township of Scott partially abrogated Wayside Church. On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment to Freed, affirming that the county had to pay Freed the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, but dismissed claims against Thomas due to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Freed’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees from Gratiot County and Michigan. However, the court vacated the district court’s fee calculation and remanded for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit held that Freed prevailed against both Gratiot County and Michigan, and Michigan’s intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) subjected it to attorneys’ fee liability. The court found the district court’s explanation for reducing Freed’s hours and rate by 35% insufficient and required a more detailed justification for the fee award calculation. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

James and Kim McCormick own a 128.75-acre tract in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, accessed by a private driveway from Modica Lott Road. The property was part of a larger tract subdivided without adhering to the Bossier Parish Subdivision Code, which requires a plat description for split-out tracts. The McCormicks' deed, recorded in 2014, did not comply with these regulations. After a fire damaged their home in 2018, they applied for a building permit in 2020, which was denied by the Bossier Parish Police Jury (BPPJ) due to non-compliance with subdivision regulations.The McCormicks filed a mandamus action against Joe E. Ford, the Parish Engineer, seeking a court order for the permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the McCormicks, requiring the BPPJ to issue the permit, subject to certain conditions regarding the driveway. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the permit but removed the conditions, stating that the five-year prescriptive period for enforcing subdivision regulations had expired, making the property non-conforming.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the McCormick Tract enjoyed non-conforming status under La. R.S. 9:5625, which provides a five-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions. The Court held that the prescriptive period began when the deed was recorded in 2014, and since no action was taken within five years, the property attained non-conforming status. Consequently, the McCormicks were entitled to the building permit without additional conditions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, confirming that the McCormick Tract complied with relevant statutes and regulations. View "MCCORMICK VS. FORD" on Justia Law