Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

An individual operated a bed and breakfast (B&B) on Maui under a permit requiring compliance with local regulations and that the owner reside on the property. In 2020, neighbors repeatedly complained to the Maui Department of Planning about noise and the owner’s absence during guest stays. Police were called, and the department investigated, finding evidence that the permit conditions had been violated—including the owner’s own admission that he sometimes stayed elsewhere and evidence of noncompliance with quiet hours and COVID-19 regulations. The department revoked the B&B permit and imposed a two-year ban on future permit applications. The owner appealed this decision to the Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals (BVA), which after several hearings and delays, ultimately upheld the department’s decision.After the BVA announced its decision orally on November 24, 2021, it did not adopt and file formal findings of fact and conclusions of law (FOF/COL) until January 2022, exceeding a 45-day deadline specified in the BVA’s procedural rules. The owner appealed to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the BVA’s delay violated its own rules and required reversal. The circuit court affirmed the BVA’s decision, finding the owner in violation of permit conditions and upholding the ban.On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the BVA’s failure to comply with the 45-day rule was a mandatory violation warranting reversal, and that the delay prejudiced the owner’s substantial rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that the 45-day deadline in the BVA’s rules is directory, not mandatory, because the rule does not specify a consequence for noncompliance. The court further found that the owner did not suffer prejudice to substantial rights due to the delay. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and reinstated the circuit court’s decision upholding the permit revocation and ban. View "Norrie v. Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals" on Justia Law

Cody Hatt, an employee of a demolition contractor, was fatally injured while working at the Hatfield’s Ferry Power Station in Pennsylvania, which was undergoing demolition after years of disuse. The plant was owned and operated by various FirstEnergy entities. Hatt was dismantling a catwalk on a smokestack when it collapsed, resulting in his death. His mother, Lisa DeBar, brought wrongful death and survival claims against the owner and operators of the plant, alleging negligence. The claims focused on whether the defendants retained control over the demolition work and whether they owed a duty to protect Hatt from the dangers present at the job site.The case was initially filed in Pennsylvania state court, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. After DeBar amended her complaint and voluntarily dismissed some defendants, the remaining defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court dismissed the claims against FirstEnergy Service and FirstEnergy Corp. with prejudice, and against Allegheny Energy Supply without prejudice. DeBar chose not to amend again and appealed the final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, a property owner who hires an independent contractor does not owe a duty to the contractor’s employees unless the owner retains detailed control over the work, which was not sufficiently alleged here. Additionally, landowners owe no duty to protect invitees from dangers that are open and obvious, and the risks associated with demolishing the long-disused power station qualified as such. The court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Debar v. FirstEnergy Corp" on Justia Law

Chatham County established a fire protection service fee, assessed either as a flat charge per parcel or based on the square footage of structures, on all real property in a special district comprising unincorporated areas of the county. Initially, fire services were provided by Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (CES), funded by direct payments from property owners. When payment rates fell and CES could no longer provide services as before, the county contracted with CES and adopted a fire service protection tax, later replaced by the Fire Protection Service Fee Ordinance in 2022 and revised in 2023. The fee was collected from property owners in the designated area, with enforcement measures including penalties, collection costs, and potential liens.Property owners Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, subject to the fee, filed a class action in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking refunds. They contended the fee was actually an illegal tax because it was not ad valorem, as required by Georgia law. The county moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs sought class certification and summary judgment. After discovery and hearings, the superior court certified the class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the fire fee was a tax on real property and invalid because it was not assessed ad valorem.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo. The Court agreed with the lower court that the fire protection service fee was, in substance, a tax rather than a fee or assessment. It further held that, under Georgia constitutional and statutory law, taxes on real property—including those levied in special districts—must be ad valorem. Because the county’s ordinance imposed a non-ad-valorem tax, it was unauthorized and illegal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the superior court’s judgment in favor of the property owners. View "CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH" on Justia Law

Two individuals jointly purchased a Vermont home during their marriage. After separating, they divorced in Florida, where the court assigned each a percentage ownership interest in the property but did not resolve matters concerning ongoing property expenses or order a sale or partition of the house. One party returned to Vermont and lived in the house with their children, solely paying all mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. The parties informally agreed that the out-of-state party would not assert ownership rights until their youngest child graduated college. After that event, the out-of-state party initiated a partition action in Vermont.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, found that the parties’ ownership interests were as set by the Florida court and converted their tenancy by the entirety to a tenancy in common. The court determined the party living in the house should be credited for property expenses paid but limited such credits to only those expenses incurred within the prior six years, applying Vermont’s general statute of limitations for civil actions (12 V.S.A. § 511). The court assigned the property to the in-state party, conditioned upon purchase of the other’s interest, and required that the party in possession continue to pay property expenses until transfer or sale.Upon appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that, in partition actions, contribution credits for property expenses are not subject to the six-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 511, because partition is an equitable remedy and such credits are integral to the equitable division of property. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s limitation on contribution credits, remanding for recalculation. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order requiring the party in possession to pay ongoing property expenses until the final disposition. View "Wich v. Corcoran" on Justia Law

A mortgage issuer, Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC (RMF), participated in a federal program allowing it to securitize reverse mortgages. When RMF entered bankruptcy, Texas Capital Bank provided debtor-in-possession financing, secured by RMF’s interests in certain collateral, specifically incremental balances on the mortgages known as “tails.” After RMF defaulted on its agreement, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), under its statutory and contractual authority, extinguished RMF’s interests in the underlying mortgages and assumed ownership of the loans, also extinguishing Texas Capital’s lien interest in the mortgage tails. Texas Capital argued that Ginnie Mae’s actions violated federal law and Texas tort law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially allowed Texas Capital’s claims for statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and tortious interference to proceed, but dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to sovereign immunity. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Ginnie Mae, finding it acted within its statutory authority and concluding that the extinguishment of RMF’s interests necessarily eliminated Texas Capital’s derivative interest in the mortgage tails. The court also dismissed Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim, citing sovereign immunity and a lack of legal basis, and refused to consider Texas Capital’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory because it was not sufficiently pled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Ginnie Mae acted within its statutory and contractual authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g)(1) in extinguishing both RMF’s and Texas Capital’s interests in the mortgages. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim barred by sovereign immunity and ruling that Texas Capital’s failure to plead an arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory justified the district court’s refusal to consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Texas Captl Bank v. Govt Natl Mtge" on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired real property via a tax deed after the previous owner, a limited liability company, failed to pay property taxes. The property had originally been purchased by two individuals who later transferred ownership to the LLC. When the LLC did not pay taxes for 2015, the county sold the property at a tax sale, with the plaintiff eventually purchasing the tax certificate and being assigned it in 2020. The plaintiff attempted to serve notice of intent to take a tax deed on the LLC at multiple addresses and ultimately provided the notice to the Minnesota Secretary of State, which accepted service as the LLC’s registered agent. The LLC did not redeem the property, and the county issued a tax deed to the plaintiff.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the tax deed was void because notice was not personally served on the LLC. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota previously reversed that decision in Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, holding that service on the Secretary of State constituted personal service. On remand, the plaintiff sought an order quieting title, but the circuit court denied this, later granting the defendants’ motion to make redemption and ordering the county to issue a certificate of redemption to the defendants. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the defendants were entitled to redeem the property. The Court held that the plaintiff properly acquired the tax deed under SDCL chapter 10-25 and followed the statutory procedure for quieting title under SDCL chapter 21-41. Because the LLC, the owner of record, did not timely redeem, the plaintiff owns the property in fee. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order granting redemption to the defendants and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including a residents association, an affordable housing advocacy group, and several former residents, challenged actions taken by the City of Stanton over approximately 17 years regarding a low-income neighborhood comprised of fourplexes. The City gradually acquired most of the properties using redevelopment funds, allowed units to deteriorate and become uninhabitable, left many vacant units unrented, and demolished several fourplexes, which effectively removed substantial low-income housing from the market. Despite plans for redevelopment and affordable housing construction, little progress was made, and the City failed to replace demolished units or update relocation plans for displaced residents.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of San Diego County. Plaintiffs filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the City violated statutory obligations by not adopting a replacement housing plan, failing to provide replacement housing, and neglecting to adopt or update a relocation plan. The defendants demurred, claiming the petition was uncertain and insufficiently pled. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, citing ambiguity and failure to identify actions triggering statutory duties.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the petition was not uncertain and that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action under the Community Redevelopment Law and the California Relocation Assistance Act. Specifically, the court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged violations for not adopting a replacement housing plan, not providing replacement housing within statutory periods, and not maintaining a compliant relocation plan. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrer. View "Tina-Pacific Residents Assn. v. City of Stanton" on Justia Law

Three adjacent residential parcels in Los Gatos were subject to a lot line adjustment application in 2023, submitted by the owners’ architect. One parcel had an existing house, while two were unimproved and nonconforming with zoning requirements. The adjustment sought to resolve nonconformities, including minimum lot size and street frontage. As a condition, the Town required an offer of dedication for a cul-de-sac easement to provide new access and satisfy frontage requirements. The Town accepted this dedication, resulting in a mapped cul-de-sac extension.The Town’s development review commission approved the adjustment, and subsequent appeals by an adjacent homeowner, Alison Steer, were denied by the planning commission and Town Council. Steer argued the approval was discretionary, not ministerial, due to the Town’s acceptance of the dedication, which she claimed triggered the need for environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Town filed a notice of exemption, stating the approval was ministerial and thus exempt from CEQA. Steer then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, alleging CEQA violations. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the dedication was for zoning compliance and the Town lacked discretion to refuse it, making the approval ministerial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while lot line adjustments are typically ministerial, this approval included a discretionary element—the Town’s acceptance of the property dedication for the cul-de-sac. The court found that the Town had discretion to accept, modify, or reject the dedication, which made the project discretionary for CEQA purposes. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, concluding the Town violated CEQA by relying on the ministerial exemption. View "Steer v. Town of Los Gatos" on Justia Law

BBC, LLC, contracted Germer Construction, Inc. to provide construction services for a subdivision development. A dispute arose regarding the amount owed, leading to arbitration as required by contract. The arbitrator awarded Germer nearly $1,000,000, including costs and fees. BBC sought a court order to vacate the arbitration award, while Germer requested confirmation of the award and entry of judgment. Germer also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming BBC was dissipating assets. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order restricting BBC’s asset transfers. At a hearing, the district court required BBC to post a $1,000,000 surety bond and Germer a $250,000 bond, characterizing them as “equivalent” to supersedeas bonds, then dissolved the restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive relief.BBC petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for writs of prohibition or mandamus to vacate the district court’s order and prohibit further pre-judgment asset restrictions, arguing the district court lacked authority to require the bond or injunctive relief solely to secure a potential monetary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and sought briefing from Germer and the Attorney General.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court exceeded its authority by requiring BBC to post a surety bond to secure a potential money judgment for an unsecured debt. The court found no rule, statute, or inherent equitable power authorizing such relief in this context. The court issued a writ of review, vacating the district court’s order, including both bond requirements. BBC was found to have no adequate, speedy remedy at law, and the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus were denied. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

ACC OP (Oxford, Mississippi), LLC owns a student-housing property in Oxford, Mississippi. For the 2021 and 2022 tax years, the Lafayette County Tax Assessor appraised and the Board of Supervisors approved the property's value at approximately $21.3 million. ACC believed the property was overvalued by $8–9 million and objected in writing to the Board's assessments, submitting documentation as required. Prior to the Board hearing, the Tax Assessor, through her office, requested additional documents via a form referencing Mississippi Code Section 27-1-23 and directed submission to the Assessor’s Office, not the Board. ACC responded to each item, explaining that some requested documents did not exist, and submitted others.The Board denied ACC’s objections, citing ACC’s failure to submit “required documentation” and, for 2021, also referencing ACC’s absence at the Board meeting. ACC appealed both denials to the Lafayette County Circuit Court, which consolidated the appeals. After extensive litigation, the County moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that ACC’s noncompliance with document requests barred the circuit court’s jurisdiction under Mississippi Code Section 27-35-97. The circuit court denied the motions, finding that Section 27-35-97’s preclusion applies only to a demand from the Board, not the Tax Assessor, and that ACC had complied with the written objection requirement.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the County’s motions to dismiss de novo. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Assessor’s document request was an informal request under Section 27-1-23, not a Board demand under Section 27-35-97, and thus carried no penalty for preclusion. The Board itself never made a demand for documents, and ACC satisfied the written objection requirement under Section 27-35-93. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lafayette County Board of Supervisors v. ACC OP" on Justia Law