Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Several residents of the Town of Harpers Ferry challenged the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Tourism Development District Act. The Act allows the creation of tourism development districts in municipalities with a population of 2,000 or less, for projects with projected costs of at least $25 million, and limits the number of districts to five statewide. Within these districts, qualifying tourism projects are exempt from most local regulations, including zoning, land use, licensing, and building codes, and are instead regulated by state agencies. The only tourism development district approved since the Act’s adoption was for a luxury hotel redevelopment in Harpers Ferry, which prompted the lawsuit by local residents.After the complaint was filed, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Act had a rational basis for its classifications and was reasonably related to legislative policy goals, so it did not violate equal protection principles or the constitutional prohibition on special laws. The court also found no constitutional right to “self-rule” and ruled that there was no violation of the right to vote, as municipalities possess only powers granted by the legislature. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal, concluding that the Act was a general law, rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and did not infringe upon municipal regulatory rights or voting rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that the Act does not violate the constitutional prohibitions on special laws or equal protection, and does not infringe upon any inherent right to self-rule or the right to vote. The classifications in the Act were found to be reasonable and uniformly applicable to all qualifying municipalities and projects. The Court affirmed the decisions of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. View "Fleming v. Herridge" on Justia Law

The case arises from a series of contractual and property disputes among three parties in Vermont. In 2015, one party sold land to another, then was hired to construct a pond on a separate property owned by the buyer. The pond builder subcontracted a third party to clear-cut land for the pond and also hired this subcontractor to cut timber on his own property. Disagreements ensued regarding payment, completion of work, and use of equipment, resulting in a lawsuit in 2017. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract and violations under Vermont’s Prompt Pay Act against the buyer, as well as conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims against the subcontractor included breach of contract and conversion. Both defendants counterclaimed, including allegations of consumer protection violations, assault, and extortion.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, conducted a jury trial on most claims. The plaintiff was awarded $7,500 for breach of contract against the buyer, plus interest. The buyer received $5,000 for assault, and the subcontractor was awarded $15,100 on his civil extortion claim. Both the plaintiff and buyer requested attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act, each arguing they were the substantially prevailing party. The court denied both motions, finding neither party substantially prevailed in the construction dispute. The court also allowed the subcontractor’s civil extortion claim to proceed.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. It held that the determination of a substantially prevailing party under the Prompt Pay Act is within the trial court’s discretion and confirmed that neither party substantially prevailed. The Supreme Court also upheld the recognition of a civil claim for restitution based on economic duress, consistent with Vermont precedent, and affirmed the damages awarded for extortion. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Lamson v. Goode" on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that since 2018, stormwater runoff from a drainage easement in a residential subdivision caused damage to his property. He first sued the homeowners’ association and the four owners of lots nearest his property, resulting in a jury verdict against the association and pro tanto settlements with three lot owners. After continued drainage issues and difficulties collecting the judgment, the plaintiff brought a new suit in 2024 against the homeowners’ association, a newly formed association, all 21 lot owners, and the boards of both associations. The central claim against the lot owners was their alleged undivided interest in the common property, including the drainage easement.In the Mobile Circuit Court, most non-board-member lot owners moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing they did not own the drainage easement and had no involvement in causing the drainage problem. Two lot owners, Wallace and Smith, additionally asserted that prior settlement agreements barred further claims against them. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss the non-board-member lot owners and enforced Wallace’s and Smith’s releases. Claims against the homeowners’ association and the six board members remained pending. The court certified its dismissal orders as final under Rule 54(b), allowing the plaintiff to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the circuit court’s Rule 54(b) certification was proper. Applying a de novo standard to the question of finality and reviewing for excess of discretion, the Court concluded the certification was improper. The Court found the dismissed claims and those still pending were too closely intertwined, and the possibility that the remaining claims could moot the need for appellate review weighed against certification. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment and did not reach the merits. View "Carpenter v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

A rental company, Pharming Capital, became involved in a dispute after a portable cabin was delivered to land in Geneva County, Alabama, under a rent-to-own contract with a third party, Leland Hedlund. Although the contract documents inconsistently listed addresses in both Florida and Alabama, the cabin was ultimately placed on property owned by James R. Turner. Turner had agreed to sell this property to James Gough in 2021, but the final deed conveying ownership to Gough and his wife was not recorded until July 22, 2024, after the events in question. When repossession of the cabin was attempted due to nonpayment, access was prevented by a locked gate. Pharming Capital, relying on property searches and public records, believed Turner was the record owner and sued him for possession of the building.The Coffee Circuit Court (trial court) first granted summary judgment in favor of Pharming Capital regarding some of Turner's counterclaims, but allowed negligence/wantonness and punitive damages claims to proceed to trial. After a jury trial, Turner was awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Pharming Capital moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, which were denied. Pharming Capital then appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing a copy of the complaint filed by Pharming Capital to be taken into the jury room, contrary to Rule 51 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits pleadings from being sent to the jury room. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court did not reach or resolve other arguments raised on appeal, as the error regarding the complaint was dispositive. View "Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner" on Justia Law

A dispute arose following a 2016 chlorine gas leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia, where IPI, Inc. employees, including its president, Matthew Joseph Taylor, were injured and IPI’s equipment was damaged while performing power washing and industrial painting services for Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corporation and Westlake Natrium LLC (collectively Westlake). The parties operated under two interrelated service agreements containing indemnity provisions. After the incident, IPI and Taylor sued Westlake for personal injury and property damage. Westlake counterclaimed, arguing that IPI breached the indemnity agreements by bringing suit and owed Westlake indemnification for Taylor’s claims.The Circuit Court of Marshall County applied Pennsylvania law, granted summary judgment to Westlake, and found the indemnity agreements clearly required IPI to indemnify Westlake, even for claims arising from Westlake’s own negligence, except in cases of Westlake’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court ruled that IPI’s claims fell within the scope of the agreements, including damages from the chlorine gas release, and certified its order as final under Rule 54(b). On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the application of Pennsylvania law but concluded that the circuit court erred by not analyzing the possible conflict between the two indemnity provisions and by insufficiently explaining why the claims fell within their scope. The ICA remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo, holding that the two indemnity provisions should be read together, not in conflict, and that both unequivocally require IPI to indemnify Westlake for its own negligence. However, the court found ambiguities regarding the scope of indemnity and the application of exceptions, necessitating factual development through parol evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to the circuit court. View "Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1902, F.W. Severin conveyed 117.55 acres of land in Doddridge County, West Virginia, to L.D. Nicholson, reserving “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” for himself. Over time, Nicholson’s successors leased their oil and gas interests, and, in 2017, production began, resulting in royalty payments. Disputes arose regarding the respective interests of Severin’s and Nicholson’s successors in the oil and gas estate, leading to litigation. The central issue was whether Severin’s reservation in the deed constituted a one-sixteenth or a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate.The Circuit Court of Doddridge County, in a declaratory judgment order dated September 28, 2022, concluded that the deed was unambiguous and that Severin had reserved a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate. The court reasoned that, in the context of 1902 West Virginia oil and gas law, a reservation of one-sixteenth operated as a reservation of one-half of the mineral estate. The Nicholsons appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment on November 13, 2023. The ICA found the deed unambiguous and determined that Severin reserved only a one-sixteenth interest in the oil and gas minerals under the land.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. The Court held that the 1902 deed was unambiguous and that Severin’s reservation of “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” meant exactly one-sixteenth of the oil and gas mineral estate. The Court rejected arguments for construing the deed in light of historical industry practice or adopting the “estate misconception theory” used in Texas. The ICA’s decision was affirmed. View "Severin POA Group, LLC v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

A couple entered into an agreement with a construction company to build a home on their property. The contract was signed at a time when the construction company’s registration as a contractor had lapsed, which violated the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA). During construction, numerous problems arose, including water leaks, mold, improper grading, and unfinished work. The couple paid substantial sums and alleged that the company issued fraudulent invoices for work not performed. After failed attempts to resolve the issues, the couple sued for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and fraudulent billing. The construction company counterclaimed, arguing it was prevented from completing the work and that its registration lapse was inadvertent.The District Court of the Second Judicial District, Clearwater County, initially dismissed the construction company’s counterclaims due to its failure to register under ICRA. Later, the court granted summary judgment to the construction company, dismissing the couple’s claims and finding the contract void and unenforceable because of the registration violation. The court reasoned that neither party could enforce the contract and denied all claims arising from it, including those for breach of contract and fraudulent billing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The Court held that while ICRA prohibits an unregistered contractor from enforcing a contract, it does not bar the innocent project owner from doing so. Contracts entered in violation of ICRA are voidable, not void, and remain enforceable at the option of the project owner. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the couple’s breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings, clarifying that the project owner may pursue claims under such a contract. Attorney fees were denied, but costs were awarded to the prevailing party. View "Kumm v. Work Shops & Sons " on Justia Law

A church organization sued its pastor after he withdrew $223,000 from a parish bank account and deposited the funds into his personal account. The pastor asserted that the money was a personal gift from a church member, who had written three $300,000 checks during a church event. One check was made payable to the church, while the other two had blank payee lines and were delivered in sealed envelopes to two pastors. The recipient pastor initially gave his check to the church president, who filled in the church’s name as payee and deposited the check in the parish account. Later, the church member allegedly told the pastor that the check was intended for him personally, prompting the pastor to transfer the funds to his own account.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Davison County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the church on its claims for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty and against the pastor on his counterclaims for conversion and fraud. The court found that all money in the parish account belonged to the church or its parish and concluded that a blank check was not sufficient delivery of a gift. The court also awarded prejudgment interest to the church.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that the check delivered to the pastor was not a completed gift under South Dakota law, but this finding alone did not entitle the church to summary judgment. The court determined that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the pastor’s fraud claim, specifically whether the church obtained the funds through misrepresentation of the donor’s intent. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims and remanded for further proceedings. It also reversed the award of prejudgment interest. View "Iglesia Pentecostal V. Torres" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were involved in a residential real estate transaction in the District of Columbia. The sellers transferred a property to the buyer, and a disclosure statement about the property’s condition was provided, as required by statute. After encountering water issues, the buyer sued the sellers, alleging that the disclosure statement contained fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations. The disclosure statement, while referenced, was explicitly not part of the sales contract itself.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The judge conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the sellers on the buyer’s claims. Subsequently, the sellers sought attorney fees under a provision of the sales contract that allowed recovery for actions based on the performance or nonperformance of the contract’s terms and conditions. The trial court denied this request, finding that the buyer’s claims were based on statutory obligations for disclosure, not on any term or condition of the contract.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the sellers were entitled to attorney fees under the contract. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the contract’s interpretation and found its language unambiguous. The court held that attorney fees could only be recovered for actions based on performance or nonperformance of contractual terms, not statutory obligations. Since the buyer’s claims were rooted in alleged statutory violations rather than breaches of the contract, the sellers were not entitled to attorney fees. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorney fees. View "Lovern v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A homeowners association filed suit against a property owner, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctions to prohibit the use of the property for short-term rentals. The owner admitted operating short-term rentals and argued that the restrictive covenants did not clearly prohibit such activity, contending the terms were ambiguous. The association imposed fines and assessments for violations, and neighbors reported nuisance activities such as late-night parties and disruptive behavior by renters. The owner counterclaimed for breach of contract, asserting unequal enforcement and lack of due process.After a five-day bench trial, the District Court of Oklahoma County found that the owner’s use of the property constituted a prohibited business under the clear and unambiguous language of the restrictive covenant, awarded damages based on accumulated fines, issued an injunction, and dismissed the owner’s breach of contract claim. The court found the association to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees to be determined later.The owner appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, partially reversed, vacating the injunction and prevailing party status, and remanded for further proceedings on nuisance claims unrelated to restrictive covenants. The association petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari, vacated the appellate court’s opinion, and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Court held that the owner’s short-term rental activities violated the clear and unambiguous language of the restrictive covenant, the challenges to fines and assessments lacked merit, the injunction was supported by the evidence, and no abuse of discretion occurred regarding the denial of a new trial. The owner’s challenge to the attorney fees was not preserved for review. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. View "SILVERHAWK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. TAWOSE" on Justia Law