Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit healthcare organization based in the Bering Strait region owns a seven-unit apartment building in Nome, Alaska, located near its hospital. The building’s primary use is to house doctors, nurses, and newly hired hospital employees, most of whom are recruited from outside the region. The organization provides this housing to ensure that medical staff are available to quickly respond to emergencies, especially given the acute shortage of short-term housing in Nome. While the majority of occupants are hospital staff, a small percentage of the units are temporarily used by new hires, who receive free rent for the first 30 days and are then charged a nominal amount.The City of Nome denied a property tax exemption for the apartment building, reasoning that it was not used exclusively for hospital purposes. The matter was reviewed by the City of Nome Board of Equalization, which upheld the denial. The Board found that although the building housed hospital staff, it was also used for private residential purposes and that such use was not “vitally necessary” to the provision of medical care. The Board also rejected arguments based on federal preemption. On appeal, the Superior Court of Alaska reversed the Board’s decision, holding that the apartment building qualified for a hospital purposes exemption.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s judgment. The court held that while the apartment building is not used exclusively for hospital purposes because it also serves private residential needs, it is exempt from taxation because its use is directly incidental to and vitally necessary for hospital operations. The court found that, given the lack of local housing and the requirement for on-call staff, the apartment building meets the requirements for exempt use. The court also concluded that nominal rent charged to some tenants did not disqualify the property from exemption, as the issue was not properly raised or developed in the lower proceedings. View "City of Nome Equalization Board v. Norton Sound Health Corp." on Justia Law

A railroad company operates lines throughout Indiana, holding various property interests in its corridors, such as easements and fee simple ownership. A telecommunications utility installed fiber optic cables above and below some of these railroad tracks without the railroad’s permission, safety review, or payment of licensing fees required by the railroad. The railroad claimed that under Indiana law, its easements gave it exclusive rights to the airspace and subsurface, including the right to exclude third parties and charge for installations.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the railroad asserted claims including trespass, theft, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed all claims related to Illinois sites for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the Indiana properties where the railroad held only easements, the district court ruled that the railroad lacked standing to assert trespass and rent claims, finding that its easements did not necessarily include the right to exclude others from the air or subsurface where there was no interference with railroad operations. The court also held that claims based on older installations were time-barred, determining these did not constitute continuing trespasses under Indiana law.Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the railroad argued its easements included exclusion and licensing rights, and that the installations were continuing trespasses. The Seventh Circuit held that, under Indiana law, railroad easements do not necessarily include the right to exclude third parties from the air or ground below the tracks, nor the right to charge licensing fees for such installations unless the railroad’s operations are disturbed. The court also affirmed that these installations are not continuing trespasses and that claims outside the applicable statute of limitations are barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v Zayo Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A family purchased two parcels of land by warranty deed from a trust, through its successor trustee. After the purchase, the buyers adjusted fence lines to match the legal descriptions in the deed. A third party then sued the buyers, seeking to quiet title to portions of the land based on adverse possession. The buyers notified the trust and trustee and requested a defense against the claim, asserting a duty under the warranty deed, but the trust and trustee refused.The third-party action was heard in the District Court for Douglas County. The buyers moved for partial summary judgment, and the court quieted title in their favor. Their counterclaims for slander and attorney fees were denied. The court found the third party had a colorable claim but lacked legal expertise. The buyers subsequently sued the trust and trustee, seeking reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in defending the title, alleging anticipatory repudiation and breach of the warranty deed. After a stipulated bench trial, the district court ruled that Nebraska law does not allow recovery of attorney fees from a grantor when the grantee successfully defends title; a breach of the covenant of warranty only occurs upon an unsuccessful defense resulting in eviction or surrender. The buyers appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law. The court held that the covenant of warranty in Nebraska does not impose a separate duty to defend against third-party claims, and attorney fees are compensable only if the grantee suffers eviction or surrender under a paramount title. Because the buyers successfully defended their title and were not evicted, there was no breach, and neither the trust nor its trustee was liable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Dall" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over real property in Harrison County, Mississippi, after the land was sold to the state for unpaid taxes in August 2017 and subsequently conveyed to Jermille Johnson via forfeited tax land patents in 2021. Elizabeth Cleveland, who had lived on the property since the 1980s, filed a complaint in the Harrison County Chancery Court seeking to quiet title through adverse possession and to void the tax sale due to lack of proper notice. Cleveland asserted that she had acquired ownership by adverse possession over more than twenty years.The Harrison County Chancery Court found that Cleveland had standing to challenge the tax sale and land patents, and determined the sale was void because the required notice had not been given. The chancellor cancelled the land patents and returned the property to the county. Johnson appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s judgment, holding that Cleveland lacked standing to challenge the tax sale and that Mississippi Code Section 29-1-21 barred such claims once land was struck off to the state. The appellate court remanded the case for consideration of Johnson’s counterclaim to quiet title.On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed only the issue of Cleveland’s standing. The Court held that Cleveland has standing to challenge the tax sale because her adverse possession claim, if true, would have vested title in her by operation of law. Additionally, the unique facts of the case demonstrated an adverse impact sufficient to confer standing, as Cleveland faced losing her home. The Court rejected Johnson’s statutory argument, holding that other statutes permit challenges to tax sales. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court. View "Johnson v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Jason Wylie, a farmer and business owner, experienced significant financial distress following a serious illness in 2018 that left him unable to manage his farm and businesses. Over the preceding years, Wylie and his mother, Kathleen Sullivan, engaged in several financial transactions, including property transfers and loans. In August 2019, Wylie transferred three pieces of real property back to Sullivan by quitclaim deed, with two properties still subject to mortgages. The parties executed a “Mutual Release in Full” to settle the debt. In August 2020, Wylie filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, seeking to discharge nearly $2 million in debt. The bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Sullivan to avoid one of the property transfers, alleging it was constructively fraudulent and intended to shield assets from creditors.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that Wylie received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the property transferred to Sullivan, determining the transfer was constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). The court ordered Sullivan to return one of the properties to the estate. Sullivan appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, with no deference to the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Wylie did not personally guarantee the business loan to Sullivan, the Mutual Release did not cover damages from a prior conversion of funds, and the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by ordering recovery of the transferred property rather than its value. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Sullivan v. Miller" on Justia Law

A transmission development company sought to build a high-voltage transmission line across three Maryland counties to address a regional electricity shortage. After receiving federal approval, the company was required to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from Maryland's Public Service Commission (PSC) before construction. As part of the CPCN application, environmental and socioeconomic field studies needed to be conducted on properties along the proposed route. The property owners refused access for these surveys, prompting the developer to submit desktop studies instead, which the PSC's Power Plant Research Program (PPRP) found inadequate, deeming the application incomplete. The developer then sought an injunction to enter the properties for the necessary field studies.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the developer's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the developer was likely to succeed on the merits under Maryland law, particularly Section 12-111(a) of the Real Property Article, which allows entities with eminent domain powers to access private land for surveys. The court determined that the developer had a viable claim to such power for the purposes of conducting the surveys, even though it could not condemn property until it obtained a CPCN. The court also found irreparable harm due to lost revenues from project delays, that the balance of equities favored the developer, and the public interest supported the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the developer likely possessed the statutory right of access to conduct surveys prior to obtaining a CPCN, and that all four Winter factors for injunctive relief were satisfied. View "PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP" on Justia Law

A developer sought to construct an 82-lot residential subdivision on a 66-acre parcel in unincorporated Sussex County, Delaware, where the property’s current zoning permitted such use as of right. The Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission approved the developer’s subdivision plan but imposed 19 conditions. The developer objected to two of these: one eliminating a lot (lot 64) due to concerns about isolation and flooding, and another requiring a 25-foot fixed buffer from non-tidal wetlands, which the developer argued was inconsistent with existing regulations and a recently adopted ordinance that exempted pending applications.After the Commission declined to reconsider, the developer sought certiorari review in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The Superior Court found that the Commission had erred as a matter of law, holding that the elimination of lot 64 was based on generalized neighborhood opposition rather than minimizing adverse impacts, and that the buffer condition was inconsistent with the applicable code and improperly applied to the pending application. The Superior Court struck both conditions as unreasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether the Commission had exceeded its discretion and clarified the standard for “reasonable” conditions. The Supreme Court held that local governments may impose reasonable, fact-based conditions on subdivision approvals, but those conditions must be rationally related to specific land use impacts and cannot be based only on generalized community opposition. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision striking the buffer condition, finding no code support or articulated rationale for it. However, it reversed and remanded the decision regarding the elimination of lot 64, instructing the Commission to further investigate the environmental and drainage concerns and to base any condition on substantial evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission v. Smokey Hollow, LLC" on Justia Law

A national flooring retailer contracted with a Louisiana-based construction management company for the construction of a retail store in Metairie, Louisiana. The relationship soured after the retailer terminated the agreement, allegedly due to delays. Shortly after termination, the construction company disputed that it had breached the contract and demanded payment for work performed. The retailer did not respond to the payment demand.The construction company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Louisiana Private Works Act, seeking recovery for the work performed. The retailer moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement’s dispute resolution provision and also sought to transfer the case. The district court granted the transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. When the motion to compel arbitration was renewed in the new court, the district court denied it again, concluding the retailer had not followed the prerequisite steps outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted de novo review. The appellate court determined that the arbitration clause in the contract, which gave the retailer sole discretion to elect arbitration, was a contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. Applying state contract principles and relevant Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court found that the lack of mutuality and the imbalance in bargaining power rendered the clause unenforceable. The court held that the arbitration provision was adhesionary and thus invalid, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "MAPP v. Floor and Decor" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

Michael Ball agreed to sell a residential property in Washington, D.C. to David Hubbard for $665,000. Hubbard failed to pay the sale price by the settlement date, after which Ball sold the property to another buyer. Ball then sued Hubbard for breach of contract, seeking damages representing the difference between the original contract price and the subsequent sale. The contract listed “221 35th LLC (To Be Formed)” as the buyer, but Hubbard signed and initialed the contract himself. The contract included an integration clause and a provision requiring Ball to comply with the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA), granting Hubbard a right to void the contract if compliance was not achieved after specific notice and cure periods.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia first denied Hubbard’s motion to dismiss, finding the contract was enforceable and Hubbard could be personally liable as a promoter of the unformed LLC. Later, after Ball ceased participating in the proceedings, Hubbard filed an unopposed motion for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in Hubbard’s favor, concluding that the contract was unenforceable because two conditions precedent—the formation of the LLC and delivery of TOPA documents—were not met. The court also found Hubbard not personally liable as an agent of a disclosed principal and ordered Ball to return Hubbard’s $10,000 deposit and pay attorney’s fees.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. It held that neither the formation of the LLC nor the delivery of TOPA documents constituted conditions precedent to performance under the contract. Furthermore, the court concluded that Hubbard could potentially be held personally liable for breach, as the LLC was not formed and no evidence established that Ball agreed to bind only the LLC. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ball v. Hubbard" on Justia Law