Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissal of Village Lofts at St. Anthony Falls' common-law claims and statutory warranty claims, holding that, for statute of repose purposes, a single warranty date applies to an entire condominium claim and that the two buildings in this case that compromised a condominium building were separate improvements to real property. In dismissing Village Lofts' claims, the district court concluded that the claims were barred by the statutes of repose in Minn. Stat. 541.051. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) in determining how the statute of repose operates for claims of breach of the statutory warranties in Minn. Stat. ch. 327A, a single warranty date applies to each unit within a condominium building; and (2) the two buildings that compromised the condominium development at issue in this case constituted two separate improvements to real property for purposes of applying the repose period in Minn. Stat. 541.051 to defective and unsafe condition claims. View "Village Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Ass'n v. Housing Partners III-Lofts, LLC" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims alleging that Defendants violated the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and the Massachusetts Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 49, holding that both counts were time-barred. Plaintiff filed her complaint against the current holder of a mortgage on her property and the servicer of the mortgage loan, alleging that the loan was predatory because at its inception the lender knew or should have known that Plaintiff would not be able to repay it. Defendants removed the case to federal district court and then moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court dismissed the chapter 93A count as time-barred and the second count on the ground that chapter 93, 49 does not provide private right of action. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both counts, albeit on different grounds, holding that both the chapter 93A claim and the chapter 93, 49 claims were time-barred. View "O'Brien v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the superior court foreclosing Crown Realty LLC's right of redemption to real property that was the subject of a 2017 tax sale, holding that that the superior court justice properly entered a decree forever barring Crown Realty's right of redemption. Crown Realty was the owner of real property that was sold to Plaintiff at a tax sale conducted by the Town of North Providence. Plaintiff failed a petition to foreclose the right of redemption, citing a failure to any interested party to redeem the property. The justice determined that Crown Realty's right of redemption was barred. One week later, a final decree was entered foreclosing the right of Crown Realty to redeem the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Crown Realty's request that an exception to Conley v. Fontaine, 138 A.3d 756 (R.I. 2016), be applied in this case was misplaced; and (2) no implied-in-fact contract existed between the parties. View "Conley v. Crown Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

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The lessee of commercially used Sixteenth Section Land sought to prevent the leasing school board from adjusting the annual rent outside the time constraints of the lease. While the terms of the lease appeared to contain a clear time restriction within which the Board did not act, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the restriction could not be enforced. The restriction ran contrary to the statutory requirement that rent “shall be adjusted not less than once every ten (10) years . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. sec. 29-3-69 (Rev. 2010). Further, a school board’s duty as trustee to assure adequate consideration is received based on current fair market value of the Sixteenth Section Land cannot be waived, even by mutual agreement in a contract. For those reasons, the Supreme Court concluded the chancellor did not err by denying the lessee’s motion for a declaratory judgment that the school board was precluded from adjusting the rent based on the time restrictions in the lease. View "Oak Grove Marketplace, LLC v. Lamar County School District" on Justia Law

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In Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun., 365 Or 371, 446 P3d 53 (2019), the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Energy Facility Siting Council had failed to substantially comply with a procedural requirement when it amended rules governing how it processes requests for amendment (RFAs) to site certificates that the council issued. The Court therefore held that the rules were invalid. In response to that decision, the council adopted temporary rules governing the RFA process. Petitioners contended that those temporary rules were also invalid. According to petitioners, the rules were invalid because the council failed to prepare a statement of its findings justifying the use of temporary rules. Petitioners also maintained that the council’s rules exceed the 180-day limit on temporary rules or otherwise improperly operated retroactively. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed with petitioners’ arguments and concluded the temporary rules were valid. View "Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the circuit court's order awarding damages under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act to Alexander Apartments, LLC and certain tenants after determining that the City of Little Rock violated Appellees' due process rights under the Arkansas Constitution, holding that the circuit court correctly found that the City violated Appellees' due process rights but incorrectly awarded damages. On appeal, the City argued that it did not violate Alexander Apartments' or the tenants' due process rights under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the circuit court was correct as a matter of law that the City violated Alexander Apartments' and the tenants' due process rights under the Arkansas Constitution; (2) substantial evidence supported the circuit court's award of damages to Alexander Apartments in the amount of $432,744.33; and (3) the circuit court erroneously considered events and circumstances that were unrelated to the City's due process violations in determining the tenants' damages awards. View "City of Little Rock v. Alexander Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted New Wen, Inc.'s request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of its real property, holding that New Wen showed, by clear and convincing evidence, that ODOT must pay compensation for the taking of the property at issue in this case. At issue was ODOT's closure of a certain intersection, which deprived New Wen of access to a state route. The Supreme Court held that an easement agreement expressly preserved the right of access of New Wen's predecessor-in-title right to the state route and that ODOT's closure of the intersection deprived New Wen of its right of access. Therefore, the Court granted a writ of mandamus to compel ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings and pay compensation for the taking of the property at issue in this case. View "State ex rel. New Wen, Inc. v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

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After John Worthen amassed over eighteen million dollars in unpaid tax liabilities, the federal government placed liens on properties it claimed belonged to his alter egos or nominees. Following a court- ordered sale of the properties, Worthen sought to exercise a statutory right to redeem under Utah state law. The district court concluded there were no redemption rights following sales under 26 U.S.C. 7403. The Tenth Circuit concurred, finding neither section 7403 nor 28 U.S.C. 2001, which governed the sale of realty under court order, explicitly provided for redemption rights. Moreover, federal tax proceedings provided sufficient protection for taxpayers and third parties. View "Arlin Geophysical Company v. United States" on Justia Law

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In this inverse condemnation action the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court entering judgment of a matter of law that Appellant failed to establish a taking and failed to provide proof of damages, holding that the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence of the value of Appellant's property. In her action, Appellant alleged that a road expansion project took a portion of her real property in Johnson County. The trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law, concluding that Appellant did not meet her burden to show that a taking occurred and that the evidence would be inadequate to prove any measure of damages for a partial taking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law that Appellant failed to establish a taking and failed to provide proof of damages. View "Byrnes v. Johnson County Commissioners" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court ordering strict foreclosure, holding that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that an initial entry into a record of debt was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule when that entry was provided by a third party in the course of the sale of the debt. Specifically, the Court held that the Appellate Court (1) did not err in concluding that Jenzack Partners, LLC (Jenzack) had standing to foreclose a mortgage executed in support of a personal guarantee of a promissory note given by a third party even though the guarantee was not explicitly assigned to the foreclosing party; and (2) erred in determining that the business records exception did not apply to Jenzack's calculation of the debt owed on the promissory note where the initial entry into the record of the debt was provided by a third party. View "Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC" on Justia Law