Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals loaned money to entities for which a third person guaranteed repayment. When those loans went unpaid, the lenders obtained a default judgment of approximately $4.5 million against the guarantor. The guarantor did not pay the judgment, leading the lenders to initiate post-judgment proceedings to discover and collect his assets. They issued a citation on funds previously held in escrow by a lender as security for loans on properties owned by entities the guarantor controlled. After property sales fully repaid the loans, the escrowed funds remained frozen pending resolution of who was entitled to them. Several limited liability companies (LLCs) associated with the guarantor, as well as his estranged wife, intervened, each asserting claims to the funds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois appointed a Special Master to determine the ownership of the escrowed funds. After discovery and a hearing, the Special Master found that the funds belonged to the guarantor, not the LLCs, based on evidence that he exercised complete control over similar proceeds and used them for personal expenses without objection from the LLCs. The district court adopted these findings and ordered further proceedings to determine if the wife’s claim for unpaid child and spousal support had priority. Before those proceedings concluded, the wife and the lenders agreed to split the funds, and the district court approved this resolution, over objections from the LLCs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the LLCs’ appeal and dismissed the guarantor’s appeal for lack of standing. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the escrowed funds belonged to the guarantor and could be used to satisfy the judgment. It also rejected the argument that the proceedings improperly pierced the corporate veil or violated procedural requirements under Illinois law. View "Zhu Zhai Holdings Limited v Ivankovich" on Justia Law

A Montana company that provides mold remediation services was contacted to perform emergency work at a home in Idaho. The homeowner’s father, a long-time acquaintance of the company’s owner, facilitated the arrangement. Although the company disclosed it was not registered as a contractor in Idaho, it entered into an agreement with the homeowner and completed the remediation work. The company billed over $44,000 for its services, but the homeowner, after receiving insurance funds, refused to pay, claiming the work was not properly completed and instead used the funds to pay another contractor.The company then filed a complaint for unjust enrichment in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Bonner County. The homeowner moved to dismiss, arguing that under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA), unregistered contractors are barred from bringing actions in Idaho courts to recover compensation for work performed. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that the company’s failure to register precluded its claim and that no equitable exception applied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of ICRA unambiguously bars unregistered contractors from seeking compensation through Idaho courts, even under equitable theories such as unjust enrichment, when the claim is against a member of the general public—the party the statute is designed to protect. The court affirmed the district court’s decision and declined to award attorney fees on appeal, concluding that the appeal raised legitimate legal questions, though the arguments did not prevail. View "Samuel Lee Services LLC v. Bangeman" on Justia Law

A developer specializing in large-scale data centers agreed to purchase industrially zoned property in Lordstown, Ohio, intending to construct a data center. To proceed, the developer initiated the required site-plan review process under local ordinances in October 2025 by submitting initial materials to the Planning and Zoning Office. Shortly after, the village council passed an ordinance prohibiting data centers, but then repealed it before it took effect. The council instead enacted a temporary moratorium suspending the issuance and processing of permits for new data centers, and later extended this moratorium. As a result, the site-plan review for the developer’s project was halted and did not advance beyond the initial stages.Prior to the present proceedings, the developer and the property seller sought a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio to compel the Village of Lordstown and its planning-and-zoning administrator to continue the site-plan review under the ordinances in effect when the application was first submitted—before the moratorium. The respondents moved to dismiss the petition, and the court dismissed the claim as to the village solicitor but allowed the action to proceed against the other respondents, granting an alternative writ and setting a schedule for merits briefing.The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the village lacked a clear legal duty to proceed with the site-plan review while the moratorium was in effect. The court held that the developer did not have a vested legal right to have its site plan reviewed under the prior zoning ordinance because it had not yet met all legislative requirements for a building permit. The court distinguished earlier cases that had found vested rights under different circumstances. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus, holding that the moratorium lawfully suspended the village’s obligations regarding the site-plan review for data centers during its effective period. View "State v. Lordstown" on Justia Law

A commercial law firm entered into a 66-month lease for office space in downtown Oakland, California, but quickly failed to make rent and other payments. After accumulating substantial arrears, the landlord initiated an unlawful detainer action. The parties settled, with the tenant agreeing to pay arrears and stipulating that if it defaulted again, the landlord could obtain a judgment for possession, unpaid rent, fees, and future rent. The tenant defaulted again, leading the landlord to seek and obtain judgment under the settlement’s terms.The Alameda County Superior Court held hearings on damages, including the landlord’s claim for future rent. The landlord presented expert testimony and evidence on market conditions, showing high vacancy rates and poor prospects for re-leasing the premises. The tenant did not present counter-evidence. The court found the tenant breached the settlement and awarded possession to the landlord, damages for unpaid rent and fees, and future rental damages for three years, reduced to present value, based on market evidence and the landlord's duty to mitigate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that substantial evidence supported the award of future rent, the stipulation for damages was not an unlawful penalty under California law, and the judgment did not result in a double recovery. The court applied the substantial evidence standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The judgment was affirmed, and the landlord was awarded costs on appeal. View "USPA City Center, LLC v. Law Offices of Jason W. Estavillo, P.C." on Justia Law

A Ukrainian Catholic parish near Pittsburgh owns two plots of land, one containing its church and the other, a cemetery and mausoleum. The parish sought to build a large shrine dedicated to Mary and the sanctity of life on its second plot in Collier Township, but the township’s zoning code did not allow such a use. The parish applied to amend the code and rezone its land to facilitate the project, submitting plans and a traffic study. After a public hearing, the township’s Board of Commissioners denied the application, citing traffic concerns, fundraising issues, and objections to the shrine’s pro-life message. The parish then proposed a smaller chapel, which was approved but with restrictive conditions. Initially, the parish appealed in state court, but it abandoned that appeal to file a federal lawsuit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and RLUIPA.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the parish’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the parish was not substantially likely to succeed on the merits, the requested relief was unclear, and granting an injunction would disrupt the status quo rather than preserve it. The court also found that no injunction was necessary to keep the case viable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. Applying a deferential standard, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that although the parish had a strong likelihood of success on its RLUIPA substantial-burden claim, it failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or the necessity of preliminary relief. The court emphasized that preliminary injunctions are meant to preserve the status quo pending trial, not to grant final relief. The denial was affirmed. View "Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church v. Township of Collier" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two individuals who cohabited for nearly a decade before marrying. During their relationship, the parties agreed to pool their efforts and share any property acquired during this period, which included contributions to one party’s government pension. After the relationship ended, the non-employee party claimed entitlement to a share of the pension accrued during their pre-marital cohabitation, based on their agreement.After separation and the filing of a civil action for breach of contract, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the proceedings. The court found that the parties had an implied-in-fact contract—known as a Marvin agreement—to share equally in all property acquired during their relationship, including pension contributions. The trial court held that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the period of cohabitation, even though the parties were not married at the time.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed only the question of whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the non-employee party from receiving a share of the pension. The appellate court held that section 12337, which generally renders such pensions unassignable and exempt from execution, does not preclude enforcement of an ownership interest in the pension arising from a Marvin agreement. The court reasoned that the non-employee party’s claim was not as a creditor but as an owner by virtue of contract, and therefore section 12337’s restrictions did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

A man and a woman were in a committed romantic relationship for nearly eight years, during which they had a child and operated joint businesses. After they separated, the man initiated a lawsuit seeking division of assets he claimed were acquired during their domestic partnership. The parties agreed that they had a domestic partnership, which under Alaska law means a relationship in which they intended to share assets as though married. However, they disagreed on whether certain assets—a building the man owned before the relationship and a boat acquired during the partnership but titled and paid for solely by the man—were partnership property subject to division.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Dillingham found that all disputed assets, including the building and the boat, were partnership property. The court reasoned that the building, though purchased and built by the man before the relationship, was essential to the operation of one of their joint businesses, and that the boat, although acquired with the man’s separate funds and titled solely in his name, was intended for partnership use. The court ordered a 50/50 division of these assets and required the man to pay an equalization amount to the woman. The man moved for reconsideration, challenging the classification and valuation of the building and the boat, but the Superior Court denied reconsideration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that property acquired before a domestic partnership begins is not subject to the special rules for partnership property and remains the owner’s separate property. It further held that, for property acquired during a domestic partnership, the tracing doctrine applies: if an item is acquired solely with one party’s separate funds and titled in that person’s name, it remains separate property. The court reversed the Superior Court’s rulings on both the building and the boat and remanded for further proceedings. View "King v. Carty" on Justia Law

A landlord and a tenant, a ballet studio, entered into two lease agreements for suites in a shopping center. The leases contained provisions for indemnification, default, and attorney fees. After the ballet studio vacated the premises, alleging that the landlord failed to address mold issues that caused personal injuries to two individuals associated with the studio and damage to the studio’s property, the studio and the individuals filed a multi-count complaint against the landlord. The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and sought defense and indemnity from the ballet studio for the claims made by the individuals.The Montgomery Circuit Court addressed a partial summary judgment motion filed by the landlord, which concerned only the claims between the landlord and the ballet studio, not the individuals’ personal injury claims. The ballet studio and the individuals filed a response to the summary judgment motion, but it was submitted one business day late. The trial court granted the landlord’s motion to strike the late response and, later, denied the plaintiffs’ attempt to resubmit the same response. The court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Subsequently, the court certified this partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, but also included language purporting to dismiss the entire case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s orders striking the untimely response and denying its resubmission, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court also affirmed the certification of the partial summary judgment as final but reversed the dismissal of the entire case, noting that claims by the individuals against the landlord and the determination of damages owed to the landlord remained unresolved. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Charalambidou" on Justia Law

A subcontractor performed fabrication and machining services for a general contractor on a filtration plant project. The arrangement included a provision that the subcontractor would be paid only after the general contractor received payment from the owner. When payment to the subcontractor ceased due to a dispute between the general contractor and the owner, the subcontractor filed two construction liens against the property to secure payment, attaching multiple invoices to each lien. The liens themselves did not state the date the claim was due, but included invoices bearing various dates.After the subcontractor filed suit to enforce the liens and for other related claims, the owner removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The owner moved to dismiss, arguing that the liens were invalid because they did not “specify the date the claim was due” as required by Mississippi Code Section 85-7-405(1)(b). The district court agreed, finding that neither the liens nor the attached invoices clearly identified the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The subcontractor appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit found no clear controlling Mississippi precedent on whether attaching invoices with dates, but without clear explanation of what those dates represent, satisfies the statutory requirement. It certified the question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that simply attaching invoices with dates that do not plainly indicate the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied does not satisfy the requirement that an enforceable lien “specify the date the claim was due” under Section 85-7-405(1)(b). The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Cuevas Machine Company, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corporation" on Justia Law

An individual operated a bed and breakfast (B&B) on Maui under a permit requiring compliance with local regulations and that the owner reside on the property. In 2020, neighbors repeatedly complained to the Maui Department of Planning about noise and the owner’s absence during guest stays. Police were called, and the department investigated, finding evidence that the permit conditions had been violated—including the owner’s own admission that he sometimes stayed elsewhere and evidence of noncompliance with quiet hours and COVID-19 regulations. The department revoked the B&B permit and imposed a two-year ban on future permit applications. The owner appealed this decision to the Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals (BVA), which after several hearings and delays, ultimately upheld the department’s decision.After the BVA announced its decision orally on November 24, 2021, it did not adopt and file formal findings of fact and conclusions of law (FOF/COL) until January 2022, exceeding a 45-day deadline specified in the BVA’s procedural rules. The owner appealed to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the BVA’s delay violated its own rules and required reversal. The circuit court affirmed the BVA’s decision, finding the owner in violation of permit conditions and upholding the ban.On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the BVA’s failure to comply with the 45-day rule was a mandatory violation warranting reversal, and that the delay prejudiced the owner’s substantial rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that the 45-day deadline in the BVA’s rules is directory, not mandatory, because the rule does not specify a consequence for noncompliance. The court further found that the owner did not suffer prejudice to substantial rights due to the delay. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and reinstated the circuit court’s decision upholding the permit revocation and ban. View "Norrie v. Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals" on Justia Law