Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A group of landowners and mutual water companies in Ventura County, California, claimed rights to groundwater from the Las Posas Valley Groundwater Basin, which supplies water for agricultural, commercial, and domestic purposes. The groundwater basin had been subject to restrictions and management by the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (Fox Canyon), especially in light of overdraft conditions and the requirements of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). Disputes arose over groundwater pumping allocations, historical use, and the proper method for determining and allocating water rights among various landowners, mutual water companies, and public agencies.The case was brought as a comprehensive groundwater adjudication in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, proceeding in three phases. First, the court established the initial “Total Safe Yield” of the basin and allocated a portion to certain public water suppliers. In the second phase, the court, after a trial and a settlement agreed to by a large majority of parties, allocated the remaining rights among landowners, prioritizing overlying landowners and finding no surplus for appropriators. The third phase established a “physical solution” for basin management, appointing Fox Canyon as watermaster and integrating the settlement into a final judgment. Several parties, including Mahan Ranch and two mutual water companies, objected to aspects of the allocations and the final judgment, raising issues about the treatment of mutual water companies, the handling of dormant rights, and the legality of the court's actions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court properly allocated water rights based on overlying landowners’ rights, not directly to mutual water companies, and that there was no surplus for appropriators. The court found the physical solution and allocations consistent with California law, the Constitution, and SGMA, and that non-stipulating parties were treated equitably. The judgment was affirmed. View "Las Posas Valley Water v. Ventura County Waterworks" on Justia Law

A family visiting Arkansas stopped at the Lydalisk Bridge, a low-water crossing over the Middle Fork of the Little Red River. The bridge, owned by The Nature Conservancy, created a pool upstream where water flowed through narrow culverts beneath the bridge. There were no warning signs posted. A seven-year-old child swam in the pool and was pulled by the river’s current into a culvert, becoming trapped and subsequently dying. The Nature Conservancy had commissioned engineering reports about this and a similar nearby bridge, but received the report warning of risks at the Lydalisk Bridge only after the incident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed the parents’ negligence and malicious failure-to-warn claims against The Nature Conservancy and its insurers. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court found that the Arkansas Recreational Use Statute (ARUS) generally relieves landowners from a duty of care to recreational users, unless there is a malicious failure to warn of an ultra-hazardous condition actually known to the owner. The court held that the complaint’s allegations did not plausibly show malice, only recklessness. The court also found that the Arkansas Direct-Action Statute (DAS) did not allow direct suit against the insurers, because The Nature Conservancy was not immune from suit—only from liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Eighth Circuit held that, under ARUS, Allen’s allegations did not satisfy the requirement for malicious conduct, and thus he failed to state a claim for breach of duty. The court further held that ARUS provides immunity from liability but not from suit, making DAS inapplicable to the insurers. The dismissal by the district court was affirmed. View "Allen v. Nature Conservancy" on Justia Law

Jay Bryant initiated an action to partition a 40-acre parcel of land, originally conveyed in 1978 to his parents, Lenora and Paul Bryant, as joint tenants. Upon their divorce in 1991, a property settlement stipulated that Paul would receive the parcel as his own, and Lenora would receive a different property. Although the divorce decree incorporated this agreement, Lenora never deeded her interest in the 40 acres to Paul. Paul subsequently transferred his interest to a third party, who then conveyed the property to Jay and his brother Jed. After Paul’s death in 2021 and during probate, a title report revealed that Lenora still legally owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, allowed Jay to amend his complaint to add Lenora and bifurcated the quiet title and partition actions. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the divorce file and stipulation and reviewed the chain of warranty deeds. After considering testimony and evidence, the circuit court found that Jay and Jed had a legal interest in the property and that Lenora’s claim was inconsistent with her prior agreement. The court applied judicial estoppel to preclude Lenora from asserting a continuing interest, extinguished her claim, and quieted title in favor of Jay and Jed. The court issued a final judgment on the quiet title action under SDCL 15-6-54(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Jay had standing under SDCL 21-41-1 to pursue a quiet title action and that the claim was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-6. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel, concluding Lenora was precluded from asserting an ownership interest after accepting the benefits of the stipulated property settlement. The circuit court’s judgment quieting title in favor of Jay and Jed was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law

A company sought to erect a digital billboard in a small Ohio municipality but was prevented from doing so by the local billboard ordinance, which included restrictions on size, location, and type of billboards permitted. The ordinance specifically banned “variable message” (digital) signs and implemented a “cap and replace” rule, allowing new billboards only if older ones were removed. The ordinance also contained several exemptions, including one for “public service” signs, which were allowed to display information like time or weather if not used for advertising.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the municipality, upholding the ordinance against the company’s First Amendment challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the exemption for public service signs was an unconstitutional, content-based restriction under the First Amendment, but remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the invalid exemption was severable from the rest of the ordinance.On remand, the district court found that the unconstitutional provision could be severed and that the remainder of the ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny, granting judgment again in favor of the municipality. The company appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the public-service exemption was severable under Ohio law, applying the three-part test from Geiger v. Geiger. The court further held that the remaining provisions of the ordinance were content-neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny because they were narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests such as traffic safety and aesthetics. The court also held that the company was not entitled to damages or attorney fees, as it was not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). View "Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard" on Justia Law

A black-owned construction company was not invited to bid as general contractor on a major Boston public housing redevelopment project after participating in pre-construction work. Years earlier, the developer had called the company’s president to discuss possible involvement, but the parties disputed what promises, if any, were made during that conversation. The construction company performed pre-construction work and was later selected as general contractor for the first phase (Camden), but after performance and communication issues arose during that project, the developer chose a different, white-owned company for the second phase (Lenox). The construction company did not protest at the time but later sued, alleging breach of contract, quasi-contract, violation of Massachusetts consumer protection law, and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.The matter was first brought in Massachusetts state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on federal question jurisdiction. After discovery, the developer moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the developer, finding no enforceable contract or promise had been made regarding the Lenox phase, that the quasi-contract and Chapter 93A claims failed as derivative, and that there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The First Circuit held that the summary judgment record did not contain evidence from which a reasonable jury could find an enforceable implied-in-fact contract or a promise sufficient for promissory estoppel. It further held that the plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding pretext or discriminatory intent under § 1981, given the legitimate business reasons cited for the company’s exclusion. Thus, summary judgment on all claims was proper. View "John B. Cruz Construction Co. v. Beacon Communities Corp." on Justia Law

Two individuals entered into a loan agreement and mortgage with a bank in Puerto Rico, using their home as collateral. After a decade, they faced financial difficulties and stopped making payments. The bank denied a request to modify the loan but proposed a short sale. The bank then initiated foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s Court of First Instance, resulting in a judgment against the borrowers. Multiple short sale offers were rejected until one was conditionally accepted, but the sale did not close in time and the home was foreclosed. Subsequently, the bank garnished funds from the borrowers, who then filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico confirmed the borrowers’ Chapter 13 plan, noting their intent to pursue claims against the bank. The borrowers filed an adversary proceeding seeking damages and other relief. The bank moved to dismiss the adversary complaint, but the bankruptcy court denied this motion, allowing the case to proceed. The borrowers later filed a similar complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and moved to withdraw the adversary proceeding to the district court. The district court denied the withdrawal as untimely and dismissed the separate federal case. After the borrowers completed their bankruptcy plan and received a discharge, the bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court erred in finding it automatically lost jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding post-discharge. The appellate court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower courts to reassess jurisdiction and properly address the borrowers’ motion for withdrawal and their jury trial request. View "Guallini-Indij v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on neighboring parcels of land in Moultonborough, New Hampshire, near Lake Winnipesaukee. The plaintiff owns Lot 3, which abuts Park Lane, and the defendant is a nonprofit club that owns nearby roadways, paths, and a lakefront beach area reserved for its members. Both parties’ properties originated from a 1959 subdivision, with subsequent conveyances and subdivisions altering the land’s configuration. The plaintiff asserted that Lot 3 retained rights to use the defendant’s roadways and beach area, either through implied or prescriptive easement, based on prior deeds and historical use by Lot 3’s owners.The Superior Court for Carroll County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. It determined that Lot 3 was not part of a common scheme of development that would entitle it to membership benefits in the club, including the use of the roadways and beach. The trial court found no express or implied easements in the relevant chain of title for Lot 3 and concluded that the plaintiff had not shown twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and applied de novo review to the legal questions. The court held that Lot 3, by virtue of the deed referencing the 1972 subdivision plan showing Park Lane and Far Echo Road as boundaries, has an implied easement as a matter of law to use those roadways. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding claims to use other roadways and the Lot 200 beach area, finding no implied or prescriptive easement rights for Lot 3. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Martin v. Far Echo Harbor Club" on Justia Law

The City sought to annex two undeveloped tracts of land adjacent to its existing boundaries in DeSoto County, Mississippi. One tract, owned by the Bridgforth family, had previously been split between city and county lines after an earlier annexation. The other tract, owned in part by the Bridgforths and in part by the Funderburk family, was near a highway interchange and had been considered for commercial development, including a potential truck stop, though no firm plans were underway. Both tracts were vacant and uninhabited, and landowners petitioned for annexation primarily to obtain municipal services for future development.The DeSoto County Chancery Court previously excluded these tracts from a major 2021 annexation. After the City enacted an ordinance and filed a new petition to annex the tracts, the Chancery Court held a trial with testimony from landowners, city officials, and experts. The court found the annexation unreasonable, citing speculative development plans, potential for jurisdictional confusion, the possibility of annexation being used to bypass county zoning restrictions, and the recent exclusion of these tracts in the 2021 annexation. The court relied on statutory factors, including the City’s need to expand, the adequacy of current county services, and the absence of population in the proposed area.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the chancery court’s denial of annexation was supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court held that the chancery court’s findings were not manifestly wrong and were supported by credible evidence, including the lack of demonstrated need for expansion and the adequacy of existing services. The Court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment, upholding the denial of annexation. View "In The Matter of The Enlarging, Extending and Defining The Corporate Limits and Boundaries of The City of Olive Branch, DeSoto County, Mississippi v. Dobbins" on Justia Law

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited.The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law

H.A.T., LLC entered into a bond-for-deed contract with Greenleaf Apartments, LLC to purchase three buildings in Portland for $1 million, with a down payment and monthly installments. H.A.T. took possession but would not receive title until the note was fully paid, and the parties executed additional agreements to address Greenleaf's concerns and clarify remedies for default. Over time, H.A.T. became delinquent in its payments, and Greenleaf lent additional funds to cover repairs after a series of casualty events. Despite proposals to consolidate debts and efforts to sell the property, H.A.T. remained in default. Greenleaf ultimately exercised its right under a memorandum agreement to terminate the contract without notice upon default, retaking possession of the property.H.A.T. then filed suit in the Maine Business and Consumer Docket, alleging various claims, including breach of contract and entitlement to insurance proceeds, while Greenleaf counterclaimed for breach of contract. The court dismissed claims against Greenleaf's counsel and, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Greenleaf on all claims. The court found that H.A.T. had defaulted on payment obligations, that Greenleaf was justified in terminating the contract, and that H.A.T. was not entitled to insurance proceeds or a setoff. The final judgment awarded Greenleaf costs and attorney fees.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment. The Court held that H.A.T. breached the contract by missing payments, Greenleaf had no obligation to provide H.A.T. with insurance proceeds, and H.A.T. was not entitled to notice of a right to cure because the statutory notice provision for foreclosures did not apply to commercial purchasers like H.A.T. The court concluded the statute was intended to protect homeowners, not commercial investors. Judgment was affirmed. View "H.A.T., LLC v. Greenleaf Apartmetns, LLC" on Justia Law