Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After a homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments, it levied the homeowner’s interest in her property and proceeded with a sheriff’s sale. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment or obtain release of the levy before the sale occurred. A third-party bidder purchased the homeowner’s interest in the property at auction. After the sale but before the court ratified it, the homeowner paid the judgment in full to the association. The association then notified the court of the satisfaction and requested that the sale be vacated, arguing the judgment had been satisfied prior to ratification.The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County, agreed with the association, concluding that the sale could be vacated since the homeowner satisfied the judgment before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed, holding a hearing and again ruling that the sale was not complete until ratification and thus could be undone by post-sale satisfaction of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that a judgment-debtor’s satisfaction of the judgment after a sheriff’s sale, but before ratification, cannot be raised as an exception to the sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). Post-sale satisfaction is not an irregularity in the sale and does not void the purchaser’s inchoate equitable interest in the property acquired at auction. The Court emphasized that the judgment-debtor may obtain release of the levy only before sale, and that post-sale options for release are not available. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to allow the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale, beginning after remand to the District Court. View "Baltimore XV Props. v. Newsteps' Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

A married couple divorced after more than two decades together, having had four children during their marriage. At the time of their separation, two children were already adults, and the youngest two were still minors or in high school. The parties agreed to a bifurcated divorce, settling some issues but leaving child support and the division of marital assets unresolved. Key disputes included child support obligations for their adult daughter, who was intellectually disabled and living in an assisted facility, the classification of a $100,000 early inheritance received by the husband, and the equitable division of marital property, including responsibility for capital gains taxes after selling marital real estate.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, conducted a trial on these issues. The court found that the wife had primary physical custody of the adult daughter and ordered the husband to pay child support, both retroactively through the daughter’s graduation and ongoing support until she began receiving Social Security benefits. The court classified the $100,000 inheritance as marital property, in part because it was deposited into a shared account and used to pay marital debt. The court divided the marital estate unequally, awarding 55% to the wife, based mainly on her role as homemaker and the husband’s higher earning potential, and denied the husband’s request for reimbursement for post-separation expenditures on the property (Ramsey credit). The court also made the husband responsible for 55% of the capital gains tax liability.On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rejection of the husband’s claims of judicial bias, its child support order, its classification of marital property, its denial of the Ramsey credit, and the overall division of the marital estate. However, it remanded for further findings on the allocation of capital gains tax liability, holding that the superior court must make additional findings explaining its unequal division of that debt. View "Cline v. Duckett" on Justia Law

A property in Hollis was owned by a trust with Wisarat Manutsom as trustee. The trustee, often traveling abroad, provided various mailing addresses—including in California, Manchester (New Hampshire), and later Maine—as well as an email address, to the town for tax-related correspondence. Mark Copp was authorized to act for the trust and provided his Manchester address. Over several years, the town sent multiple certified mail notices regarding unpaid property taxes and impending tax liens and deeds to these addresses; some were signed for and received, but several were returned as undeliverable. The town also communicated about the delinquent taxes by email. In 2019, after more undelivered certified mailings and no payment for 2016 taxes, the town executed a tax deed transferring ownership to itself, then sent post-deed notices by regular mail and, years later, by certified mail and email.The plaintiff sued in the Superior Court, alleging the town’s notice regarding the 2016 and 2018 tax liens and the 2016 tax deed was constitutionally deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, finding the notice sufficient. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It held that the town’s failure to take additional reasonable steps—such as emailing notice—after certified notices of the impending 2016 tax deed were returned undelivered, and before executing the deed, violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. The court also found the town’s notice of the 2016 tax lien insufficient because it relied on an address that had repeatedly failed. However, notice of the 2018 tax lien, sent to both Manchester and Maine addresses, was deemed sufficient. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manutsom v. Town of Hollis" on Justia Law

A nonprofit boating club owned property in Cass County, Nebraska, with access provided by a road known as Dock Road. This road extended from Main Street, past a public boat ramp owned by the city, and terminated at the club’s gate. In 2019, flooding washed out a portion of Dock Road, severing road access to the club’s property, though river access remained available. The city repaired Dock Road to restore access to its public boat ramp but did not repair the road up to the club’s property. The club sought to compel the city to restore road access, arguing the city had a mandatory duty to repair Dock Road under Nebraska law.Following the city’s refusal, the club filed for a writ of mandamus in the District Court for Cass County. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, concluding that the city’s duty under Nebraska statutes was discretionary rather than ministerial, and that the club had not shown Dock Road (particularly the portion past the public boat ramp) was a public street. The court dismissed the club’s complaint and denied its motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Court held that the club failed to demonstrate the portion of Dock Road it sought to have repaired was a public street, either by formal dedication or by prescription. Evidence showed that only members and invitees of the club used the disputed section, not the general public. Therefore, the statutory duty cited by the club did not apply, and the city was not obligated to repair the road as requested. The judgment for summary dismissal was affirmed. View "Plattsmouth Boat Club v. City of Plattsmouth" on Justia Law

Romero owned a home in Chicago but failed to pay property taxes from 2018 to 2021, resulting in Cook County holding a lien on his property. Rather than foreclosing, the county conducted a tax sale, at which Corona Investments acquired a Certificate of Purchase for Romero’s property in November 2021. This certificate gave Corona the right to take title after a waiting period unless Romero redeemed the property by paying the outstanding taxes plus penalty interest. Romero had until October 2024 to redeem, but filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy one week before the deadline, triggering an automatic stay and preventing Corona from seeking a tax deed.In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the judge determined that Corona Investments held a secured claim of $26,134.95 in the bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court classified Corona's claim as a "tax claim" under 11 U.S.C. § 511(a), which meant that the interest rate on the claim would be governed by applicable nonbankruptcy law. The court found that the relevant rate was 18%, as provided by 35 ILCS 200/21-15 of the Illinois Property Tax Code. The court rejected arguments for applying a lower redemption rate or the rate determined by the "formula approach" from Till v. SCS Credit Corp.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a tax sale purchaser’s secured claim qualifies as a “tax claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 511(a), and that the applicable nonbankruptcy law—the Illinois Property Tax Code—provides an 18% annual interest rate for such claims in Cook County. The court also declined to impose sanctions related to briefing errors, concluding they did not materially affect the appeal. View "Romero v Corona Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerned property owners who sought approval from the City of Cannon Beach to build a house on an oceanfront lot and to develop an adjacent public right-of-way to provide vehicular access. Both the lot and the right-of-way are located in a landslide hazard zone, and the city code imposes restrictions requiring applicants to demonstrate either the absence of geologic hazard or that proposed engineering methods will eliminate or minimize the hazard. The dispute arose because a state statute requires local standards regulating the “development of housing” to be “clear and objective,” while the city’s geologic hazard standard includes a subjective component.After initial conditional approval, the city ultimately denied both applications—one for the house and one for the road—based on grounds unrelated to geologic hazards. However, it did not apply its geologic hazards standards to either application, reasoning that the “clear and objective” statutory requirement precluded it from applying subjective standards to the housing development. Both parties appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), which agreed with the city’s interpretation and held that the statute preempted application of the geologic hazard standards to the road development. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed LUBA’s decision in part, holding that the “clear and objective standards” requirement did not prevent the city from applying its geologic hazard standards to the application to develop a public road.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the statutory requirement of “clear and objective” standards for “the development of housing” applies only to the housing itself, not to the development of a public road on an adjacent public right-of-way, unless the city requires the road development as a condition of approving housing. The city and LUBA’s interpretation was incorrect, and the case was remanded to LUBA for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. City of Cannon Beach" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute arising from an oral agreement between a homeowner and a contractor regarding the construction of a wheelchair ramp and a covered addition at the homeowner’s residence. The parties did not sign a written contract or agree to a specific price, instead communicating the project’s scope via text messages. The homeowner paid the contractor $73,000, including $30,000 for siding, but the project was plagued by construction delays, quality concerns, and code violations. Work ceased before completion, and the contractor did not deliver or install the siding. The homeowner and his wife continued living in the property, though it did not receive a final certificate of compliance.The homeowner sued in the District Court of Sweetwater County, asserting claims including breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty. During discovery, the homeowner failed to provide a specific calculation of damages, only indicating he would supplement disclosures later. Before trial, the contractor moved to exclude any evidence of damages not previously disclosed. The district court partially granted this motion, limiting the homeowner’s evidence to what had been disclosed. At a bench trial, the homeowner did not call his retained expert and offered only the total amount paid as the measure of damages. The district court concluded the oral contract was unenforceable due to indefinite terms and found insufficient evidence to support a damages award.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that, because the homeowner failed to make an offer of proof regarding excluded damages evidence, there was no basis to review the trial court’s exclusionary ruling. The court further held that the district court’s finding—that the homeowner did not prove damages by a preponderance of the evidence—was not clearly erroneous. As the damages element was not satisfied, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Lacher v. Case" on Justia Law

Appellants, owners of rowhouses abutting a proposed residential development in Washington, D.C., challenged the actions of the D.C. Zoning Commission regarding the approval of a Design Review application submitted by a developer. Their properties shared an easement with the development site, and a prior agreement in 2017 and a subsequent one in 2022 set the terms of access. During the Commission’s public hearing, both Appellants and Developer discussed the easement, with Developer assuring that the agreement was signed, though not yet recorded. Appellants voiced concerns about the easement’s finality and requested further review.After the Commission approved the Design Review application and issued its Order of Approval, Appellants pursued separate legal actions against the Developer, which were dismissed following the new easement agreement. Subsequently, Appellants filed a complaint against the District of Columbia in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, claiming violations of their substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged the Commission deliberately ignored statutory requirements by failing to collect their signatures for the application and by neglecting to properly investigate the easement’s final status.The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and also found that Appellants failed to state a viable due process claim. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was improper, as exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement. However, the Court affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim, concluding that Appellants’ allegations amounted at most to negligence, not the egregious conduct required for a substantive due process violation. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Samaddar, DDS v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A company owned a vacant shopping center located within a city. The city repeatedly identified the property as blighted and unsafe, urging the owner to submit an abatement plan and later ordering the property to be boarded up and fenced. Over time, city officials considered and ultimately planned for the demolition of the shopping center by means of a controlled burn, citing concerns over trespassing and public safety. The owner neither expressly agreed to the controlled burn nor provided an alternative abatement plan. The city proceeded with the demolition by fire, after notifying the owner, and later removed the resulting debris.The owner filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, asserting claims against the city and contractors for intentional trespass, statutory business conspiracy, tortious interference with a business expectancy, waste, and a takings claim under the Virginia Constitution. The owner also sought declaratory relief concerning costs and penalties imposed by the city. The city raised sovereign immunity as a defense, filing a plea in bar to dismiss all claims except the takings claim. The Circuit Court denied the plea in bar, finding it could not determine whether the city’s actions were within its governmental function. The city then pursued an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo, based on the pleadings and exhibits. It held that the city’s actions in demolishing the shopping center constituted a governmental function—blight abatement—which is protected by sovereign immunity, even if the city had additional motives or failed to comply with all statutory requirements. The court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding the city immune from all tort and statutory claims, as well as most declaratory relief sought, but not from the constitutional takings claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the takings claim and claims involving third parties. View "City of Hopewell v. Shree Arihant Motel, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a property dispute in Hampstead, New Hampshire, where the owners of a non-conforming lakefront cottage sought a special exception from the zoning ordinance to add a second story to their seasonal residence. Because their lot is smaller than what the ordinance requires and lacks sufficient frontage, any alteration required a special exception from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. The owners applied for the exception, and after a hearing where they described their plans but did not address how their proposal met the ordinance’s criteria, the Zoning Board granted the exception. The petitioner, an abutter whose property faces the cottage across the road, objected that the addition would block her lake view and decrease her property value, and she introduced photographic evidence.After the Zoning Board of Adjustment granted the exception without making specific written findings, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was denied. She then appealed to the New Hampshire Housing Appeals Board, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the special exception criteria, specifically the requirement that the project not diminish surrounding property values. The Housing Appeals Board affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision, concluding that it was not unreasonable or unlawful.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the applicants did not meet their burden of proof to show their addition would not diminish surrounding property values, as required by the zoning ordinance. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicants was insufficient, and the Zoning Board’s implicit finding to the contrary was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Housing Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the Zoning Board’s grant of the special exception. View "Appeal of Murray" on Justia Law