Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A developer applied to San Luis Obispo County for a coastal development permit to construct single-family homes on several residential lots in an established neighborhood in Los Osos. The County granted the permit in 2019. The California Coastal Commission appealed the County’s approval and denied the permit, claiming appellate jurisdiction on two grounds: that the proposed development was located within a sensitive coastal resource area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP), and that the project was not the only principal permitted use for the site under the LCP.The developer petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate in the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, arguing that the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction. The trial court found for the Commission on the SCRA issue but rejected the Commission’s alternative jurisdictional ground. On appeal, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed, holding that the Commission had properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the project’s location in an SCRA and did not reach the alternative ground.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to clarify the standard of review for the Commission’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction and whether deference is owed to either the Commission’s or the County’s interpretation of the LCP. The Court held that: (1) courts should use independent judgment when the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction turns on LCP interpretation; (2) no deference is owed to either agency’s interpretation when both administer the LCP and their views are equally plausible; (3) the proposed development site is not within an SCRA under the LCP; and (4) the Commission lacks appellate jurisdiction merely because a site has multiple principal permitted uses. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and ordered the Commission’s denial of the permit to be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. View "Shear Development Co., LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

Two neighboring property owners with lakefront lots in the Ramona Beach subdivision became involved in a dispute over the boundary between their properties. The plaintiffs, who purchased their lots in 2005, claimed that they had acquired ownership of a strip of land through adverse possession. This disputed area included portions of two garages that had been built by previous owners and which physically encroach onto the defendants’ lots. The defendants acquired their lots in 2015 and, after conducting a survey, discovered the encroachments. The dispute escalated after the defendants sought to build a new garage, prompting the plaintiffs to initiate a lawsuit to prevent construction and assert adverse possession over the contested land.The Fifth Judicial Circuit Court held a bench trial, heard live and deposition testimony, and reviewed documentary evidence. The court found that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, specifically concluding that there was no substantial enclosure or usual cultivation or improvement of the disputed land as required by law. However, the court granted the plaintiffs prescriptive easements for the portions of the garages that encroached onto the defendants’ property, though it limited the easements to the actual areas occupied by the garages and immediate areas necessary for their maintenance. The court denied the plaintiffs’ further requests to expand the easements and to add an additional easement for lake access.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings and legal conclusions, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession, and that the prescriptive easements for the garages were properly granted and appropriately limited. The Supreme Court also found that the plaintiffs’ additional claim for a lake access easement was not properly preserved for appeal and was therefore waived. View "Luzier v. Hemmah" on Justia Law

A junior mortgage holder sought to quiet title against a senior mortgage on a Brooklyn property, arguing that the senior mortgage had become unenforceable under New York’s six-year statute of limitations. The senior mortgage had been accelerated by the filing of a foreclosure action in 2007, which was later discontinued without prejudice. The junior mortgage was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff, who argued that the limitations period had expired, thus barring any further foreclosure by the senior lienholder. The validity of the original 2007 foreclosure action, specifically whether it properly accelerated the debt, was disputed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, citing a disputed issue of material fact regarding the standing of the entity that initiated the 2007 foreclosure. Shortly after this ruling, New York enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which, among other provisions, bars the defense that a prior acceleration was invalid in quiet title actions unless a court previously expressly determined invalidity. The district court, upon reconsideration, held FAPA applied retroactively and did not violate constitutional due process protections, and granted summary judgment to the junior mortgage holder.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that FAPA applies retroactively and that such application does not violate the New York Constitution’s due process guarantees. The Second Circuit then addressed whether retroactive application of FAPA violates substantive or procedural due process, the Contracts Clause, or the Takings Clause under the U.S. Constitution. The Second Circuit held that FAPA’s retroactive application does not violate any of these federal constitutional provisions and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Article 13 LLC v. LaSalle NationalBank Ass'n" on Justia Law

Two groups of plaintiffs challenged the road maintenance fees imposed by Orangeburg and Georgetown Counties, arguing these fees constituted invalid taxes under South Carolina law as interpreted in a prior decision. Both counties had long-standing ordinances requiring an annual fee from vehicle owners for road and bridge maintenance, which were increased over time. After this Court’s decision in Burns v. Greenville County Council found similar fees invalid unless they provided a benefit distinct from that received by the general public, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and monetary relief.The Orangeburg County action was reviewed by Judge Edgar W. Dickson, who dismissed all monetary claims but allowed the request for declaratory relief to proceed. The Georgetown County action was reviewed by Judge William H. Seals, Jr., who denied a motion to strike but did not address the motion to dismiss. After the legislature amended the relevant statute via Act No. 236 of 2022—explicitly allowing retroactive application to fees imposed after 1996—the cases were assigned to Judge Roger M. Young, Sr. He found section 2(E) of the Act unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Clause, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs in Butts, and denied summary judgment for the defendants in Brown, certifying the constitutional question for appeal.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the consolidated appeals. The Court held that the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to retroactively amend statutes following judicial interpretation, so long as final judgments are not disturbed and express constitutional limitations are not violated. The Court overruled prior precedent that categorically barred such retroactive legislation under the Separation of Powers Clause. Accordingly, the trial court’s orders were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Butts v. Mace" on Justia Law

BMK Enterprises purchased a commercial property from Bailey Enterprises in 2018. As part of the transaction, the parties agreed to a provision granting BMK a right of first refusal if Bailey decided to sell the adjacent Bolinger Property, which contained storage units. In 2019, Bailey informed BMK of its intent to sell the Bolinger Property, but BMK did not purchase it at that time. Bailey later sold the Bolinger Property to a third party in 2021 without further notice to BMK. BMK subsequently filed suit against Bailey for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that Bailey failed to honor the right of first refusal provision. BMK also sued the real estate broker and agent involved in the sale, but those claims were dismissed and are not part of this appeal.The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District granted summary judgment in favor of Bailey. It concluded that the right of first refusal provision was unenforceable as a matter of law because it inadequately described the property subject to the right and failed to specify the price, rendering the contract provision ambiguous and void. The court declined to consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties’ intent, reasoning that the ambiguity could not be resolved through legal canons or extrinsic evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. It held that while the provision was ambiguous, the District Court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent and resolve the ambiguity. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether extrinsic evidence could clarify the object of the contract and render the right of first refusal enforceable. View "BMK Enterprises v. Bailey" on Justia Law

A property owner initiated a forcible entry and detainer action in county court against tenants who allegedly failed to pay rent on a commercial lease. The lease included options for the tenants to purchase the property during future terms, granted credits for rent paid toward the purchase price, and restricted the owner's ability to sell the property without giving the tenants an opportunity to exercise their purchase option. The owner sought possession, past due rent, and other costs. The tenants argued that the lease provisions created an equitable interest, thereby raising a title dispute that deprived the county court of jurisdiction.The county court rejected the tenants’ argument, finding that it had jurisdiction and ordering restitution of the premises to the owner. On appeal, the tenants failed to include the county court’s judgment in the transcript, which led the District Court for Douglas County to affirm the county court’s order without addressing the jurisdictional issue. The tenants then moved to alter or amend the judgment and supplement the record with the omitted judgment, but the district court denied this motion.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It determined that when a lease includes provisions that arguably create an equitable interest and restrict the owner’s rights, a title dispute is present. In such circumstances, a county court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide a forcible entry and detainer action. The Supreme Court also held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow supplementation of the record when it was necessary to determine jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with directions to vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Martens v. BB's Childcare" on Justia Law

A catastrophic storm in March 2016 caused unprecedented rainfall in the Sabine River basin, leading the operators of the Toledo Bend Dam—jointly managed by the Sabine River Authority of Texas and the Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana—to open nine spillway gates. This action released significant amounts of water into the Sabine River over several weeks. Downriver landowners experienced extensive flooding and property damage. More than 700 landowners brought suit, alleging that the dam operators’ actions constituted a compensable taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment.The case began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where the defendants raised several defenses, including sovereign immunity, which was litigated and ultimately denied. Discovery disputes arose over the admissibility and timeliness of the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits and reports, which were found to rely heavily on an untested graduate thesis. The magistrate judge struck the challenged affidavits as untimely, and the plaintiffs did not object. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the dam’s operation caused the flooding, nor that a taking had occurred. The court also found the necessity doctrine might shield the defendants but did not decide the case on that ground.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the untimely expert affidavits. Affirming summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation—specifically, that the dam’s operation, rather than the unprecedented storm itself, caused additional flooding beyond what would have occurred without the dam. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Bonin v. Sabine River Authority" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on whether a party established a prescriptive easement over a dirt and gravel road, known as the M-1 Road, which crosses a large tract of privately owned timberland in northern Idaho. The appellant acquired three lots in a subdivision by Spirit Lake in 1999, and accessed these lots using the M-1 Road, which traversed land owned by the respondent. This land, the Brickle Creek Unit, spans approximately 20,000 acres and was primarily used for forestry, with only logging roads as improvements. The appellant and their predecessors used the road for various purposes, including construction and recreation, alongside other property owners and the general public. In 2016, the respondent installed a gate and began requiring permits for road access, which the appellant refused to obtain.The case was initially heard by the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, which granted summary judgment to the appellant, finding a prescriptive easement existed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. After remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that although the appellant’s use of the road was open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted, it was presumptively permissive due to the wild, unenclosed, and unimproved character of the land. The court ruled the use did not become adverse until 2016, when access was restricted and the appellant refused to sign a usage agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that the land’s wild and unimproved nature created a presumption of permissive use, which the appellant failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence of adverse, non-permissive use for the statutory period. The Court also found no actual or imputed knowledge of adverse use by the landowner prior to 2016. The denial of the prescriptive easement was upheld. View "Spirit Lake Cabins v. Inland Empire" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs obtained significant monetary judgments against a defendant, Deutsch, relating to a failed real estate project. Over the next several years, the plaintiffs attempted to enforce these judgments by seeking information about alleged fraudulent transfers from Deutsch to his wife, Baird, and their children. Multiple lawsuits and post-judgment discovery proceedings in Minnesota and New York courts ensued, including actions alleging Baird and her children received valuable assets as fraudulent conveyances. Repeated discovery efforts were largely unsuccessful, with courts in New York and during bankruptcy proceedings consistently finding no evidence justifying further inquiry into Baird’s finances. Despite these setbacks, the plaintiffs continued to pursue information about Baird’s assets, including through federal court subpoenas after a default judgment recognized the original state court awards.In the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, a magistrate judge had previously limited discovery into Baird’s finances, explicitly stating that further discovery would only be permitted if the plaintiffs produced new evidence of fraudulent or voidable transactions. Ignoring this warning, the plaintiffs sought leave to depose their former counsel, the Scher Law Firm, regarding its prior investigations into the alleged fraudulent transfers. The magistrate judge denied the motion, finding that the requested discovery concerned Baird’s finances and that the plaintiffs had not presented any new evidence as required. The judge also imposed sanctions, ordering the plaintiffs to pay Baird’s costs and fees for responding to the motion, citing their willful disregard of court orders and ongoing harassment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Eighth Circuit held that denying the motion for leave to depose the Scher Law Firm was not an abuse of discretion, as the plaintiffs failed to meet the court’s condition for further discovery. The appellate court also upheld the imposition of sanctions, finding the plaintiffs’ conduct justified penalties and that the district court acted within its inherent authority. View "Lupe Development Partners, LLC v. Baird" on Justia Law

The county commission in a South Dakota county adopted an ordinance amending its zoning regulations. The key change was to substitute the “board of adjustment” in place of the “county commission” and “planning and zoning board” as the authority to consider conditional use permit (CUP) applications and variances. Save Centennial Valley Association, a local group, submitted a petition to the county auditor seeking to refer the ordinance to a public vote, arguing that the amendments were legislative actions subject to referendum under state law. The auditor, after consulting with the commission, rejected the petition, determining the ordinance was administrative and not subject to referendum. The petitioners then requested a writ of mandamus from the circuit court to compel the auditor to refer the ordinance to a vote.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, considered the pleadings and granted judgment on the pleadings to the county, denying the request for mandamus. The court found that the ordinance did not constitute a legislative decision and was therefore not subject to the referendum process. The petitioners appealed this determination.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the matter de novo, considering whether the ordinance was legislative or administrative under SDCL 7-18A-15.1. The court held that the ordinance merely executed a plan already adopted by the governing body or by the Legislature and did not create a new rule or policy. The court also clarified that decisions on CUPs, whether made by the commission or the board of adjustment, are quasi-judicial and not subject to referendum. Therefore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the ordinance was an administrative decision not subject to the referendum process, and the petitioners were not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Save Centennial Valley Association v. Mcgruder" on Justia Law