Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose after the United States constructed navigation structures in the Catahoula Basin, raising water levels and affecting property in the area. Landowners in the basin, divided into Lake Plaintiffs and Swamp Plaintiffs, brought a class action against the State of Louisiana, alleging unlawful expropriation of their land and seeking damages, a declaration of ownership, and recovery of mineral royalties. The central factual issue was how to classify the Catahoula Basin: the Lake Plaintiffs argued it was part of the Little River’s banks, entitling them to ownership, while the State argued it was a lake owned by the state.After a bench trial in the Ninth Judicial District Court, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, recognizing the Lake and Swamp Plaintiffs as owners of the disputed lands, awarding damages for inverse condemnation, and granting attorney fees. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed most of the judgment but shifted the attorney fee burden entirely to the plaintiffs’ common fund. The Louisiana Supreme Court then held that plaintiffs’ compensation claims had prescribed, reversing the damages awards but leaving the attorney fee issue unresolved. When the trial court subsequently recalculated attorney fees using the lodestar method, the appellate court increased the award by applying a fourfold multiplier, finding the initial fee too low given the case’s complexity and duration.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the attorney fee award and found that while a multiplier was warranted due to the exceptional duration, risk, and complexity of the litigation, the appellate court’s fourfold multiplier was excessive given the high hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. The court reduced the multiplier to three, setting the attorney fee at $16,713,656.20, and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment as amended. The matter was remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate reserves and payment arrangements. View "CROOKS VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on ownership of a half-interest in a tract of land in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, originally owned by Augustine Howard, who died intestate in 1956. A 1996 judgment of possession recognized Earnestine Walker as Augustine Howard’s sole heir, through whom Windward Land, LLC and Michael Morris Gulley claim title. Opposing parties, whose title traces back to Addie Edwards via a 1955 deed, argue that Earnestine Walker, as an illegitimate child, was precluded from inheriting under the law in effect at the time of Augustine’s death and that Zephyr Johnson, Augustine's niece, was the rightful heir.The Frazier-Edwards respondents sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate the 1996 judgment of possession, which the District Court granted, finding Zephyr Johnson the rightful heir and awarding sole ownership to the Frazier-Edwards group. Windward moved for a new trial, asserting that any attack on the 1996 judgment was barred by prescription under La. R.S. 9:5630, but the motion was denied. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed, narrowly interpreting La. R.S. 9:5630 to bar only claims by heirs or legatees of the decedent, not claims by heirs or legatees of a third party transferee.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari and held that the prescriptive bar in La. R.S. 9:5630 applies broadly, including to actions by buyers, donees, and transferees who acquire immovable property from heirs or legatees recognized in a judgment of possession. The Court concluded the Frazier-Edwards respondents’ collateral attack was prescribed and the 1996 judgment of possession remains valid. The rulings of the lower courts were vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WINDWARD LAND, LLC VS. MANN" on Justia Law

Two neighbors in a residential community became involved in a dispute over the use of one party’s homestead property. The property owner kept various animals and had constructed several structures on her fourteen-acre homestead. The community’s Declaration of Easements, Covenants, and Restrictions set limits on the type and number of animals, prohibited certain commercial activities, and regulated the placement of structures and nuisance conditions. After a complaint, the property owner and the community association reached a mediated settlement agreement requiring her to take remedial measures and provide proof of compliance. The neighbors who had originally complained did not participate in the mediation and later sued, alleging ongoing violations regarding animals, nuisance conditions, and structure placements.The dispute proceeded in the 98th District Court, where the plaintiffs sought discovery, including a request under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.7 to inspect the entire property except for the residence. The property owner objected, arguing the inspection would be overly intrusive, duplicative, and unnecessary because relevant information had already been provided through depositions, documents, and photographs. The trial court initially granted the inspection and later narrowed its scope after reconsideration, but still authorized a broad entry and inspection. The owner sought mandamus relief from this order. The Texas Court of Appeals for the Third District denied relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting an inspection order that was disproportionate to the needs of the case. The court found that the information sought was available through less burdensome means, and the burden and intrusion of the inspection outweighed any likely benefit. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order authorizing entry onto the property. View "IN RE BOSCO" on Justia Law

Two condominium unit owners challenged actions taken by their association, a nonprofit corporation, after it recorded an amended declaration in 2020 that changed allocations of common-area interests and imposed new rental and moorage rules. The owners alleged that the association unlawfully altered their property and rental rights, failed to properly address encroachments, and breached its governing documents. They also sought to compel the association to remeasure unit square footage and reallocate ownership interests under Idaho law.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District granted summary judgment to the association on the owners’ claims for declaratory relief, slander of title, quiet title, encroachment, and breach of contract, concluding that these were derivative claims barred by the Idaho Nonprofit Corporation Act because the owners lacked sufficient voting power. The court found these claims challenged corporate actions as ultra vires and could only be brought derivatively. The court also determined the owners' demand for remeasurement and reallocation under Idaho Code section 55-1505(1)(c) was a direct claim, but ruled against them because the association’s actions were not shown to be in bad faith.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the first five claims, holding that the association’s actions could only be challenged derivatively under the Nonprofit Corporation Act, and the owners lacked standing and did not meet statutory requirements. However, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment on the claim for remeasurement and reallocation of ownership interests, finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the association acted in bad faith during the 2020 reallocation. The case was remanded for trial on that claim. No costs were awarded on appeal. View "K & L CRYSTAL BEACH, LLC v. THE CRYSTAL BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

A creditor obtained a money judgment against an individual for breach of a commercial lease. The creditor then sought to foreclose on the individual’s undivided one-half interest in a property that he owned with his wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship. This property was the couple’s primary residence. In response to the foreclosure action, both the individual and his wife appeared without lawyers. They argued that the property could not be foreclosed because it was their family home and because the judgment was only against the husband, not the wife. The wife further contended that her interest, as a nondebtor, could not be divided or foreclosed upon.The District Court for Douglas County found that there were no material factual disputes and that neither spouse presented valid defenses. It determined that the creditor’s judgment lien was valid and subordinate only to the mortgagee’s interest. The court entered a decree ordering the sale of the entire marital residence unless the debt was paid within 20 days, with the proceeds to satisfy the judgment.Upon review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the homestead exemption did not prevent the decree because the debtor never filed the required application for such an exemption under Nebraska law. The court clarified that the homestead exemption is only available if a statutory application is properly made. However, the Supreme Court identified plain errors in the lower court’s decree: it improperly ordered the sale of the entire residence instead of only the debtor’s interest, and it failed to specify the party responsible for conducting the sale. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the district court’s decree and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "11819 Miracle Hills Drive v. Ali" on Justia Law

Steve and Monica Zirbel purchased two landlocked parcels along Lake Alice in Deuel County, South Dakota, with neither parcel abutting a maintained roadway. After discovering that their presumed section line right-of-way access had been vacated, as asserted by local officials, they attempted to negotiate with neighboring landowners for access easements. When negotiations failed, they applied to the Deuel County Board of County Commissioners for statutory access under SDCL chapter 31-22. The Board initially denied their application, reasoning the parcels were not “isolated” because Lake Alice provided public highway access. Upon appeal, the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit disagreed with the Board’s reasoning, finding the parcels to be isolated, and remanded the case for further proceedings.Following remand, the Board conducted site visits and obtained an appraisal to assess damages for proposed right-of-way routes. The Board ultimately selected a route and assessed substantial damages divided among affected landowners, also charging the Zirbels for the appraisal cost. The Zirbels appealed again to the circuit court, challenging the damages assessment, the appraisal cost, and alleging a conflict of interest for one Board member. The circuit court reviewed the Board’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the damages assessment and access route, but reversed the appraisal cost charge to the Zirbels.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including a trial de novo. The Court held that the Board’s action was quasi-judicial, not quasi-legislative, requiring de novo review. The Court also directed the circuit court to determine whether the section line right-of-way had been lawfully vacated and whether the appraisal cost was a proper expense under SDCL 31-22-6. View "Zirbel v. Deuel County" on Justia Law

More than thirty years ago, a property owner in Miami entered into an easement agreement allowing a neighboring telecommunications company to use part of its land. The agreement included a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision, stating that in any suit to enforce its terms, the successful party would be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs from the other party. After multiple transfers of ownership, RJ’s International Trading, LLC (RJI) owned the property subject to the easement, while Crown Castle South, LLC subleased the neighboring property and exercised rights under the easement.In 2020, Crown Castle excavated and installed fiber optic cables beyond the easement boundaries, prompting RJI to sue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The district court granted partial summary judgment for RJI, finding Crown Castle liable for trespass and breach of the easement. After a trial, the jury awarded RJI $1 for breach and $40,000 for trespass. RJI then requested attorney’s fees based on the easement’s fee provision, arguing the provision was a real covenant binding successors. The district court denied the motion, finding the fee provision did not “touch and concern” the land and thus did not run with it. RJI appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which certified the question of whether such a fee provision runs with the land under Florida law to the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida held that a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision in an easement agreement does not run with the land under Florida law, as it is too attenuated from the use, enjoyment, or occupation of the land to satisfy the “touch and concern” requirement. The Court distinguished its prior decision in Hayslip v. U.S. Home Corp., finding that Hayslip addressed materially different obligations and did not control the outcome in this case. View "RJ's International Trading, LLC v. Crown Castle South, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, a county initiated a project involving the drilling of new foundations for guy wires attached to a communications tower. The county hired a general contractor, which then subcontracted drilling work to another company. An employee of the subcontractor, while working near the site, carried a steel cable into contact with an overhead high voltage power line owned by an electric cooperative, resulting in his electrocution and subsequent death. The power line was not part of the communications tower and the contractors were not working on it.The estate of the deceased employee sued the electric cooperative, the general contractor, and the subcontractor in the Circuit Court of Accomack County, alleging negligence under Virginia’s Overhead High Voltage Line Safety Act (OHVLSA) for failing to implement safety measures near the power line. The circuit court dismissed the subcontractor based on the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Act. The general contractor settled with the estate, and the electric cooperative also settled before a verdict was reached. Subsequently, the electric cooperative’s insurer, as subrogee, filed a federal suit seeking indemnification from the contractors under the OHVLSA. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the claim, holding that the work performed fell within an exemption in the OHVLSA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified two questions of Virginia law to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the exemption in Virginia Code § 59.1-413 applies to the contractors’ work on the communications tower, thereby excluding them from the OHVLSA’s requirements. As a result, the court found the second certified question—concerning indemnification requirements—to be moot. View "A&N Electric Cooperative v. Dietzel Enterprises" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, an individual with heart disease and his family rented a property in Kauaʻi. The rental agreement required weekly cleanings by staff. Due to his health condition, the tenant requested an accommodation to waive the cleaning provision, fearing increased risk if exposed to the virus by non-family members. The landlord denied the request, suggesting instead that the tenant could leave during cleanings. After further correspondence and formal requests for accommodation, the landlord terminated the tenancy and withheld a portion of the security deposit for cleaning and repairs.After vacating the property, the tenants filed a complaint with the Hawaiʻi Civil Rights Commission (HCRC), alleging disability discrimination for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and to engage in an interactive process. The HCRC found reasonable cause, issued a right to sue, and subsequently initiated an action in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court granted the landlord’s motion to dismiss, finding the accommodation request was not sufficiently alleged as reasonable and necessary, and that Hawaiʻi’s fair housing law did not create standalone liability for failing to engage in an interactive process.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case, concluding there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the “disability,” “necessary,” and “reasonable” factors. The landlord then sought review by the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case, clarifying the legal framework for evaluating disability accommodation requests under Hawaiʻi’s fair housing law. The court held that plaintiffs bear the initial burden to show an accommodation is both reasonable and necessary, after which the burden shifts to defendants to prove unreasonableness, including proposing alternatives. The court further held that neither Hawaiʻi’s fair housing statute nor its regulations impose standalone liability for failure to engage in an interactive process. View "Kawatachi v. The Parrish Collection, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose between two neighboring homeowners in a Tucson subdivision governed by a homeowners’ association and subject to recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). The plaintiff alleged that noise and vibrations from the defendants’ newly installed air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance in violation of an anti-nuisance provision within the CC&Rs and sought both injunctive relief and damages. The CC&Rs also included a fee-shifting provision entitling the prevailing party in enforcement proceedings to recover attorney fees and costs.The Superior Court in Pima County held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that while the noise was annoying, it did not rise to the level of an actionable nuisance or a violation of the CC&Rs. The court also concluded that the plaintiff did not prove any breach of contract or obligation by the defendants. Although the court recognized the CC&Rs as creating contractual relationships, it denied the defendants’ request for attorney fees, reasoning that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially a tort claim for nuisance, not a contract claim. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed, relying on the view that the anti-nuisance provision in the CC&Rs merely mirrored existing tort duties and did not independently support a contractual fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that an anti-nuisance covenant in recorded CC&Rs constitutes a contractual obligation that can be enforced between homeowners, even if the conduct also constitutes a tort. The Court further held that the fee-shifting provision applies to actions enforcing such covenants. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney fees to the defendants, and remanded for determination of reasonable attorney fees. View "BURKETT v DRYJA" on Justia Law