Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

During the summer of 2018, housing advocates interacted with tenants at the Yale Park Apartment Complex in Omaha, documenting alleged building code violations and submitting complaints to the City. Based largely on this information, the City’s Chief Housing Inspector applied for and received an inspection warrant. Subsequent searches led to the closure of the complex, and tenants were forced to relocate. The City later provided AB Realty, LLC—the owner—and Kay and Janae Anderson with a list of violations and barred reopening until repairs were made. AB Realty attempted to challenge the closure through the Property Management Appeals Board and faced ongoing notices and prosecution for code violations. After completing repairs and reopening the complex in 2021, AB Realty and the Andersons initiated a lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and stayed proceedings pending the outcome of Kay Anderson’s criminal trial. After a state-court jury convicted Kay on a few counts but acquitted him of most, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against the City of Omaha and associated defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the search warrant, even excluding disputed information, was supported by probable cause based on the complaints and evidence of violations. It further determined that violations of Nebraska state law regarding warrants did not sustain a federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also found AB Realty’s procedural due process allegations insufficiently specific to identify constitutionally protected interests or responsible parties. Finally, the court ruled that AB Realty failed to plead either a per se or regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment, as the City did not physically appropriate the property and the closure for code violations did not constitute a regulatory taking. All claims against all defendants were dismissed. View "AB Realty, LLC v. Lane" on Justia Law

A man and a woman jointly purchased a house in Iowa, taking title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The man alone signed the promissory note for a loan from Wells Fargo to finance the purchase, but both he and the woman signed the mortgage as “Borrower.” The mortgage explicitly listed both as “Borrower” and obligated them to make payments but stated that only the person who signed the note had personal liability; the woman, who did not sign the note, was not personally liable for repayment. After the man moved out, the woman remained in the house, which was her homestead. When the loan went into default, Wells Fargo sent a notice of right to cure only to the man at both his old and new addresses, but sent no notice to the woman. The woman later asserted that, had she received such a notice, she could have cured the default.The foreclosure action was filed in the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County against both parties. The district court granted summary judgment for the lender, holding that the woman was not a “borrower” under Iowa Code section 654.2D because she did not sign the note and therefore was not entitled to notice of her right to cure. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed on the same basis.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a part-owner and resident of a homestead who signs the mortgage as “borrower,” even if not personally liable on the note, is a “borrower on a mortgage” under Iowa Code section 654.2D and is therefore entitled to notice of the right to cure before foreclosure. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newrez LLC v.McMillen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into an oral lease agreement with the defendant for the rental of a dump trailer for seven days at a flat rate. During the lease period, the plaintiff was arrested while using the trailer, and the trailer was impounded by law enforcement. The defendant retrieved the trailer from the impound lot before the lease term ended. The plaintiff was released from custody before the lease expired and alleged that the defendant breached the contract by repossessing the trailer early and converted his property contained in the trailer, which he claimed to be valuable.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Muddy Boyz Drywall LLC, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the alleged breach of contract and conversion. After procedural steps involving the dismissal of counterclaims and certification under Rule 54(b), the plaintiff appealed the certified judgment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the terms of the oral contract, whether its conditions were breached, whether the defendant’s performance was rendered impossible, and whether the plaintiff suffered damages. The Court also found that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged a conversion claim and that factual disputes existed regarding ownership, value, and the defendant’s disposal of the plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Gum v. Muddy Boyz Drywall" on Justia Law

A family dispute arose after the deaths of William and Elaine Stramer, who had five children and owned farmland in North Dakota. Their 2013 wills gave Douglas the option to purchase the farmyard around his house and Todd the option to purchase the remaining farmland for $100 per acre within one year of the surviving spouse’s death, provided Todd moved back to North Dakota and “actively farmed” the land. After William died in 2015, various trusts were created to hold the land, with Todd named as trustee. Elaine died in 2022, and Todd became personal representative of her estate. Subsequently, Douglas and Ann filed actions challenging Todd’s management and the exercise of the purchase options.The District Court of Emmons County consolidated the cases and conducted a bench trial. The court found the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust void due to lack of capacity. It determined Douglas’s option encompassed 25 acres as identified in a 2014 plat, while finding Todd had not “actively farmed” and therefore did not validly exercise his purchase option. The court invalidated Todd’s self-executed contracts for deed, removed him as trustee and personal representative, and appointed Steve Stramer instead. The court declined to award damages for Todd’s use and possession of the farm from 2023 to 2025, citing insufficient information.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the district court did not err in finding Todd had not actively farmed the land within the meaning of the will, nor in removing Todd from his fiduciary roles. However, it concluded the district court erred in finding Douglas’s option included 25 acres, holding instead that it should be limited to 5.96 acres identified as the farmyard. The Court also held that the district court misapplied the law on damages and remanded for a determination of damages for Todd’s wrongful occupation of the farm. View "Stramer v. Stramer" on Justia Law

Derek and Keisha Hall hired Jose Silva to construct their new home and financed the project through Priority One Bank, where Harvey Lott served as the loan officer. The Halls later discovered construction defects and alleged that Silva, Lott, and the bank engaged in a secret arrangement for personal profit, including unauthorized loan disbursements and a failure to conduct proper inspections. The Halls also claimed Silva lacked a contractor’s license and that the relationship between Silva and Lott involved improper payments. Both Lott and the bank denied these allegations, asserting that bank inspections were for their own benefit and that loan advances sometimes occurred before work was completed, in line with their agreement.The Halls brought several claims against the bank, Lott, and Silva in the Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court, including breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy. In response, the bank and Lott sought summary judgment, but the circuit court denied their motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained. Subsequently, the Halls moved to strike a provision in the loan agreement, arguing it was unconscionable and deprived them of legal remedies. The circuit court granted this motion, holding the provision was void, invalid, and unconscionable.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the Halls’ “Motion to Strike Contract Provision” was not an appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge the enforceability of a contract provision, as motions to strike under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) are limited to pleadings, not contract clauses. The court reversed the circuit court’s order striking the provision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that any challenge to the provision’s enforceability must follow the proper procedures for dispositive motions. View "Priority One Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

A property once owned by the Vinings in Ravalli County, Montana, had two groundwater wells historically used for commercial beaver pens, with statements of claim filed in 1982. The property also included a pond not originally specified in the water rights claims. After the mid-1990s, the Vinings discontinued use of the wells for beaver pens, instead using the water for irrigation and livestock, without obtaining the required authorization to change the beneficial use. In 2020, YC Properties, LLC acquired the property and associated water rights. In 2023, YC Properties sought to amend the claims to include the historic pond, prompting objections from neighboring landowners who argued the water rights had been abandoned.The Montana Water Court consolidated the claims and, after motions from both sides, granted summary judgment to the objectors. The Water Court determined that use of the water for irrigation and livestock by the Vinings and YC Properties, instead of the claimed commercial beaver pen use, constituted unauthorized use. The Water Court concluded that the long period of unauthorized use was the functional equivalent of non-use and intent to abandon, thus triggering a presumption of abandonment. The court found YC Properties failed to rebut this presumption and dismissed the water rights claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the Water Court erred in its abandonment analysis. The Supreme Court held that while post-1973 conduct could be considered in abandonment determinations, unauthorized water use is not per se equivalent to intent to abandon under Montana’s common law. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that abandonment is a factual question requiring consideration of all circumstances, including whether water was continuously put to beneficial use, even if unauthorized. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. View "YC Properties v. Connolly" on Justia Law

A group of local United Methodist churches, through their trustees, sought to disaffiliate from the United Methodist Church while retaining ownership of their church property. This dispute arose amid a broader doctrinal disagreement within the denomination, particularly regarding the ordination of homosexual clergy and performance of same-sex weddings. The Conference, representing the denomination’s regional authority, asserted that church property was held in trust for the benefit of the entire denomination and could not be retained by a local church upon disaffiliation except as authorized by church law. The local churches alleged that the Conference engaged in fraudulent and collusive conduct, including misrepresentations about the procedures and timing for lawful disaffiliation, which caused them to miss the window for disaffiliation with property under denominational rules.The Circuit Court of Mercer County initially dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine since the dispute required interpretation of church doctrine and governance—a matter reserved for the church’s highest tribunals. The court found that the allegations of fraud and collusion did not pertain to the procurement of a final ecclesiastical adjudication. However, following a Rule 59(e) motion by the local churches, a different judge vacated the prior dismissal, determining that the allegations of fraud and collusion raised factual questions for a jury and reopened the case.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of prohibition. The court held that constitutional limitations under the First Amendment and the West Virginia Constitution prevented civil courts from adjudicating disputes involving church doctrine, discipline, or governance. The court further clarified that the fraud or collusion exception only applies if such conduct procured a final ecclesiastical adjudication, which was not alleged here. The writ of prohibition was granted, barring enforcement of the order reopening the case, and reaffirming the circuit court’s lack of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Trustees of the West Virginia Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Wills" on Justia Law

A consumer used an online platform to book short-term accommodations, paying through the platform’s payment processor. The payment processor, a subsidiary of the platform, collected, held, and later disbursed guest payments to hosts after the guest’s check-in. The platform’s terms specified that the payment processor acted as a collection agent for the host and retained any interest earned on guest funds held before disbursement. The platform did not claim to act as an escrow agent or company and explicitly disclaimed any broader agency relationship with users.The consumer sued in the Superior Court of San Francisco City and County, alleging that the defendants unlawfully operated as escrow agents without complying with California’s Escrow Law and engaged in unfair business practices, in violation of the state’s unfair competition law (UCL). The complaint also included claims under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and for unjust enrichment. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the operative complaint without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendants acted as escrow holders or conducted escrow transactions as defined by law. Judgment was entered for the defendants.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege facts showing that the defendants acted as escrow agents under California law, as there was no indication that any party expected or intended an escrow relationship, or that the transactions had the irrevocability and fiduciary duties characteristic of escrow arrangements. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the UCL for unlawful or unfair business practices, and that amendment would not cure the defects. View "Edson v. Airbnb Payments, Inc." on Justia Law

A company sought a lease from the Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners to develop a wind energy project on state land in Converse County. This project was designed to power a green hydrogen facility, with grid connection being possible but not necessary. The applicant engaged stakeholders and amended its proposal in response to feedback, including reducing the project’s footprint and number of turbines. Public comments were received, most expressing opposition. After a public meeting and legal consultation, the Board approved the lease.Stephens Land and Livestock, LLC, which owns property adjacent to the leased state land, challenged the Board’s approval in the District Court of Converse County. Stephens argued that the lease approval was not in accordance with law, exceeded statutory authority, and violated Board rules, including a requirement that wind energy leases involve connection to the transmission grid. The district court found that Stephens had standing, concluded the Board’s rules required grid connection for wind energy leases, and reversed the lease approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the Board’s decision as if it came directly from the agency. The Court held that Stephens had standing due to immediate, substantial, and pecuniary interests affected by the project. Interpreting the Board’s rules, the Court found the term “including” to be expansive, meaning grid connection is one example of a permissible use, not a requirement. The Court concluded the lease approval was in accordance with law and did not conflict with the Board’s definition of “Wind Energy Leasing.”The Court further addressed and rejected Stephens’s additional legal arguments, finding the Board complied with its statutory duties, did not violate relevant executive orders or rules, and provided adequate financial assurances. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the Board’s approval of the wind energy lease. View "Pronghorn H2, LLC v. Stephens Land and Livestock, LLC" on Justia Law

A commercial real estate lender provided a loan to a hotel operator to purchase a resort in Ohio, secured by a mortgage. The borrower, obligated to secure insurance on the property, worked with an insurance broker to obtain coverage. However, after policy cancellations and changes, the lender’s interest as a mortgagee was not fully protected under the final insurance policy. The borrower defaulted, and the lender sued for breach of contract, fraud, and related claims, ultimately settling by accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure, which was considered full payment of the borrower’s debt. The settlement also included an additional payment obligation secured by a consent judgment.Following the settlement, the lender brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the insurance broker, the insurance provider, and an underwriter, seeking damages for not properly securing its mortgagee interest. The claims included breach of contract, negligence, and misrepresentation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, finding that the lender’s mortgagee interest had been extinguished by the settlement and deed in lieu of foreclosure, thereby eliminating any insurable interest required to support its claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying Ohio law. The appellate court held that a mortgagee’s insurable interest is tied to the existence of the underlying debt; once the debt is satisfied or released, the mortgagee’s interest and right to insurance proceeds are extinguished. The court found that the settlement agreement and acceptance of the deed in lieu of foreclosure satisfied the debt and ended the lender’s insurable interest. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants. View "Sinmier, LLC v. Everest Indemnity Ins. Co." on Justia Law