The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for HSBC in an action seeking to foreclose on defendant's property. The court held that HSBC was the holder of the home equity note and that defendant failed to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to HSBC's ownership of the note. The court also held that HSBC's suit was timely because defendant's bankruptcy suit tolled the statute of limitations for 127 days. Finally, the court held that defendant waived his argument that the district court erred when it signed and entered a final judgment that authorized a foreclosure sale of the property, without complying with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 309. View "HSBC Bank USA, NA v. Crum" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant Leo Dolan, Jr. and Cherie Dolan entered into an agreement of sale with Bentley Homes, Ltd., Garvin Mitchell Corporation, Chadwell Associates, L.P., Chadwell Realty, Inc. and Harrison Community Association (hereinafter “Bentley”) for a new custom house. Hurd Millwork Company, Inc. (Hurd) provided many of the windows used in the construction of Appellant’s home. Within a year, the house developed substantial defects, including air and water leaks around the windows. Hurd filed an action against Bentley for unpaid invoices related to the construction of Appellant’s home and other homes in the same development. Bentley filed a counterclaim against Hurd for providing defective windows. In October 2002, Bentley and Hurd entered into a settlement containing admissions that numerous homes in the development suffered from extensive defects and leaks. During the pendency of the litigation between Hurd and Bentley, Appellant experienced additional problems with his home including severe leaks, rotted wood and issues with a stucco wall. Bentley made some repairs to the home, but the leaks continued to worsen. Appellant hired a civil engineer to assess the home and determine what repairs were required to fix the problems with the house. The repairs and associated costs amounted to $826,695.99. The house was purchased for $1,941,669.00. In this appeal by permission, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was the proper role of an appellate court when reviewing a non-jury decision where it deems the trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) inadequate, but the trial judge is no longer available to provide a supplemental opinion. The Supreme Court concluded that where a Rule 1925(a) opinion is deemed inadequate and the trial judge is unavailable to provide a supplemental opinion, the appellate court should review the legal issues raised in the appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. When deciding issues of law an appellate court is not required to defer to the conclusions of a trial court. Applying this standard and scope, the Superior Court will be able to review the entire record and ultimately determine whether the trial court correctly decided the legal issues raised in Bentley’s appeal. View "Dolan v. Hurd Millwork Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Petitioner’s petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, in which Petitioner sought the dissolution of a memorandum of lis pendens, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying extraordinary relief. Petitioner was a defendant in an action in the superior court concerning certain real property. On the motion of the plaintiff, a judge endorsed the memorandum of lis pendens at issue in this case. Petitioner appealed from a judgment enforcing the parties’ agreement to settle the case, challenging the enforcement of the settlement agreements, as well as the endorsement of the memorandum of lis pendens. Before the Appeals Court affirmed, Petitioner filed this Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice properly denied extraordinary relief because the case in the superior court had not yet gone to final judgment. View "Saade v. Price" on Justia Law

This case stems from the foreclosure and lien priority case arising out of the failed Idaho Club golf course and residential housing development project. The developer, Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC (“POBD”), took out several loans on the real property, agreed to promissory notes, and mortgaged the Idaho Club real property with several lenders, including JV, LLC and, as relevant to this appeal, three other lenders: RE Loans (“REL”), LLC, Pensco Trust Co., and Mortgage Fund ’08 LLC (“MF08”) (collectively, the three “lenders”). JV’s interest in the Idaho Club arose out of a mortgage (the “JV Mortgage”) it recorded against five parcels on the Idaho Club property that JV sold to POBD. POBD ultimately defaulted on its obligations on the promissory notes associated with the mortgages. In addition to defaulting on the notes, POBD failed to pay property taxes to Bonner County for several years and failed to pay various mechanics and materialmen, one of which was Genesis Golf Builders, Inc. (“Genesis”). JV appealed the district court's conclusion that Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Valiant”) held a priority position in the mortgages on the development. JV also appealed the district court’s award of costs against it, as well as a judgment by the district court that awarded sanctions against JV and its attorney. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, finding JV's redemption deed did not subordinate it to Bonner County's right, title, claim and interested based on a tax deed. The Supreme Court also found the district court abused its discretion in the way that it applied the formula announced in Valiant Idaho, LLC v. North Idaho Resorts, LLC (No. 44583, 2018 WL 4927560) to arrive at its costs award. View "Valiant Idaho v. JV, LLC" on Justia Law

In this proceeding under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 72.010 authorizing property owners subject to multiple taxation to petition the Supreme Court directly to determine which county is owed taxes, the Court determined that it had original jurisdiction and that taxes on Relators’ property were owed to San Patricio County rather than Nueces County. This dispute concerned shoreline boundary on Corpus Christi Bay. For a decade both Nueces County and San Patricio County have taxed the same piers, docks, and other facilities affixed to land in San Patricio County but extending out into the water in Nueces County. After the statute was enacted and signed into law in 2017, Relators filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court praying that the Court determine which county is authorized to tax Relators' piers. The Supreme Court held (1) this case presented a compelling reason for the Court to exercise original jurisdiction; (2) section 72.010 does not violate the Texas Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws; and (3) San Patricio County is owed the taxes due on Relators' piers. View "In re Occidental Chemical Corp." on Justia Law

In this dispute in which an owner of one property sought to bind the purchaser of another property to the terms of a fifty-year lease agreement entered into between different parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the purchaser, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Court held (1) the statute of frauds barred the owner’s claim for breach of contract because there was no privity of contract and the purchaser did not expressly assume the lease; (2) equitable estoppel did not prevent the purchaser from raising the statute of frauds as a defense; and (3) there was no genuine issue of material fact, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the purchaser. View "Brick Development v. CNBT II" on Justia Law

This was an action arising out of a failed golf course and residential development project known as the “Idaho Club.” North Idaho Resorts, LLC (“NIR”) appealed an award of discretionary costs and costs as a matter of right awarded against it, contending the district court abused its discretion by awarding discretionary costs, and that the court’s award of some costs as a matter of right was erroneous. After review of the district court record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court abused its discretion by using a formulaic analysis in this case, and by awarding some costs as a matter of right against NIR. The district court judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Valiant Idaho v. No. Idaho Resorts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment affirming a hearing examiner’s decision that an exemption from taxation for real property be increased to 100 percent but reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that the circuit court correctly upheld the hearing examiner’s decision but erred in its award of attorney fees. The Pennington County Board of Equalization established an exemption of thirty-two percent for the 2017 tax year for real property owned by American Legion Home Association Post 22. On American Legion’s administrative appeal, the hearing examiner concluded that the real property qualified for a 100 percent exemption under S.D. Codified Laws 10-4-9.2. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in affirming the hearing examiner’s decision that the property was entitled to a 100 percent exemption under the statute; but (2) awarded attorney fees without sufficient information to determine a reasonable fee. The Court remanded the attorney fee issue. View "American Legion Home Ass’n Post 22 v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

In this case concerning property that was the subject of a 2011 valuation complaint, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the Board of Revision’s (BOR) denial of the property owner’s request for a hearing for tax year 2012, holding that the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction under Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D). Appellant, the owner of the property at issue, filed a 2011 valuation complaint. The BOR issued its decision on the complaint more than ninety days after it was filed, and the matter was not finally resolved until after an appeal to the BTA. The next year, Appellant sought to invoke the BOR’s continuing-complaint jurisdiction for tax year 2012 pursuant to section 5715.19(D). The BOR denied the request, and the BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause to the BOR for a determination of the subject property’s tax-year-2012 value, holding that the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction under the facts of this case. View "Molly Co. v. Cuyaohga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

When a lease of federal lands includes an option to extend its term and the tax assessor reasonably concludes that the option will likely be exercised, the value of the leasehold interest is properly based on the extended term. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the County's demurrer to Glovis's complaint for refund of property taxes. The court held that the terms of the lease evidenced the parties' mutual intent to grant Glovis the option to extend its possession of the Navy's property past the initial five-year term; the lease clearly and explicitly gave Glovis the exclusive right to lease the Navy's property under 2028; and there was no language permitting the Navy to withdraw or revoke its offer. The court independently reviewed whether to use extrinsic evidence to interpret the lease and held that there was no need to do so in this case. Finally, the court rejected Glovis's contention that the assessor erred when he determined it was reasonable to assume the option will be exercised. View "Glovis America, Inc. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law