Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights.Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners regarding an express easement for ingress and egress known as Canyon Creek Lane in Butte County, South Dakota. The express easement was created as part of a property sale and recorded, obligating each owner to contribute to maintenance costs. Tanya Lorenz acquired one of the parcels benefiting from the easement but later constructed her own driveway with direct access to Highway 34. Plaintiffs alleged that Tanya’s easement rights should be extinguished due to abandonment and lack of necessity, pointing to her nonuse, installation of a gate, lack of maintenance contributions, and creation of a new access. They also alleged nuisance conduct by Tanya.In the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their claims, finding Tanya had abandoned the easement and that it was extinguished due to lack of necessity. The court also found Tanya’s conduct constituted a nuisance, but did not award damages for that claim. At trial, the court determined Tanya was responsible for nine years of maintenance costs for the easement and awarded Plaintiffs $6,750 in damages. Tanya appealed the summary judgment and damages award.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that summary judgment on abandonment was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding Tanya’s intent and use of the easement. The Court also reversed the extinguishment of the easement for lack of necessity, noting that such a condition does not apply to express easements unless specified in the agreement. Summary judgment on the nuisance claim was also reversed due to insufficient evidence of substantial or unreasonable interference. The Court affirmed the award of damages for maintenance costs and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maher v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on real property originally acquired by John and Constance Clark as part of a family farming operation. In 1988, two parcels were conveyed to their son, Jay Clark, who subsequently transferred the properties to Clover Hollow Farms, Inc., a corporation formed shortly before the conveyance with John Clark as its sole shareholder. Jay Clark served as vice-president and director of Clover Hollow. According to Jay Clark, his parents promised that Clover Hollow would hold the property in trust for him as a premarital asset, to be returned upon demand or subject to his exclusive control. Years later, Jay Clark assigned his interests in one of the properties to C & H Properties, LLC, operated by his children.After John Clark was placed under a conservatorship, the conservator, Judith Appleby, adopted corporate resolutions nullifying Jay Clark’s authority and authorizing the corporation to join litigation seeking a declaration that Jay Clark had no interest in the corporate stock, real property, or tangible property. Jay Clark filed counterclaims challenging the validity of these resolutions and seeking to regain title to the properties. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, granted summary judgment to the Estates and Clover Hollow. It ruled that judicial estoppel barred Jay Clark’s claims due to his failure to disclose the properties in bankruptcy and found that his claims under constructive trust, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the corporate resolutions enacted by Appleby.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Ms. Appleby, as executor, lacked authority under Clover Hollow’s bylaws and the Idaho Business Corporation Act to convene a special shareholder meeting and enact corporate resolutions, rendering those actions invalid. Consequently, Clover Hollow was never properly joined in the litigation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Jay Clark’s sixth counterclaim, and remanded the case with instructions to allow reasonable time for proper joinder of Clover Hollow as a party. View "Estate of Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

San Francisco voters approved Proposition M in November 2022, which imposed an “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of residential units in buildings with more than two units if any unit was kept vacant for over 182 days in a tax year. The tax, designed to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase housing availability, applied on a tiered scale based on the unit’s size and length of vacancy, with certain exemptions. Plaintiffs, including individual property owners and housing associations, challenged the proposition, arguing it violated statutory and constitutional protections, particularly the Ellis Act, which guarantees the right of property owners not to offer their units for rent.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the tax would force them to rent out units or pay substantial sums, affecting their personal use, privacy, and familial arrangements. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that Proposition M was lawful. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court found plaintiffs had standing and granted their motion, holding Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, and infringed on due process, equal protection, and privacy rights. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from enforcing Proposition M.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court focused on the Ellis Act preemption claim, finding that Proposition M, by imposing a substantial tax on owners who choose not to rent out residential units, directly conflicted with the Ellis Act’s protection of an owner’s right not to offer their property for rent. The court held that Proposition M was preempted by the Ellis Act and affirmed the judgment, declining to reach the constitutional issues. The plaintiffs were awarded costs on appeal. View "Debbane v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction.The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law

Two neighboring owners in a condominium complex disputed the ownership of a garage parking space labeled 38G-a. Plaintiff WCST Enterprises, LLC owns Unit 38, while Defendant Berit Ling owns Unit 39. Although Ling had used garage space 38G-a for many years, both parties’ grant deeds identified different garage spaces appurtenant to their units. WCST purchased Unit 38 with knowledge of the ongoing dispute and filed a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to garage space 38G-a, among other claims.The Superior Court of Orange County initially ruled in favor of Ling after a bench trial. This decision was reversed by the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, which remanded for a new trial. After a trial de novo, the Superior Court granted judgment quieting title in favor of WCST, finding the grant deeds showed WCST was the rightful owner of garage space 38G-a. WCST waived its remaining claims and the judgment named WCST as the prevailing party and provided that attorney fees could be determined by appropriate motion.After judgment, WCST moved for attorney fees under Civil Code section 5975 and a contractual provision in the complex’s CC&R’s. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding WCST was not entitled to fees under either source because its quiet title action did not seek to enforce any rights under the CC&R’s or other governing documents, but rather sought to enforce rights under its grant deed. WCST appealed the fee order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees. The court held that a statement naming a party as “prevailing party” in the judgment does not automatically entitle that party to fees. The trial court retains discretion to deny fees where the prevailing party has not established entitlement under statute or contract. View "WCST Enterprises, LLC v. Ling" on Justia Law

A married couple with three minor children separated after more than a decade together, leading to divorce proceedings focused on property and custody issues. The central dispute concerned the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, which had been purchased in part with funds that one spouse received as an inheritance. During the marriage, the home increased in value, and the parties disagreed about whether the inheritance funds and their appreciated value should be considered separate or marital property. Additional disputes included whether proceeds from the sale of a neighboring property to a family member should be part of the marital estate and whether credits or adjustments were owed for post-separation expenses and exclusive use of the marital home.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, conducted a property division trial. The court credited the wife’s testimony that her inheritance funds used for the down payment remained her separate property, but classified the increase in the home’s value as marital. It ordered an equal division of marital property, enforced a payment promised by the wife to the husband to facilitate the home sale, denied claims for credits and imputed rental value, and required each party to pay their own attorney’s fees. The court issued a child support order based on information provided by the wife after the husband failed to submit requested documentation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling that the inheritance funds remained separate property, holding that when separate property is commingled with marital property, a presumption arises that it becomes marital unless rebutted by sufficient evidence. Uncorroborated testimony about intent is insufficient to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed the remainder of the Superior Court’s rulings, including the equal division of marital property, denial of credits and imputed rental value, enforcement of the agreed payment, child support award, and attorney’s fees. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Dickerson v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer began constructing and selling duplex-style condominiums in Bonner County, Idaho, using a standard real estate purchase and sale agreement (PSA) form. The buyers, including a real estate agent and his wife, entered into PSAs for two units, planning to use them as personal and investment properties. The PSAs referenced detailed “Plans and Specifications” for the construction and finishes of the units, but no such documents were attached or ever created. Disputes later arose over the scope and quality of the promised finishes, especially after the developer communicated price increases and clarified the options for base and upgraded finishes. The buyers sued to enforce the contracts and sought specific performance, while the developer counterclaimed for a declaration that the PSAs were invalid due to indefiniteness.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, conducted a bench trial. It found that the PSAs for the disputed units were missing essential material terms, specifically the absent Plans and Specifications, which left the scope of work, finishes, and price adjustments undefined. The court concluded that no enforceable contract was formed and denied the buyers’ request for specific performance. The developer was ordered to return deposits but was deemed the prevailing party, entitling him to attorney fees and costs. The district court also conditioned a stay of its judgment pending appeal on the posting of an additional bond.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the PSAs were invalid and unenforceable because they omitted material terms necessary to define the contractual obligations. The buyers’ challenge to the additional bond was deemed moot given the disposition of the contract claims. The award of attorney fees to the developer was upheld, and the Supreme Court granted him attorney fees and costs for the appeal as the prevailing party. View "SCHUSTER v. MILBRATH" on Justia Law

Marline and Melvin Stein were the beneficial owners of a property in Wilmette, Illinois, held in trust with Chicago Title Land Trust Company as trustee. In June 2011, the Steins executed a promissory note in favor of Sara Watkin, trustee of the Sara Watkin 2000 Revocable Trust, for $150,000, secured by a mortgage on the Wilmette property. The Steins never made any payments. In June 2022, just before the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure, Watkin filed a foreclosure action. Chicago Title moved to dismiss, arguing Watkin had not provided evidence of an acceleration notice. The Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed Watkin’s foreclosure claim without prejudice, and Watkin did not amend her claim.One year after the limitations period lapsed, Chicago Title initiated a quiet title action, seeking to declare Watkin’s mortgage lien void due to the lapse of the statute of limitations. Watkin moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expiration of the limitations period barred only foreclosure, not the existence of the mortgage lien. The circuit court granted Watkin’s motion. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning that the lapse of the limitations period bars enforcement but does not extinguish the underlying obligation or the lien, and cited section 13-116 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a mortgage lien survives for 20 years after the last payment is due.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case. It held that the expiration of the 10-year limitations period for foreclosure actions does not extinguish the mortgage lien, which persists for at least 20 years pursuant to section 13-116, unless released or extended by agreement. The court affirmed the lower courts’ judgments, rejecting the quiet title action and upholding the continued existence of Watkin’s mortgage lien. View "Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. Watkin" on Justia Law