Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A worker employed by an independent subcontractor was injured while performing rebar reinforcement work on a pedestrian bridge construction project. The subcontractor had been hired by a construction company serving as the turnkey contractor for the project. The worker fell while climbing rebar, claiming muddy conditions contributed to his injury. Central to the dispute was whether the construction company could be held liable under California law for the worker’s injuries, given the company’s role in preparing the worksite and its ongoing involvement in certain site safety measures.In the Superior Court of San Mateo County, the construction company sought summary judgment, arguing it was not liable under the Privette doctrine, which generally holds that a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to the contractor’s employees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the doctrine applied and that the worker had not raised a triable issue of fact showing an exception to the doctrine. The worker argued that the construction company owed him a nondelegable duty under Cal-OSHA regulations and that the company had not actually delegated workplace safety responsibilities to the subcontractor. He also contended that the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine applied because the construction company exercised control over site safety in a manner that affirmatively contributed to his injury.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine’s presumption of delegation applied, including to duties imposed by Cal-OSHA regulations, and that there was no evidence the construction company affirmatively contributed to the worker’s injury or interfered with the subcontractor’s means and methods. The court concluded that neither the nondelegable duty argument nor the retained control exception applied, and it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the construction company. View "Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Seventeen property owners in Burlington sought a declaratory judgment that the city’s newly adopted ordinances regulating short-term rentals did not apply to their twenty-two nonowner-occupied properties, arguing that these uses were preexisting and nonconforming, and thus exempt from the new regulations. The city’s ordinances, passed in 2022, imposed significant restrictions on short-term rentals, including prohibiting most nonhost-occupied rentals and establishing new definitions and requirements. The property owners asserted that the ordinances threatened their ability to continue operating their properties as short-term rentals.Previously, these owners brought a similar action in the Civil Division of the Vermont Superior Court, seeking a declaration that their properties were legally permitted nonconforming uses. The Civil Division dismissed their claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that issues of nonconforming use arose under Chapter 117 of Title 24, over which the Environmental Division had exclusive jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal in a prior case—32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington—concluding that the Civil Division properly declined jurisdiction.While that earlier appeal was pending, the owners filed a new declaratory judgment action in the Environmental Division. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was not ripe and that the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction because the ordinance at issue was not enacted under the zoning statutes. The Environmental Division agreed, concluding that the owners’ claims were premature, involved factual issues inappropriate for declaratory relief, and should first be addressed through the statutory appeals process.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s dismissal. The Court held that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate because the owners’ claims were not ripe: no enforcement action was imminent, and the factual questions about each property’s status required more concrete controversy. The owners were not left without remedy, as they could pursue administrative determinations or appeals if enforcement occurred. View "32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

An employee of a plumbing subcontractor was injured when a trench collapsed at a residential construction site, resulting in serious physical and emotional harm. The employee had been directed by his supervisor to enter a trench that did not comply with OSHA safety regulations. The general contractor for the project was not present at the site and only learned of the accident months later, after an OSHA investigation. The subcontractor, not the general contractor, was responsible for the trenching work and the day-to-day safety of its employees.After receiving workers’ compensation and settling gross negligence claims against his co-employees, the injured worker proceeded to trial solely on a negligence claim against the general contractor. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the general contractor’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, allowing the case to go to a jury, which found the general contractor liable and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The court held that, as a general rule, a general contractor does not owe a duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor. The court found that neither the “retained control” nor “peculiar risk” exceptions to this rule applied. The general contractor did not retain operative control over the subcontractor’s work, either by contract or by conduct, and residential trenching work is not inherently or peculiarly dangerous as a matter of law under Iowa precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the general contractor was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed the lower court’s ruling. View "Kono v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

Leslie and Karen Turgeon own property in Spearfish, South Dakota, which can only be accessed by the Thoen Stone Road. The City of Spearfish owns the Thoen Stone Monument and the surrounding parkland, and has maintained a locked gate at the northern entrance of the Road for over forty years, providing keys to certain property owners, including the Turgeons. The Turgeons occasionally experienced issues with the key, hindering their access. They filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that the Road is a public right-of-way, asking the court to order the City to remove the gate and any other obstructions, and to enjoin the City from restricting access for themselves and the public.The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined that earlier documents (the 1953 Easement, 1971 Agreement, and 1972 Warranty Deed) did not manifest an intent to dedicate the Road for public use. The court found that the 2012 Plat expressly dedicated the Road as a public right-of-way but concluded that the City had not accepted this dedication, either expressly or impliedly, in part because the locked gate was inconsistent with public use. On this basis, the court granted summary judgment to the City and denied all relief to the Turgeons.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that the Road was not dedicated for public use until the 2012 Plat, and that there was no express acceptance of dedication by the City. However, it reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment regarding implied acceptance, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City impliedly accepted the dedication of the Road as a public right-of-way. The case was remanded for trial on this issue. View "Turgeon v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

An Irish company leased two airplanes to an Indian airline under agreements designating English courts as the forum for resolving disputes. After the airline failed to keep up with lease payments, the lessor sued in England and secured a monetary judgment. Seeking to enforce that judgment in Washington, the lessor filed a recognition action in King County Superior Court, claiming the airline had interests in personal property within the state but did not identify specific assets.The airline challenged the action in King County Superior Court, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because it had no contacts, assets, or business in Washington. The superior court denied the airline’s motion to dismiss, holding that jurisdiction was not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment under Washington’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The court ultimately entered summary judgment recognizing the English judgment and ordering payment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that neither statute nor constitutional law required the creditor to show personal jurisdiction or a property nexus for recognition of such a judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted review and reversed the lower courts. The court held that, under chapter 6.40A RCW, a judgment creditor must establish either general or specific jurisdiction over the debtor or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, demonstrate that the debtor has property within Washington before a foreign-country money judgment may be recognized. The court found that recognition actions under the Act are not purely ministerial and require adjudicative jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the debtor has property in Washington sufficient to support jurisdiction. View "Alterna Aircraft V B Ltd. v. SpiceJet Ltd." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a 50-foot-wide easement for ingress and egress over land owned by Thibault Enterprises, LLC, which is used by the Yosts to access their home. The easement is much wider than the gravel road the Yosts actually use, which is about 12 feet wide. Thibault has placed fences, grapevines, hay bales, and other objects within the easement's boundaries but not in the gravel road itself. These objects have not prevented or impeded the Yosts from traveling to and from their home. The Yosts requested an injunction to prohibit Thibault from placing anything within the 50-foot easement, arguing their entitlement to unrestricted use of the entire width.The Dinwiddie County Circuit Court granted an injunction, finding that although the objects did not interfere with the Yosts’ current use, their placement within the easement was improper. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding that any object placed within the easement’s defined width was an impermissible narrowing of the easement.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Virginia law does not require the removal of all objects within an easement of defined width unless those objects unreasonably interfere with the easement holder’s rights. The Court held that the correct rule is one of reasonableness, which requires examining the deed and the purpose of the easement, and determining whether the servient owner’s actions unreasonably interfere with the easement. Because the objects did not impede the Yosts’ ingress or egress, Thibault was not required to remove them. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for Thibault. View "Thibault Enterprises, LLC v. Yost" on Justia Law

Yerano Martinez was seriously injured in a car accident after he drove through a stop sign at an intersection. Martinez alleged that an overgrown bush, located on property owned by Jeffrey Smith, obscured the stop sign. The bush extended from Smith's property into the county's right-of-way, which is a strip of land adjacent to the roadway. Martinez argued that Smith failed in his duty to maintain his property so as not to obstruct the stop sign for passing motorists.The Marion Superior Court granted summary judgment to Smith, finding that, under the Indiana Supreme Court’s previous decision in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Smith owed no duty to motorists unless a hazardous condition actually extended onto the paved portion of the roadway. The Indiana Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, interpreting Reece to mean that a landowner’s duty to motorists is limited to conditions that extend onto the roadway itself, not merely into the public right-of-way or county easement.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on transfer. The Court held that a landowner’s common-law duty under Reece to refrain from creating hazardous conditions for passing motorists on adjacent highways includes traffic-control devices, such as stop signs, located within the public right-of-way. The Court clarified that the duty is not confined to the paved part of the road but extends to conditions that obstruct traffic-control devices within the right-of-way. Because Smith admitted the bush encroached into the public right-of-way and created a visual obstruction, the hazardous condition was not wholly contained on his property. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Smith and reversed the lower court’s decision. View "Martinez v. Smith" on Justia Law

A public hospital district in California established and recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) in 1991 for a common interest development known as the Tulare Medical Center. These CC&Rs included a prohibition on abortion clinics within the development. In 2001, certain property subject to these CC&Rs was transferred to individual owners, who later sought to lease it to a family planning organization that provides a range of services, including abortion. The property owners association, comprised of all parcel owners and authorized to enforce the CC&Rs, objected to the lease and sought to enjoin the operation of the clinic, arguing that any abortion services would violate the CC&Rs.The Superior Court of Tulare County reviewed the association’s request for a preliminary injunction. After considering the parties’ submissions and arguments, the court denied the injunction. The court found there was a credible threat that abortion services would be provided but concluded the association had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Specifically, the trial court noted unresolved legal questions regarding whether restrictions on abortion clinics in CC&Rs violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act or California constitutional protections, and found the association failed to demonstrate that the balance of harms favored an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the prohibition on abortion clinics, adopted by a public entity, constituted government action that interfered with the fundamental constitutional right to reproductive choice under the California Constitution. The court applied the compelling interest test, found no compelling interest justifying the restriction, and concluded the prohibition violated fundamental public policy. Additionally, the court held that the prohibition was void under Civil Code section 53 because it indirectly limited property use based on a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Tulare Medical Center Property v. Valdivia" on Justia Law

Two families owned adjacent lots in a five-lot subdivision in Gallatin County, Montana. The land, formerly a horse pasture, was subdivided in 2006. As a condition of subdivision approval, the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) required the developer to abandon certain small irrigation ditches crossing the lots, except for one on the east boundary. These requirements were recorded with the subdivision’s plat and were to be referenced in all future property transfers. Despite these requirements, the disputed ditch continued to carry water across several lots, including those eventually purchased by the plaintiffs.After purchasing their lots, the plaintiffs used the ditch water for irrigation, believing they had rights to the ditch based on representations by previous owners and realtors. Years later, the DEQ and local health authorities notified subdivision owners that the continued existence of the ditch violated the terms of the subdivision approval and related sanitation regulations. To comply, the defendants installed culverts, which were approved by authorities. The plaintiffs then sued, claiming the installation of culverts interfered with their implied ditch easement.The case was first reviewed by the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, which granted summary judgment for the defendants. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had no ditch easement—implied or otherwise—because the recorded conditions for subdivision approval required abandonment of the ditches. The court further determined that any intent to allow continued ditch use, necessary for an implied easement, was negated by these recorded conditions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not hold an implied easement by existing use, as the circumstances and recorded subdivision restrictions demonstrated no intent to continue the ditch’s use. The Supreme Court also upheld the award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and remanded for determination of additional fees incurred on appeal. View "Dolan v. Guenther" on Justia Law

A public entity contracted with a general contractor to construct a major rail line project. The general contractor, in turn, subcontracted a significant portion of the work to a subcontractor. As the project progressed, it experienced numerous delays and disruptions, which the subcontractor claimed increased its costs. After completing its performance, the subcontractor, relying on expert analysis of its additional costs, filed a verified statement of claim under the Colorado Public Works Act, asserting it was owed additional millions for labor, materials, and other costs, including those stemming from delay and disruption.Following the filing, the general contractor substituted a surety bond for the retained project funds and the subcontractor initiated litigation in Denver District Court. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the subcontractor, concluding that its verified statement of claim was not excessive and that there was a reasonable possibility the claimed amount was due. The court awarded the subcontractor damages for delay, disruption, and unpaid funds. The general contractor appealed, contending the claim was excessive and should result in forfeiture of all rights to the claimed amount. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed in relevant part, holding that the verified statement of claim was excessive as a matter of law and that the subcontractor forfeited all rights to the amount claimed. This disposition left certain issues raised by the subcontractor on cross-appeal unaddressed.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted review and held that, under the Public Works Act, disputed or unliquidated amounts—including delay and disruption damages—may be included in a verified statement of claim if they represent the specified categories of costs and the claim is not excessive under the statute. The court also held that filing an excessive claim results only in forfeiture of statutory remedies under the Act, not all legal remedies. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co. v. Reg'l Rail Partners" on Justia Law