The Town of North Hero appealed the Property Valuation and Review (PVR) Division hearing officer’s decision to impose a $2000 discovery sanction against the Town in a property-tax-reappraisal appeal brought by the Williams Living Trust. The hearing officer imposed the sanction as a result of a claimed discovery violation by the Town concerning disclosure of an electronic Excel spreadsheet file requested by the Trust. The Trust disagreed with the reappraisal of its property and challenged it through the statutory appeals process. In the notice of appeal, the Trust requested that the Town’s listers provide the Trust with a specific Excel spreadsheet file in “native format” and “unprotected.” The Town had provided the Excel spreadsheet in PDF format, not in the electronic format later requested. The Trust sent additional email requests to the Town asking for the Excel file. The Trust ultimately moved to compel production of the file in the requested format; the Town responded it did not have the file and could not produce “what does not exist.” The PVR hearing officer issued a decision on the Trust’s motion to compel, ordering the Town to make one last effort to obtain a copy of the file requested and giving the Town ten days to comply. In compliance with the hearing officer’s order, the Town conducted another search and located the file and produced it in the format originally requested. The Trust filed a motion describing the Town’s conduct concerning the file request as “blatant misconduct during discovery” and seeking monetary sanctions of $2500 and other sanctions as the hearing officer deemed proper for the Town’s failure to produce the file earlier. The hearing officer imposed a monetary sanction against the Town of $2000 for false statements made by Town officials and the “expenses, effort, and time” the Trust spent as a result of the Town’s failure to produce the file until ordered to do so. No evidence was provided concerning how much time, effort, and expense was incurred by the Trust, and there was no way to determine how the hearing officer determined $2000 to be the appropriate sanction amount. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the sanction, finding the Town had fully complied with the order compelling discovery, making imposition of a monetary sanction against the Town an abuse of discretion. View "Williams v. Town of North Hero" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the case brought by Plaintiff seeking to have the district court address the same grievances she brought without success in the Massachusetts state courts, holding that Supreme Court case law divests federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction in such cases. A bank commenced a summary process action in the Worcester Housing Court seeking to evict Plaintiff. Plaintiff counterclaimed. The Housing Court eventually entered final judgment awarding possession of the property to the bank. Plaintiff’s appeal was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a civil action against the bank in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging wrongful foreclosure and other claims relating to the same issues she addressed in the summary process action. The district court granted the bank’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the doctrine set forth in D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), deprived the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court lacked jurisdiction where Plaintiff’s federal suit sought to invalidate the antecedent state courts’ judgments. View "Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Shellpoint in an action alleging that Shellpoint discriminated against plaintiffs based on race when it prohibited them from assuming the loan of a home that they had purchased. The court held that no reasonable jury could find that Shellpoint discriminated against plaintiffs based on their race where their only evidence was vague and speculative. Furthermore, the requirement that plaintiffs satisfy the outstanding loan payment was consistent with the loan agreement, which conditions assumption on Shellpoint's determination that its security would not be impaired. The court also held that plaintiffs did not point to evidence countering the Shellpoint representative's statement that they never produced a complete application. View "Sims v. New Penn Financial LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this boundary dispute was whether a property line ran to the center of a road where the deed described the property as being bounded by that road and included the property’s square footage, as well as a reference to the subdivision plat. Landowner owned Parcel E, which was located in a property owners’ association (Association). The dispute concerned whether Landowner owned the portion of Hibiscus Drive, a road forming the northeast boundary of Parcel E, between the road’s edge and its center. The circuit court that Parcel E extended only to the edge of Hibiscus Drive and entered judgment for the Association. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because nothing in the deed expressed a contrary intent, Parcel E ran to the center of Hibiscus Drive by operation of the rule of construction. View "Ettinger v. Oyster Bay II Community Property Owners’ Ass’n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Petitioners’ petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that Petitioners demonstrated no error of law or abuse of discretion in the denial of extraordinary relief. Petitioners were defendants in a summary process action commenced by a bank. The bank was awarded possession of the property after a trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. Thereafter, an execution issued on the judgment for possession. After moving unsuccessfully to vacate the execution, Petitioners filed a motion to stay or strike the execution. The Appellate Division denied the motion. Petitioners then filed the instant Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. A single justice of the Court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners had, and to some extent pursued, an avenue for relief in the ordinary appellate process. View "Bishay v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for HSBC in an action seeking to foreclose on defendant's property. The court held that HSBC was the holder of the home equity note and that defendant failed to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to HSBC's ownership of the note. The court also held that HSBC's suit was timely because defendant's bankruptcy suit tolled the statute of limitations for 127 days. Finally, the court held that defendant waived his argument that the district court erred when it signed and entered a final judgment that authorized a foreclosure sale of the property, without complying with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 309. View "HSBC Bank USA, NA v. Crum" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant Leo Dolan, Jr. and Cherie Dolan entered into an agreement of sale with Bentley Homes, Ltd., Garvin Mitchell Corporation, Chadwell Associates, L.P., Chadwell Realty, Inc. and Harrison Community Association (hereinafter “Bentley”) for a new custom house. Hurd Millwork Company, Inc. (Hurd) provided many of the windows used in the construction of Appellant’s home. Within a year, the house developed substantial defects, including air and water leaks around the windows. Hurd filed an action against Bentley for unpaid invoices related to the construction of Appellant’s home and other homes in the same development. Bentley filed a counterclaim against Hurd for providing defective windows. In October 2002, Bentley and Hurd entered into a settlement containing admissions that numerous homes in the development suffered from extensive defects and leaks. During the pendency of the litigation between Hurd and Bentley, Appellant experienced additional problems with his home including severe leaks, rotted wood and issues with a stucco wall. Bentley made some repairs to the home, but the leaks continued to worsen. Appellant hired a civil engineer to assess the home and determine what repairs were required to fix the problems with the house. The repairs and associated costs amounted to $826,695.99. The house was purchased for $1,941,669.00. In this appeal by permission, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was the proper role of an appellate court when reviewing a non-jury decision where it deems the trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) inadequate, but the trial judge is no longer available to provide a supplemental opinion. The Supreme Court concluded that where a Rule 1925(a) opinion is deemed inadequate and the trial judge is unavailable to provide a supplemental opinion, the appellate court should review the legal issues raised in the appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. When deciding issues of law an appellate court is not required to defer to the conclusions of a trial court. Applying this standard and scope, the Superior Court will be able to review the entire record and ultimately determine whether the trial court correctly decided the legal issues raised in Bentley’s appeal. View "Dolan v. Hurd Millwork Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Petitioner’s petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, in which Petitioner sought the dissolution of a memorandum of lis pendens, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying extraordinary relief. Petitioner was a defendant in an action in the superior court concerning certain real property. On the motion of the plaintiff, a judge endorsed the memorandum of lis pendens at issue in this case. Petitioner appealed from a judgment enforcing the parties’ agreement to settle the case, challenging the enforcement of the settlement agreements, as well as the endorsement of the memorandum of lis pendens. Before the Appeals Court affirmed, Petitioner filed this Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice properly denied extraordinary relief because the case in the superior court had not yet gone to final judgment. View "Saade v. Price" on Justia Law

This case stems from the foreclosure and lien priority case arising out of the failed Idaho Club golf course and residential housing development project. The developer, Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC (“POBD”), took out several loans on the real property, agreed to promissory notes, and mortgaged the Idaho Club real property with several lenders, including JV, LLC and, as relevant to this appeal, three other lenders: RE Loans (“REL”), LLC, Pensco Trust Co., and Mortgage Fund ’08 LLC (“MF08”) (collectively, the three “lenders”). JV’s interest in the Idaho Club arose out of a mortgage (the “JV Mortgage”) it recorded against five parcels on the Idaho Club property that JV sold to POBD. POBD ultimately defaulted on its obligations on the promissory notes associated with the mortgages. In addition to defaulting on the notes, POBD failed to pay property taxes to Bonner County for several years and failed to pay various mechanics and materialmen, one of which was Genesis Golf Builders, Inc. (“Genesis”). JV appealed the district court's conclusion that Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Valiant”) held a priority position in the mortgages on the development. JV also appealed the district court’s award of costs against it, as well as a judgment by the district court that awarded sanctions against JV and its attorney. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, finding JV's redemption deed did not subordinate it to Bonner County's right, title, claim and interested based on a tax deed. The Supreme Court also found the district court abused its discretion in the way that it applied the formula announced in Valiant Idaho, LLC v. North Idaho Resorts, LLC (No. 44583, 2018 WL 4927560) to arrive at its costs award. View "Valiant Idaho v. JV, LLC" on Justia Law

In this proceeding under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 72.010 authorizing property owners subject to multiple taxation to petition the Supreme Court directly to determine which county is owed taxes, the Court determined that it had original jurisdiction and that taxes on Relators’ property were owed to San Patricio County rather than Nueces County. This dispute concerned shoreline boundary on Corpus Christi Bay. For a decade both Nueces County and San Patricio County have taxed the same piers, docks, and other facilities affixed to land in San Patricio County but extending out into the water in Nueces County. After the statute was enacted and signed into law in 2017, Relators filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court praying that the Court determine which county is authorized to tax Relators' piers. The Supreme Court held (1) this case presented a compelling reason for the Court to exercise original jurisdiction; (2) section 72.010 does not violate the Texas Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws; and (3) San Patricio County is owed the taxes due on Relators' piers. View "In re Occidental Chemical Corp." on Justia Law