Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose following a 2016 chlorine gas leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia, where IPI, Inc. employees, including its president, Matthew Joseph Taylor, were injured and IPI’s equipment was damaged while performing power washing and industrial painting services for Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corporation and Westlake Natrium LLC (collectively Westlake). The parties operated under two interrelated service agreements containing indemnity provisions. After the incident, IPI and Taylor sued Westlake for personal injury and property damage. Westlake counterclaimed, arguing that IPI breached the indemnity agreements by bringing suit and owed Westlake indemnification for Taylor’s claims.The Circuit Court of Marshall County applied Pennsylvania law, granted summary judgment to Westlake, and found the indemnity agreements clearly required IPI to indemnify Westlake, even for claims arising from Westlake’s own negligence, except in cases of Westlake’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court ruled that IPI’s claims fell within the scope of the agreements, including damages from the chlorine gas release, and certified its order as final under Rule 54(b). On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the application of Pennsylvania law but concluded that the circuit court erred by not analyzing the possible conflict between the two indemnity provisions and by insufficiently explaining why the claims fell within their scope. The ICA remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo, holding that the two indemnity provisions should be read together, not in conflict, and that both unequivocally require IPI to indemnify Westlake for its own negligence. However, the court found ambiguities regarding the scope of indemnity and the application of exceptions, necessitating factual development through parol evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to the circuit court. View "Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1902, F.W. Severin conveyed 117.55 acres of land in Doddridge County, West Virginia, to L.D. Nicholson, reserving “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” for himself. Over time, Nicholson’s successors leased their oil and gas interests, and, in 2017, production began, resulting in royalty payments. Disputes arose regarding the respective interests of Severin’s and Nicholson’s successors in the oil and gas estate, leading to litigation. The central issue was whether Severin’s reservation in the deed constituted a one-sixteenth or a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate.The Circuit Court of Doddridge County, in a declaratory judgment order dated September 28, 2022, concluded that the deed was unambiguous and that Severin had reserved a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate. The court reasoned that, in the context of 1902 West Virginia oil and gas law, a reservation of one-sixteenth operated as a reservation of one-half of the mineral estate. The Nicholsons appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment on November 13, 2023. The ICA found the deed unambiguous and determined that Severin reserved only a one-sixteenth interest in the oil and gas minerals under the land.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. The Court held that the 1902 deed was unambiguous and that Severin’s reservation of “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” meant exactly one-sixteenth of the oil and gas mineral estate. The Court rejected arguments for construing the deed in light of historical industry practice or adopting the “estate misconception theory” used in Texas. The ICA’s decision was affirmed. View "Severin POA Group, LLC v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

A couple entered into an agreement with a construction company to build a home on their property. The contract was signed at a time when the construction company’s registration as a contractor had lapsed, which violated the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA). During construction, numerous problems arose, including water leaks, mold, improper grading, and unfinished work. The couple paid substantial sums and alleged that the company issued fraudulent invoices for work not performed. After failed attempts to resolve the issues, the couple sued for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and fraudulent billing. The construction company counterclaimed, arguing it was prevented from completing the work and that its registration lapse was inadvertent.The District Court of the Second Judicial District, Clearwater County, initially dismissed the construction company’s counterclaims due to its failure to register under ICRA. Later, the court granted summary judgment to the construction company, dismissing the couple’s claims and finding the contract void and unenforceable because of the registration violation. The court reasoned that neither party could enforce the contract and denied all claims arising from it, including those for breach of contract and fraudulent billing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The Court held that while ICRA prohibits an unregistered contractor from enforcing a contract, it does not bar the innocent project owner from doing so. Contracts entered in violation of ICRA are voidable, not void, and remain enforceable at the option of the project owner. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the couple’s breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings, clarifying that the project owner may pursue claims under such a contract. Attorney fees were denied, but costs were awarded to the prevailing party. View "Kumm v. Work Shops & Sons " on Justia Law

A church organization sued its pastor after he withdrew $223,000 from a parish bank account and deposited the funds into his personal account. The pastor asserted that the money was a personal gift from a church member, who had written three $300,000 checks during a church event. One check was made payable to the church, while the other two had blank payee lines and were delivered in sealed envelopes to two pastors. The recipient pastor initially gave his check to the church president, who filled in the church’s name as payee and deposited the check in the parish account. Later, the church member allegedly told the pastor that the check was intended for him personally, prompting the pastor to transfer the funds to his own account.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Davison County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the church on its claims for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty and against the pastor on his counterclaims for conversion and fraud. The court found that all money in the parish account belonged to the church or its parish and concluded that a blank check was not sufficient delivery of a gift. The court also awarded prejudgment interest to the church.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that the check delivered to the pastor was not a completed gift under South Dakota law, but this finding alone did not entitle the church to summary judgment. The court determined that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the pastor’s fraud claim, specifically whether the church obtained the funds through misrepresentation of the donor’s intent. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims and remanded for further proceedings. It also reversed the award of prejudgment interest. View "Iglesia Pentecostal V. Torres" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were involved in a residential real estate transaction in the District of Columbia. The sellers transferred a property to the buyer, and a disclosure statement about the property’s condition was provided, as required by statute. After encountering water issues, the buyer sued the sellers, alleging that the disclosure statement contained fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations. The disclosure statement, while referenced, was explicitly not part of the sales contract itself.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The judge conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the sellers on the buyer’s claims. Subsequently, the sellers sought attorney fees under a provision of the sales contract that allowed recovery for actions based on the performance or nonperformance of the contract’s terms and conditions. The trial court denied this request, finding that the buyer’s claims were based on statutory obligations for disclosure, not on any term or condition of the contract.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the sellers were entitled to attorney fees under the contract. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the contract’s interpretation and found its language unambiguous. The court held that attorney fees could only be recovered for actions based on performance or nonperformance of contractual terms, not statutory obligations. Since the buyer’s claims were rooted in alleged statutory violations rather than breaches of the contract, the sellers were not entitled to attorney fees. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorney fees. View "Lovern v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A homeowners association filed suit against a property owner, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctions to prohibit the use of the property for short-term rentals. The owner admitted operating short-term rentals and argued that the restrictive covenants did not clearly prohibit such activity, contending the terms were ambiguous. The association imposed fines and assessments for violations, and neighbors reported nuisance activities such as late-night parties and disruptive behavior by renters. The owner counterclaimed for breach of contract, asserting unequal enforcement and lack of due process.After a five-day bench trial, the District Court of Oklahoma County found that the owner’s use of the property constituted a prohibited business under the clear and unambiguous language of the restrictive covenant, awarded damages based on accumulated fines, issued an injunction, and dismissed the owner’s breach of contract claim. The court found the association to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees to be determined later.The owner appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, partially reversed, vacating the injunction and prevailing party status, and remanded for further proceedings on nuisance claims unrelated to restrictive covenants. The association petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari, vacated the appellate court’s opinion, and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Court held that the owner’s short-term rental activities violated the clear and unambiguous language of the restrictive covenant, the challenges to fines and assessments lacked merit, the injunction was supported by the evidence, and no abuse of discretion occurred regarding the denial of a new trial. The owner’s challenge to the attorney fees was not preserved for review. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. View "SILVERHAWK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. TAWOSE" on Justia Law

Maria Diaz contracted with a franchisee, SOL Pools, LLC, to build a swimming pool, while SOL Pools operated as a franchisee of Premier Franchise Management, LLC. Diaz initially brought a small claims action in 2022 against SOL for breach of contract and property damage, resulting in a default judgment in her favor. Subsequently, in 2023, Diaz filed suit in district court against both SOL and Premier, alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and violations of the Home Repair Fraud Act, including claims against Premier based on apparent authority. SOL again failed to appear, leading to a default judgment against SOL for damages and punitive damages.The District Court of Oklahoma County allowed Premier to amend the pretrial conference order to assert the defense of res judicata, relying on the prior small claims judgment. The district court then vacated the default judgment against SOL, dismissed Diaz’s claims against SOL with prejudice, and dismissed Diaz’s apparent authority claims against Premier based on claim preclusion. The district court certified its order for immediate appeal under Oklahoma law, and Diaz sought review by petition for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Premier to amend the pretrial conference order to add the defense of res judicata. However, it found that the district court erred in dismissing Diaz’s apparent authority claims against Premier without first developing the necessary factual record to determine whether claim preclusion applies under Oklahoma law. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s certified interlocutory order in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DIAZ v. PREMIER FRANCHISE MANAGEMENT, LLC" on Justia Law

After the foreclosure sale of a residential property in Charles Town, West Virginia, the purchasers sought to evict the previous owners, who had defaulted on their mortgage. The former owners responded by filing counterclaims and third-party claims against the mortgage servicing company and others, alleging breach of contract, tortious conduct, and violations of West Virginia’s consumer protection laws. The litigation centered on whether the mortgage servicer had properly handled a payment intended to cure the default: the former owners claimed they mailed a cashier’s check that was delivered before the sale, but were repeatedly told by customer service representatives that the check had not been received. The dispute focused on what actually happened to the payment and what representations were made by the servicer’s employees.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County initially denied the mortgage servicer’s request for a protective order and granted the former owners’ motion to compel depositions of two customer service employees located outside the United States. The circuit court determined these individuals were “managing agents” because they made decisions regarding the disputed payment and its investigation, thus subject to deposition upon notice alone. PHH Mortgage Corporation argued that international procedures, such as those in the Hague Convention, were required and that the depositions would be unduly burdensome and duplicative.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the petition for a writ of prohibition. The court held that, under West Virginia’s procedural rules, a corporate party’s managing agents located outside the United States may be deposed upon notice alone, without resort to international procedures. It clarified the factors courts should consider in determining “managing agent” status. Finding no clear legal error or abuse of discretion by the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Appeals denied the requested writ of prohibition and upheld the circuit court’s discovery order. View "State ex rel. PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Hammer" on Justia Law

A property owner in rural Teton County, Idaho, brought a suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding responsibility for snow removal and maintenance costs for a segment of East 5250 South, a road providing access to several properties, including his own. The dispute centered on whether the Overlook at Fox Creek Subdivision Owners’ Association (HOA), the developer GNJ Properties, LLC, and various individual property owners were obligated to share or bear maintenance costs for the road. The owner argued that either the HOA was solely responsible under subdivision covenants or, alternatively, all property owners using the road should equitably share the costs. For years, he had paid these costs himself, despite demand letters sent to the HOA and neighbors.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Teton County, initially dismissed the owner's complaint, concluding he lacked standing because he was not in privity of contract with the HOA or GNJ under the subdivision’s covenants or the development agreement. The court also granted summary judgment for the respondents on their counterclaims, finding insufficient evidence that the disputed road segment was within the subdivision and thus not subject to the HOA’s maintenance obligations. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees and costs to the respondents.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case de novo. It held that the district court erred by failing to address the owner’s alternative equitable claims and by prematurely dismissing his complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found unresolved factual issues regarding the road’s location relative to subdivision boundaries, making summary judgment improper. The court reversed the dismissal and summary judgment, vacated the attorney fee awards, and remanded for further proceedings to resolve these factual and legal determinations. The respondents’ request for attorney fees on appeal was denied. View "Colton v. The Overlook at Fox Creek Subdivision " on Justia Law

A homeowner in Meridian, Idaho, rented space on his property to the owner of a mobile tiny home, which was certified as a recreational vehicle and hooked up to utilities. Shortly after the tiny home was installed, a neighbor complained to the city’s code enforcement office. The city investigated both the property with the tiny home and another nearby property, determining that the tiny homes violated city ordinances because they were not affixed to improved foundations and were being used as residences outside of approved RV parks. The city issued notices of violation and orders to abate. The property owner erected a privacy fence and claimed the tiny home was vacated, but city officials remained unconvinced.The property owner and the tiny home’s owner filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho, Ada County. Their amended complaint challenged several city code provisions on substantive due process grounds and alleged selective enforcement under the Idaho Constitution’s equal protection clause. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the substantive due process claims as moot, finding that even if some ordinances were unconstitutional, the plaintiffs would still be denied a permit due to the unified ownership requirement. It also dismissed the selective enforcement claim with prejudice, finding no disparate treatment as enforcement was triggered by a neighbor's formal complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the substantive due process claims, but on ripeness grounds rather than mootness, holding that the plaintiffs’ pre-application challenge was too speculative for judicial review since they had not actually applied for a permit. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim, finding substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that enforcement was based on a formal complaint rather than unconstitutional selective enforcement. Costs were awarded to the city. View "Decker v. City of Meridian" on Justia Law