Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a series of unsuccessful commercial real estate transactions in South Lake Tahoe, where the buyer, Urban Sunrise LLC, was represented by dual agents—David Vogt, a real estate broker, and Ryan Smith, a real estate agent. Urban Sunrise entered into purchase agreements for five properties, intending to complete a tax-deferred exchange under Internal Revenue Code section 1031. The transactions failed because Urban Sunrise could not obtain loans due to the high cost of fire insurance, resulting in the forfeiture of over $1.1 million to the sellers and loss of the anticipated tax benefit.In the Superior Court of El Dorado County, Urban Sunrise and its managing member, Susan Kerr, sued Vogt and Smith for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, constructive fraud, and rescission, alleging six breaches of fiduciary duty. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no triable issues of fact regarding their performance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims, finding no breach of fiduciary duty, and also granted summary judgment in part on Vogt's cross-complaint for commission owed, ordering Urban Sunrise to pay Vogt commission, interest, attorney fees, and costs.Reviewing the trial court’s decisions, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, applied de novo review and affirmed both summary judgment rulings. The appellate court held there were no triable issues of material fact regarding any alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, finding that the dual agents had adequately disclosed their prior relationship, had no duty to further investigate insurance issues beyond contractual obligations, did not act as attorneys in a way that created an unwaivable conflict, and did not improperly recommend the unfavorable terms. The judgment in favor of the defendants and in part for Vogt on his cross-complaint was affirmed. View "Urban Sunrise v. Vogt" on Justia Law

A company engaged in outdoor advertising sought to erect a large billboard in a business district of Bath Township, Ohio. The local zoning inspector denied its application, citing a categorical ban on “off-premises” signs under the township’s zoning resolution. The company’s proposed billboard would have been a two-sided structure, 30 feet tall and 360 square feet per side. Notably, the company did not challenge other relevant provisions of the zoning resolution, such as the bans on “pole signs” and “high-rise” signs, which also would have prohibited the proposed billboard.The company, joined by a related entity, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, asserting that the off-premises sign ban violated the First Amendment and conflicted with Ohio law. The defendants, Bath Township’s board of trustees and zoning officials, moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing because even if the off-premises ban were invalidated, other unchallenged provisions would still bar the billboard. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because invalidating the off-premises sign ban would not redress their injury, as the bans on pole and high-rise signs would independently prohibit the billboard. The court found that this reasoning was controlled by its prior decision in Midwest Media Property, L.L.C. v. Symmes Township. The Sixth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs had forfeited any alternative standing theories, such as those based on the permitting process or application fees, by not properly raising them. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Summit Locations, LLC v. Bd. of Trustees, Bath Township" on Justia Law

Several parcels of land along the shore of Priest Lake, Idaho, were originally owned by William and Mary Taylor and later subdivided and conveyed to various parties, including the Byrds, the McCray Living Trust, and the Coffeys. The dispute centers on a strip of land between the parcels now owned by the Byrds and the Trust and the lake’s ordinary high water mark. The Byrds and the Trust argued their deeds conveyed property extending to the lake’s shoreline, and thus included littoral rights. The Coffeys contended the deeds did not reach the shoreline and that they held title to the disputed strip.After a prior administrative dispute over a dock permit, the Byrds and the Trust initiated quiet title and declaratory judgment actions in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Bonner County. The Coffeys counterclaimed, also seeking a declaration of ownership and alleging civil trespass. Following a bench trial, the district court found the deeds ambiguous, looked to extrinsic evidence, and concluded the deeds did not convey land up to the shoreline. The court awarded the disputed strip and littoral rights to the Coffeys, determined the Byrds and the Trust had trespassed, and awarded damages and attorney fees to the Coffeys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in its findings and in the legal standards applied. The Supreme Court held that while the district court correctly found the deeds ambiguous, it used the wrong burden of proof—a clear and convincing evidence standard—when deciding the parties’ competing declaratory judgment claims. The correct standard was a preponderance of the evidence. Because the district court did not analyze the evidence under the appropriate standard, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings using the proper burden of proof. The Supreme Court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Byrd v. Coffey" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two parties over a residential lease agreement in Mountain Home, Idaho, which included an option to purchase the property after the underlying Wells Fargo mortgage was satisfied. The lessee paid $8,000 for the purchase option and began residing at the property. Eighteen months later, the lessee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing the lessor as a creditor and rent as an expense but denying any legal or equitable interest in real property and failing to disclose the lease agreement or the purchase option in the bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy trustee closed the case without distributing any assets, and the lessee received a discharge of debts. Four years after discharge, the lessee attempted to exercise the purchase option, but the lessor refused.The lessee filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, seeking specific performance and declaratory relief, while the lessor counterclaimed for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court initially denied both motions, finding factual disputes, and declined to apply judicial estoppel. Upon reconsideration, the district court ruled for the lessor, holding that the lessee’s claims were barred by judicial estoppel and, in the alternative, that the lessee lacked standing because the undisclosed purchase option remained property of the bankruptcy estate. The district court denied the lessee’s request to stay the proceedings to reopen the bankruptcy case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the lessee lacked standing to enforce the purchase option. The court reasoned that the purchase option was property of the bankruptcy estate, was not properly disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules, and thus remained with the estate after the bankruptcy case closed. Only the bankruptcy trustee, not the lessee, had standing to enforce the option. Costs on appeal were awarded to the lessor. View "Conger v. Clark" on Justia Law

The dispute involves the town of Nahant and Northeastern University over a peninsula known as East Point. Northeastern owns most of the land, using part for its Marine Science Center, while the town owns a smaller parcel at the tip, which it maintains as a public park. The town also holds an easement over Northeastern’s property for access to the park. In 2018, Northeastern announced plans to expand its campus with a new building, sparking local opposition. In response, Nahant residents voted in 2021 to authorize the town’s board of selectmen to use eminent domain to acquire conservation and access easements across portions of Northeastern’s property. The town then petitioned the Massachusetts Superior Court to establish its right to take these property interests.Northeastern challenged the taking, arguing it was undertaken in bad faith, claiming the town’s real motive was to block its development project. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court judge sided with Northeastern, finding that the town’s stated public purpose was pretextual and that its true intent was to prevent the proposed expansion. As a result, the judge dismissed the town’s petition and awarded Northeastern over $1 million in fees and costs.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. It held that Nahant’s stated purposes for the taking—conservation, open space, and public access—constitute valid public purposes under Massachusetts law. The Court found no reasonable expectation that Northeastern could prove the town acted in bad faith or that the taking was improperly motivated by private interests, and rejected alternative public policy arguments. The Court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, vacated the fee award, and remanded for entry of an order establishing the town’s right to take the property interests, and for further proceedings. View "Town of Nahant v. Northeastern University" on Justia Law

Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees.Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees. View "Ramirez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

The City of Indian Wells enacted ordinances regulating short-term rentals (STRs) in response to complaints about nuisances caused by such rentals. Initially, the City imposed a 29-night minimum stay requirement for residential rentals, effectively banning STRs. To accommodate owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wished to operate STRs, the City adopted an ordinance allowing CID members to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, subject to certain conditions. Matthew and Rebecca Parsons, owners of property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID conducted an opt-out vote. When the City denied their permit request, the Parsons filed a petition for writ of mandate, claiming that the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law (specifically Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act) and constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of the Parsons, finding that the City’s opt-out provision was preempted by state law and improperly delegated authority to private parties. The court granted a writ of mandate directing the City to issue an unrestricted STR permit to the Parsons and awarded attorney fees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the case. The court held that the City’s ordinance was not preempted by Civil Code section 4740 because the opt-out vote did not require an amendment to CID governing documents. The court also held that delegating the decision to CID members to opt out of the minimum stay requirement did not violate due process rights. Additionally, it concluded the City did not enact the ordinance arbitrarily or capriciously. The judgment and postjudgment order awarding attorney fees were reversed. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a brother and sister over the ownership of a property in Washington, D.C., purchased in 1999. The brother paid for the property but directed that the title be issued in his sister’s name, allegedly to shield the asset from his estranged wife during a potential divorce. The sister claimed the property was a gift to her in appreciation for her support, and she granted her brother power of attorney so he could manage the property and operate his pharmacy business there. For nearly two decades, the brother managed the property, paid its expenses, and collected rental income, while the sister remained hands off but never revoked the power of attorney. After the brother developed Alzheimer’s disease, a dispute arose between his children—acting as his guardians—and the sister over ownership, leading to litigation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and found that the brother had acquired the property through adverse possession, based on his long period of exclusive management and his public assertion of ownership. The court rejected the sister’s claim that the property was a gift, concluding there was no clear intent to relinquish ownership. It also awarded the brother attorney’s fees and costs without explanation.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the evidence did not support adverse possession, primarily because the brother’s actions were with the sister’s permission via power of attorney, so they could not be considered hostile or adverse. The Court of Appeals also held that the lower court erred by awarding attorney’s fees and costs without explanation. The appellate court vacated the judgment declaring the brother sole owner, vacated the fee award, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Admadu v. Bockai" on Justia Law

A group of residents in the District of Columbia challenged amendments to the District’s Comprehensive Plan, a document that guides land use decisions. The 2021 amendments, enacted after a lengthy planning and public comment process, increased land use densities in certain neighborhoods, prompting concerns among residents about potential harms such as increased risk of displacement, infrastructure strain, and changes to neighborhood character. The residents sued, alleging that the Mayor’s Office of Planning failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment and did not give proper consideration to their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with prejudice, finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court determined that the alleged injuries were too hypothetical and amounted to generalized grievances rather than concrete, particularized harm. Additionally, it concluded that there was no causal link between the Office of Planning’s actions and the claimed injuries, and that the injuries were not redressable because the court could not prevent implementation of the enacted Plan.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the appellants lacked standing, holding that none had alleged an injury-in-fact that was sufficiently concrete or imminent. The court explained that most harms were generalized or speculative and not tied to any specific development project at the time the Plan was enacted. However, the appellate court found that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice; dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but remanded for the trial court to revise the judgment to reflect that it is without prejudice. View "Booth v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over a deed transferring a one-half interest in a farm from a mother to her son, Peter, without consideration, while she was alive. After the mother’s death, her estate, left to four children in equal shares, was inventoried; the contested property was listed as belonging to Peter due to the earlier transfer. David, another son and a beneficiary, objected, claiming that the mother lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she executed the deed. The estate administrator declined to pursue the claim, believing litigation costs would outweigh the benefit. David then initiated a separate action to invalidate the deed and impose a constructive trust, seeking to restore the property interest to the estate.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division held a trial and ruled in favor of David, finding that Peter had unduly influenced the mother and that she lacked capacity at the time of the transfer. The probate court invalidated the deed, deferred ruling on the constructive trust, and awarded attorney’s fees to David. Peter’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court and subsequently moved in probate court to vacate all orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the probate court declined to address the motion, noting the issue was already raised on appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked statutory subject matter jurisdiction over David’s claims. The court found that the claims, concerning an inter vivos property transfer, did not have the direct connection to estate administration or distribution required for probate court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the probate court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law