Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute between two individuals who cohabited for nearly a decade before marrying. During their relationship, the parties agreed to pool their efforts and share any property acquired during this period, which included contributions to one party’s government pension. After the relationship ended, the non-employee party claimed entitlement to a share of the pension accrued during their pre-marital cohabitation, based on their agreement.After separation and the filing of a civil action for breach of contract, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the proceedings. The court found that the parties had an implied-in-fact contract—known as a Marvin agreement—to share equally in all property acquired during their relationship, including pension contributions. The trial court held that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the period of cohabitation, even though the parties were not married at the time.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed only the question of whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the non-employee party from receiving a share of the pension. The appellate court held that section 12337, which generally renders such pensions unassignable and exempt from execution, does not preclude enforcement of an ownership interest in the pension arising from a Marvin agreement. The court reasoned that the non-employee party’s claim was not as a creditor but as an owner by virtue of contract, and therefore section 12337’s restrictions did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

A man and a woman were in a committed romantic relationship for nearly eight years, during which they had a child and operated joint businesses. After they separated, the man initiated a lawsuit seeking division of assets he claimed were acquired during their domestic partnership. The parties agreed that they had a domestic partnership, which under Alaska law means a relationship in which they intended to share assets as though married. However, they disagreed on whether certain assets—a building the man owned before the relationship and a boat acquired during the partnership but titled and paid for solely by the man—were partnership property subject to division.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Dillingham found that all disputed assets, including the building and the boat, were partnership property. The court reasoned that the building, though purchased and built by the man before the relationship, was essential to the operation of one of their joint businesses, and that the boat, although acquired with the man’s separate funds and titled solely in his name, was intended for partnership use. The court ordered a 50/50 division of these assets and required the man to pay an equalization amount to the woman. The man moved for reconsideration, challenging the classification and valuation of the building and the boat, but the Superior Court denied reconsideration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that property acquired before a domestic partnership begins is not subject to the special rules for partnership property and remains the owner’s separate property. It further held that, for property acquired during a domestic partnership, the tracing doctrine applies: if an item is acquired solely with one party’s separate funds and titled in that person’s name, it remains separate property. The court reversed the Superior Court’s rulings on both the building and the boat and remanded for further proceedings. View "King v. Carty" on Justia Law

A landlord and a tenant, a ballet studio, entered into two lease agreements for suites in a shopping center. The leases contained provisions for indemnification, default, and attorney fees. After the ballet studio vacated the premises, alleging that the landlord failed to address mold issues that caused personal injuries to two individuals associated with the studio and damage to the studio’s property, the studio and the individuals filed a multi-count complaint against the landlord. The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and sought defense and indemnity from the ballet studio for the claims made by the individuals.The Montgomery Circuit Court addressed a partial summary judgment motion filed by the landlord, which concerned only the claims between the landlord and the ballet studio, not the individuals’ personal injury claims. The ballet studio and the individuals filed a response to the summary judgment motion, but it was submitted one business day late. The trial court granted the landlord’s motion to strike the late response and, later, denied the plaintiffs’ attempt to resubmit the same response. The court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Subsequently, the court certified this partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, but also included language purporting to dismiss the entire case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s orders striking the untimely response and denying its resubmission, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court also affirmed the certification of the partial summary judgment as final but reversed the dismissal of the entire case, noting that claims by the individuals against the landlord and the determination of damages owed to the landlord remained unresolved. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Charalambidou" on Justia Law

A subcontractor performed fabrication and machining services for a general contractor on a filtration plant project. The arrangement included a provision that the subcontractor would be paid only after the general contractor received payment from the owner. When payment to the subcontractor ceased due to a dispute between the general contractor and the owner, the subcontractor filed two construction liens against the property to secure payment, attaching multiple invoices to each lien. The liens themselves did not state the date the claim was due, but included invoices bearing various dates.After the subcontractor filed suit to enforce the liens and for other related claims, the owner removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The owner moved to dismiss, arguing that the liens were invalid because they did not “specify the date the claim was due” as required by Mississippi Code Section 85-7-405(1)(b). The district court agreed, finding that neither the liens nor the attached invoices clearly identified the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The subcontractor appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit found no clear controlling Mississippi precedent on whether attaching invoices with dates, but without clear explanation of what those dates represent, satisfies the statutory requirement. It certified the question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that simply attaching invoices with dates that do not plainly indicate the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied does not satisfy the requirement that an enforceable lien “specify the date the claim was due” under Section 85-7-405(1)(b). The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Cuevas Machine Company, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corporation" on Justia Law

An individual operated a bed and breakfast (B&B) on Maui under a permit requiring compliance with local regulations and that the owner reside on the property. In 2020, neighbors repeatedly complained to the Maui Department of Planning about noise and the owner’s absence during guest stays. Police were called, and the department investigated, finding evidence that the permit conditions had been violated—including the owner’s own admission that he sometimes stayed elsewhere and evidence of noncompliance with quiet hours and COVID-19 regulations. The department revoked the B&B permit and imposed a two-year ban on future permit applications. The owner appealed this decision to the Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals (BVA), which after several hearings and delays, ultimately upheld the department’s decision.After the BVA announced its decision orally on November 24, 2021, it did not adopt and file formal findings of fact and conclusions of law (FOF/COL) until January 2022, exceeding a 45-day deadline specified in the BVA’s procedural rules. The owner appealed to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the BVA’s delay violated its own rules and required reversal. The circuit court affirmed the BVA’s decision, finding the owner in violation of permit conditions and upholding the ban.On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the BVA’s failure to comply with the 45-day rule was a mandatory violation warranting reversal, and that the delay prejudiced the owner’s substantial rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that the 45-day deadline in the BVA’s rules is directory, not mandatory, because the rule does not specify a consequence for noncompliance. The court further found that the owner did not suffer prejudice to substantial rights due to the delay. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and reinstated the circuit court’s decision upholding the permit revocation and ban. View "Norrie v. Maui County Board of Variances and Appeals" on Justia Law

Cody Hatt, an employee of a demolition contractor, was fatally injured while working at the Hatfield’s Ferry Power Station in Pennsylvania, which was undergoing demolition after years of disuse. The plant was owned and operated by various FirstEnergy entities. Hatt was dismantling a catwalk on a smokestack when it collapsed, resulting in his death. His mother, Lisa DeBar, brought wrongful death and survival claims against the owner and operators of the plant, alleging negligence. The claims focused on whether the defendants retained control over the demolition work and whether they owed a duty to protect Hatt from the dangers present at the job site.The case was initially filed in Pennsylvania state court, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. After DeBar amended her complaint and voluntarily dismissed some defendants, the remaining defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court dismissed the claims against FirstEnergy Service and FirstEnergy Corp. with prejudice, and against Allegheny Energy Supply without prejudice. DeBar chose not to amend again and appealed the final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, a property owner who hires an independent contractor does not owe a duty to the contractor’s employees unless the owner retains detailed control over the work, which was not sufficiently alleged here. Additionally, landowners owe no duty to protect invitees from dangers that are open and obvious, and the risks associated with demolishing the long-disused power station qualified as such. The court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Debar v. FirstEnergy Corp" on Justia Law

Chatham County established a fire protection service fee, assessed either as a flat charge per parcel or based on the square footage of structures, on all real property in a special district comprising unincorporated areas of the county. Initially, fire services were provided by Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (CES), funded by direct payments from property owners. When payment rates fell and CES could no longer provide services as before, the county contracted with CES and adopted a fire service protection tax, later replaced by the Fire Protection Service Fee Ordinance in 2022 and revised in 2023. The fee was collected from property owners in the designated area, with enforcement measures including penalties, collection costs, and potential liens.Property owners Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, subject to the fee, filed a class action in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking refunds. They contended the fee was actually an illegal tax because it was not ad valorem, as required by Georgia law. The county moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs sought class certification and summary judgment. After discovery and hearings, the superior court certified the class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the fire fee was a tax on real property and invalid because it was not assessed ad valorem.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo. The Court agreed with the lower court that the fire protection service fee was, in substance, a tax rather than a fee or assessment. It further held that, under Georgia constitutional and statutory law, taxes on real property—including those levied in special districts—must be ad valorem. Because the county’s ordinance imposed a non-ad-valorem tax, it was unauthorized and illegal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the superior court’s judgment in favor of the property owners. View "CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH" on Justia Law

Two individuals jointly purchased a Vermont home during their marriage. After separating, they divorced in Florida, where the court assigned each a percentage ownership interest in the property but did not resolve matters concerning ongoing property expenses or order a sale or partition of the house. One party returned to Vermont and lived in the house with their children, solely paying all mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. The parties informally agreed that the out-of-state party would not assert ownership rights until their youngest child graduated college. After that event, the out-of-state party initiated a partition action in Vermont.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, found that the parties’ ownership interests were as set by the Florida court and converted their tenancy by the entirety to a tenancy in common. The court determined the party living in the house should be credited for property expenses paid but limited such credits to only those expenses incurred within the prior six years, applying Vermont’s general statute of limitations for civil actions (12 V.S.A. § 511). The court assigned the property to the in-state party, conditioned upon purchase of the other’s interest, and required that the party in possession continue to pay property expenses until transfer or sale.Upon appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that, in partition actions, contribution credits for property expenses are not subject to the six-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 511, because partition is an equitable remedy and such credits are integral to the equitable division of property. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s limitation on contribution credits, remanding for recalculation. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order requiring the party in possession to pay ongoing property expenses until the final disposition. View "Wich v. Corcoran" on Justia Law

A mortgage issuer, Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC (RMF), participated in a federal program allowing it to securitize reverse mortgages. When RMF entered bankruptcy, Texas Capital Bank provided debtor-in-possession financing, secured by RMF’s interests in certain collateral, specifically incremental balances on the mortgages known as “tails.” After RMF defaulted on its agreement, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), under its statutory and contractual authority, extinguished RMF’s interests in the underlying mortgages and assumed ownership of the loans, also extinguishing Texas Capital’s lien interest in the mortgage tails. Texas Capital argued that Ginnie Mae’s actions violated federal law and Texas tort law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially allowed Texas Capital’s claims for statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and tortious interference to proceed, but dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to sovereign immunity. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Ginnie Mae, finding it acted within its statutory authority and concluding that the extinguishment of RMF’s interests necessarily eliminated Texas Capital’s derivative interest in the mortgage tails. The court also dismissed Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim, citing sovereign immunity and a lack of legal basis, and refused to consider Texas Capital’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory because it was not sufficiently pled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Ginnie Mae acted within its statutory and contractual authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g)(1) in extinguishing both RMF’s and Texas Capital’s interests in the mortgages. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim barred by sovereign immunity and ruling that Texas Capital’s failure to plead an arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory justified the district court’s refusal to consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Texas Captl Bank v. Govt Natl Mtge" on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired real property via a tax deed after the previous owner, a limited liability company, failed to pay property taxes. The property had originally been purchased by two individuals who later transferred ownership to the LLC. When the LLC did not pay taxes for 2015, the county sold the property at a tax sale, with the plaintiff eventually purchasing the tax certificate and being assigned it in 2020. The plaintiff attempted to serve notice of intent to take a tax deed on the LLC at multiple addresses and ultimately provided the notice to the Minnesota Secretary of State, which accepted service as the LLC’s registered agent. The LLC did not redeem the property, and the county issued a tax deed to the plaintiff.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the tax deed was void because notice was not personally served on the LLC. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota previously reversed that decision in Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, holding that service on the Secretary of State constituted personal service. On remand, the plaintiff sought an order quieting title, but the circuit court denied this, later granting the defendants’ motion to make redemption and ordering the county to issue a certificate of redemption to the defendants. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the defendants were entitled to redeem the property. The Court held that the plaintiff properly acquired the tax deed under SDCL chapter 10-25 and followed the statutory procedure for quieting title under SDCL chapter 21-41. Because the LLC, the owner of record, did not timely redeem, the plaintiff owns the property in fee. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order granting redemption to the defendants and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC" on Justia Law