Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit environmental organization challenged the Maui Planning Commission’s amended rules, which governed development in Maui’s Special Management Area (SMA), a protected coastal zone. The amendments created fifteen categorical exemptions from environmental assessment, some with monetary thresholds and some based on landowner declarations. The rules also allowed continuation, repair, or renovation of previously approved developments without new environmental review, and replaced the requirement for a final environmental assessment (EA) with a draft EA for permit applications.After the rules were enacted, the nonprofit filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the commission’s rules unlawfully bypassed the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (CZMA) required assessment process, shifting the duty to regulated parties and undermining statutory and constitutional protections. The commission responded that its exemptions were within its rulemaking power, claiming they excluded non-development activities from the CZMA process. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, invalidating the relevant rule sections and restoring the final EA requirement.The Maui Planning Commission and County of Maui appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the commission’s rules exceeded its statutory authority by creating categorical exemptions from the CZMA’s assessment process and unlawfully delegating assessment duties to private parties. The court also found that replacing the final EA with a draft EA undermined required environmental safeguards. The Supreme Court clarified that counties may streamline permitting but cannot eliminate the statutory assessment process or delegate it to applicants. The court affirmed the invalidation of the amended rules. View "Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

A property owner acquired a Chicago apartment building through foreclosure in February 2024, after the city’s ordinance requiring new owners of foreclosed rental properties to negotiate new 12-month leases with existing tenants and provide a $10,600 relocation fee to those who decline new leases went into effect. Upon acquisition, the owner notified more than 220 tenants of their rights, and at least five tenants declined to sign new leases, requesting the relocation assistance. The property owner filed suit against the City of Chicago, claiming that the ordinance’s relocation fee requirement constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the owner’s complaint, which sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. The court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the ordinance did not violate the Constitution, and the owner declined to amend its pleading before appealing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the ordinance’s relocation assistance requirement amounted to a physical or regulatory taking, or imposed an unconstitutional condition. The court held that the ordinance, which regulates the landlord-tenant relationship and imposes financial obligations similar to permissible rent control schemes, is not a per se physical taking. Applying the Penn Central factors, the court found no regulatory taking, noting the property owner’s lack of allegations regarding economic infeasibility and that the acquisition occurred after the ordinance’s enactment. The court also determined that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply, as the ordinance directly mandates a fee rather than leveraging a permitting process. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the ordinance does not violate the Takings Clause. View "BBLI Edison, LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Glendale Shooting Club acquired property adjacent to the Racine family in 1976, intending to operate a firing range. The Racines brought a nuisance action against Glendale, claiming persistent gunshot noise affected their property. In 1987, the Franklin County Circuit Court issued a permanent injunction that restricted Glendale’s range operations, limiting the number of competitions, shooters, and hours of use, as well as restricting the use of firearms over a certain caliber. Both parties appealed, but the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction. In 1989, the Landolts purchased the Racine property. Subsequently, Missouri enacted section 537.294, granting firearm ranges immunity from noise-based nuisance actions.Glendale repeatedly sought relief from the injunction, arguing that the statutory change and modifications to the range mitigated the nuisance. After extensive litigation, including a period where further court action was barred by settlement, Glendale moved to set aside the injunction. The Franklin County Circuit Court granted relief, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. v. Landolt ("Glendale I") found the court had failed to properly weigh the equities and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, after a bench trial, the circuit court again set aside the injunction, finding both the statutory change and physical modifications to the range rendered continued enforcement inequitable.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the circuit court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Court held that while a change in law alone is not sufficient to set aside a judgment, the circuit court’s alternative finding—that factual changes had rendered the injunction inequitable—was supported by the evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dissolving the 1987 injunction. View "Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. v. Landolt" on Justia Law

A homeowners association challenged an order issued by a joint board of county commissioners from Licking and Franklin Counties, which directed the Franklin County Engineer to prepare reports and plans for a proposed improvement of Cole Ditch, a waterway affecting both counties. The association alleged procedural deficiencies, including lack of notice to all affected landowners, and claimed that its rights were violated during the first hearing on the improvement petition. The engineer’s preliminary report found the improvement feasible and beneficial, but most landowners opposed it. The joint board nonetheless found the improvement necessary and ordered the project to move forward.The association appealed the joint board’s order in both the Licking County and Franklin County Courts of Common Pleas. Both courts dismissed the appeals. On further appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that the Licking County court was not required to convene a joint panel of judges, that the association had no right to appeal the order after the first hearing, and that the matter was not ripe for review. In contrast, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Franklin County dismissal, holding that a joint panel of judges should have been convened and that the association had standing and statutory authority to appeal. The Tenth District remanded for further proceedings, and certified a conflict with the Fifth District’s ruling.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, affirming the Tenth District’s judgment. It held that any appeal from an order of a joint board of county commissioners not involving compensation or damages must be heard by a panel of judges from each affected county. It further held that any affected landowner, including a homeowners association whose procedural rights were allegedly violated, has standing and statutory authority to appeal any order issued after a first hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for the joint panel to hear the appeal. View "Colt's Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs." on Justia Law

A group of affiliated real estate companies entered into an agreement with a city to develop and manage an affordable senior housing community. The agreement included a promissory note, requiring the companies to provide annual audited financial statements and payments based on residual receipts. The city’s finance director later raised concerns about compliance, and the city issued a breach notice, which was subsequently cured and rescinded. The companies also pursued a similar housing project in a neighboring city, but after city officials discussed the prior project with the original city’s staff, the negotiations ended and the exclusive agreement expired. The companies alleged that false statements made by the original city’s staff about their financial compliance and loan status caused the neighboring city to terminate the project and harmed their reputation.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the companies’ complaint for interference, breach of covenant, and defamation. The city filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the claims arose from protected activity and were barred by the Government Claims Act due to lack of proper claim presentation. The trial court found the city’s activities were protected but determined the companies were likely to prevail, holding that delivering a letter outlining their claims to a city council member was sufficient compliance with the Act.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the city’s communications and actions regarding municipal contracts and development projects were protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. It further held that the companies failed to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement, as delivery to a single council member at a private meeting did not constitute proper service to the governing body or authorized recipient. The court reversed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, remanded with instructions to grant the motion, and directed further proceedings to determine attorney fees. View "Eagle Colton 55, LP v. City of Colton" on Justia Law

A resident of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled individuals was injured when she stepped into an uncovered and unmarked trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot before sunrise. The apartment complex was managed by a company that had contracted with one entity to replace concrete (which created the trench) and another company to fill the trench, which was not completed until after the resident’s injury. The resident alleged that the management company breached its statutory duty under Michigan law to keep common areas fit for their intended use, and that the contractor who created the trench was negligent for failing to correct or adequately warn of the hazard. The contractor responsible for filling the trench was dismissed from the case and not part of the appeal.The Montcalm Circuit Court granted summary disposition to both the property management company and the concrete contractor. The court found that the trash-disposal area remained reasonably accessible and thus fit for its intended use, so the statutory covenant was not breached. The court further ruled that the resident’s claim against the contractor sounded in premises liability, and the contractor owed no duty because the hazard was open and obvious. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither defendant was liable: the trench posed only a “mere inconvenience,” and the contractor had not breached any duty under ordinary negligence principles.The Supreme Court of Michigan, reviewing the case, held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the contractor breached its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others, and whether the management company violated its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep common areas fit for their intended use. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. The holding clarified that summary disposition was not appropriate because reasonable persons could differ on whether the uncovered, unmarked trench rendered the area unfit for elderly and disabled tenants and created an unreasonable risk of harm. View "Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co. Inc." on Justia Law

Two private hunting clubs, each owning substantial contiguous acreage in rural Pennsylvania, sought to maintain privacy over their lands, which are used by members and guests for hunting and other recreational activities. The clubs posted “no trespassing” signs, marked boundaries with purple paint, installed gates, and in some areas, fenced their properties. Despite these efforts to exclude non-members, officers from the Pennsylvania Game Commission repeatedly entered the clubs’ land without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, sometimes installing trail cameras and issuing citations for alleged hunting violations. The clubs argued that such warrantless searches violated their constitutional rights.The clubs filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, naming the Game Commission and a game warden as respondents. They challenged specific provisions of the Game and Wildlife Code that authorize warrantless entry onto private land outside buildings and curtilage. The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, granted summary relief for the Commission and denied relief to the clubs, reasoning that it was bound by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Russo, which held that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not extend privacy protections to open fields.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed its precedent in Russo and conducted an independent constitutional analysis. The court overruled Russo, holding that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides more robust protection than the Fourth Amendment regarding open fields. Specifically, the court determined that landowners who take sufficient steps to exclude intruders—such as posting signs, fencing, or gating—have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their open fields. As a result, the Game Commission’s statutory authority to enter posted private land without a warrant was struck down as unconstitutional, and the Commonwealth Court’s order was reversed. View "Punxsutawney Hunting Club v. PGC" on Justia Law

Following an unusually severe rainstorm in San Francisco, a retaining wall separating the backyards of two uphill and two downhill residential properties collapsed, sending soil and debris from the uphill properties into the downhill properties. This resulted in significant damage to all four properties, prompting the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection to issue notices of violation to all owners, requiring reconstruction of the wall. The uphill neighbors sued the downhill neighbors, including claims for nuisance, negligence, and loss of lateral support, and the downhill neighbors countersued for nuisance, negligence, and trespass. Before trial, some parties settled, leaving Mary Coulton as the sole remaining downhill neighbor defendant and cross-complainant.The San Francisco County Superior Court ruled on various motions. It denied Coulton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the loss of lateral support claim, finding at least a cause of action for negligence. Before trial, the court granted Coulton’s motion in limine to exclude strict liability and negligence per se claims based on Civil Code section 832, concluding that strict liability does not apply absent excavation. The uphill neighbors then voluntarily dismissed their nuisance and negligence claims, and the court entered judgment in favor of Coulton. Coulton later sought expert fees as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, based on joint settlement offers made to the uphill neighbors, which the trial court upheld.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that California law does not recognize a strict liability claim for loss of lateral support absent excavation, thus affirming the trial court’s exclusion of that claim. However, the appellate court found Coulton’s joint section 998 offers invalid because they were unapportioned among multiple plaintiffs with separate claims, and no unity of interest exception applied. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for Coulton but reversed the award of expert fees, directing the trial court to strike those costs. View "Quinn v. Coulton" on Justia Law

The case concerns a municipality’s efforts to use eminent domain to acquire two privately owned parcels, Lots 84 and 90, from their respective owners. The Township adopted a series of ordinances authorizing the taking of these lots. Rather than putting the condemned properties to public use, the Township arranged to swap these parcels with a private developer in exchange for other land owned by the developer, which would be used as open space. The ordinances did not specify any public use for Lots 84 and 90 after the exchange, nor did they restrict their use for public purposes.The Superior Court, Law Division, first found the taking was for a public purpose and allowed the condemnation process to proceed, appointing commissioners to determine just compensation. The property owners’ motions to stay the condemnation were denied by both the trial court and the Appellate Division. Upon appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the condemnation was not for a valid public purpose as required by law and that the lots were being used as “currency” for a land swap, with no assurance the condemned properties would serve any public use.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that neither New Jersey’s condemnation statutes nor federal or state case law authorize the condemnation of private property solely to exchange it for other land that will be put to public use. The Court further found that the Township failed to act forthrightly with the property owners. The matter was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy. Thus, the main holding is that condemning private property solely to swap it for property to be used for public purposes does not satisfy the public use requirement under New Jersey law. View "Township of Jackson v. Getzel Bee, LLC" on Justia Law

After a homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments, it levied the homeowner’s interest in her property and proceeded with a sheriff’s sale. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment or obtain release of the levy before the sale occurred. A third-party bidder purchased the homeowner’s interest in the property at auction. After the sale but before the court ratified it, the homeowner paid the judgment in full to the association. The association then notified the court of the satisfaction and requested that the sale be vacated, arguing the judgment had been satisfied prior to ratification.The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County, agreed with the association, concluding that the sale could be vacated since the homeowner satisfied the judgment before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed, holding a hearing and again ruling that the sale was not complete until ratification and thus could be undone by post-sale satisfaction of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that a judgment-debtor’s satisfaction of the judgment after a sheriff’s sale, but before ratification, cannot be raised as an exception to the sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). Post-sale satisfaction is not an irregularity in the sale and does not void the purchaser’s inchoate equitable interest in the property acquired at auction. The Court emphasized that the judgment-debtor may obtain release of the levy only before sale, and that post-sale options for release are not available. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to allow the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale, beginning after remand to the District Court. View "Baltimore XV Props. v. Newsteps' Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc." on Justia Law