Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking recognition and enforcement of their easement over Prairie Drive in Park County, Montana, near the City of Livingston. The parties raised several issues regarding the district court's findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order dated August 4, 2010. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the relief ordered by the district court, if properly implemented, would not allow them to use their easement essentially as they did and therefore, the district court both recognized and upheld plaintiffs' easement rights and ordered relief specifically designed to address their complaints. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees and costs where there was no factual support for defendants' argument that they were actually the prevailing party and plaintiffs prevailed on all substantive issues. The court held that the Prairie Drive Subdivision Homeowner's Association ("HOA") had standing to participate in the case where the HOA cured a defect with the Secretary of State when it had been involuntarily dissolved for failure to file its annual report. The court held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs' property right in the easement had been taken or extinguished and the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' private easements existed independently of any public right to use the right of way. The court held that there was no merit in the argument that plaintiffs' settlement with the City of Livingston absolved defendants of any liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court except as to the matter of plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees and costs and that matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. 32.28(3)(d) in a condemnation proceeding between defendant and plaintiffs, the condemnees, when defendant initiated condemnation proceedings against the condemnees under Wis. Stat. 32.06 for an easement to construct an electrical transmission line across the condemnees' property. At issue was whether litigation expenses should be awarded when an appeal was taken from a negotiated price recorded in a certificate of compensation. The court held that an owner who accepted the negotiated price under section 32.06(2a), timely appealed that price, and subsequently received an award from the county condemnation commission that exceeded the thresholds under section 32.28, should be awarded litigation expenses. The court also considered, but was not persuaded by various other arguments defendant made criticizing the circuit court's and the court's interpretation of section 32.06(a) and section 32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in the present case should be awarded litigation expenses.

Boston Edison Company ("Boston Edison") brought an action under G.L. c. 79, 12 to recover damages caused by four eminent domain takings by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") on property known as the Fore River Station ("site") in the town of Weymouth and city of Quincy. The parties raised issues related to the reasonable probability of residential development on the north parcel of land; limiting damages on the south parcel of land to those caused by the actual taking or the public project for which the taking was made; and the calculation of interest. The court held that a rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Boston Edison, reasonably could have found that it was reasonably probable that the north parcel could be rezoned for residential use and developed even though it was in a designated port area. The court also held that damages arising from a planned taking were not compensable and therefore, the jury must distinguish between damages arising from the actual taking and those arising from the planned, but unrealized, taking. The court further held that there was no error in the calculation of prejudgment or postjudgment interest where the court failed to see what basis remained for claiming the preamendment rate of interest when Boston waived any constitutional challenge to the statutory rate of interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings and remanded for further action consistent with the opinion and the judge's allowance of the motion for remittur.

Plaintiff-Appellee Steven Johnson wanted to purchase a tract of commercial real estate from Defendant-Appellant Harrell Sellers and his wife Sandra Green. The purchase agreement, dated May 2009, was prepared by Mr. Johnson's attorney and incorrectly indicated that Mr. Sellers was a single person. Mr. Sellers was married at the time, but in the process of obtaining a divorce from Ms. Green. Ms. Green moved out in October 2008, and divorce proceedings started in January 2009. Sometime after signing the purchase agreement, Mr. Sellers told his attorney about the mistake in the agreement. Mr. Sellers' counsel advised him that Ms. Green would need to give her permission to sell the property. In June 2009, Ms. Green would not authorize the sale. The parties tried to work out agreements as to the closing and problems with the title, but could not resolve their problems. Mr. Sellers tried to rescind the original purchase agreement, arguing that issues with his divorce made closing on the property impossible. Mr. Johnson sued for specific performance. The trial court ruled that Mr. Sellers waived his rights pertaining to certain terms of the original purchase agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that the impediments to closing were resolved within a reasonable time, and because of this, the court could award specific performance of the contract. The Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiff-Appellant James Wylie owned a subdivision in the City of Meridian. He sought a declaration from the district court that the City and the Idaho Transportation Department improperly denied access for his property directly onto a nearby state highway. The district court dismissed Plaintiffâs complaint on the ground that he failed to present a âjusticiable issue.â The Supreme Courtâs review of the record revealed that Plaintiff acquired the land in question subject to certain conditions recorded in the plat for the subdivision. The plat listed plainly that âthe subject property does have frontage along [the state highway] but . . . not direct access [to the highway].â The Court reasoned that Plaintiff failed to bring an issue for the Court to resolve since Plaintiffâs recorded deed clearly listed the frontage road as access to his property. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the case was ânon-justiciableâ and affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss Plaintiffâs case.

Petitioner entered into a contract with respondent for the construction of a hotel. After seventeen months of work on the project, petitioner terminated the contract with respondent and respondent subsequently filed a lien against the hotel property for amounts it claimed remained owing. Petitioner filed a petition to strike the lien pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-1-311(b), which the district court denied on the ground that petitioner failed to prove respondent knew, when it filed its claim of lien, that the lien was groundless or contained a material misstatement or false claim. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on petitioner and that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. The court affirmed and held that, although it agreed that the burden of proof under the statute was on the lien claimant, the court found that the district court's ruling was properly based on the evidence presented by the lien claimant, respondent, and on the failure of petitioner to allege proper grounds for relief under the statute.

This case involved a residential construction scheme, which required the investor, the mortgage broker, the builder, and the bank providing the builder with the funds to construct the house to enter into certain independent contractual arrangements. Petitioners, investors whose builders went under and left them with unfinished houses or vacant lots, sought a writ of mandamus asking the court to order the district court to require respondent, the bank's executive vice-president for mortgage lending, to make a restitution in an amount equivalent to one point of their construction loans. The court held that the cause of petitioners' loss was not respondent, but the fact that the builders became insolvent and were unable or unwilling to complete their work. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was denied where petitioners assumed the risk that the builder might walk off the job; that if it did, the bank would declare the construction loan in default; and that, as the bank's borrower, they would be liable for the draws the builders had received plus interest.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court upholding the zoning board of appeals of the city of Stamford's ("board") decision that a dock located on the waters of Stamford Harbor was a neighborhood dock rather than a marina, and therefore, improvements to the dock were not subject to the city's zoning regulations. At issue was whether the trial court properly upheld the board's decision that the Southfield Point Associations' construction of a 196 foot dock and the use of Cook Road Extension for access to and connection with the dock were entirely immune from local zoning regulation merely because they related to water dependent use. The court held that the trial court properly upheld the board's decision and agreed with defendants when the dock and its intersection with Cook Road Extension were located waterward of the mean high water line, where the city normally had no jurisdiction, and when the zoning regulations did not apply to activities that took place on Cook Road Extension.

The Supreme Court consolidated nine separate cases for review. In each, Plaintiffs own property that was subject to state property taxes. Each Plaintiff described the property as âmachinery and equipment.â For the 2008 tax year, the local assessors classified the property for tax-assessment purposes as âindustrial real propertyâ or âcommercial personal property.â Plaintiffs petitioned the relevant boards-of-review to reclassify the property as âindustrial personal property.â That reclassification would permit them to take advantage of recently enacted tax exemptions or credits. In each case, the board denied the request. Plaintiffs then petitioned the State Tax Commission (STC) to reclassify the property. In each case, the STC denied the requests. Plaintiffs then sought and obtained relief in various state circuit courts. The STC appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the court reversed each of the circuit court judgments. The appellate court held that state law barred an appeal of the STC classifications to any state court. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, to ask whether the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals of STC classification decisions. The Supreme Court found the state legislature has not provided for other means for judicial review of STC classification decisions. Accordingly, the Court held that the circuit courts do have jurisdiction over appeals from the STC.