Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury slip-and-fall action against defendants and defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney. At issue was whether defendants had standing to bring a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs' attorney's law firm had previously represented defendants' exclusive property manager. Also at issue was whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law in applying an "appearance of impropriety" standard in deciding the motion for disqualification. The court held that defendants had standing to move to disqualify opposing counsel where defendants have shown that plaintiffs' attorney's prior representation was so connected with the current litigation that the prior representation was likely to affect the just and lawful determination of defendants' position. The court also held that the circuit court incorrectly applied the standard of law and should have determined the motion for disqualification based on an attorney's duty to a former client in SCR 20:1.9. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner sued the owners of her childhood home alleging injuries from lead paint on the premises. At issue was the trial court's instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords and tenants in keeping the property in good condition. The court held that the inclusion of the instruction was error because neither plaintiff's contributory negligence nor negligence of her family members were at issue in the case. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because it introduced into the jury deliberations the idea that plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for the injuries and such an argument was not only irrelevant to the case but prohibited by law and policy. The court further held that the inclusion of the argument could have permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise appropriate.

Pursuant to a permit issued by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the developer built 26 of 79 planned homes and installed infrastructure between 1992 and 2007. The Rhode Island Historic Preservation and Heritage Commission (HPHC) became interested in the site and recommended withdrawal of the permit or requiring a complete archaeological data recovery project. In 2009, after informal negotiations, the developer notified the HPHC that it would resume construction absent some response from the agencies. The developer resumed construction and a stop-work order issued. CRMC hearings are ongoing. The district court dismissed the developer's takings claims as unripe, rejecting an argument that the state litigation requirement was excused; that argument was foreclosed by a binding First Circuit holding that Rhode Island's procedures were available and adequate. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the developer did not prove that state remedies were unavailable or inadequate.

In 1953, Standard Oil Company owned a refinery in Mandan, and the Northern Pacific Railway Company owned land between the refinery and the Heart River. Northern Pacific executed a written permit granting Standard Oil permission to construct a pipeline along Northern Pacificâs right-of-way from the refinery to the river. The permit provided that Standard Oil could not transfer or assign the permit without Northern Pacificâs permission. In 1998, Northern Pacificâs successor-in-interest sold the portion of land that contained Standard Oilâs pipeline. In 2001, Standard Oilâs successor-in-interest, sold the refinery. In 2004, Tesoro, the new owner of the refinery, filed a âNotice of Permitâ along with the 1953 permit, with the Recorderâs Office. Later that year, the property was sold to Riverwood Commercial Park. Disputes arose between Riverwood and Tesoro over Riverwoodâs planned development of the property. The dispute bounced between the district and Supreme Court for various theories of recovery. Riverwoodâs theories centered on the characterization of the 1953 âpermitâ: all of Riverwoodâs claims would fail as a matter of law if the 1953 permit was not a license but an easement. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1953 permit was indeed an easement, and affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Tesoro and Standard Oil.

Defendant Stowe Mountain Club, LLC (SMC) appealed a judgment in favor of Plaintiff David Smalley. SMC and Mr. Smalley were neighbors. The trial court found that portions of a golf course built and operated by SMC violated certain restrictive covenants in Mr. Smalleyâs deed. On appeal, SMC argued that the court misinterpreted the covenants in Mr. Smalleyâs deed, and as a result, refused to admit certain evidence or allow for additional discovery to allow the court to fully consider the case. The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court record, and found that the parties moved for summary judgment before the exact nature of issues concerning the chain-of-title and restrictive covenants could be fully developed. The Court felt the decision was therefore premature and reversed the trial courtâs grant of summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioners Dana and Robin Murphy appealed a judgment entered in favor of Respondent HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC), which allowed HSBC to foreclose on and sell the Murphyâs house. The Murphys contended that the court erred by granting HSBC summary judgment when there were numerous errors that primarily concerned HSBCâs evidence of its ownership of the note and mortgage to their house. In particular, the Murphys challenged the trustworthiness of multiple affidavits filed by HSBC in support of its motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the affidavits submitted by HSBC were âinherently untrustworthyâ and the business records attached to them were not admissible at trial. The Court held that the trial court erred by granting a summary judgment in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited ("Hollywood") filed a complaint in district court against the Seminole Tribe of Florida ("Tribe") where the Tribe and the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") approved a lease assignment between Hollywood and the Tribe. At issue was whether Hollywood alleged an injury fairly traceable to the Secretary or redressable by the district court in a complaint that alleged that the Tribe had threatened to repossess tribal property in violation of the lease. Also at issue was whether the interests of Hollywood were within the zone of interests protected by the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. 415, and its accompanying regulations. The court held that Hollywood lacked constitutional standing to maintain its complaint and therefore, vacated in part the judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also held that Hollywood lacked prudential standing to sue the Secretary and therefore, affirmed the denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile.

This case came before the Supreme Court twice. The property owner challenged the Board of Tax Appeals' (BTA) use of a propertyâs sale price as an indicator of its value, arguing that it was an unreliable way to value property. The BTA rejected that challenge and adopted use of the sale price. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the BTA failed to give full consideration to whether the sale was "recent" which was one of the criteria that must be satisfied before a sale price may be used to value a property for tax purposes. The BTA responded by relying solely on the temporal proximity of the sale to the tax-lien dates. Because proximity was not the only factor affecting recency, and because the property owner made a persuasive argument, the Supreme Court vacated the BTA's decision and remanded the case for a proper determination of "recency" based on the entire record. BTA then issued its decision on remand. The BTA again adopted the sale price as the value of a property based on a conclusion that "recency" had not be rebutted. The property owner appealed again to the Supreme Court, arguing that the BTA disregarded the Supreme Court's earlier holding. The Supreme Court reviewed the BTA's findings of fact and found that its decision was "reasonable and lawful," and that it "fulfilled the instruction of the Court." The Court affirmed the decision of the BTA.

Plaintiffs Terry and Susan Brown purchased land adjacent to Defendant James Hanson. The neighbors signed a well-and-road easement agreement, which was recorded with the County Register of Deeds. Believing that the Browns had violated the terms of the agreement, Mr. Hanson filed a letter "rescinding" the agreement with the Register of Deeds. The Browns sued Mr. Hanson, and the trial court ruled that a rescission was not the appropriate remedy for a breach of the easement. Mr. Hanson appealed that decision, and the appellate and Supreme Courts affirmed it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for other issues, one of which was that the Browns alleged Mr. Hanson slandered their title by filing his "rescission" letter with the Register of Deeds. Furthermore, that letter created a cloud on the Browns' title, which the Browns claimed interfered with their contract to sell the property to a third party. The trial court entered a judgment in the Browns' favor. Mr. Hanson again appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding Mr. Hanson slandered the Browns' title and tortiously interfered with their sales contract. The Court remanded the case for the redetermination of attorney's fees.

A parcel of land in Tyler County was split in ninths and bequeathed to the heirs of Robert Amos. Plaintiff and Heir Barbara Renner began to purchase the other heirsâ one-ninths interests. In 2000, Ms. Renner owned six-ninths of the original parcel. Billie Worden, C.W. Anderson and Mary Anderson owned the remaining three-ninths. Ms. Renner brought a partition suit against the Andersons and Ms. Worden. Appellants Edgar and Hazel Bonner owned a tract of land that bordered the Worden/Anderson portion. During the pendency of the partition suit, the Bonners acquired an undivided one-ninthsâ interest in the Worden ninth by virtue of a deed from Ms. Worden. The Bonners said they bought the interest to preserve their right to cross the property in order to access the nearby state highway. The Bonners then intervened in Ms. Rennerâs partition suit. Ms. Renner sued the Bonners, claiming that they interfered with a contract between Ms. Renner and Ms. Worden over the purchase of Ms. Wordenâs parcel. The court granted partial summary judgment to the Bonners, finding that they owned a one-ninth interest in the land. The court also found that Ms. Renner now owned the other eight-ninthsâ interest in the property. Ms. Renner brought a separate suit against her relatives and the Bonners to force the partition so that all could be paid for their respective interests in the land. A hearing was held in the circuit court, and the court appointed three Commissioners to prepare a report as to whether the property could be partitioned. The report acknowledged that all parties were concerned with access to the state highway. The Commissioners recommended that the parcel be split using the right-of-way to the highway as the division line. The Bonners objected because according to the Commissionerâs report, they would get a smaller piece of land. Furthermore, the Bonners argued that if Ms. Renner sold her parcel, the Bonners would be landlocked. The court held a hearing of the partiesâ objections to the Commissionersâ report. Without taking any evidence, the Court held that the parcel should be sold as one parcel at public auction. A judicial sale was held at the front door of the county courthouse, at which the only bidders were Ms. Renner and the Bonners. Ms. Renner was the highest bidder, and bid over $200,000 for the entire parcel. The Supreme Court reversed the actions of the trial court, finding that the lower court should have held an evidentiary hearing on issues presented by the parties regarding partition. The Court found that the lower court and its appointed Commissioners failed to address why the parcel should not have been partitioned: âEvidence on these issues must be taken by the circuit court, and the circuit courtâs ruling on the matter must be supported by a detailed order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.â Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.