Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A group neighbors (Neighbors-Appellants) in the Town of Dorset appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted Applicant Bradford Tylerâs application for a zoning permit for the construction of a self-storage facility in the Dorset Village Commercial District. Appellants contend that the court erred in determining the rental storage units to be an authorized land use within the applicable Dorset zoning district. Applicant Tyler owns and resides on a 5.6-acre property located in the Village Commercial District (VC District) of Dorset. He filed for a zoning permit to construct a self-storage facility on his property. The Town Planning Commission issued written approval of applicantâs site development plan. Following this, the Town Zoning Administrator issued a zoning permit. Interested neighbors appealed to the Dorset Zoning Board of Adjustment, contending that applicantâs proposed self-storage facility is not a âretail sales/rentalsâ use, as required by the townâs Zoning Bylaws for development in the VC District. Neighbors, in response to applicant questioning the validity of a decision rendered by less than a majority of the Board, appealed to the Environmental Court. They asserted that, regardless of the majority vote issue, the earlier approval by the Zoning Administrator was erroneous and should be voided. Applicant cross-appealed, arguing that the Boardâs denial was invalid and that the proposed facility was a permitted use in the VC District. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the question of whether a storage facility was permitted. The Environmental Court granted applicantâs motion and denied Neighborsâ, holding that the proposed use was permissible as a âretail rental.â Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable zoning statutes, the Supreme Court acknowledged the conflict created by a plain reading of the definition of "retail" in the statute: "[d]efining âretailâ in terms of sales arguably creates a conflict when used to define âretail rentalsâ . .. Using the common understanding of the words involved, and in the context of the overall scheme and purpose of the VC District, it is clear that the Bylawsâ drafters intended âretail sales/rentalsâ to include only residential and small-scale commercial establishments trading in services or in goods, for sale and for rent, as opposed to renting storage space as applicant proposes." Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Environmental Court.

Appellees John and Janet Ethen sought declaratory relief in district court to resolve a boundary dispute with neighbors River Resource Outfitters and Christine Fischer. The district court declared that the common boundary line between the parties' properties runs in a meander line along the west bank of Flint Creek and declined to award the Ethens' request for attorney fees. The neighbors appealed and the Ethens cross-appealed on the issue of attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not improperly rely upon extrinsic evidence to determine legal title to the disputed property; (2) the district court correctly determined that the boundary line between the parties' properties meanders along Flint Creek; (3) the Ethens filed a timely claim for declaratory relief; (4) the district court correctly determined that it could grant meaningful relief without joining other landowners along Flint Creek; (5) the district court correctly determined that the neighbors did not gain title to the disputed property through adverse possession; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award attorneys fees to the Ethens.

The Board of County Commissioners of Cecil County voted to grant a water services and wastewater franchise to two related companies, after which it approved an agreement providing for the sale and transfer to the companies of county-owned water and wastewater facilities. County residents filed petitions for judicial review of the decisions. The circuit court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on the issue of its right to award the franchise agreements and ultimately concluded that the Board had a right to sell the county-owned property. The residents appealed, arguing that Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibits the Board from conveying the property. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibited the Board from selling facilities that will continue to provide essential services to county citizens. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board was not prohibited from entering into the asset purchase agreements at issue.

EB Investments, LLC and Pavilion Development, LLC filed separate appeals to challenge an a court order that held Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments, and multiple other parties, held legal interests. In 1997, Pavilion sought to redeem nineteen acres of land purchased by JBJ Partnership at a foreclosure sale. The land was purchased from a development project that went bankrupt. In 1995, the bankruptcy trustee supervised a settlement agreement through which the developer would make payments on the development to its creditors. When the developer defaulted on the settlement agreement, the property was foreclosed and sold. Over the following months and years, a host of counterclaims, cross-claims, and separate lawsuits were filed by various parties who had interests in the property. At issue in this particular case was which party is entitled to redeem the disputed property. The trial court determined that Pavilion was entitled to redeem the property. In its order, the court specified how Pavilion should perfect its redemption. If Pavilion failed to pay all sums required by the court's order, it would waive its right to redeem the property. The court denied the remaining post-judgment motions and certified its judgment as final. EB Investments and Pavilion both appealed that judgment. Though they took opposing sides on most issues in the case, both EB Investments and Pavilions challenged whether the trial court's order was indeed final. They argued that the judgment did not address all other pending issues before the court. JBJ and other parties responded and essentially asked the Court to end this long-running dispute. Upon careful review of the sixteen-year history of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's attempt to end it was ultimately insufficient. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion by certifying its judgment as final. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClungâs parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClungâs mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Lorettaâs life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Greenâs granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her fatherâs interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughterâs) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Lorettaâs intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial courtâs reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Monica Ware appealed a summary judgment in favor of Respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, the trustee for HSI Asset Securitization Corporation. The Bank foreclosed on Petitioner and published notice of the foreclosure in a local Birmingham newspaper. The court entered summary judgment against her. Petitioner then filed a motion to amend or vacate the judgment and requested a hearing. The trial court refused to rule on Petitionerâs motion or hold a hearing. The motion was deemed denied by operation of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner challenged the timing and propriety of the summary judgment and its refusal to rule on her motion to amend or vacate. In affirming the trial courtâs judgment, the Supreme Court "searched [Petitionerâs] briefs in vain for the argument that she actually made in the trial court, namely, that the foreclosure was "null and void. . . .[A] remand . . . would serve no purpose other than to afford her a 'second bite at the apple.'" The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

A real estate broker received money for contracting work never completed, used false addresses in invoices from companies that did not exist, submitted loan applications with inflated incomes and account balances, and forged documentation. At trial on charges of wire fraud, aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 2, 371, and 1343), witnesses used the words "fraud" and "misrepresentation." The district court directed acquittal on aiding and abetting and conspiracy charges and sentenced defendant to 71 monthsâ imprisonment and payment of $2,360,914.51 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction. The testimony of the lay witnesses could have been helpful and did not amount to legal conclusions about intent or "de facto" instructions to the jury. Defendant would not have been acquitted had the court struck the sporadic, repeated use of two words with potential legal baggage in otherwise appropriate testimony. The court vacated the sentence. The district court erred in considering transactions underlying dismissed counts as relevant conduct without making sufficient findings regarding the number of victims and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to victims not clearly harmed by conduct in her counts of conviction.

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal.

Appellants the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League appealed a final order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that granted Respondent Jerry Risher's "critical area permit" application to construct a bridge over a portion of wetlands contained within his property on Fripp Island. Respondent owns less than a half-acre, half of which is "upland high ground" or build-able property. The remainder of the property partially surrounds the build-able portion and is composed of wetlands. One year prior to Respondent's purchase of the lot, his predecessor in title applied to the DHEC and was approved for a critical area permit to construct a vehicular bridge across the non-build-able wetland portion of the lot to connect with the nearest vehicular road. In 2006, Respondent began to construct a bridge similar to the one previously submitted and approved by his predecessor in title. To that end, Respondent submitted a permit application to OCRM. OCRM took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied Respondent's application based on its finding that the upland build-able portion of the lot qualified as a coastal island which was too small to allow bridge access. After exhausting DHEC's review options, Respondent filed a request for review by the ALC. A hearing was held, and the ALC issued an order reversing DHEC's denial of Respondent's permit request. DHEC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence before the ALC to reverse its decision. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALC's decision. The Court affirmed the ALC's decision in support of Respondent.