Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued R.R. Street & Co., Inc. (Street), which designed and manufactured a machine used in the dry cleaning business, and several other defendants for contribution to environmental cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675. Plaintiff also raised various state law causes of action, including claims for trespass and nuisance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Street on all claims and plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff failed to present evidence giving rise to a genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to its CERCLA claim, nuisance claim, and trespass claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Street.

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshalls' (respondents and lessors) fraud claim against BP America Production Co., et al. (the lessee and operator), and whether Vaquillas Ranch Co., Ltd., et al. (lessors) lost title by adverse possession after Wagner Oil Co. (successors-in-interest) succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that because the Marshalls' injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations. Accordingly, the Marshalls' fraud claims against BP were time-barred. The court further held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession.

The issue central to this case stemmed from a contract dispute between two landowners and the City of Casper Wyoming as to whether the landowners were obligated to reimburse the City for certain street improvements. When the landowners did not comply with the City's demand for payment, the City recorded deficiency notices in the local property records on their lots. The landowners sued the City, claiming the notices violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the ground that the landowners had not shown the existence of a protected property interest and that the deficiency notices did not constitute a deprivation of any right. Upon review by the Tenth Circuit, the Court concluded that the landowners demonstrated a disputed issue of fact as to whether the City harmed their property interests. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether that deprivation violated the Due Process Clause. However, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the equal protection claim.

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters.

Landowner Appellant Charles Miller contracted with Handle Construction Company, a manufacturer of pre-fabricated steel hangars, to erect a steel hangar on his land. After completing its work, the Company sued Appellant for unanticipated costs it incurred as a result of manufacturing defects in the hangar. Appellant made an offer of judgment which the Company accepted. When the Company received a separate payment from the hangar's manufacturer, Appellant refused to pay the full amount, arguing that an offset was warranted. The superior court rejected Appellant's argument and ordered him to pay the full amount of the offer. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court for review, but the Court determined that the basis for the superior court's decision was unclear. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for additional factual findings.

The railroad owns a 2.8-mile right-of-way that it has leased to the Chicago Transit Authority for almost 50 years. When the lease became too costly, the CTA sought to condemn a perpetual easement. The district court enjoined the condemnation as preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10501(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The railroad and its right-of-way fall under the Act; the proposed state condemnation would be a regulation of railroad transportation preempted by the Act. The court employed an "as applied" analysis and concluded that the condemnation would prevent or unreasonably interfere with rail transportation by changing the relationship between the parties. Under the proposed easement, the CTA's rights would not be subject to termination for any reason. The railroad would lose property rights to reclaim the property if the CTA ceases passenger transportation operations on the Right of Way or violates any term of the lease and to oust the CTA from the Right of Way if the CTA fails to meet its lease obligations.

These three closely related appeals arose out of two district court cases, each involving a different tract of land owned by the Avoyelles Parish School Board (School Board), where neither tract was accessible by public road and both shared borders with the Lake Ophelia Wildlife Refuge (Refuge), which was owned by the United States Department of Interior (Department). The School Board filed these suits against all adjoining landowners, including the Department, to fix the School Board's legal rights of passage to the respective enclosed lands. The district court fixed rights of passage that burdened Refuge lands and concluded that the Department could not impose certain desired restrictions on the School Board's actions on Refuge lands. On appeal, the court reversed both judgments in full and remanded for further proceedings.

This case concerned the application of payments made in connection with a real estate transaction between Kang Park and Marsha Park and Gary Stanford. The district court granted summary judgment to the Parks, determining, as a matter of law, that none of the payments Stanford submitted to the Parks could be credited toward a personal guaranty Stanford had made on the note payable to the Parks. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that no evidence indicated the Parks had actual knowledge that Stanford intended for the past payments to apply to his guaranty and no agreement or contractual provision expressly required the Parks to make such an application. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied the wrong test in its holding, and rather, a rule in which payments are credited toward a personal guaranty when the recipient of the payments has a reasonable basis to know the payments were submitted in satisfaction of the guaranty governed the application of payments toward a personal guaranty; and (2) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment under the rule and the record required further development. Remanded.

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.

This case arose when elderly widow Dorothy Chase Stewart filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Wells Fargo Bank filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court reciting debts owed from an outstanding mortgage on Ms. Stewart's house. The bankruptcy court subsequently found that Wells Fargo's mortgage claims exhibited systematic errors arising from its highly automated, computerized loan-administration program and issued an injunction requiring Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it had filed on or filed after April 13, 2007; to provide a complete loan history on every account and file that history with the appropriate court; and "to amend...proofs of claim already on file to comply with the principles established in this case and [In re] Jones." Wells Fargo appealed, challenging the claim amount and the injunction. The court vacated the injunction as exceeding the reach of the bankruptcy court. Because neither the injunction nor the calculation of Ms. Stewart's debt was properly before the court, the court dismissed as moot Wells Fargo's appeal of legal rulings underlying the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the mortgage.