Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants, a group of heirs who were entitled to receive the net proceeds of a judicial sale of four tracts of land, sued Appellees, a former master commissioner of the circuit court, a circuit court judge, and the administrative office of the courts, pursuant to the Kentucky Board of Claims Act, after the former master commissioner failed to disburse the proceeds of the sale. The Board of Claims (Board) entered a final order dismissing Appellants' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claim involving judicial officers or court employes may proceed at the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judge's continued use of the master commissioner, without reappointment, to perform significant functions in actions in the circuit court without a bond and without surety approved by the judge as statutorily mandated, was grounds for a claim in the Board of Claims based upon alleged negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty by an officer of the state. Remanded to the Board for a determination of whether Appellants suffered damages as a proximate cause of the alleged negligence.

Two brothers had a dispute over an alleged oral agreement relating to the care of their mother by which one brother agreed to give up part of his inheritance if the other brother would care for their mother. The trial court found that a valid agreement between the brothers had been reached. The court of appeals reversed on an issue that had not been raised at the trial court but which the court reached as part of its overall examination of the validity of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals cannot reverse the judgment of the trial court on an issue that was not specifically raised at the trial court, but (2) the court of appeals nevertheless reached the correct result because the parties' agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and thus, no action on it could be maintained.

In 2000, plaintiff sold 6600 acres of farmland for $16.35 million to an environmental organization, which wanted to restore it as an ecologically functional floodplain for the Illinois River. Plaintiff expressly warranted that there was no petroleum contamination. The organization discovered such contamination and sued. The district court awarded $800,000 in damages, some for a separate breach, failure to clean up livestock waste from lagoons. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed and filed suit against the local drainage district, which had a right of way and equipment on the land to pump surface waters into the river. The district stored petroleum in tanks; at least one was on the organization's land. The organization, wanting to restore the land as wetlands, turned off the pumps. The district court entered summary judgment for the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A blameless contract breaker cannot invoke noncontractual indemnity to shift risk that he assumed in a contract. The suit is also barred by the economic-loss doctrine, based in part on concern with liability for unforeseeable consequences.

This case stemmed from FEMA's determination that the Holy Cross School was eligible for public assistance funds to construct a new school campus on the site of Cabrini Church and Cabrini School in Gentilly to replace its old campus six miles away in the Lower Ninth Ward. Friends of Cabrini Church filed a complaint against FEMA, alleging that, inter alia, the section 106 review process, which defined the "area of potential effects" (APE), C.F.R. 800.4(a), 800.16(d), was deficient. On appeal, Friends of Cabrini Church subsequently challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. The court held that because Friends of Cabrini Church lacked standing to bring its claims, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case.

Petitioner Limited Editions Properties, Inc., appealed a superior court order upholding a decision to deny Petitioner's subdivision application by the planning board of Respondent Town of Hebron (Town). Petitioner owned 112.5 acres of property in Hebron on the northwest end of Newfound Lake with frontage on West Shore Road. A portion of the lot lay within the Hebron lake district, and the remainder lay within the rural district. In an earlier decision, the Board determined that because Petitioner had materially revised its plan for the property, it was required to submit a new application to develop it. Petitioner sued, and the Board was reversed. When the Board resumed consideration of the application, Petitioner requested that it grant preliminary conditional approval of the plan's overall concept before Petitioner sought the required state and federal permits. Petitioner acknowledged that the plan would not meet then-current state regulations; it intended to revise the plan to obtain the necessary permits after the Board granted preliminary approval. Once it obtained the permits, Petitioner intended to return to the Board for consideration of any necessary changes to the plan. However, the Board determined that it would not approve the subdivision application in stages; rather, it would either conditionally approve the application or deny it. After holding several hearings on the application, a motion to deny the application was introduced and seconded, and after further discussion, three of the five members of the Board voted to deny the application. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the superior court, which upheld the Board's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner failed to establish that the trial court erred in affirming the Board's decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Plaintiff Carleton, LLC appealed a superior court order finding that the Defendants' notice of intention to adopt articles of dissolution was timely filed. In 1995, Bukk Carleton and Defendant Richard Balagur formed defendant MTS Corporation (MTS) for the purpose of purchasing land and operating as a real estate holding company. In 2004, Carelton brought an action agains MTS and Richard Balagur to dissolve MTS, obtain payment of rent due MTS, and to remove Richard Balagur as an officer and director of MTS. Richard Balagur brought an action to compel MTS to transfer certain real estate to him, and to pay him certain funds. Adrienne Balagur, Richard's mother and a shareholder in MTS, successfully moved for leave to file an election to purchase shares in lieu of dissolving MTS pursuant to state law. The parties sued over how to value the shares in MTS. Concluding that the trial court did not err in its determination of the terms and conditions of purchase of the shares, the Supreme Court appointed a commissioner to sell MTS' real estate holdings should Mrs. Balagur not comply with the Court's order. One month after the Supreme Court issued its holding, the Balagurs and MTS filed a notice of intention to adopt articles of dissolution. Carelton objected, contending that the notice was not timely filed. The trial court held that the notice was timely filed and Carelton appealed. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the notice of intent to adopt articles of dissolution was timely filed.

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims.

Respondent Parade Residence Hotel, LLC (Parade) appealed and Petitioner Harborside Associates, L.P. (Harborside) cross-appealed a superior court decision that partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) to grant Parade variances to install two parapet and two marquee signs on its hotel and conference center site. Upon review, the Supreme Court found evidence in the record to support the ZBAâs factual findings: "[b]ecause the ZBA used the correct test to determine whether the public interest and spirit of the ordinance factors were met and because there is evidence to support the ZBAâs findings on these factors, to the extent that the trial court ruled that the ZBA acted unlawfully when it found that the factors were met, the trial court erred." Further, the Court found there was evidence in the record supporting the ZBAâs finding that the signs would not "negatively impact surrounding property values ... the ZBA was also entitled to rely upon its own knowledge, experience and observations." The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the superior court's decision, and remanded the case back for further proceedings.