Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a real property insurance contract between plaintiff and defendant. The insurance policy provided coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to" a building plaintiff owned in the Buckhead area of Atlanta. At issue was whether the Georgia courts would hold that the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Mabry rule extended to standard insurance contracts for buildings. Because this was an important unsettled question of state law, and there was no controlling precedent from the Georgia state courts, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

This was the second of two appeals arising from a property dispute between Plaintiffs, members of a local parish of the Episcopal church and the church, and Defendants, several present or former officers or vestry members of the parish. Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendants, alleging breach of trust for the wrongful failure to relinquish to Plaintiffs all of the real and personal property of the parish following a decision by a majority of the voting members of the parish, including Defendants, to withdraw from the diocese and to affiliate the parish with an ecclesiastical society that was not part of the Episcopal church. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court properly (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and declared that the disputed property was held in trust for the Episcopal church, and that Defendants had no right or authority to occupy, use or possess the property; (2) ordered Defendants to relinquish possession, custody and control of the property to the Plaintiffs; and (3) permitted Plaintiffs to move for an order of accounting.

This was the first of two appeals arising from a property dispute between members of a local parish of the Episcopal church and several present or former officers or vestry members of the parish. An unincorporated voluntary association attempted unsuccessfully to intervene in the action to protect its alleged ownership interest in the property. The association appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied its motion to intervene and its request for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion because (1) the issues raised by the association were fully and fairly raised by the present pleadings, and (2) the association did not seek to intervene to assert a claim against Defendants. In addition, the Court held that there was a presumption of adequate representation because the record demonstrated that the identities of the association members and Defendants were overlapping and that they had the same ultimate objective.

Plaintiffs, members of a religious organization, demonstrated around the stadium at which the 2006 "Gay Games" were held, but were prohibited from demonstrating and preaching on the sidewalk. They stopped demonstrating on the sidewalk outside a major tourist attraction (Navy Pier) under threat of arrest. One plaintiff, who refused to move from his spot on a public sidewalk outside one of the game venues, was arrested for disorderly conduct. The district court ruled in favor of the city defendants on claims under the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration, and common law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the First Amendment claim dealing with a policy requiring a permit for even small-group demonstrations outside Navy Pier. The constitutionality of that policy must be evaluated in light of the unique features of the location. The city's legitimate concerns justify its actions with respect to the other locations.

Appellants filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), OCGA 16-14-1 et seq. In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all appellees on the contract, negligence, and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. The court held that, since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, the court reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that there was no evidence in the record that would provide the basis for a fact-finder to calculate damages upon a finding of liability and therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that summary judgment was authorized due to the failure of appellants to present evidence of damages.

This appeal concerned tax deductions that Altria claimed in 1996 and 1997, and which the IRS disallowed. The claimed deductions resulted from Altria's participation in nine leveraged lease transactions with tax-indifferent entities. The jury found that Altria was not entitled to the claimed tax deductions. Applying the substance over form doctrine, the jury rejected Altria's contention that it retained a genuine ownership or leasehold interest in the assets and therefore was entitled to the tax deductions. The district court denied Altria's motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial and entered judgment for the government. The court affirmed and held that Altria had not shown that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the substance over form doctrine.

From the 1930s until 1982, NL manufactured pigments on 440 acres surrounded by the Raritan River. NL later leased to manufacturers of sulfuric acid, until 2005, when a redevelopment agency acquired the site by eminent domain. NL had entered into an administrative consent order with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, requiring NL to investigate and perform remediation. The state had identified other sources of contamination and suggested a regional approach, but no action was taken. The redevelopment agreement provided that NL would retain liability for contamination of river sediments, but does not call for any remediation. In 2009, the U.S. EPA ordered remediation of river sediments upstream from the site. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed citizens suits under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B), and CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1). The district court dismissed, concluding that abstention was appropriate. The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the state has not taken action with respect to the contamination.

In this condemnation case, Plaintiffs brought an action against the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) and the State. IDOT's motion to dismiss was granted. Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was a mandamus action to compel condemnation proceedings. The court then dismissed the first action. Before the district court had entered its summary judgment ruling, Plaintiffs petitioned for writ of mandamus against IDOT in a second action. After the court granted summary judgment for the State, IDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the dismissal of the first action barred Plaintiffs from bringing the second action under both claim and issue preclusion. The district court disagreed and granted Plaintiffs' requested writ of mandamus. Defendants appealed on the issue of claim preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a court order dismissing an action reveals the court's intent to preserve a claim arising out of the same transaction that is pending in another lawsuit, the claim in the other lawsuit should be allowed to proceed.

Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. (Turquoise) appealed a circuit court judgment that denied its motion to alter, amend or vacate an arbitration award in an action filed by Clark A. Cooper, David L. Faulkner, Jr., and Hugh and Adrienne Overmyer (collectively, Claimants). Claimants signed purchase and escrow agreements to purchase condominiums to be built as part of "phase I" of a complex Turquoise was developing in Orange Beach. In conjunction with the purchase, they each posted a letter of credit for 20% of the purchase price. When construction neared substantial completion, the Claimants declined to "close" on the purchases on their respective units, allegedly because Turquoise had failed to build an outdoor pool and sundeck area or to provide individual storage units and private cabanas which it had agreed to build and to provide. The purchase and escrow agreements contained an arbitration provision. Claimants' initial demands contained claims of breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The arbitrator entered a lengthy arbitration award containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately in favor of the Claimants. Turquoise filed a motion to modify the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had made a computational error in his calculation of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did mistakenly calculate damages owed to the claimants. The Court vacated the arbitrator's award and remanded the case for recalculation of damages.

Capmark Bank appealed a preliminary injunction entered in favor of RGR, LLC; MB Park, LLC; TTM MB Park, LLC; Robert G. Randall; and T. Todd Martin III (referred to collectively as "RGR") which enjoined Capmark from foreclosing on certain real property that served as the primary collateral for a loan from Capmark to RGR, LCC, MB Park, LLC, and TTM MB Park, LLC. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded RGR failed to establish the requisite elements entitling it to a preliminary injunction. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment issuing the injunction.