Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Incentives under the National Housing Act, to encourage private developers to meet the needs of moderate income families, included below-market 40-year mortgages, with an option to prepay after 20 years. Restrictions, for example, on rent increases, were in effect until the mortgage was paid off. The prepayment option gave developers an opportunity to convert to market rate housing. To avoid a shortage of affordable housing, Congress enacted Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988), and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990) under which an owner needed HUD approval to prepay or to go through regulatory hoops. In 1996 Congress restored prepayment rights. Plaintiff was prohibited from prepayment for five years, 10 days. The Court of Federal Claims held that the restriction of prepayment rights constituted a taking but did not constitute a breach of contract, because there was no privity between HUD and plaintiff. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to temporary taking. The evidence did not demonstrate that plaintiff's investment backed expectations were objectively reasonable in light of industry practice,

Husband obtained a purchase-money mortgage from Bank to invest in commercial real estate. Wife's signature was forged in executing the purchase-money mortgage. After Husband's death, Bank attempted to foreclose its mortgage, but Husband's Estate and Wife asserted Wife's fraudulent signature voided the mortgage. The district court (1) granted Bank summary judgment, concluding its purchase-money mortgage was superior to Wife's statutory dower interest and the Estate's other debts and charges; and (2) ordered any excess sale proceeds to be paid to the Estate. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the award of summary judgment; but (2) reversed the district court's determination that the foreclosure sale surplus be paid to the Estate, instead holding that Wife's statutory dower interest took priority over the Estate's other debts and charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that a surviving spouse's dower interest, codified in Iowa Code 633.211 as to nonhomestead real property, was not subject to the debts and charges of the Estate of the spouse who died intestate.

Plaintiff refinanced her home by executing a promissory note in favor of Saxon Mortgage and a deed of trust (DOT) naming Saxon as beneficiary and a title company as trustee. Saxon assigned the note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 by endorsing the note in blank. The assignment was not recorded. Plaintiff defaulted under the note. Deutsche Bank then executed a substitution of trustee, removing the title company as trustee and appointing Tiffany and Bosco as the substituting trustee. Tiffany and Bosco recorded a notice of trustee's sale, naming "Deutsche Bank/2005-3" as the current beneficiary in care of Saxon Mortgage Services. An agent of Saxon then executed an assignment of the DOT, assigning all its beneficial interest to Deutsche Bank. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of questions certified by the United State Bankruptcy Court, answering that the recording of an assignment of deed of trust is not required prior to the filing of a notice of trustee's sale under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-808 when the assignee holds a promissory note payable to bearer.

In 1999, Christopher Sullivan learned through a business acquaintance, Robert Weaver, acquired all interests in a particular oil and gas lease. The then-current operators of the wells on the lease, QEP Energy, made regular payments to Mr. Sullivan for several years. In early 2006 QEP determined that the total payments to Mr. Sullivan by all operators on the lease exceeded his interest in the leases. QEP therefore ceased further payments and sought reimbursement of the overpayment from Mr. Sullivan. He disputed the claim, asserting that QEP owed him additional payments. QEP brought this action in Utah state court, seeking a declaration of the amounts due Mr. Sullivan. It also sought recovery from Mr. Sullivan for the alleged overpayment. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment on their claims for declaratory relief. The district court held that the terms of Mr. Sullivan's interest (from when he acquired the original interest in the lease) unambiguously described he should have only received a three percent production-payment. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of QEP, and dismissed Mr. Sullivan's claims with prejudice. Mr. Sullivan appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis of the leases in question and affirmed its decision in favor of QEP.

Defendant failed to close on a real estate contract. The seller retained his $25,000 earnest money, resold the property, and assigned his claim for the $400,000 price differential to plaintiff. The district court rejected a claim that the contract showed an intent that the earnest money serve as liquidated damages. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the contract unambiguous.

Decedent executed a pour-over will and a revocable inter vivos trust for the intended purpose of disinheriting her surviving Spouse, and thereby effectively destroying his elective share as to the property transferred to the trust. This appeal involved two consolidated cases. The district court granted summary judgment against Spouse in both matters, concluding (1) in the probate matter, the property transferred and held in the trust was not subject to the elective share; and (2) in the related civil action in which Spouse sought $125,000 from the trust as a creditor for work performed during the marriage on a building owned by Decedent and transferred to the trust, the claim was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment in the probate matter because the property transferred to the Trust was never legally the property of Decedent's estate, and therefore, there was no legal basis for making the property a part of Decedent's estate for purposes of the elective share; and (2) the district court properly found that the failure of Spouse to file his civil complaint against the Estate deprived the court of jurisdiction.

Rapid City ordinances required a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepted a final plat, but in lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepted a plat, the City could accept a surety from a developer. In this case, several Developers provided sureties, which the City accepted. The sureties expired, after which the City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers, concluding that when the sureties expired, Developers were no longer liable for the improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remained liable until the City accepted the improvements by a final acceptance letter. Remanded.

Appellees in McCormick v. LaChance (McCormick I) brought a motion for reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of a portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in McCormick I. In McCormick I, Appellant appealed the judgment of the superior court granting Appellees summary judgment in an action regarding location of an easement. The Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant action, Appellees contended that because the only issue presented for decision in McCormick I was whether the prior owner of Appellant's land could, by deed referencing a plan, relocate an easement on the face of the earth, the Court should not have addressed an issue of whether actions that Appellant had taken on the face of the earth could have accomplished a relocation of a previously existing easement benefiting Appellees. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and revised its opinion, concluding that in addressing Appellant's attempts to relocate the easement by his actions on the ground after receipt of the deed, the Court misapprehended the issues and addressed matters not presented to the trial court in the summary judgment proceeding and, thus, not properly preserved and presented to the Court for consideration on appeal.

Wife initiated a divorce from Husband. After a trial and after applying the parties' premarital agreement to the evidence presented to divide the parties' real and personal property, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $145,000. The court then ordered Wife to pay Husband $300,000 to achieve an equitable distribution. Wife appealed. Wife subsequently moved the district court to enforce the preliminary injunction, claiming Husband removed her from his health insurance policy in violation of the injunction. The trial court denied Wife's motion. Wife appealed this judgment and consolidated her appeals. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's action with respect to Wife's motion for a preliminary injunction as the parties' premarital agreement unequivocally barred the awarding of spousal support, and therefore, neither spouse could be required to provide the other with health insurance; and (2) affirmed most of the divorce judgment but vacated the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Husband $300,000 to create an equitable division of the marital estate because there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that $300,000 of the assets awarded to Wife were marital property. Remanded.

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the Union County Circuit Court erred in finding that the City of New Albany Board of Aldermen's (City) decision that a tract of land had been legally rezoned from agricultural to industrial was arbitrary and capricious and that the City failed to give statutorily required notice before changing the zoning designation. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court did not err: in finding that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously; in finding that the City failed to give statutorily required notice; and in concluding that the property should remain zoned for agricultural use. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' holding and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court.