Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland (SADISCO) sued Prince George’s County, Maryland and five County officials after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County. SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in favor of the County and officials with respect to the remaining counts. Plaintiff appealed, and after review, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly rejected Plaintiff's arguments.

The issue before the Supreme Court was a dispute over the existence of an alleged prescriptive easement that was necessary for large commercial vehicles to get to the loading dock of a commercial building. The plaintiffs, Butterfly Realty and Dairyland, Inc., appealed the judgment entered against them on their claims for a prescriptive easement on the property of the defendant, James Romanella & Sons, Inc. (JR & Sons). Butterfly Realty purchased a parcel of land from Albert Romanella, who, at the time, was president and 50 percent shareholder of JR & Sons. On that same date, Albert Romanella also assigned to Butterfly Realty his lease for an adjacent lot. Dairyland, Inc. was the owner of another adjacent parcel. Access to the loading dock at the rear of Butterfly’s building was impossible without crossing onto JR & Sons' property to some degree because the commercial building was built so close to the common property line between the lots in question. Therefore, JR & Sons granted an express easement to Butterfly to provide access to the loading dock of Butterfly’s commercial building. After a delivery truck struck a building on JR & Sons' property, JR & Sons surveyed the area in May 2010 to determine the precise location of the express easement. Then, in an effort to encourage Butterfly to "come to some kind of agreement for * * * using all of [its] property all the time, JR & Sons installed “concrete pylons" along the southwestern borders of the express easement making it nearly impossible for trucks to continue to pull directly up to the loading dock as had been done previously. The trial justice denied Butterfly's claim for a prescriptive easement and denied both Butterfly and JR& Sons' requests for injunctive relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial justice misapplied the law with regard to Butterfly's use of the easement as "sufficiently hostile," and this misapplication sufficiently tainted the balance of the trial justice's decision. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Philip and Eileen Pelletier challenged a Superior Court judgment in favor of their neighbor Aphrodite Laureanno which dismissed their complaint for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Pelletiers believed that a written and recorded agreement, entered into by the Pelletiers and Laureanno's predecessor-in-interest, created a permanent easement for parking on a small portion of Laureanno's adjacent property. Laureanno disagreed, and erected a fence, which served to obstruct the Pelletiers' long-standing parking there. After a trial on the merits, the trial justice concluded that the written agreement at issue did not grant an easement to the Pelletiers, but instead served merely as a revocable license. On appeal, the Pelletiers argued that the Superior Court erred in dismissing their complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice was justified in his assessment of Mrs. Pelletier's testimony regarding the parties' intent in executing the driveway agreement. Conferring the requisite substantial deference to the trial justice's credibility determination at issue, the Court did not find the trial court's assessment as arbitrary or in error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

In this appeal, a property owner challenged an increase to the 2006 valuation of its property that was ordered by the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) at the instigation of the Bedford Board of Education. The BTA reversed the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR), which had retained the auditor's valuation of $3,713,500. The BTA valued the property by using the allocated portion of the March 2006 sale price, which increased the valuation to $4,835,000. The owner appealed, contending that the allocated sale price was not reflective of market value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA erred by ignoring and failing to weigh the significance of testimony regarding the seller's tax motivations in allocating the sale price to the subject property; and (2) because it is the duty of the BTA to weigh the evidence and determine the facts concerning valuation, the case was remanded for proper consideration of the effect of that testimony.

Nicole Tausend, the beneficiary of a trust together with her father, Ronald, commenced a N.Y.C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against Ronald and the partnership (NJR) formed by Ronald for the purpose of acquiring and selling property. Nicole commenced the proceeding in order to obtain access to the partnership documents and an accounting of its finances. In response, NJR issued a demand for arbitration. Supreme Court ordered the parties to arbitration, and the appellate division affirmed. Nicole appeared in the arbitration and asserted several counterclaims, which lead to NJR's commencement of this court proceeding seeking to stay arbitration of the counterclaims on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the petition and stayed arbitration of the counterclaims. The appellate division modified by dismissing NJR's petition to stay arbitration of the counterclaims, reasoning that the partnership was precluded from obtaining a stay because it had initiated and participated in the arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because NJR initiated and participated in the arbitration of issues stemming from the dispute, its timeliness challenge to the counterclaims must be decided by an arbitrator.

Defendant, a loan officer, recruited buyers to obtain mortgage loans for which they were not qualified by using false information. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The Second Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by allowing jurors, after the beginning of jury deliberations and after receiving various cautionary instructions, to take the indictment home to read on their own time.

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim.

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity.

Washington Mutual foreclosed on property before receiving assignment and transfer of the promissory note and the delinquent home mortgage and before recording it. The homeowner brought a lawsuit for an allegedly false claim of ownership under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, against the law firm acting for the purported mortgagee. She claimed violation of the Act, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding that she did not state a claim under the Act and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The filing of foreclosure action by the law firm, claiming ownership of the mortgage by its client, constituted a "false, deceptive or misleading representation" under the Act because the bank had not obtained transfer of the ownership documents. The homeowner adequately alleged that the misidentification caused confusion and delay in trying to contact the proper party concerning payment and resolution of the problem.

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud.