Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Chapter 11 Debtor, an LLC, held certain parcels of undeveloped land that were included within property-owners' improvement districts (the Districts) formed in accordance with Arkansas law. After Debtor entered into bankruptcy, secured creditor National Bank of Arkansas (the Bank) filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking a ruling that a proposed state court action against the Districts would not violate the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court determined (1) the automatic stay applied to the Bank's proposed action and that relief from the stay was unwarranted, and (2) the Bank's motion was barred by laches. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the automatic stay did not apply to the Bank's proposed action against the Districts because the Districts were neither property of the Debtor nor debtors themselves, the Bank's action would only impact the value of the estate in some undetermined and indirect manner, and the action would not divest the Debtor of its property; and (2) the doctrine of laches did not apply in this situation because there was no showing of detrimental reliance by the Debtor upon the Bank's failure to raise this particular challenge in a more timely fashion. View "Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mtn. Land Dev. " on Justia Law

Two issues came before the Supreme Court in this case: (1) whether an assignee of a note and mortgage has a right to surplus funds generated by the foreclosure of a prior mortgage on the property; and (2) whether that assignee is barred from recovering the surplus funds because the note and mortgage assigned to it allegedly were closed without attorney participation. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the assignee may recover the surplus funds even though it was not a lienholder of record at the time of the sale. The Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify its decision in "Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer," (714 S.E.2d 532 (2011)), and held that because the mortgage at issue in this case was filed before "Matrix," whether it was closed without the services of an attorney would not bar the assignee from receiving the surplus funds. View "BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Kinder " on Justia Law

This case was the third appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a 2002 real estate transaction between Thomas and Colleen Birch-Maile and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. Attorney and Real Estate Broker Thomas Maile advised the Trust to reject an offer to sell certain trust property. Months later, Mr. Maile submitted an earnest money agreement for the same property. The prospective buyers, collectively the Taylors, sued the Mailes and Berkshire Investments, LLC (the company that the Mailes formed and to whom they assigned rights to the property) for professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties. The Mailes filed suit seeking to set aside a 2006 judgment against them, which the Court affirmed in the second appeal. The district court determined on summary judgment that the 2006 judgment was res judicata with regard to the issues raised in the Mailes' complaint. At trial the jury awarded damages against the Mailes on the Taylors' counterclaim. The Mailes appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed: the district court was correct in summarily dismissing the Mailes' lawsuit and denying their motion for JNOV. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney to two of the prospective buyers. View "Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a condemnation action brought by the Idaho Transportation Board (ITB) against HI Boise, LLC. ITB sought to acquire a strip of land as part of a project to improve the I-84/Vista Avenue Interchange in Boise. ITB offered HI Boise the condemned property's appraised value of $38,177, but HI Boise filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, claiming damages of $7.5 million for additional lost rights of access and visibility. HI Boise appeals the district court's summary dismissal of those claims. Because the Supreme Court found that neither claim involved a compensable taking, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC" on Justia Law

When the original developer of Plantations created the subdivision in 1986, it retained a 4.3-acre Recreation Area, including a pool, tennis courts, and a gym. Plantations residents and the general public use the facilities for a fee. The developer failed to reserve an express easement to the public road. Owners of the Recreation Area and customers of the health facility must use land owned by the Associations, which own and maintain Plantations’ common areas, for access. A new owner of the recreation facility was unable to reach agreement with the Associations concerning access and parking and sought to establish that an easement exists in its favor over the roads of the Associations and for use of a parking lot adjacent to the Recreation Area and that it is under no obligation to contribute to the upkeep of the property over which it claims an easement, relying on a Declaration of Covenants. The Declaration is poorly drafted and unclear. The Chancellor held that the owner has established an easement to use the private roadways of Plantations in connection with its business, but failed to demonstrate an easement for parking. The question of maintenance obligations awaits further factual development. View "Sandie, LLC v. The Plantations Owners Ass'n, Inc.,." on Justia Law

In 2005 Truman and partners purchased a vacant commercial building for $175,000, insured for $4,250,000 in fire-related losses. The property, without the building, was worth more than with the building. After a minor accidental fire, Truman told an employee that if it ever caught fire again, just get out. Considering leasing, Truman stated that it would make more money if it burnt. By late 2006, Truman had less than $5,000 in personal bank accounts. Premiums were paid through November 17. The building burned down November 12. Truman, Jr. confessed that he had burned the building at his father’s direction. State charges were dismissed because of inability to corroborate junior’s testimony, as required under New York law. Truman was charged with aiding and abetting arson, 18 U.S.C. 844(i); mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; use of fire in commission of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 844(h); and loan fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Following a guilty verdict the district court granted acquittal and conditionally granted a new trial. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded for sentencing. Junior’s refusal to answer certain questions did not render his testimony incredible as a matter of law, and his prior state testimony was nonhearsay. Truman was not prejudiced by improper cross-examination or summation argument references to the cooperation agreement. View "United States v. Truman" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the approval of a permit application for a Livestock Confinement Operation (LCO), also known as a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO), by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners. The Board approved the application after a remand by the district court of the Board's decision previously denying the permit. Several individuals and organizations opposed to the LCO because of the potential harms to the neighboring farms and to the Minidoka National Historic Site petitioned the district court for review of the Board's decision. The district court affirmed the Board's approval of the permit, finding in the process that four of the organizations concerned with the effects on the Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the district court's decision, asking the Supreme Court to find that these parties had standing to challenge the permit approval, that the Board's procedure for presenting evidence before the Board violated procedural due process rights, and that the Board failed to follow all of the county's relevant zoning ordinances when it approved the application. The issue central to the Court's opinion pertained to standing of all the appellant-organizations, the Board's procedure for presenting evidence throughout the LCO permit application process, the constitutionality of the "one mile rule" of Idaho Code section 67-6529, and the application of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinances. The Court concluded that the Board properly applied its zoning ordinance to the LCO permit application process, that I.C. 67-6529 was not unconstitutional, and that the public was afforded appropriate due process prior to, and during the LCO permit application hearing. View "Friends of Minidoka v. Jerome County" on Justia Law

Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. (DHL), and Oak Leaf Realty, Inc. (OLR). DHL owned property in Washington County, and OLR owned several thousand acres in Hancock County. The DHL and OLR properties have a four-rod-wide rail corridor running over them that was once owned by the Maine Central Railroad Company which was later conveyed to the State of Maine, which the Department of Transportation (DOT) claimed to own in fee simple absolute by virtue of deeds given to Maine Central's predecessor in title from 1897 to 1898. DHL and OLR contended that Maine Central held only a railroad easement that it abandoned prior to its purported conveyance to the State, and therefore DOT owned nothing. Alternatively, OLR contended that if DOT held an interest in the corridor, two deeds in DOT's chain of title contained covenants allowing OLR to compel DOT to build and maintain a fence along a portion of the corridor in Hancock County. DHL and OLR appealed the grant of summary judgments entered in favor of DOT by the Superior Court on their complaints seeking a declaration on who owned what. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly found that DOT held an easement that had not been abandoned in the Washington County portion of the corridor, and owned the fee simple in the Hancock County portion of the corridor. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the covenants requiring Maine Central to build and maintain a fence along the corridor were not enforceable against DOT in equity. View "Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

HJ Grathol is a California general partnership that owed real estate in Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for development. The Idaho Transportation board later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. Grathol contended that the Board failed to negotiate for the sixteen acres in good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of two roads which were believed to have significantly increased the property's value. Grathol also asserted that the Board failed to file its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with Idaho law before moving for early possession of the property pursuant to a "quick take" provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board indeed did negotiate in good faith for the subject property, and filed its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with the applicable statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that the "quick take" provision in question was satisfied. View "Idaho Transportation Board V. HJ Grathol" on Justia Law

Liberty entered into a Master Declaration and Easements, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for a shopping mall. PMI purchased the property and entered into a Declaration that gave Liberty the right to prior approval of future purchasers and an option to purchase. PMI borrowed $3.5 million from Nationwide, using the property as collateral. Nationwide purchased title insurance from Commonwealth, containing the ALTA 9 endorsement. PMI defaulted and conveyed the property to Nationwide, which attempted to sell to Ironwood. Liberty’s successor, Franklin, refused to approve Ironwood under its rights conferred by the Declaration, based on Ironwood’s planned use as a school. Nationwide claimed that the restrictions upon which Franklin justified refusal rendered the property unusable and unsalable. Commonwealth denied the claim. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit remanded, holding that Commonwealth is obligated to cover the claim if the restriction causing Nationwide’s harm was covered by the ALTA 9 Endorsement and not expressly excepted on Schedule B. The district court then ruled in favor of Nationwide. The Third Circuit affirmed and remanded for determination of damages owed Nationwide, relying on the plain language of the ALTA 9 rather than deferring to industry custom and usage. View "Nationwide Life Ins. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law