Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff interred her husband's remains in the backyard of her property. The town's zoning compliance officer issued a cease and desist order for violation of the town's zoning regulation. Plaintiff appealed to the town zoning board of appeals, seeking a variance. Subsequently, the compliance officer withdrew the order to allow Plaintiff to remedy the violation. Plaintiff then notified the board she was withdrawing her objection to the order. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced an action in the trial requesting a judgment declaring she had the right to use her property for the interment of her and her husband's remains. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff had failed her exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing to the board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's failure to pursue her appeal and, thereby, to exhaust her administrative remedies left the trial court without jurisdiction over her action for a declaratory judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff was actually challenging the proper interpretation of the town zoning regulations, which was a function of the board, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Piquet v. Chester" on Justia Law

Stephen E. Lipscomb ("Appellant"), the manager of SEL Properties, LLC ("SEL") appealed a jury verdict against him for tortious interference with a contract entered into by SEL with Dutch Fork Development Group, II, LLC and Dutch Fork Realty, LLC (collectively "Respondents"). Appellant contended that he could not be held individually liable in tort for a contract that was breached by SEL. Alternatively, Appellant challenged the jury's award of $3,000,000 in actual damages to Respondents on grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in charging the jury that lost customers and lost goodwill were elements of damages as there was no evidence of such damages; and (2) that the award was improper and should have been reduced as the actual damages for the tort claim were "coextensive" with or subsumed in the jury's award of actual damages to Respondents for the breach of contract claim against SEL. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the claim of tortious interference with a contract. Accordingly, the Court reversed the jury's award of damages. View "Dutch Fork Development v. SEL Properties" on Justia Law

Faith Malpeli brought an inverse condemnation action against the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT), seeking compensation for the alleged taking of her property as a result of the reconstruction of Montana Highway 191 near Big Sky during a highway safety improvement project. A jury found that MDT had not taken a property right belonging to Malpeli, and therefore did not reach the question of compensation. Malpeli appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by: (1) denying Malpeli's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial; (2) excluding Malpeli's appraiser from testifying; and (3) allowing MDT to disclose to the jury an offer of compromise it had made to Malpeli before this action was filed. MDT cross-appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by denying its motion for partial summary judgment before trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court determined that the motion for summary judgment should have been granted, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of MDT. View "Malpeli v. Montana" on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute between certain members of two Delaware real estate holding companies, Defendant Companies and the Companies' manager, Rubin Schron. Plaintiffs, MICH and SEEVA Entites, originally brought an action against Schron and Schron-affiliated entities in New York (the MICH/SEEVA action) alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and of the Companies' operating agreements. In response, Schron filed an opposing action in New York against the MICH and SEEVA entities' majority owners and controllers, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. The New York court dismissed the MICH/SEEVA action, holding that the operating agreements required all claims against the Companies to be brought in Delaware. Plaintiffs then filed this action, which Schron moved to stay or dismiss. The Chancery Court granted Defendants' motion to stay this action in favor of Schron's first-filed New York action. Plaintiffs then filed combined motions for reconsideration and certification of an interlocutory appeal. The Chancery Court held that, with the exception of Plaintiffs' claim regarding Defendants' withholding of certain distributions allegedly owed to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that relief was warranted. View "MICH II Holdings LLC v. Schron" on Justia Law

T-Mobile proposed to build a cellular tower in an area of West Bloomfield Township, Michigan, that had a coverage gap. After deciding that sites in the township zoning ordinance’s cellular tower overlay zones were infeasible, T-Mobile decided that the best option would be to construct a facility at a utility site on property owned by Detroit Edison. The facility contained an existing 50-foot pole, which T-Mobile wanted to replace with a 90-foot pole disguised to look like a pine tree with antennas fashioned as branches. The township denied special approval. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of T-Mobile in a suit under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Five stated reasons for denial of the application were not supported by substantial evidence and the denial had “the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services” in violation of 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). View "T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield" on Justia Law

In 2008, the General Assembly enacted a statute to require that a foreclosing lender provide advance written notice to the borrower of its intention to foreclosure. Among the information to be provided in that notice is the identity of the "secured party," although the statute does not specifically define that phrase. In this case, there was more than one entity that qualified as a "secured party" under the commonly understood meaning of the phrase. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, in such a situation, a foreclosing party was obligated to identify all secured parties in the advance written notice to the borrower. The Court held (1) a foreclosing party should ordinarily identify, in the notice of intent to foreclose, each entity that is a "secured party" with respect to the deed of trust in question; (2) however, a failure to disclose every secured party is not a basis for dismissing a foreclosure action when certain conditions are met; and (3) under the circumstances of the instant case, because many of the enumerated conditions were met even though the notice failed to disclose every secured party, the dismissal of the foreclosure action was not required. View "Shepherd v. Burson" on Justia Law

Tenant rented her residence from Landlord, who defaulted on the mortgage on that property. U.S. Bank National Association (USBNA), as trustee for a mortgage-backed security that owned that debt, foreclosed on Landlord's deed of trust and terminated Tenant's lease. In doing so, it sent conflicting notices to Tenant about her right under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA) to remain on the property temporarily and filed a premature motion for immediate possession of the property. The circuit court granted USBNA's motion for possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) misleading and contradictory notices concerning a tenant's right to remain in a residence temporarily are ineffective to satisfy the purchaser's obligation under the PTFA; and (2) a motion for possession is premature when it is filed prior to the expiration of the period that the PTFA permits a bona fide tenant to remain in a residential property subject to foreclosure. Remanded. View "Curtis v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Frankenmuth, “Michigan’s Little Bavaria,” is a tourist destination, famous for Bavarian-themed stores, family-style restaurants, and the world’s largest year-round Christmas store. Plaintiffs own a 37-acre tract just outside city limits. A 2003 property-tax appraisal valued the land at $95,000. It has been used as farmland for nearly 100 years. Under a joint agreement with the township, about 15 acres on the western portion of the property was zoned as Commercial Local Planned Unit Development, with the remaining 22 acres designated as Residential Planned Unit Development. In 2005, the plaintiffs agreed to sell 23.55 acres to Wal-Mart for $125,000 per acre. Wal-Mart had 180 days to determine the feasibility of its plan and was permitted to, for any reason, cancel and receive a refund of the $50,000 deposit.” The city first enacted a moratorium and then rezoned a relatively small area, including the property. Wal-Mart cancelled the agreement and a jury awarded plaintiffs $3.6 million for selective zoning. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the city harbored animus against the plaintiffs, as opposed to animus against Wal-Mart and gave inaccurate instructions on damages. View "Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth" on Justia Law

Tim Lilley leased pastureland adjacent to Mark and Janis Evanson's property. Lilley started a fire on the pastureland that spread to the Evensons' property, destroying the outbuildings on the property and around 200 trees. Lilley stipulated that he was at fault for the fire and the resulting damage. The district court held that the measure of damages was the difference in the fair market value of the property before and after the fire. The court awarded damages in the amount of $4,687 for the loss in value of the property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court and court of appeals incorrectly attempted to superimpose principles of temporary and permanent damages on the facts of this case; but (2) the lower courts' conclusions were nonetheless correct, and the district court did not err in relying on a diminished-value calculation of property loss. View "Evenson v. Lilley" on Justia Law

The respondents, Malborn Realty Trust and its trustee, Daniel Osborn, appealed a superior court order that enjoined Osborn from occupying property in Atkinson because he lacked an occupancy permit and that imposed a civil penalty for this violation. Petitioner Town of Atkinson cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to award it attorney’s fees. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the injunction, modified its imposition of civil penalties, reversed its denial of attorney’s fees, and remanded. View "Town of Atkinson v. Malborn Realty Trust" on Justia Law