Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in November, 2012
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Ronald Rowland appealed the grant of summary judgment that declared that 15 deeds executed in the 1950s covering certain Bowman County property conveyed royalty interests rather than mineral interests, and an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. Because the deeds were ambiguous and reasonable differences of opinion existed as to the inferences drawn about the grantor's intent from the language of the deeds and the extrinsic evidence presented, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hamilton v. Woll" on Justia Law

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Paul Ehlen appealed a judgment that dismissed his action against John and LynnDee Melvin to enforce a purchase agreement, a judgment for costs, and an amended judgment. The matter stemmed from a property transaction between the parties from early 2011. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding the parties did not mutually consent to the purchase agreement was not clearly erroneous. View "Ehlen v. Melvin" on Justia Law

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This case concerned the construction of a new Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) rail/truck terminal outside Kansas City, Kansas. Because the preferred site contained streams and wetlands protected under federal law, several groups (collectively, "Hillsdale") brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under the Clean Water Act. The district court denied Hillsdale's motion for an injunction and granted summary judgment for the Corps and BNSF. On appeal, Hillsdale requested that the Tenth Circuit set aside the Corps's decision to grant the permit because the Corps inadequately considered alternatives to the selected site under the Clean Water Act and violated the National Environmental Policy Act by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment and failing to prepare a full environmental impact statement. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Corps's decision was supported by the record, and was not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its approval powers under federal law. View "Hillside Environmental Loss, et al v. United States Army Corps, et al" on Justia Law

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Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

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The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

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Walter Henderson brought a quiet title action to claim ownership of an undivided thirty percent interest in a mineral estate. Following a court trial, which confirmed Walter's ownership of the mineral interest in fee, Walter's half-sister, Susan Henderson, individually and as representative of her deceased mother, Dora Henderson, appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that Walter's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13(1) and 15-3-2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly quieted title in Walter's favor and concluded that Walter was the owner of the thirty percent mineral interest described in an agreement between Walter and his father. View "Estate of Henderson v. Estate of Henderson" on Justia Law

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Youngstown Belt Railway Company entered into a purchase agreement with Total Waste Logistics of Girard for the purchase of Mosier Yard, which the railway owned. The sale was never consummated, and later the city of Girard commenced an appropriation action to appropriate a portion of Mosier Yard. The trial court held that the city's appropriation proceedings were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). On remand, the trial court held that it would be inappropriate to consider the railway's potential sale to Total Waste in the preemption analysis but determined that the railway's use of a portion of the appropriated land for storage caused the city's action to be preempted by the ICCTA. The appellate court affirmed, although on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city's proposed eminent-domain action against the undeveloped portion of the railway's property, which did not contain any tracks or rights-of-way and did not have any concrete projected use that would constitute rail transportation by a rail carrier, was not preempted under the ICCTA. View "Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co." on Justia Law

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These consolidated appeals stemmed from the Redland family's dispute over ranch property and operations. Two of the appeals related to real property that some of the Redland children claimed their father, Robert Redland, agreed to place in a family trust. The district court granted Robert partial summary judgment, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and statute of frauds. A bench trial was held on the remaining issues. The trial court ruled against Robert on his two sons' unjust enrichment claims for improvements they had made to the disputed trust properties and also ruled against Robert on his counterclaim against another child and his wife for a partnership interest in their cattle operation. In the remaining appeal, Robert appealed the trial court's rulings on the unjust enrichment and partnership claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed on the questions of whether the Redland children's property claims were barred by the state of limitations or statute of frauds; and (2) affirmed the district court's ruling on the unjust enrichment claims and the partnership claims. Remanded. View "Redland v. Redland" on Justia Law

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Quicken Loans, Inc., a Michigan corporation and a large national mortgage lender doing business in West Virginia, appealed an order of the circuit court denying post-trial motions for amendment of the circuit court's findings of fact and/or conclusions of law and for offset following a verdict which found it liable for common law fraud and various claims under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a subprime loan made to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court, holding (1) the elements of fraud were not met with regard to Quicken's misrepresentation of loan discount points, but the other acts of fraud were proven by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the circuit court correctly found that, given the particular facts of this case, the terms of the loan and the loan product were unconscionable; (3) the circuit court incorrectly cancelled Plaintiff's obligation to repay the loan principal; and (4) because the circuit court's order in punitive damages lacked the necessary analysis and findings, the Court was unable to conduct an adequate review of the punitive damages award. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

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EQT Production Company was the lessee of an oil and gas lease. Matthew Hamblet was the surface owner of a parcel of property included within EQT's leasehold. EQT filed a permit application with the Office of Oil and Gas of the West Virginia EPA (DEP) for a shallow well targeting a Marcellus formation. The DEP issued the permit requested by EQT. Subsequently, Hamblet filed a petition for appeal of the issuance of the well permit in the circuit court. The DEP and EQT filed motions to dismiss the petition contending that Hamblet did not have the right to appeal the issuance of the permit. The circuit court denied the motions, concluding that Hamblet had the right to appeal the permit, but submitted its ruling to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) upon consideration of the court of appeals' opinion in State ex rel. Lovejoy v. Callaghan and the relevant statutes, a surface owner is not permitted to seek judicial review of the DEP's issuance of a well work permit for a horizontal Marcellus well; and (2) given this fact, the Court had no basis to find Hamblet had a right to appeal the well work permitted issued by the DEP. View "Martin v. Hamblet" on Justia Law