Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal resulted from an action in eminent domain in which the Utah Department of Transportation sought to condemn an access point easement on property owned by FPA West Point. FPA's codefendant and lessee, Kmart Corporation, also claimed an interest in the access. Because of the different interests claimed by FPA and Kmart, FPA filed a motion asking the court to order separate just compensation determinations. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court was correct in determining that the values of respective interests in a parcel of condemned property must be individually assessed; (2) the value of respective interests may be individually assessed in either separate or consolidated proceedings; (3) accordingly, the district court has discretion to order separate proceedings in an action involving multiple interest holders in a condemned parcel of property; and (4) because it was unclear whether the district court intended that FPA's and Kmart's interests be assessed through separate or through consolidated proceedings, the case was remanded with instructions to determine whether to order separate or consolidated proceedings in this matter. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action in the district court seeking a preliminary injunction preventing Defendants, their neighbors, from crossing Plaintiff's land, or in the alternative, a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants did not have a prescriptive easement. The district court granted a prescriptive easement in Defendants' favor but limited the width of the easement to twenty feet. Defendants appealed. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Defendants' use was permissive, whether the prescriptive easement included residential and recreational uses, and the width of the prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the existence of a prescriptive easement; (2) reversed and remanded the portion of the district court's judgment concluding that the prescriptive easement included residential and recreational uses; and (3) reversed and remanded the district court's decision to limit the width of the prescriptive easement to twenty feet for the purpose of trailing cattle. View "Brown & Brown of MT, Inc. v. Raty" on Justia Law

This appeal pertained to the location of a partially-constructed horse barn in a planned unit development (PUD). Plaintiffs were the owner of the barn, the owner's contractor, and FPR Properties. After it was notified that the barn did not comply with the regulations and covenants and must be removed, FPR submitted an application to modify the conditional use permit of the PUD development to bring the location of the barn into compliance. The planning and zoning commission affirmed the code compliance specialist's determination that the barn violated zoning regulations and applicable covenants. The commission also denied FPR's request to modify the conditional use permit for the PUD. On appeal, the district affirmed the commission's rulings and dismissed FDR's takings claim without conducting a trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) affirming the commission's determination that the partially-constructed barn violated applicable zoning regulations and covenants and must be removed; (2) affirming the commission's denial of FPR's application to modify the PUD's conditional use permit; and (3) dismissing FPR's constitutional takings claim. View "Botz v. Bridger Canyon Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

After the death of the president of the original corporate developer of a residential development, a successor developer purchased the property with the intent to continue to develop it. Homeowners filed suit, alleging the successor developer's new development plan violated restrictive covenants. The court of appeals remanded on the question of whether a general plan of development, or the plat for the subdivision, gave rise to certain implied restrictive covenants. Meanwhile, the homeowners' association amended its charter and the restrictive covenants, which the homeowners challenged. The trial court granted the successor developer summary judgment on all claims in both suits. The court of appeals remanded with directions to determine whether the amendments were reasonable and whether the plat supported the existence of implied restrictive covenants. The successor developer appealed, contending that Tennessee law did not support the court of appeals' reasonableness inquiry and that the plat provided no basis for the existence of implied restrictive covenants. The Supreme Court held that the amendments were properly adopted but found that there was no basis for implied restrictive covenants arising from a general plan of development or from the plat, thus vacating the portion of the court of appeals' judgment remanding the case. View "Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the parties' contract language specifying that Seller's "sole remedy" was liquidated damages and Seller had "no further rights" against the defaulting purchaser (Buyer), trumped language in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(a) directing that statutory interest be awarded in a contract dispute. Buyer commenced this action to recover its down payment. Supreme Court rendered a judgment awarding Buyer the down payment plus statutory interest. The Appellate Division modified to vacate the award of statutory interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the contract language controlled in this instance; and (2) therefore, Buyer was not entitled to statutory pre-judgment interest. View "J. D'Addario & Co. v. Embassy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

East Midtown Plaza Housing Company, a limited-profit housing company organized under the Mitchell-Lama Law, sought to withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program and become a private cooperative apartment complex. A vote was taken on a revised privatization plan, and the proposal would have been approved if the votes were tallied using a one-vote-per-share rule, but not if counted under a one-vote-per-household formula as directed by the certificate of incorporation and City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). Following the vote, East Midtown filed a proposed second amendment stating that the plan had been adopted by the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the outstanding shares of East Midtown. The Attorney General refused to accept the amendment. East Midtown responded by commencing this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Attorney General to accept the second amendment declaring the plan effective and to direct HPD to recognize that the plan achieved the necessary two-thirds shareholder vote. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the courts below correctly held that the vote should be calculated using the one-vote-per-apartment formula, and therefore, the necessary two-thirds approval was not met. View "E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. Cuomo " on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Los Angeles County (County) and forty-seven cities (Cities) within County regarding how County calculated and imposed property tax administration fees on Cities for their share of County's costs in administering the property tax system. Cities petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandate ordering County and its auditor-controller to reimburse Cities for the amount disputed in fiscal year 2006-2007. Following a trial, the referee ruled that County's method of calculating the disputed fee was consistent with legislative intent and did not violate Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 97.75. The court of appeal reversed, relying almost exclusively on the plain meaning of section 97.75 to conclude that County's method of calculation was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that County's method of calculating property tax administration fees violated the statutory scheme. View "City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

We, the Taxpayers, an unincorporated association of individual taxpayer residents of Effingham County ("Taxpayers"), appealed the trial court's order dismissing Taxpayers's complaint against the Board of Tax Assessors of Effingham County ("Board"). In a separate case, the Board appealed the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Former OCGA 48-5B-1 became law in 2009, and was effective until January 2011. It placed a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property subject to ad valorem taxation for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and continuing through January 9, 2011, but provided an exception from the moratorium for any county which performed or had performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county in 2008 or any county which in 2009 was under contract prior to February 28, 2009, to have performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county. The Board, believing that Effingham County met the exception set forth in former OCGA 48-5B-1 (c), did not impose a moratorium on increases in assessed values in the 2009 tax year, but in fact, increased assessed values of certain property. Taxpayers, believing that the exception did not apply and that the moratorium should have been imposed, filed a complaint under OCGA 48-5-296 seeking the removal of Board members. Taxpayers amended the complaint to include the equitable relief of eliminating the 2009 assessed values and imposing instead the 2008 tax year figures; by later amendment, Taxpayers dropped the request to remove Board members, and added a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to act in accordance with Taxpayers's interpretation of OCGA 48-5B-1. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, contending that the undisputed evidence showed that the exception to the moratorium did not apply; the Board also moved for summary judgment, asserting that OCGA 48-5B-1 was unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that the undisputed facts showed that the statutory exception applied. The trial court denied both motions. The Board then filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that the Taxpayers property owners were obligated to appeal their 2009 ad valorem assessments to the county Board of Equalization, or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial court's addressing the equitable and mandamus claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in denying Taxpayers's motion, and vacated the court's decision denying the Board's motion. View "We, The Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors Effingham Cty." on Justia Law

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a jury verdict in favor of the sellers of real property in an action by the buyers to recover damages or be granted rescission of the sale contract on the ground that the sellers made misrepresentations and breached the contract and the Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act. The buyers also sought to raise the issue of mutual mistake. About a year after purchasing the property, Buyers hired a contractor to see if the garage could be enlarged. The Contractor discovered that the building permit obtained to construct the garage had not been finalized, so that it had lapsed. The permit had been issued in 2000 to construct a garage with storage space above it. In connection with the sale, Sellers completed and delivered to Buyers a property disclosure form as required by the Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act. When completing that form, Sellers answered "No" to the question: "Have any substantial additions or alterations been made without a building permit?" In 2007, Buyers filed this lawsuit against Sellers seeking damages for breach of the Disclosure Act, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. They also sought, in the alternative, to have the real estate contract rescinded. The matter was tried to a jury in 2010, on the three theories seeking damages. The jury returned a special verdict finding that Buyers had failed to prove a violation of the Disclosure Act, had failed to prove misrepresentation, and had failed to prove a breach of contract. On the second day of trial, Sellers moved to prevent Buyers from raising the issue of mutual mistake of fact, which Buyers had apparently discussed in their pretrial brief. The matter was argued, and the district court ruled that Buyers could not present evidence regarding mutual mistake because it had not been pled. On February 25, 2010, and again on March 8, 2010, Buyers moved to amend their complaint to conform to the evidence by adding a request for rescission based upon mutual mistake. On March 8, 2010, Buyers moved to have the real estate contract rescinded, and on August 30, 2010, they moved for a new trial. The district court denied those motions, and Buyers timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and the court's denial of the motion for a new trial. View "Bolognese v. Forte" on Justia Law