Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a civil action against Sportsman's Inn, Inc., a hotel and lounge, and DLM, Inc., the corporation that leased the premises to the hotel, alleging that he was shot as a result of the failure of Defendants to provide adequate security at the business. Several months later, Plaintiff learned that the property where the hotel was located was for sale, and moved for a preliminary injunction. The trial justice granted Plaintiff's motion to enjoin the sale of the property, concluding that Plaintiff had established a likelihood of success that the corporate formalities should be disregarded and that Sportsman's Inn had breached its duty of reasonable care to him. Defendants appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in finding Plaintiff had demonstrated there was a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the negligence claim and that the corporate veil should be pierced. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order granting a preliminary injunction, holding that Plaintiff did not establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying negligence claim and that a "piercing of the corporate veil" analysis was unnecessary at this stage of the litigation. View "Vasquez v. Sportsman's Inn, Inc." on Justia Law

Relators represented a putative class including all residential property owners in three Minneapolis neighborhoods. Relators challenged the assessed values that the City placed on Relators' properties and alleged that because their properties were overvalued, Relators were required to overpay property taxes in 2009 through 2011. The tax court dismissed Relators' complaint, holding (1) because Relators alleged that the City's assessment practices were illegal, Minn. Stat. 278 provided the Realtors' exclusive remedy, (2) Relators' 2008 and 2009 claims were untimely under chapter 278, and (3) Relators' 2010 claims failed because chapter 278 did not allow multiple taxpayers to file a single action concerning multiple properties. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Relators' claims based on the 2008 and 2009 tax years were untimely pursuant to chapter 278; but (2) because the plain language of chapter 278 allows multiple taxpayers to file one tax action concerning multiple properties, the tax court erred in dismissing Relators' claims based on the 2010 tax year to the extent those claims alleged a violation of Minn. Stat. 273.11. View "Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an LLC, sought an exception from the Charles County Zoning Regulation to build an office building, gun range, and driving track on a parcel of land in a rural community in the County. The property was subject to zoning restrictions prohibiting such activity except as authorized through a special exception. In deciding Petitioner's application, the Board conducted one trip to the property in question. The Board allowed representatives from the LLC as well as two citizens to attend but prohibited any other members of the public from attending and kept no transcript or other record of that which transpired. The Board then granted Petitioner's application. Various individuals filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Board improperly conducted the visit to the property in a manner that was closed to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the site visit constituted a "meeting", which was required to be open to the public; and (2) because the Board violated the open meeting provisions of the Maryland Code, the Charles County Code, and its own Rules of Procedure, the matter should be remanded for a new hearing. View "WSG Holdings, LLC v. Bowie" on Justia Law

A steel fabrication company deposited solid waste on a landowner's property, after which the landowner (Plaintiff) filed a complaint seeking damages against multiple parties (Defendants) and on multiple grounds, including a claim for an environmental legal action (ELA). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on his environmental legal action claim and sought to impose corporate liability on Defendants. Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, except for his claim of negligence. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motions and granted Defendants' motions as to all claims, leaving for trial only Plaintiff's negligence claim and the claims of potential liability against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was (1) not proper for either party on Plaintiff's ELA claim; (2) not proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's illegal dumping, fraud, nuisance, and trespass claims; (3) proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment and intentional torts claims; (4) proper for certain defendants on Plaintiff's responsible corporate officer claim but improper as to others; and (5) proper for Plaintiff on his claims against one defendant as responsible corporate officer. View "Reed v. Reid" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging, inter alia, that Liberty, a management company, was a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and was civilly liable for violating several of the FDCPA's provisions. The exemption at issue on appeal, section 1692a(6)(F)(i), provided that the Act did not apply to persons or entities "collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed... another to the extent such activity is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation." The court held that this exemption applied to Liberty, which collected unpaid assessments on behalf of a homeowners association, as long as the collection of such assessments was not central to the management of the company's fiduciary obligations. Accordingly, Liberty was not a debt collector under the Act and its actions did not violate state law. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Liberty. View "Harris, et al v. Liberty Community Mgmnt." on Justia Law

William and Carla Trotter and Kevin and Cheryl Buehner appealed a judgment which declared "Trotter Road" a public road, and that awarded Ralph and Patricia Howard damages. Since 1984, the Howards have used Trotter Road to access their farmland. In 1986 or 1987, Gene Buehner built a dam along Trotter Road because the road had frequently been washed away by high water traveling through the ravine. In the fall of 2009, the road had become increasingly narrow due to high water. The width of the road made it impossible for the Howards to access their farmland with heavy farm equipment, which had previously not been a problem. Also in the fall of 2009, the Trotters erected steel poles across Trotter Road further preventing the Howards from accessing their farmland. In 2011, the Howards sued the Trotters and Buehners seeking injunctive relief and money damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in finding Trotter Road was a public road, and in awarding the Howards damages. View "Howard v. Trotter" on Justia Law

Olin brought suit against its insurers, including American Home, regarding environmental contamination at Olin sites in the United States. On appeal, Olin challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Home. At issue was whether the $30.3 million attachment point for American Home's excess policies for the years 1966-69 and 1969-72 could be reached by the alleged property damage at Olin's Morgan Hill, California, manufacturing site. The court held that the plain language of Olin's policies with American Home required American Home to indemnify Olin for that damage. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to avail themselves under terms of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA), 15 U.S.C. 1701-20, by bringing suit for revocation of a purchase agreement they executed with defendants for a luxury condominium unit in New York City. Plaintiffs asserted that the agreement failed to comport with ILSA's disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the purchase agreement was revocable because it did not contain "a description of the lot which makes such lot clearly identifiable and which is in a form acceptable for recording" under section 1703(d)(1) of ILSA. The court held that section 1703(d)(1) required the description and not the agreement itself be "in a form acceptable for recording" and that the description at issue in this case satisfied ILSA's requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions that the district court enter judgment for defendants. View "Bacolitsas v. 86th & 3rd Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

Enviro-Chem conducted waste-handling and disposal operations at three sites north of Zionsville, Indiana, until it ceased operations in 1982, leaving considerable amounts of pollutants. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency undertook cleanup and identified potentially responsible parties (PRPs), including former owners, their corporate entities, and their insurers. A trust was established to fund cleanup and trustees sued to recover cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (CERCLA), the Indiana Environmental Legal Actions Statute (ELA), and more. Work continues at the site at issue. The district court dismissed, in part, on limitations grounds, construing the complaint as seeking contribution. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of three counts, holding that claims to recover costs incurred pursuant to the 2002 Administrative Order by Consent between the EPA and PRPs and that related claims, including the ELA claim, were not moot. The court upheld denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment on preclusion grounds. View "Bernstein v. Bankert" on Justia Law

Decedent's will divided his estate among his wife (Wife) and his sons and left to Wife all of their jointly-owned vehicles and other property. At the time of Decedent's death he and Wife owned a motor home as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. There was an outstanding purchase money security interest on the motor home, and both Decedent and Wife signed the loan document, which specifically provided that each of them was independently obligated for the full amount of the debt. Wife filed a claim against Decedent's Estate for one half the debt on the motor home. The Estate's Personal Representative denied Wife's claim. The district court (1) applied a majority common-law rule from other states providing that Decedent's estate has an equitable duty to pay its aliquot share of debts on such jointly-held property, and (2) held the equitable outcome was to allow Wife's claim against the Estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Montana law would, as a matter of equity under common law, require Decedent's Estate to pay half of the outstanding security interest in the motor home that became Wife's sole property upon Decedent's death. View "In re Estate of Afrank" on Justia Law