Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his action against the Museum for its acquisition, possession, display, and retention of a painting that had been confiscated by the Russian Bolshevik regime from plaintiff's great-grandfather in 1918. On appeal, plaintiff contended principally that the district court erred in holding that the painting was taken pursuant to a valid act of state despite factual allegations in his Amended Complaint to the contrary. The court found that it was clear that the Amended Complaint, on its face, showed that plaintiff's action was barred by the act of state doctrine. The court considered all of plaintiff's arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Konowaloff v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art" on Justia Law

A property owner sought a driveway permit from the State Department of Transportation (DOT) to connect its proposed subdivision's system of roads to a state road by which the property was accessed. Two railroad companies opposed the permit, claiming that the rail traffic at a nearby crossing, located approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the proposed driveway connection, might pose a safety hazard to future residents. Consequently, a DOT engineer denied the permit. On appeal, a DOT division engineer granted the permit request subject to the conditions that the owner make improvements to the railroad crossing and obtain the owning and operating railroads' consent to the improvements. On judicial review, the trial court ruled in favor of DOT, finding the agency acted within the scope of its powers in issuing the driveway permit subject to these conditions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conditions imposed by DOT in this case were not statutorily authorized, and therefore, DOT exceeded its authority when it issued the conditional permit. View "High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Roundup Heights, a subdivision in Laramie County, was located within one mile of the City of Cheyenne. The owners of certain lots applied for County approval of a partial vacation of the subdivision plat. The County granted the partial vacation without City approval despite the City's contention that the partial vacation required joint approval by both the City and the County. The City filed suit, seeking declaratory judgment that joint City and County approval was required for partial vacation if the affected land was within one mile of the City. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relevant statutes unambiguously do not require joint City and County approval of partial vacations if the affected property is wholly within the County. View "City of Cheyenne v. Laramie County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

This was the second appeal from a judgment of the superior court finding that Annabelle Robbins had breached implied covenants in her deed when she sold land to David and Vickie Lloyd. On appeal, Robbins' estate argued that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the six-year statute of limitations had not expired, (2) finding that the neighboring landowners never possessed or occupied the disputed land and that it misquoted the neighbor's testimony in its decision, and (3) awarding damages in the amount agreed to by the parties in a stipulated judgment because the court vacated that judgment in 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly found the statute of limitations had not expired at the time when the Lloyds filed their complaint alleging Robbins's breach; (2) the court's misstatement in its decision was harmless; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages because the Estate failed to present any evidence that the stipulated damages were manifestly unjust and should be set aside. View "Lloyd v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Policyholder obtained a title insurance policy from Insurer for a parcel of property it owned. Because an ambiguity in the legal description of the property prevented Policyholder from reselling the property, Policyholder filed an action seeking a declaration of Insurer's obligations under the policy and alleging breach of contract against Insurer. The district court held in favor of Policyholder, concluding that Insurer was liable because the title to the property was unmarketable. The court, however, limited Policyholder's recovery to the face value of the policy. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of liability but held that Policyholder was entitled to recovery in excess of the policy limit. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to Policyholder on the question of Insurer's liability for its failure to defend and indemnify Policyholder; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' award of damages to Policyholder in excess of the policy limit and remanded for reinstatement of the district court's award of damages. View "Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Tile, LLP" on Justia Law

In this dispute two companies claimed superior interests in a subdivision property. VCS, Inc. performed work on the subdivision as a general contractor and claimed a valid mechanic's lien on the property. Utah Community Bank (UCB) claimed it acquired an interest in the same property by extending a construction loan, secured by a deed of trust, to the subdivision's owner. VCS sued UCB to vindicate its allegedly superior interest in the property. UCB, in response, asserted that VCS's mechanic's lien was not valid as against UCB's interest because VCS failed to record a timely lis pendens. The district court granted summary judgment for UCB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) VCS's failure to record a timely lis pendens rendered its mechanic's lien void and unenforceable as against UCB; (2) VCS was not entitled to equitable relief under the doctrine of unjust enrichment because it failed to appropriate exhaust its legal remedies; (3) accordingly, the district court did not err in awarding attorney fees to UCB; and (4) likewise, UCB was entitled to its reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. View "VCS, Inc. v. La Salle Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

Defendants were two owners of an apartment in a condominium (the Tomchinskys) and a company the Tomchinskys hired to renovate their unit (Company). Additional defendants were the condominium, its board of managers, and the Trump Corporation (collectively, the condominium defendants). Plaintiff, an employee of Company, was allegedly injured while working in the Tomchinskys' apartment. Plaintiff sued Defendants, claiming common-law negligence and violations of N.Y. Labor Law. Several parties moved for summary judgment, including Plaintiff, who cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action alleging a violation of N.Y. Labor Law 241 (6). Supreme Court denied the motions and cross motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed in part, granting the condominium defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his cross motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in affirming Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Labor Law. View "Guryev v. Tomchinsky" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission owns and manages the Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area, 23,000 acres with multiple hardwood species and used for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed Clearwater Dam upstream from the Area and adopted the Water Control Manual, setting seasonally varying rates for release of water from the Dam. From 1993-2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into peak timber growing season. The Commission objected that deviations adversely impacted the Area, and opposed a proposal to make deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. After testing, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased temporary deviations. The Commission sued, alleging that the deviations caused sustained flooding during growing season and that the cumulative impact of the flooding caused destruction of Area timber and substantial change in the terrain, necessitating costly reclamation. The Claims Court judgment ($5,778,757) in favor of the Commission was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which held that government-induced flooding can support a taking claim only if “permanent or inevitably recurring.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable. There is no blanket temporary-flooding exception to Takings Clause jurisprudence and no reason to treat flooding differently than other government intrusions. While the public interests are important, they are not categorically different from interests at stake in other takings cases. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence of a compensable taking, as are the degree to which the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land, the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and the severity of the interference. View "AR Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States" on Justia Law