Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Dittmer appealed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) of their two lawsuits against a failed bank, the FDIC as the bank's receiver, and the successor representative to the Estate of John Peters. Barkley is a Missouri general partnership with two equal partners, John Peters and Joe Dittmer. In the first of two eventual lawsuits arising out of a 2006 loan transaction to Barkley, Dittmer, representing Joe Dittmer's half interest in Barkley, sued Premier Bank, seeking declaratory judgment that the loan should be declared void as to Dittmer and sought to enjoin the bank from selling encumbered property. The suit was filed in Missouri state court, and the primary basis for Dittmer's complaint was that Peters did not have authority from his partner, Joe Dittmer, to mortgage Barkley property for this transaction. The second suit included the same claims as the first case but included various Dittmer successors as plaintiffs, and both the FDIC and the personal representative were added as defendants. The court found that under 12 U.S.C. 1821(j), the district court correctly dismissed Dittmer's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; given the language of the Missouri Uniform Partnership Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 358.090(1), the amended partnership agreement, and the power of attorney documents, the district court correctly dismissed the claim in the second suit against the FDIC; and the court agreed with the district court that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal of the second suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dittmer Properties v. FDIC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Dennis and Evangeline Bakken appealed a judgment declaring the Bakkens no longer had an option to repurchase Pierce County property Paul and Evangeline Bakken sold to John and Bernadine Duchscher in 1991, and which the Duchschers later transferred to John Duchscher, Jr., and Ann Duchscher. Upon review of the trial court record and applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Bakkens' option to repurchase the property had expired. View "Bakken v. Duchscher" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Harald Dude secured a $1.9 million loan on his Aspen home from Washington Mutual Bank. He sought to borrow another $500,000 from Wells Fargo Bank. As part of the application process, Defendant completed a form for Wells Fargo's title insurance company, Plaintiff-Appellee Stewart Title Guaranty Company. The form required Defendant to disclose existing liens on property. Knowing that the company failed to discover the existence of the Washington Mutual loan, Defendant did not list the lien on Stewart Title's form. Wells Fargo proceeded with the second loan based on representations made on the form. Several years later, Defendant elected to sell the property. Stewart Title was contacted to provide title insurance. A second title search failed to reveal the Washington Mutual loan. The company again provided its disclosure form to Defendant who again omitted the Washington Mutual loan. At some point, Defendant stopped making payments on the Washington Mutual loan. Eventually it threatened the property's new owner with foreclosure. The new owner made a claim on her title insurance with Stewart Title. Honoring what it perceived to be its contractual obligations, Stewart Title paid Washington Mutual’s loan amount in full. Stewart Title then sued. A jury found Defendant liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. On appeal, Defendant and his company argued there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable. Finding sufficient evidence for which the jury could have found Defendant liable, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the verdict against him. View "Stewart Title v. Dude, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, prospective luxury home buyers, alleged that Toll Brothers, a real estate development company, unlawfully refused to return deposits when plaintiffs could not obtain mortgage financing. The district court denied Toll Brothers' motion to dismiss or stay the suit pending arbitration, finding that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision lacked mutuality of consideration under Maryland law because it required only the buyer - but not the seller - to submit disputes to arbitration. The court held that the appeal was properly before it under 9 U.S.C. 16(a), and that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision was unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration under Maryland law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Lamon and Lori Gentillon and Wes and Connie Gentillon (the Partnership) appealed a district court’s order granting title to all but .34 acres of a disputed parcel of land and a 30-foot easement in favor of Craig and Janice Peterson in an action to quiet title to certain portions of riparian and agricultural land in Bingham County, Idaho. In 1998, the Partnership entered into a three-party agreement in which they purchased the majority of Scott and Tracy Gentillon's farm and were to exchange three small parcels of land with Marcel and Doris Gentillon following a survey of the land. The survey was completed in 1999 and revealed boundary problems that led to further land exchanges between the Gentillons and the Partnership. In 2006, the Gentillons sold their homestead to the Petersons by a warranty deed that did not reflect the Gentillons' land exchanges with the Partnership. The Petersons then brought the action to quiet title to the property they had acquired by deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Partnership’s claim for specific performance of the 1998 Agreement and the district court’s denial of the Partnership’s resulting trust claim as to a 50-foot strip on the disputed property. The Court also reversed the district court in defining the width of the Petersons' easement. View "Peterson v. Gentillon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this case related to attorney fees incurred in litigation arising from a construction contract for a custom cabin in Island Park, Idaho. There were two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that the Maglebys were entitled to recover only $2,500 from defaulting parties by operation of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4); and (2) whether the district court erred in its decision regarding the Maglebys' entitlement to post-judgment attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) did not limit the Maglebys' fees to the $2,500 pled in their complaint even though defendants did not contest them. The Court vacated the judgments of the district court as they related to attorney fees awards in light of I.C. sec. 12-120(5) and "ITP" and "Jenks." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Magleby v. Garn" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Schultz appealed a circuit court order that denied his motion to dismiss and one that granted judgment to plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank in an action for possession of real estate. Defendant was notified that the bank would foreclose on his property in 2009. He did not act to enjoin the foreclosure. The sale took place May 2011. A month later, Defendant was served with an eviction notice. A month after the eviction, the bank filed a possessory action. Defendant moved to dismiss that action, arguing that plaintiff's possessor right was based on two prior assignments that were fatally defective "if not fraudulent." The trial court denied defendant's motion. Finding no error with the circuit court order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Schultz " on Justia Law

Petitioners Stephen Bartlett and others, appealed a superior court order that vacated a City of Manchester Zoning Board of Adjustment decision which granted intervenor Brookside Congregational Church a variance. Although petitioners asked the trial court to reverse the ZBA's decision, they appealed the court's order because it ruled that Brookside's proposed use and similar uses of its property were permitted as accessory uses under the Manchester Zoning Ordinance (ordinance) as a matter of right. Brookside cross-appealed, asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the ZBA's grant of the variance. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court order and remanded the case to the ZBA for further proceedings. View "Bartlett v. City of Manchester " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Adriana Berneike appealed the district court’s dismissal of her Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Utah Consumer Sales Protection Act (UCSPA), and breach of contract claims asserted against CitiMortgage, Inc. (Citi). In 2010, Plaintiff faxed twenty-eight different letters to Citi, her mortgage loan servicer, asserting that Citi was incorrectly billing her for overcharges and improper fees. She faxed a two more rounds of different letters, insisting Citi was overcharging her. Citi replied that Plaintiff's account was correct and that taxes and an escrow shortage caused billing fluctuation. Several months later, Plaintiff sent a third round of fort-seven different letters to Citi claiming billing errors. Altogether, Plaintiff faxed more than one hundred letters to Citi, and claimed that despite paying in full every bill she received, she continued to be overcharged and was facing foreclosure and bankruptcy. Plaintiff then filed suit in Utah state court. Among other damages, she sought $1,000 per violation of RESPA. Citi removed the case to federal court, and the court subsequently granted Citi's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Finding that the federal court did not err by dismissing Plaintiff's claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds. View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law