Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The subject property was located at 44 Lafayette Road in Saint Paul. Relators challenged the County's assessments for the assessment dates 2007, 2008, and 2009. After trial, the tax court adopted the market values proposed by the County in its post-trial brief, which were higher than the value opinions presented by either party's appraiser at trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the tax court to explain its reasoning for rejecting the appraisal testimony and to describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. On remand, the tax court again adopted market values that exceeded the parties' appraisal opinions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court failed to follow the Court's remand instructions in its calculation of parking income and expenses. Remanded for a further evidentiary hearing regarding the appropriate calculation of net parking income. View "444 Lafayette, LLC v. County of Ramsey" on Justia Law

Landowners believed they had the right to use a ten-foot wide strip of land that was used as a driveway to property owned by a Trust. The community homeowners association (Association) and six residents of the subdivision (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against the Trust and the Trust's settlor (collectively, Petitioners) seeking a declaratory judgment that the Association held fee simple title to the strip and that the Landowners' property enjoyed an easement over the strip. Petitioners responded with a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Trust held fee simple title to the strip and no easement existed in favor of any plaintiff. The circuit court concluded that the Trust held all title and interest in the strip and that the Trust's interest was subject to an easement appurtenant to the Landowners' property for the purposes of ingress and egress. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Landowners had an easement over a five-foot wide portion of the strip. View "Lindsay v. Annapolis Roads Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a deed executed in 1881 reserving the subsurface and removal rights of "one half of the minerals and petroleum oils" in the grantor included any natural gas contained within the shale formation beneath the subject land. The trial court, relying on the 1882 Supreme Court decision "Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick," (101 Pa. 36 (Pa. 1882)) and its progeny, held that because the deed reservation did not specifically reference natural gas, any natural gas found within the Marcellus Shale beneath the subject land was not intended by the executing parties to the deed to be encompassed within the reservation. The Superior Court reversed that decision and remanded the case with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing complete with expert, scientific testimony to examine whether: (1) the gas contained within the Marcellus Shale was "conventional natural gas"; (2) Marcellus shale was a "mineral"; and (3) the entity that owns the rights to the shale found beneath the property also owns the rights to the gas contained within that shale. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Superior Court erred in ordering the remand for an evidentiary hearing and reinstated the order of the trial court. View "Butler v. Charles Powers Estate" on Justia Law

After Maxine's family contributed financially to help her keep her house, Maxine transferred title of the property to the Maxine Lane Irrevocable Trust. The Trust Agreement provided that if the property was sold during Maxine's lifetime, $50,000 was to be paid to each of Maxine's brothers. Later, Maxine consented to the sale of the property, and the Trust received $176,469 in net proceeds. The Trustee indicated she was obligated to make $50,000 distributions to Maxine's brothers as stated in the Trust and then use the remaining proceeds for Maxine's support. Maxine filed a declaratory judgment action against the Trustee, asking the district court to determine whether the Trust required the sale proceeds to be used to purchase another residence for Maxine, or whether the Trust required the $50,000 distributions be made. The district court granted summary judgment to Linda, concluding that the Trust mandated the Trustee to make the distributions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded the Trust Agreement required the Trust to make the $50,000 distributions upon the sale of the property. View "Lane v. Caler" on Justia Law

The City of Baltimore initiated a condemnation action to acquire an old theater once used as a vaudeville venue. The theater's owner (Owner) contested the action, arguing that the City had no right to condemn the property. Six weeks before trial, Owner filed an emergency motion demanding a postponement and an order requiring the City to pay to move all the junk out of the theater prior to trial so the jury would not view the property in its existing condition. The trial court denied the motion and the jury viewed the theater as is. The court of special appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Owner's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Owner was not entitled to a payment in advance of trial, and Owner suffered no prejudice from the denial beyond what it brought upon itself. View "A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the City and RBIII where the City demolished a dilapidated building on property that RBIII owned. The City did not provide notice to RBIII before razing the structure and RBIII filed suit against the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims except a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim. Those claims were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of RBIII. The City then appealed. The court agreed with the City's argument on appeal that the district court's jury instructions did not accurately reflect the applicable law and that, under the correct legal standards, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. Because the court vacated the trial court's judgment against the City, the court need not consider the other issues raised in the City's appeal. View "RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, purchaser of real property, sought damages resulting from alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Plaintiff purchased property advertised as development-ready with an active waste-water permit. Plaintiff then learned that the permit had expired, but nevertheless maintained possession of the property and continued making its required financing payments. Plaintiff did not allege fraud until it defaulted on the modified promissory note - the original note having been modified after plaintiff defaulted - and faced foreclosure. The court held that plaintiff, with full knowledge of the alleged fraud, ratified the purchase and sale price of the property. Such ratification foreclosed plaintiff's right to damages, because plaintiff received the benefit of its bargain. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "R&L Investment Property, L.L.C v. Hamm, et al" on Justia Law

In 2004 Wallace financed a home purchase with a $272,315 mortgage. He took a second mortgage of $164,500 for improvements and to pay down debt. In 2006, Wallace sought a refinance loan of $422,500. Midwest obtained an appraisal from Brock, through the now-defunct Accupraise. A former Accupraise employee explained that Midwest would send a requested appraisal value and Brock would return a tailor-made appraisal, often without seeing the property. Accupraise and Brock valued Wallace’s home at $500,000. Unbeknownst to Wallace, his refinance was an adjustable-rate mortgage that allows negative amortization; he had a teaser rate of two percent that quickly multiplied. For securing a high long-term interest rate, Midwest received a premium in excess of $14,000. The loan created insurmountable financial problems for Wallace. He learned that the true 2006 value of his home was $375,000. Wallace declared bankruptcy, surrendered the home, and sued alleging that he was the victim of a fraudulent scheme violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Kentucky conspiracy law. Mediation produced a settlement, under which Wallace prevailed on a RESPA claim. The district court granted defendants partial summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed a finding that Wallace did not sufficiently demonstrate that the appraisal proximately caused his financial injuries, but otherwise affirmed. View "Wallace v. Midwest Fin. & Mortg. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for a special permit to open an adult entertainment establishment within an industrial district. By the terms of a City ordinance, adult entertainment was forbidden on sites within an industrial district. The City denied Plaintiff's application. The Zoning Board of Appeals denied Plaintiff's appeal for variances from the ordinances. At issue on appeal was whether the City's zoning ordinances violated the First Amendment by preventing Plaintiff from opening his adult entertainment establishment on land zoned industrial without providing an adequate opportunity elsewhere. The federal district court entered summary judgment for the City. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in calculating the land available to Plaintiff for adult use; and (2) the available land provided Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to open an adult business. View "Lund v. Fall River, Mass." on Justia Law

Clarinet sued Essex alleging that Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Clarinet sought payment for expenses for stabilizing and demolishing a building that it owned, in accordance with Clarinet's interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment. The insurance policy contained several conditions and exclusions, including the owned property exclusion. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet because the owned property exclusion barred coverage. View "Clarinet v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law