Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the surface owner of land in Sioux County. Plaintiff sued the owners of severed mineral interests in that land under Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes to reacquire their allegedly abandoned interests. Mineral interests are deemed abandoned unless the "record owner" has taken certain steps to publicly exercise his ownership rights during the twenty-three years preceding the surface owner's suit. This appeal involved one defendant (Defendant), who asserted that she was the "record owner" of the mineral interests through the will of Decedent. The register of deeds still listed Decedent as the owner of the disputed mineral interests. The district court vested title to the disputed mineral interests in Plaintiff, concluding that Defendant was not a "record owner" of the mineral interests because the term "record owner" under the dormant mineral statutes meant only the person listed in the register of deeds in the county where the property was located. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, for the reasons set forth in Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, the "record owner" of mineral interests includes an individual identified by probate records in the county where the interests are located. View "WTJ Skavdahl Land LLC v. Elliott " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the surface owner of various tracts of land. Plaintiff sued the owners of several mineral interests in those tracts under Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes to reacquire their allegedly abandoned interests. Mineral interests are deemed abandoned unless the "record owner" has taken certain steps to publicly exercise her ownership rights during the twenty-three years preceding the surface owner's suit. This appeal involved two Defendants. The district court vested title to the disputed mineral interests in Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the "record owner" of mineral interests includes an individual identified by probate records in the county where the interests are located and need not be determined only from the register of deeds in the county where the interests are located; and (2) an amended complaint that adds, rather than changes, a new party defendant does not relate back to the original complaint. View "Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler" on Justia Law

Respondent awarded Petitioner a contract to develop an affordable housing development project. The parties entered into a development services agreement (DSA) that contained a provision stating that the parties would proceed to arbitration under state law in the event of a dispute. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from the project. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner asserting several causes of action, including intentional misrepresentation and negligence. Petitioners counterclaimed. Petitioners later filed an arbitration motion, which the circuit granted. The intermediate court of appeals denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the order compelling arbitration in this case was sufficiently final under the collateral order doctrine to be appealable under the general civil matters appeal statute; (2) the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the DSA encompassed all claims of Respondent and counterclaims of Petitioners; and (3) the circuit court correctly granted the motion to compel alternative dispute resolution and to stay proceedings. Remanded. View "County of Hawaii v. UniDev, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a boundary line dispute between neighboring property owners in Clearwater County. Jimmy and Susan Sims brought suit against Eugene and Elda Daker, claiming a fence line between their properties constituted a boundary by agreement. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the Simses. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in determining that the fence line constituted a boundary by agreement. Upon review, the Court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the fence line constituted a boundary by agreement, and accordingly affirmed the district court's judgment quieting title in favor of the Simses. View "Sims v. Daker" on Justia Law

The underlying annexation suit was voluntarily dismissed in 2008 with certain terms and conditions imposed on plaintiff James Frisby. Plaintiff owns property in Harrison County. In 2007, he filed a Petition for Inclusion, seeking to have his property annexed by the City of Biloxi. Biloxi responded and asked the court to grant plaintiff's petition. Gulfport objected to the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the City of Biloxi. Harrison County filed an answer as an interested party and also objected. Plaintiff sought clarification of the terms set forth in the order of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case should have been dismissed as moot, because nothing remained to be decided on appeal. View "Frisby v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property that was conveyed by warranty deed to J.A. Reed. In 1968, Reed conveyed the property to Julianne Biggane, and in 2006, the Biggane Trust transferred the property to Plaintiffs. Prior to Reed's transfer of the property to Biggane, a pole line easement across the property was granted to PacifiCorp's predecessor in interest. Reed, however, signed the easement grant as president of Continental Live Stock Company, rather than in his personal capacity, at a time that the company had no interest in the underlying land. Therefore, the easement was a "wild deed." At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a "wild deed" can be the "root of title" under the Wyoming Marketable Title Act. This case arose when Plaintiffs filed an action seeking to have the easement declared invalid because it emanated from a wild deed. The district court held that the Act validated PacifiCorp's easement across Plaintiffs' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a wild deed may constitute the root of title under the Act, and a wild deed serving as a root of title that does not bear a defect "on its face" is not an "inherent defect" in the chain of record title under the Act. View "Esterholdt v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal with prejudice plaintiff's complaint seeking indemnification for property loss caused by fire under an insurance policy. At issue were two provisions in the policy: one requiring the insured to file suit on the policy within two years and the second requiring the insured, seeking replacement costs, to replace the damaged property before bringing suit, and to complete the replacement work as soon as reasonably possible. Because New York law did not clearly resolve the question of what happens to insured property that could not reasonably be replaced within two years, the court certified the question to the New York State Court of Appeals. View "Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent credit union sought to foreclose on the homestead that Appellant and her husband (Husband) owned. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellant after concluding that the mortgage Appellant signed with Respondent was void under Minn. Stat. 507.02 because it was not also signed by Husband. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the mortgage was valid because Husband had quitclaimed all of his interest in the homestead property to Appellant before the mortgage was executed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mortgage signed by Appellant in favor of Respondent was void because (1) the mortgage at issue here did not meet any of the statutory exceptions to the signature requirement in section 507.02; and (2) Husband's quitclaim deed did not constitute an explicit waiver of his rights under the homestead statute. View "Marine Credit Union v. Detlefson-Delano" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a contract to sell a shopping center. The contract was amended on several occasions. In one provision, the buyer agreed to indemnify the seller for a real estate commission, which they both disclaimed in the contract itself, that might ultimately be owed to a particular real estate broker. Another provision provided for forfeiture of the buyer's deposit if the transaction did not close on the timetable in the contract. The transaction ultimately closed after the appointed date, and the real estate broker successfully sued the seller for a commission. The buyer went bankrupt, and the seller and the assignee investors were left to sort of the consequences of the course of events. The Court of Appeals held (1) the seller here was not entitled to indemnification from the assignee investors for its liability for the broker's commission, even though the buyer (their assignor) was obligated to indemnify the seller; (2) the seller was not entitled to forfeit the deposit funded by the investors; and (3) the seller was entitled to have the investors' claim for refund of the deposit offset by the amount of indemnification that the buyer owed the seller. View "Pines Plaza Ltd. P'ship v. Berkley Trace, LLC" on Justia Law