Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified three questions regarding the operation of the State's law governing non-judicial foreclosure to the Georgia Supreme Court. After careful analysis, the Georgia Court concluded that current law did not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secure debt to hold, in addition to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. The Court also concluded that the plain language of the State statute governing notice to the debtor (OCGA 44-14-162.2), required only that the notice identify "the individual or entity [with] full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor." This construction of OCGA 44-14-162.2 rendered moot the third and final certified question. View "You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from appellee Bank of America, N.A.'s attempts to enforce the terms of the promissory note and deed to secure debt executed in its favor by appellant Johnta M. Austin ("Borrower"). The Bank sued to collect the debt it claimed the Borrower owed as a result of default, including attorney fees, and the trial court awarded the Bank summary judgment. The issue came on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court because the constitutionality of the statute at issue was called into question. The Court has long held that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an [a]ct of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and [the] Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality." The Court found that the statute in this case bore a rational relation to the purpose for which the statute was intended, namely to provide debtors with the opportunity to avoid the contractual obligation to pay the creditor’s attorney fees by allowing the debtor a last chance to pay the balance of the debt and avoid litigation. Further, the Court concluded that the application of OCGA 13-1-11 to arrive at the amount of the award of attorney fees in this case was neither punitive nor violative of Borrowers’ due process rights, nor was the award contrary to the intent of the statute. View "Austin v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

The Michigan State Real Estate Transfer Tax, MICH.COMP.LAWS 207.521, and the County Real Estate Transfer Tax, section 207.501, impose a tax when a deed or other instrument of conveyance is recorded during the transfer of real property. The tax is imposed upon “the person who is the seller or grantor.” State and county plaintiffs sought to recover transfer taxes for real property transfers recorded by Fannie Mae, a corporation chartered by Congress to “establish secondary market facilities for residential mortgages,” in order to “provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages,” and “promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation,” 12 U.S.C. 1716; Freddie Mac, also a corporation chartered by Congress for substantially the same purposes; and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, an independent federal agency, created under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. 4617, which placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorships, 12 U.S.C. 4617(a)(2). When Congress created defendants, it expressly exempted them from “all” state and local taxes except for taxes on real property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, reasoning that “transfer taxes are excise taxes, not taxes on real property. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Genesee Cty, v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

Peoples Bank loaned Debtors $214,044, secured by a mortgage recorded in 2004. In 2008, Debtors obtained a $296,000 construction loan from Banterra, secured with a second mortgage on the same property. Banterra was aware of the first mortgage, but did not know was that in 2007, Debtors obtained a second loan from Peoples, for $400,000, secured by another mortgage on a different piece of property. The 2004 Peoples mortgage contained a cross-collateralization provision, stating that “In addition to the Note, this Mortgage secures all obligations … of Grantor to Lender … now existing or hereafter arising,” and a provision that “At no time shall the principal amount of the Indebtedness secured by the Mortgage … exceed $214,044.26 … “Indebtedness” … includes all amounts that may be indirectly secured by the Cross-Collateralization provision.” In 2010 Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The balance due on Peoples 2004 loan was then $115,044.26. Debtors received permission and sold the property for $388,500.00. Out of these proceeds, Peoples claimed the balance due on the 2004 loan plus partial payment of the 2007, up to the cap. The Bankruptcy Court found in favor of Peoples. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, upholding the “plain language” of the cross-collateralization agreement. View "Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Banterra Bank" on Justia Law

Fred and Nancy Eagerton petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in their favor and against SE Property Holdings, LLC, consistent with the Court's mandate in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank," (99 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2012)). SE Property Holdings, LLC, is the successor by merger to Vision Bank. The underlying suit arose from a loan that the Eagertons personally guaranteed, secured by a mortgage on property within the Rock Creek Tennis Club in Fairhope. The bank declared the original and second loans in default and accelerated balances due under both. The bank sued the primary obligor, and the Eagertons as person guarantors on one of the original loans. The primary obligor declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The reorganization plan consolidated the two loans. The obligor eventually defaulted on the terms of the reorganization plan. The bankruptcy was dismissed, the property foreclosed, and the money obtained in the foreclosure sale was applied to the consolidated loan. The Eagertons argued that the Chapter 11 reorganization of the debts of primary obligor (the consolidation of the original loan with the second loan), created a new indebtedness not encompassed by their guaranty contracts. The Eagertons therefore argued that the creation of this new indebtedness, without their knowledge or consent, operated to discharge them from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. The bank, on the other hand, argued, among other things, that the consolidated loan was a replacement note contemplated by the guaranty contracts and that the Eagertons had waived the material-modification defense. The Supreme Court in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank" concluded that the Eagertons' guaranty contracts were unambiguous; that based on the language in the guaranty contracts the Eagertons did not intend to guarantee any indebtedness other than that indebtedness arising out of the original loan and any extensions, renewals, or replacements thereof; and that, once the Eagertons' original loan was modified pursuant to the Chapter 11 reorganization of Dotson 10s, the Eagertons were at that point discharged from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. Because the circuit court did not follow the mandate in the Court's prior decision in "Vision Bank," the Supreme Court granted the Eagertons' petition and issued the writ. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Eagerton" on Justia Law

Appellant purchased a home and fell behind on her mortgage payments. Despite the bank having agreed to postpone a foreclosure sale, it proceeded with the sale. After she threatened suit, the bank re-purchased the home and entered into settlement negotiations with appellant; the bank promised to re-convey the property to appellant so that she could proceed with a sale to a third party. The bank subsequently refused to perform and appellant sued both the bank and the bank's counsel for breach of the settlement agreement and fraudulent inducement. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the woman on her breach of contract claim, finding that a binding settlement contract had been formed between appellant and the bank. Appellant then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee sold the property and the bankruptcy estate abandoned the present state court claim, placing the remaining balance from the sale of the property into the superior court registry. The superior court held a bench trial on the remaining fraud claim and on the parties' respective damages. At the conclusion of appellant's case, the court granted a directed verdict to the bank and the bank's counsel on the fraud claim. The superior court awarded the bank the unpaid loan balance as well as the fair rental value of the property for appellant's post-foreclosure occupancy of the property, and awarded the woman lost sale damages. The superior court also awarded the parties prejudgment interest, and later awarded the bank and its counsel attorney's fees. Appellant appealed the superior court's final judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank abandoned its claim for rental damages at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's award of rental damages and any accompanying award of prejudgment interest. Because any right to recover fees for work performed on behalf of the dismissed defendants was waived, because it was error to award attorney's fees to the bank's counsel in responding to the bankruptcy petition, and because the superior court did not properly calculate attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68, the case was remanded to recalculate attorney's fees. The superior court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Taylor v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their son appealed the district court's summary judgment holding that they were not entitled under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, to an accommodation and a modification that they requested from the HOA. Plaintiffs had requested a modification to add a ramp leading to the front door of their home for use by their son, who required the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiffs also requested an accommodation to an HOA policy prohibiting the use of certain types of vehicles to allow the son to use an ATV within the community. The court vacated the district court's holding on the merits of the modification request for the wheelchair access ramp because that claim was not ripe; affirmed the district court's holding with respect to the accommodation request for permission to use an ATV because that request was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Act; and affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' request for attorneys' fees and costs. View "Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs' house was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, they sued the lender, the holder of the Deed of Trust at the time of the sale, and the successor trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Fannie Mae designation; the foreclosure sale's procedures complied with Missouri law; the district court properly ruled that plaintiffs' challenged to activities after the foreclosure sale lacked standing; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim; and the district court did not err in deciding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts that proved a duty to investigate the transaction on the part of the fiduciary trustee. View "Hallquist, et al v. United Home Loan, et al" on Justia Law

SCRG purchased a St. Croix alumina refinery in 2002. The plaintiffs (more than 500 individuals) alleged that for 30 years, the facility refined bauxite, creating mounds of the by-product, red mud. Hazardous materials, including chlorine, fluoride, TDS, aluminum, arsenic, coal dust ,and other particulates were buried in the red mud, outdoors, in open piles, as high as 120 feet and covering up to 190 acres. Friable asbestos was also present. The substances were dispersed by wind and erosion. According to the plaintiffs, SCRG purchased the site knowing about the contamination, did nothing to abate it, and allowed it to continue. The district court remanded to the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, finding that the action did not qualify as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1), because all the claims arise from an event at a single facility, with resulting injuries confined to the Virgin Islands. The Third Circuit affirmed. An event, under CAFA, encompasses a continuing tort, resulting in a regular or continuous release of hazardous chemicals, where no superseding occurrence or significant interruption breaks the chain of causation. Congress intended to allow state or territorial courts to adjudicate claims involving truly localized environmental torts with localized injuries. View "Abraham v. St Croix Renaissance Grp., LLLP" on Justia Law