Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1997, the Bellevale Respondents sold an agricultural preservation easement on their dairy farm, Bellevale Farms, to a state agency (MALPF). Twelve years later, Bellevale asked MALPF to permit it to construct a creamery operation on the farm under the terms of the easement. MALPF approved the proposal, despite challenges from owners of real property adjacent to Bellevale Farms and a community association (collectively Petitioners). Petitioners filed this action against Bellevale Farms, MALPF, and others (collectively Respondents), seeking a declaration that the creamery violated the easement and an order prohibiting the construction of the creamery. The circuit court dismissed the action, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing to enforce the easement. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the easement constituted a charitable trust, and therefore, they possessed standing as "interested persons" under Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 14-302(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the instrument creating the easement and the statutory scheme of the MALPF program through which the easement was purchased did not indicate that Respondents intended to or created a charitable trust with a charitable purpose; and (2) therefore, Petitioners did not have standing under 14-302(a) to maintain a cause of action to enforce the easement. View "Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owed the surface estate of a forty-acre tract. Defendant, the lessee of the tract's severed mineral estate, constructed a well site on Plaintiff's tract without Plaintiff's approval. Plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction requiring Defendant to remove the well, asserting that Defendant failed to accommodate his existing use of the surface so Defendant's acts exceeded its rights in the mineral estate and constituted a trespass. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the failure of Defendant's operations to accommodate Defendant's existing use would have been sufficient to support injunctive relief, Plaintiff failed to raise a material fact issue as to whether Defendant failed to accommodate his use. View "Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, the district court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff child support. In 2006, the court issued a writ of execution against Defendant's unspecified property to satisfy the child support lien. However, Defendant had conveyed the property to his girlfriend by quitclaim deed. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a second praecipe for an execution on Defendant's property, seeking an execution sale of the property that Defendant had previously owned and alleging that when the quitclaim conveyances were made, the property was subject to her lien. The court ordered the sheriff to execute on the property, and the sheriff sold the property to Plaintiff. John McWilliams challenged the sale, alleging that when the court issued the writ of execution, he was the record owner, and therefore, the court could not order the sheriff to conduct the execution sale because the property was not titled in Defendant's name. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order confirming the sale, holding that the court lacked authority to order the sheriff to levy the writ on property in which Defendant, the judgment debtor, no longer had an interest, absent any finding that Defendant's transfer of the property was fraudulent. Remanded. View "Fox v . Whitbeck" on Justia Law

Appellee sought to void or reform a deed resulting from a sale of property through Appellant's real estate company. Specifically, Appellee claimed that the deed grossly misrepresented the amount of land he contracted to buy. The deed's description called for 300 acres but showed the property was being sold by tract, not acreage. Appellee learned through other sources that the property did not consist of 300 acres. After closing, a survey showed the tract contained forty-four acres. The trial court ruled in favor of Appellants, concluding that, because Appellee was aware at the time of closing that the tract did not contain 300 acres of land, no fraud existed that warranted reforming the deed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because Appellee was aware there was a deficiency in acreage, Appellee was on notice regarding the deficiency in the property, and the common law doctrine of caveat emptor applied. View "Manning v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action alleging that he was the owner of certain mineral rights in the land previously sold to the Sabine River Authority. The court disagreed, concluding that the language used in the conveyance deeds did not demonstrate that the disputed mineral rights were transferred to plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, defendant owned the disputed mineral rights and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Temple v. McCall, et al." on Justia Law

The Town of Kearny hired Brandt-Kuybida Architects to design and plan the construction of a new public safety facility. Construction began in 1994. The general contractor, Belcor Construction, signed a "Certificate of Substantial Completion" in late 1995. Approximately ten days later, the architects signed the same Certificate. The Certificate defined the date of substantial completion in language similar to that of the construction contract. The signatories to the Certificate, however, left the "date of issuance" and the "date of completion" of the project blank. In Spring1996, the Town's Construction Official issued the first Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (TCO), limited to the police section of the building. Structural defects in the facility surfaced shortly after the Kearny Police Department took occupancy, including leaks, buckled tiles and cracks in the walls. By 2007, ceilings in the facility had fallen and pipes had separated and pulled, all of which were attributed to uneven settlement. The Town never issued a final certificate of occupancy and on February 8, 2007, had the building vacated. Belcor initiated arbitration proceedings against the Town because the Town withheld final payment under the contract. Belcor and the Town resolved their dispute by Stipulation of Settlement. Both the Stipulation of Settlement and the related Town of Kearny Resolution identified the date of substantial completion of the facility as February 1, 1996. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) when could a building be considered substantially complete for purposes of calculating the ten-year period of the statute of repose; and (2) whether the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law authorized the allocation of fault to defendants who obtained dismissals pursuant to the statute of repose. The Supreme Court concluded after review that (1) the ten year period of the statute of repose started when the first Temporary Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the facility; and (2) when the claims against a defendant are dismissed on statute of repose grounds, fault may be apportioned to the dismissed defendant under the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. View "Townof Kearny v. Brandt" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a district court's judgment to condemn an easement across the appellants' real property for an irrigation pipeline. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court's holding that there was a reasonable necessity required for condemnation of the easement in question. The Court vacated a portion of the judgment as it pertained to Defendants-Appellants Donald and Carolyn Cain's counterclaim and the award of a perpetual easement across their property, but the Court affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Telford Lands v. Cain" on Justia Law

Appellants Tommy and Erin Dorsey contended that they were conveyed beachfront property when they bought "Lot 1." Respondents, who own the other lots in the subdivision, contended that the property was dedicated to the use and benefit of the entire subdivision. The district court agreed with Respondents. Plaintiffs appealed. But after a review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Ross v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Albar, Inc. owned a convenience store, gas station and marina on the Pen Orielle River. In 2003, one of its three underground storage tanks leaked gasoline into the surrounding soil. The tanks were insured through the State's Petroleum Storage Tank Fund. Albar ultimately entered into a consent agreement with the State Department of Environmental Quality to remediate the property and any impacted adjacent properties. In 2005, Albar put the businesses up for sale. Albar made a disclosure regarding the 2003 leak, but that statement would later be found false. JLZ Enterprises was interested in purchasing the property, and relied on the false disclosure. In 2007, JLZ Enterprises sued Albar to recover damages for fraud and breach of contract; to rescind the contract; and to recover damages for negligence against the real estate agent and the broker. The matter was tried to the district court. After hearing the evidence, the court declined to rescind the real estate contract, but found that Albar had breached the contract. The court entered a judgment forclosing the deed of trust on the property and ordering its sale. Albar appealed the grant of JLZ's motion to disallow its costs and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's decision finding Albar breached the contract was supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that it was not an error for the court to disallow Albar's costs and fees. View "Echo Vanderwal v. Albar" on Justia Law

The Bank of Commerce filed suit to foreclose on two mortgages against properties under development by Jefferson Enterprises, LLC. Jefferson raised a variety of counterclaims. Ultimately the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, ordering the foreclosures. Jefferson raised numerous issues on appeal, but finding no error or abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Ent" on Justia Law