Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town after the Town declared plaintiffs' cottages to be in violation of its nuisance ordinance. The cottages were considered nuisances as a result of storm or erosion damage. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claims because plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were not violated where the Town never deprived plaintiffs of any property interest; affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claims because plaintiffs' equal protection rights were not violated where the Town had a rational basis for its decision to declare plaintiffs' cottages nuisances under the Town's ordinance; and remanded the takings claims based on the court's conclusion that a state and its political subdivisions waived the state-litigation requirement by removing a case to federal court. View "Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head" on Justia Law

Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) initiated an unlawful detainer action against Appellant, claiming ownership of Appellant's home pursuant to a trustee's deed it obtained from ReconTrust, a national bank that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in its capacity as trustee of the trust deed that Appellant had executed to secure her mortgage. After an immediate occupancy hearing, the district court entered an order of restitution requiring that Appellant vacate her home. At issue on appeal was whether ReconTrust had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale and convey Appellant's home to the FNMA where Utah Code 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 limits the power of sale to trustees who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title insurance companies with an office in Utah. The district court concluded that ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct the sale under federal law and that federal law preempted Utah law. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order of restitution, holding that the relevant Utah statutes were not preempted by federal law, and therefore, a national bank seeking to foreclose real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. Remanded. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist" on Justia Law

After Edwin and Linda divorced, Linda obtained a New Jersey judgment ordering Edwin to pay $695,477 in unpaid alimony, unpaid child support, medical expenses, and attorney fees and costs. Linda subsequently filed a motion seeking to satisfy the New Jersey judgment with Edwin's interest in a Nevada limited liability corporation (BMR) licensed to do business in Montana and with assets in Montana. A writ of execution was issued against Edwin, and thereafter, the district court issued a charging order and an order for the appointment of a receiver, for foreclosure of the lien, and for the sale of BMR's property. Edwin subsequently filed a motion for relief from the charging order and order for the appointment of the receiver foreclosure of the lien, which the district court denied after concluding that Edwin's arguments were waived because he had foregone earlier opportunities to challenge the two orders on the bases he asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwin's motion; and (2) because Edwin's appeal was vexatious and filed for the purposes of delay, costs and fees assessed should be solely levied against Edwin. Remanded. View "Jonas v. Jonas" on Justia Law

Defendant New Vornado/Saddle Brook, LLC owned a tract of land that was located in East Brunswick's HC-2 (General Highway Commercial District) zone. The property included one vacant free-standing building which New Vornado sought to convert into a gym. Because a for-profit health club was treated as a conditional use in the zone, the gym was required to comply with the relevant conditions established in the zoning ordinance, particularly that the boundary of the lot on which the gym was to be situated could not be located within 500 feet of any residence. On the other side of the street and behind other existing commercial buildings, there was a small residential neighborhood 1,200 feet away from New Vornado's property, but the edge was within 500 feet of a residence. New Vornado filed an application seeking a conditional use variance to enable it to open the gym. Plaintiff TSI East Brunswick, LLC (TSI), the owner of a health club located across the street from New Vornado's property, was the principal objector to New Vornado's application. Plaintiff filed suit to challenge the local Zoning Board's approval of New Vornado's variance. The trial court upheld the Board's decision, finding that New Vornado had met its burden of proving that its proposed plan satisfied both the positive and negative criteria and that TSI had failed to demonstrate that the Board's grant of a conditional use variance was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. TSI appealed; the Appellate Division affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division and affirmed the Zoning Board's decision. View "TSI East Brunswick, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of East Brunswick" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Western Watersheds Project (WWP) challenged a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) decision to grant a 10-year grazing permit to LHS Split Rock Ranch, LLC for four federal public land allotments in central Wyoming. WWP asserted that BLM?s decision to grant the grazing permit was arbitrary and capricious because BLM had previously concluded that past grazing was a substantial cause of serious environmental degradation on the allotments. The district court granted summary judgment to BLM. WWP appealed. Finding that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Western Watersheds Project v. BLM" on Justia Law

In 1998, Hedstrom married Kotter, a real estate agent. The marriage lasted two years, but the two were on good terms when Hedstrom died. There is no evidence that Hedstrom lacked mental capacity. In 2006 Hedstrom purchased two Chicago condominiums. Kotter acted as his real estate agent and Geldes acted as his real estate attorney. Kotter told Geldes that Hedstrom would take title in another name and that Hedstrom could not hear over a phone so she would answer questions for him. Hedstrom died in 2007. Hedstrom’s children from a prior marriage were appointed administrators. Title to one condominium vested fully in Kotter, the other was titled to the Kotter Family Trust. The administrators sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by a real estate agent and legal malpractice. Because the administrators failed to timely identify experts, the magistrate barred them from presenting expert testimony encompassing Kotter’s position as a real estate agent and Geldes’ position as an attorney. The district judge affirmed and the administrators did not appeal. The district court granted summary judgment because expert testimony was needed on the standard of care and because undisputed evidence demonstrated the units were titled in accordance with Hedstrom’s intent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ball v. Kotter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a trial court judge erred in finding that a state agency complied with the state's Real Property Acquisition Act before it moved to condemn petitioners' property. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed, the orders vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the condemnation action without prejudice. View "Lawson v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The City of Springfield passed an ordinance creating a single-parcel historic district encompassing a church owned by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield (RCB). Under the ordinance, RCB could not make any changes affecting the exterior of the church without the permission of the Springfield Historical Commission (SHC). RCB challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated RCB's rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Massachusetts Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that some of RCB's claims were not ripe for review and that its remaining claims failed as a matter of law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed RCB's unripe claims without prejudice and rejected the remaining ripe claim, holding (1) the claims that the district court found were unripe should have been dismissed without prejudice, not resolved on summary judgment; (2) those of RCB's claims which depended on the potential consequences of compliance with the ordinance were not ripe for adjudication; and (3) RCB's claim based on the enactment of the ordinance was ripe for review but failed on the merits. View "Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Appellees' (two brothers and a sister) family owned and operated a farm in Pomfret. In 2009, neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division from a decision by the Town’s zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) granting a construction permit for a planer building on farm property. They also appealed a ZBA denial of their request to enforce what they considered to be zoning violations concerning the building of a sawmill and kiln buildings on farm property. The trial court issued a written ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, concluding that the wood-processing buildings at issue did not satisfy the criteria for a permit exemption under the Pomfret zoning ordinance, but that factual issues remained as to whether they qualified as “farm structures” exempt from local zoning regulation under state law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found no basis to disturb the judgment the trial court's decision, and affirmed it. View "In re Moore Accessory Structure Permit and Use" on Justia Law

Steven Johnson appealed an order compelling discovery of his federal income tax returns, and a judgment canceling a contract for deed and dismissing his action for specific performance against Sandra Mark, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Jeanne Johnson, and Stuart Johnson and Scott Johnson. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in compelling discovery, in canceling the contract for deed, and in dismissing the action for specific performance. View "Johnson v. Mark" on Justia Law