Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Druid Ridge Cemetery Company entered into a contract to sell thirty-six acres of the approximately 200 acres it owned and were a part of its cemetery operation. The intended purchaser entered into the contract to construct residences on portions of the land immediately adjacent to Park Heights Avenue. The Dumbarton Improvement and Long Meadow Neighborhood Associations challenged the sale, claiming that the residential development violated a restrictive covenant contained in the deed conveying the cemetery property to Druid Ridge. The circuit court determined (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous, and (2) alternatively, there were radically changed circumstances in the area rendering the restrictive covenant ineffective and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was unambiguous; and (2) the nexus between the changed circumstances and the purpose of the covenant was not sufficient to render the restrictive covenant unenforceable. Remanded. View "Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co." on Justia Law

Relatives of Bradford Lund (collectively, Miller) sought the appointment of a guardian and conservator to manage Bradford's assets. Bradford, his father, and his stepfather (collectively, the Lunds) opposed the appointment. Miller's counsel subsequently served a law firm that previously represented Bradford (JS&S) with a subpoena requesting all non-privileged information relating to Bradford. JS&S mistakenly delivered the entire client file to counsel without reviewing it for privileged information. Eventually, the trial court decided to review the documents in camera before ruling on whether each document was privileged. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) before reviewing a particular document, a trial court must first determine that an in camera review is necessary to resolve the privilege claim; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by ruling that it would review all the documents to determine whether they were privileged without considering the parties' arguments regarding privilege and waiver to determine whether in camera review was warranted for particular documents before reviewing them. Remanded. View "Lund v. Myers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, sought to expand the buildings on his property and, accordingly, asked the City to rezone a portion of his property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. The City denied the request along with Plaintiff's building permits because the proposed expansion extended to a portion of Plaintiff's property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the circuit court, which included a writ of certiorari, a request for declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, a civil rights claim, and a state constitutional claim. While the suit was pending, the City partially granted Plaintiff's rezone request. The circuit court subsequently denied Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the remainder of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granting summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Parris v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, landowners, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., seeking damages from the government for its role in the design, construction, and maintenance of a portion of a highway that prevented sufficient drainage periods of heavy rainfall. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred when it declined to apply Louisiana's continuing-tort doctrine to delay commencement of the running of the FTCA's two-year limitations period. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not been aggrieved by a Louisiana continuing tort and have failed to bear their burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claim was time-barred. View "Young, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Respondents Steven and Philomena Landrigan appealed a Superior Court order finding that they unlawfully subdivided their property and granting petitioner Town of Newbury's request for injunctive relief and the imposition of a $2,000 fine. Respondents argued that the trial court erred in finding that their conduct and that of their predecessors had merged two non-conforming parcels into a single lot. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Newbury v. Landrigan" on Justia Law

Petitioners Bilden Properties, LLC and TD Bank, N.A. appealed and respondents S. Gerald and Gail Birin cross-appealed a superior court order finding, among other things, that the petitioners were bona fide purchasers for value, who acquired interests in the subject property without notice of the Birins’ mortgage on it. The Supreme Court concluded petitioners purchased the subject property subject to the Birins’ mortgage, upholding the trial court’s decision to the extent that it allowed the Birins to foreclose. To the extent that the trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Birins from foreclosing, the Court vacated that permanent injunction. Additionally, the Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that petitioners’ interests were equitably subrogated up to the amount paid to discharge the mortgages held by Southern New Hampshire Bank. View "Bilden Properties, LLC v. Birin" on Justia Law

Timothy Watts sold real property to the Marions, who financed the purchase with one loan from PrimeLending and a second loan from Watts. Watts signed a subordination agreement agreeing to subordinate his loan to the PrimeLending loan. The Marions subsequently signed a deed of trust to PrimeLending and a trust indenture in favor of Watts. The Marions defaulted on the loan originating with PrimeLending, which assigned its interest in the loan to HSBC Bank. After a trustee's sale, HSBC purchased the property. The Marions also defaulted on the loan from Watts. Claiming to be unaware of the previous HSBC trustee's sale, Watts held his own trustee sale and was purchaser of record. After discovering HSBC claimed ownership of the property, Watts filed a complaint against HSBC and other parties claiming an interest in the property, seeking to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Watts' motion for summary judgment against HSBC, finding that the Marion debt to PrimeLending was no longer in the first priority lien position because the debt had been assigned to HSBC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HSBC's deed of trust in the property was clearly entitled to priority over Watts' subordinated trust indenture. View "Watts v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Carl and Karen were married in 1993. In 1995, Karen made Carl a co-owner of certain property. In 2007, the county clerk recorded a quit claim deed transferring Carl's interest in the property back to Karen. When the parties divorced in 2009, the district court concluded that Karen was the owner of the property and that the $100,000 increase in the property's value from 1993 to 2009 was due to market force and had nothing to do with any contributions made by Carl. In 2012, Carl filed a complaint alleging that Karen fraudulently forged Carl's signature on the deed to the property and that Alta, another defendant, notarized the forged signature. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims had run. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Carl's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) erred by awarding fees and costs to Defendants. View "Kananen v. South" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Webbs, believing they held title to a quarter-acre tract of land, contended that the land was part of three parcels they acquired in 2000. The land abutted and shared its western boundary with property owned by Respondents, the Nowaks, who claimed title to the disputed land. The parties' disagreement stemmed from conflicting interpretations of a 1928 recorded deed (the Wolf deed), which described a fence in a certain location as constituting the western boundary line of the property conveyed in the deed. The Nowaks asserted that an existing fence was the same fence described in the Wolf deed. The Webbs contended that their property extended beyond the existing fence and that the existing fence did not exist in 1928. The circuit court entered judgment for the Nowaks. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower court did not clearly err in its factual determination as to the correct boundary line. View "Webb v. Nowak" on Justia Law

This case involved two potential easements across oceanfront property that provided access to two beaches. Charles Parsons once owned all of the property involved. In 1915, a plan divided the property into lots and identified several roads. One of the lots, commonly referred to as the Farm Lot, was owned by Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill, who acquired title to the lot by deed from their father. The father, in turn, inherited the property through the residuary clause of his wife Helen's will. Rose and Merrill filed a complaint asking the court for a declaratory judgment that the owners of the Farm Lot had the right to use easements over two roads based on chain of title or adverse possession. Defendants, several neighbors, filed a counterclaim asking for a declaratory judgment that Rose and Merrill did not have the right to use the easements. The court found that merger extinguished the easements and no later deed revived the easements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the easements were established through merger, Helen's codicil established easements for the benefit of the Farm Lot. Remanded for consideration of whether the easements created by the codicil still existed or were abandoned. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law