Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baldwin County Commission passed a resolution recognizing the Fair Association's planned construction of a multimillion dollar coliseum at the Association's new fairgrounds site in Baldwin County. The Commission resolved to provide long-term funding for the Fair Association for a period of 10 years, beginning in the County's 2005 fiscal year. In 2008, the County and the Fair Association entered into a real-estate sale and purchase agreement for the conveyance of the coliseum property to the County. The purchase agreement provided that the County would be "released and relieved from paying [the Fair Association]the Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), annual payment...." Following conveyance of the coliseum property, the parties entered into a lease agreement for the property. Despite the parties' agreement to discontinue the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair Association, the County made two additional payments in 2009 and in 2010. Each additional payment was presented to the County Commission as part of the "County Commission Accounts Payable Payments" and approved by the Commission along with payments to other vendors. The County asserted the two payments were made by mistake and sued the Association to recover the payments. After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the Fair Association's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. The County appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Baldwin County v. Baldwin County Cattle & Fair Association, Inc. " on Justia Law

Thoroughbred Associates drilled a gas well (Well) in Comanche County. Thoroughbred subsequently acquired leases of land near the Well and created a unit called the Thoroughbred-Rietzke Unit (Rietzke Unit). Defendants became successors-in-interest to a lease (OXY Lease) Thoroughbred entered into for oil and gas underlying a tract near the Well. The parties disagreed, however, about whether the Well was draining the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred stopped submitting royalty payments to Defendants accruing from the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred subsequently filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that it had been mistaken when it included the OXY Lease in the Rietzke Unit. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court concluded (1) Defendants failed to prove that any drainage of the leased lands occurred; and (2) the Lease was properly included in the Rietzke Unit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendants failed to prove their drainage claim; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously granted summary judgment to Defendants on their claim that the Lease should be included in the Rietzke Unit. View "Thoroughbred Assocs., LLC v. Kansas City Royalty Co., LLC " on Justia Law

G&M filed suit against BP, asserting that it was a co-owner of both the pumping station and the land on which it sits and seeking an accounting for all revenue and profit that BP made from the pumping station. The district court granted summary judgment for BP where BP contended that the St. Julien Doctrine prescribed G&M's claim and contested G&M's assertion of co-ownership. The court concluded that the St. Julien Doctrine did not apply in this case where the bare existence of the pumping station did not demonstrate G&M's consent or acquiescence to a servitude. Nor could G&M's inaction in the expropriation action serve as the basis for finding this final element of the St. Julien Doctrine. Because G&M never acquired an ownership interest in the pumping station, the resolution of this issue turned on whether those profits were the "civil fruits" of the co-owned Tract. The district court reversed and remanded to the district court to further consider whether the profits were civil fruits of the Tract and, if so, whether G&M was therefore entitled to an accounting. View "Gulf and Miss. River Transp. Co., Ltd. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were tenants in apartment complexes owned or managed by the corporate defendants. Plaintiffs' leases included a provision providing that, if attorneys' service were required due to the tenant's failure to pay rent, then the tenant must pay $400 in attorneys' fees if a court appearance was required and $200 if the matter was resolved without a court appearance. The tenant was also required to pay actual attorneys' fees in excess of $400. Eviction actions were brought against each plaintiff for the non-payment of rent. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the corporate defendants and the individual defendant alleging violations of the Anti-Eviction Act, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and negligence. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was the sufficiency of plaintiffs' pleading as it related to claims against corporate and individual defendants for consumer fraud and negligence based on lease provisions that imposed fixed attorneys’ fees on tenants that were unrelated to in-house counsel’s actual fee to evict. Applying the indulgent standard used to review motions for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e), the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action against the corporate defendants for consumer fraud and negligence. Plaintiffs have not, however, alleged sufficient facts to support a consumer fraud or negligence claim against the individual defendant. View "Green v. Morgan Properties" on Justia Law

In 1997, Plaintiff purchased a historical building that was the largest apartment house between St. Paul and Spokane when it was built in 1916. In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against various defendants, including the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). ARCO purchased a copper mining company (ACM) in 1977, including all of ACM's liabilities. These liabilities included claims for property damage caused by mining-related surface subsidence. Plaintiffs alleged that mining-related subsidence had caused the current damage to the building. A jury found in favor of ARCO. Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law, as ARCO produced sufficient evidence to cast doubt in a juror's mind as to whether mining-related subsidence actually caused the damage alleged by Plaintiffs; and (2) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, as substantial credible evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Barile v. Butte High Sch." on Justia Law

Mortgage-backed securities, known as the MASTR Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, were offered to the public in 2007. UBS, the sponsor of the Certificates, purchased the underlying loans from originators, including Countrywide Home Loans and IndyMac Bank, then sold the loans to MASTR, which placed the loans into the MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust, the issuer of the Certificates. UBS Securities, the underwriter, sold the Certificates to investors. The Certificates were issued pursuant to a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form S-3 Registration Statement filed in 2005 and an SEC Form 424B5 Prospectus Supplement filed in 2007. Those documents assured investors that the underlying loans were originated pursuant to particular underwriting policies and in compliance with federal and state laws and regulations. The district court dismissed a purported class action by investors, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77, for failure to plead compliance with the one-year statute of limitations and dismissed an amended complaint as untimely under an inquiry notice standard. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a Securities Act plaintiff need not plead compliance with Section 13 and that Section 13 establishes a discovery standard for evaluating the timeliness of Securities Act claims, but the claims were, nonetheless, untimely. View "Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Cecil W. Scott, executed two deeds (the 1996 Deeds) conveying two real properties he owned to his brother Roland fourteen years prior to being adjudicated a disabled person. Subsequently, one of Cecil's sisters filed a complaint on behalf of Cecil seeking to set aside the 1996 conveyances. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Cecil lacked capacity when he executed the 1996 Deeds or that the 1996 Deeds were the product of undue influence by Roland. Accordingly, the court recommended that plaintiff's complaint be denied. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's eviction action on account of her lawyer's failure to attend a scheduled status conference can withstand a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) given the facts of this case. After careful review of those facts, the Supreme Court concluded that it could not and reversed. View "Ying v. Heide" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated two cases for the purposes of this opinion. Each of the plaintiffs in these cases attended a foreclosure auction, was the successful bidder at that auction, paid money for the auctioned property, and received a foreclosure deed to the property. Each plaintiff brought an ejectment action under Alabama law, claiming good title to the property at issue and the right to eject the original debtor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over these cases, including any issue as to the validity in fact of the plaintiffs' title to the property (this being one of the elements of proof required in an ejectment action). The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in the "Strudivant" case, but affirmed in the "Harris" case. View "Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law