Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After years of negotiation and lawsuits, Snohomish County agreed to let King County build a sewage treatment plant in south Snohomish County. As part of the settlement, King County agreed to provide a substantial mitigation package for the local Snohomish County community near the plant. The cost of the mitigation was included in the capital cost of the plant. Two local utility districts that contract with King County for sewage treatment filed suit, arguing that the mitigation package was excessive, among many other claims. The trial judge largely rejected the districts' claims. After careful consideration of the record, the Supreme Court largely affirmed. View "Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King County" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Kenneth and Shelley Burek, alleging that the Bureks had defaulted on a promissory note held by Wells Fargo, thus breaching a condition of a corresponding mortgage held by the bank. During trial, the superior court admitted into evidence the promissory note, mortgage, and loan modification agreement between the Bureks and Wells Fargo proffered by Wells Fargo in addition to other documents. The trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure for Wells Fargo, concluding that the bank failed to prove it was a holder of the note but that it was entitled to enforce the note as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the superior court's conclusion that Wells Fargo certified its proof of ownership of the mortgage note for purposes of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6321 by demonstrating that it was a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 11, 3-1301. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burek" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two uncles each owned as tenants in common an undivided one-third interest in two tracts of farmland. Both of Appellant's uncles separately sold their interest in the property to Appellee. Appellee subsequently sold one of the farms. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a partition of the lands and damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a tenant in common, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices. Appellant claimed that Appellee prevented a family partnership from entering into seven-year renewal leases with farmers who leased the farmland and prevented the partnership from implementing a long-term plan for improving the farms. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Appellee's favor and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's three claims, as Appellant failed to meet proof with proof that she sustained any damages as a result of Appellee's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, alleged tortious interference, and alleged deceptive trade practice. View "Skalla v. Canepari" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition in the bankruptcy court identifying his interest in his primary residence located in Maryland. On appeal, debtor and his spouse argued that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to strip off a lien on the ground that the spouse's property interest was not part of the bankruptcy estate. The lien was against the property that debtor owned with his non-debtor spouse as tenants by the entireties. The court concluded that the statutory provisions authorizing a strip off, and applicable Maryland property law, did not permit a bankruptcy court to alter a non-debtor's interest in property held in a tenancy by the entirety. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that it lacked authority to strip off debtor's valueless lien because only debtor's interest in the estate, rather than the complete entireties estate, was before the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alvarez v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Schuchmans purchased homeowner’s insurance from State Auto to insure a residence in Junction City, Illinois. About 10 years later, a fire severely damaged the insured house and the Schuchmans made a claim against the homeowner’s policy. After a lengthy investigation, State Auto denied the claim on the basis that the Schuchmans were not residing on the “residence premises,” as that term is defined by the policy, and were maintaining a residence other than at the “residence premises,” in violation of the policy’s Special Provisions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of State Auto. The Seventh Circuit reversed, agreeing that the term “residence premises” is ambiguous and should be liberally construed in favor of coverage. View "Schuchman v. State Auto Prop. & Cas.Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Bank and Lumber Company had business and financial relationships with Sawmill. A few years into its operation, Sawmill began experiencing serious financial difficulties. Sawmill defaulted on approximately $1.4 million in loan obligations to Bank and owed Lumber Company approximately $900,000. Proceedings were initiated in bankruptcy court and district court. While the cases were pending, Sawmill was destroyed by fire. Bank recovered approximately $980,000 from Sawmill's insurance proceeds. In a subsequent case between Bank and Lumber Company, the jury determined that neither Bank nor Lumber Company was entitled to recover damages from the other. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a particular letter written by the Bank president. View "H.E. Simpson Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Bank of Mont." on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved tax assessments for Petitioner's property. In the first appeal, Petitioner challenged the 2010 tax assessment to his property. The Board of Review and Equalization determined that Petitioner's appeal was not timely filed, and the circuit court affirmed. In the second appeal, Petitioner sought to adjust the 2011 assessment of his property, asserting that the Assessor erred in using a cost approach analysis to determine the value of the property to be $7.5 million. The Board ordered that the assessed value be reduced to approximately $6.5 million. The circuit court affirmed the Board's reduction in value. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's orders pertaining to both the 2010 and 2011 assessments, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding that Petitioner's appeal of the 2010 tax assessment was untimely; and (2) the Board abused its discretion in utilizing a hybrid income approach to adjust the 2011 assessment, and because Petitioner failed to establish that the Assessor's cost approach assessment was erroneous, the 2011 tax assessment for the property should be adjusted to reflect the Assessor's initial cost approach assessment value. View "Lee Trace LLC v. Raynes" on Justia Law

Respondents, owners of coal-bearing properties in Taylor County, challenged tax assessments on their properties during the 2010 tax year. The County Assessor challenged the State Tax Commissioner's appraisals of Respondents' property in hearings before the Board of Equalization and Review after she had previously accepted those appraisals. The Board of Equalization and Review accepted the Assessor's proposed changes and changed the valuations of Respondents' properties, thus increasing the natural resources property tax owed by Respondents. The circuit court reversed the Board's valuation changes, finding that the Assessor violated W. Va. Code 11-1C-10(g) by challenging the Commissioner's appraisals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 11-1C-10(g), upon receiving the appraisal of natural resources property from the Commission, a county assessor may either accept or reject that proposal; (2) if the assessor rejects the appraisal, the assessor must show just cause for doing so; and (3) if the assessor accepts the appraisal, the assessor is foreclosed from later challenging the appraisal. View "Collett v. Eastern Royalty, LLC" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers. View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law

Substitute trustees initiated a foreclosure action against defaulting borrowers. The foreclosure sale was announced in a newspaper advertisement stating that if the purchaser failed to settle within ten days of the ratification, the purchaser would pay attorney fees of $750. Appellant subsequently purchased the property. Prior to any ratification by the circuit court of the foreclosure sale, the administrative judge for the circuit court issued a notice stating that because the $750 included in the advertisement was an impermissible fee under Maddox v. Cohn, the sale was invalid. A hearing judge deferred to the administrative judge's opinion and entered an order vacating the sale and ordering a resale. The Court of Appeals reversed the order vacating the foreclosure sale, holding (1) the hearing judge abused her discretion in yielding deference to the administrative judge's view of the matter; (2) the screening procedures utilized by the circuit court, pursuant to Md. Rule 14-207.1, were permissible in this case; and (3) Maddox was inapposite to this case because the fee here was contemplated by a Maryland rule. Remanded. View "101 Geneva LLC v. Wynn" on Justia Law